Finland wakes up to the Holocaust

[Seppo Jyrkinen]

When did Finish government realize what was happening in Nazi-Germany? I don't mean single pieces of information but understanding. A black on white answer is unknown, but by examining actions of Finnish authorities you can make a conclusion, that this happened during the end part of November 1942.

a) Sending refugees to safe Sweden

Finnish Social Democratic Party's members visited Foreign Office 17. November 1942 and made a proposal of sending Jewish refugees to Sweden. Minister Witting accepted this and very soon also interior minister Horelli, who send him a refugee list with 151 names.

Ambassador Wasastjerna in Stockholm started actions and prime minister Hanson, Swedish Red Cross and chief manager Höijer became informed. Swedish foreign minister Günther didn't like the idea. Neither did prime minister Hanson, who made end with this proposal by sending a courier message to Finland, in which he wrote: "Finland should show her sovereignty to western powers by protecting at least so far those refugees."

What Finns exactly propounded, is unknown, but Hanson's creepy answer "by protecting at least so far" tells, that behind Finnish governments action had been a threat towards refugees.

About same time (26. November 1942) SS-men in Norway arrested Jewish women and children. Thousands of people escaped to Sweden, some 900 Jews among them.

b) Would Sweden help if Jews would ask it?

Hanson's answer had closed the official way but this didn't stop Finns. Valpo's senior officer Viherluoto called to Isaac Pergament, who was a well known person in Jewish society. They had a meeting in Valpo's office and Viherluoto asked Pergament to go to Sweden.

Pergament traveled to Stockholm immediately and met there Mosaiska församlingen's members. He asked about possibility to get refugees to Sweden. He also told about a possibility that Germans might demand Jewish refugees to be send to Germany. Chairman Josefson took contact to social minister Möller but got a negative answer and so was it also with foreign minister Günther.

US ambassador Schoenfeld wrote in he's message: "Chairman of Finnish Jews Society had been in Stockholm some time ago by trying to negotiate of getting refugees to Sweden, but he had met problems."

Pergament's timetable has been really tight. Hanson's answer had a date 4. December 1942 and Schoenfeld's message 11. December. This leaves a very narrow time slot to Pergament, about 5.-9. December. And Finland's Independence Day was on Sunday 6. December.

During this time slot:
- Finnish authorities had got Hanson's message,
- developed a plan B (Jews helps Jews), and
- somebody had ordered Viherluoto to work (Anthoni or higher in hierarchy).
Pergament had
- met Viherluoto in Valpo's office and
- traveled to Sweden.
Pergmanet had got or acquired by himself some papers like
- permission to leave the country,
- visa or some kind of authorization, and
- tickets (for Aero ?).
In Stockholm he had
- met chairman Josefson, who
- had been in contact with social minister Möller. And somebody (Josefson?) had told this matter also to foreign minister Günther.

To get Pergament to Sweden, Finnish authorities have been in a real hurry even if Pergament had had some requisites in he's pocket already when he met Viherluoto. Very interesting is also to notice, that Horelli and Anthoni were active to get Jews to safe Sweden. Same men didn't worry about destiny of 8 Jews whom they had send to Germany just a few weeks earlier, 6. November.

c) Sending political POWs to Germany

July-August 1941 Colonel Rautsuo in Finnish army's HQ told to he's staff that Finland and Germany will change prisoners. All political commissars and other political POWs would be send to Germany. A year later, at autumn 1942, altogether 16.000 Russian prisoners had enrolled to cooperate either with Finland or Germany. HQ's intelligence department selected men to be send; Abwehr had an interest to POWs who were willing to cooperate.

POWs were send to Germany at approximately 60 men groups, approximately once a month. Last such a group, 50 men, was send 22. September 1942. During 11 months 520 POWs had gone to Germany, and after that, during two years, only 4 POWs.



In he's article Jukka Lindstedt wonders why this process ended so suddenly. Only a part of political POWs were send. He hadn't found out an explicit reason.

d) Questions

Refugees. Why:
1. Finns had it so important to get refugees to Sweden,
2. Pergament told in Stockholm about a threat,
3. Hanson's answer was so creepy, and
4. Horelli's and Anthoni's opinions had changed?

Finnish army. Why
5. sending of political POWs got a sudden end?

All those 5 points gets an explanation if Finns, in the end of November 1942, realize what was happening in Nazi-Germany.

[siwiec]

To get Pergament to Sweden, Finnish authorities have been in a real hurry even if Pergament had had some requisites in he's pocket already when he met Viherluoto. Very interesting is also to notice, that Horelli and Anthoni were active to get Jews to safe Sweden. Same men didn't worry about destiny of 8 Jews whom they had send to Germany just a few weeks earlier, 6. November.

This same Viherluoto was in Estonia more than a year earlier witnessing German policy against Jews. Viherluoto wrote in his report for example, that

"Because I did not see a single Jew in Tallinn, I asked the gentlemen
of the Sicherheitspolizei, where all the Jews had vanished from
Tallinn. They told me, that the Jews are allowed to sojourn only in
the inland, 15 kilometers from the coast. When I had heard from my
Estonian guide, that the Jews had been placed in concentration camps,
I asked the matter also from a couple of officials of the political
police, a.o. from Mikson. They explained that there were practically
no Jews in Estonia any more. Only a group of younger Jewish women and
children is closed in a concentration camp situated in Arkna. All the
male Jews have been shot. After the conquest of Tarto 2600 Jews and
communists were shot. In Tarto a great number of even very small
Jewish children starved to death.

A couple of days before my return to Finland Mikson told me that the
next day they would bring several tens of elderly Jewish women to the
central prison on Tallinn and another official who was there, said
that they will be given "sweet food". Both of them explained that such
Jewish old women had nothing to do in the world any more. They did not
tell me more precisely what they meant by "sweed food", but I think
that those Jews were shot a couple of days later. Mikson namely told
me that on the same morning when I last time visited the central
prison, they had taken 80 Jews on trucks to the woods, made them to
kneal on the edge of a pit and shot them from back."
[--]
"Once Hauptsturmfuhrer Eggers inquired me how many Jews there were in
Finland. I said that there are almost 2000 of those. To this Eggers
said:"So few! Are they still alive?" To this hurried to answer one
Obersturmfuhrer who was on the spot:"Not anyway a long time."

http://www.nizkor.org/ftp.cgi/people/v/ ... erluoto.01

Report gives one relatively clear picture of what was the policy at least in Estonia. Whether Viherluoto or his superiors sent information forward to goverment, is of course an open question. I would say it is safe to assume that at least minister of home affairs, Toivo Horelli, knew what was going on.

[Seppo Jyrkinen]

This is - today as well as 70 years ago - normal question of contradictory information. What information is more reliable than an another?

When holocaust is context, credibility threshold is really high. When somebody claimed that Germans are killing Jews, he surely got a counter question: "Why Germans would do so, what would be the motive?"

During WWI there had also been claims that Germans were brutal against civilians, but those had been enemy propaganda. Holocaust was much more brutal.

1. Germans and Jews in Finland

Finnish army Jews and Germans had met each others at river Svir same time 1941 when Viherluoto visited Estonia. Behavior had been quite correct on both sides and even friendly relations was found out. As a matter of fact, Germans had more contacts with Jews than other Finns, because Yiddish is near German language.

A Jewish officer Leo Jakobson had served in Finnish Army HQ since Spring 1942 and he had met high-ranking German officers daily. Germans didn't protest this, not even hard class Nazis like Himmler or Dietl (don't know if Jakobson ever met them face-to-face).

Perhaps the most negative matter in Finland during the whole war happened 1942 in North, where some 40 Jewish refugees were working with Finns near Germans and those asked Finns to remove Jews somewhere else. Himmler's question to Rangell obviously didn't wake up any fear with Finns.

2. Reliability Germans vs Estonians

When red army left Estonia, all men in working age had to go with. There was not much policemen left when Germans arrived. So they took about one hundred young men to serve as policemen - without a qualified education. Gestapo's men themselves also kept distance to Estonians.

Germans, who in the eyas of Finns, were professional policemen, told that Jews had been moved to inland. Estonians told that they had been killed. Reliability of young Estonians went down also when they pronounced anti-Semitic Nazi-propaganda to Viherluoto.

Which one to believe? You don't exaggerate much if you say professional policeman vs eager schoolboys. - What we know today, is naturally quite different.

3. Report as evidence of holocaust

Those who saw this report, must have been wondering what had really happened in Estonia. Report tells about local cruelties but it was not possible to make a conclusion that killing was systematic and happened in everywhere. There is distance to the nature of holocaust. Report gave a hint, but alone didn't prove what was going on. Cruelties in a war are nothing new.

After initials Anthoni and 4 other person has seen the report but Anthoni has denied this. There is anyhow a problem with reliability of this report. The only complete copy which exists, has been made 1947 by red Valpo. Anthoni had divorced already 1944. So how is possible that he's initials are with the report? And if the page with initials is original, why the original report itself has been replaced with an another?

4. A reliable source ?

The sudden intensity of Finns at November 1942 gives reason to believe that something happened. Some Finns (social democrats, Ryti, Mannerheim, Erkko) had channels to west which leaves door open to reliable information. Or the criticism against Anthoni, who himself had ordered to collect all writings against him, had been shaken Finns. (Btw, does those maps exists?)

Swedish authorities told about killings 8. December 1942, Edens radio speech was 17. December. Finns had started to hurry several weeks earlier.

Change happened not only with Jews but also with political commissars, which were not popular at all in the eyes of Finns. Common with them was, that they were in danger in the hands of Nazis. And on a list of 150 refugees there was also 4 non-Jewish refugees.

[siwiec]

Report gave a hint, but alone didn't prove what was going on.

Connect that first hand information to what you may find said in foreign newspapers, it would have not been that much hard to connect the dots. If you wanted, that is. It may of course be the case that Finns did not want to know about the fate of the Jews, but many stories like this were already available even before Viherluoto made his visit to Estonia:

http://www.jta.org/1941/08/12/archive/n ... own-graves

Germans, who in the eyas of Finns, were professional policemen, told that Jews had been moved to inland. Estonians told that they had been killed.

Unless you think Eggers was Estonian, Germans told a bit more than that:

"Once Hauptsturmfuhrer Eggers inquired me how many Jews there were in
Finland. I said that there are almost 2000 of those. To this Eggers
said:"So few! Are they still alive?" To this hurried to answer one
Obersturmfuhrer who was on the spot:"Not anyway a long time."

Reliability of young Estonians went down also when they pronounced anti-Semitic Nazi-propaganda to Viherluoto.

Which part of the report made by Viherluoto supports your conclusion about the lack of credibility of Estonians in the eyes of Viherluoto?

Which one to believe? You don't exaggerate much if you say professional policeman vs eager schoolboys. - What we know today, is naturally quite different.

You are now calling professional policeman Mikson a schoolboy*, Mikson who had already seven years of experience at the service of Estonian State Police. And again, nothing in the report itself indicates Viherluoto shared your view.

http://www.spordiinfo.ee/esbl/biograafia/Evald_Mikson

* Mikson was, by the way, two months older than Martin Sandberger, commander of the Sicherheitspolizei and SD in Estonia.

[siwiec]

The Finns were perhaps not kept that much in the dark concerning German policies as mr. Jyrkinen would like us to believe. In his licenciate thesis Miika Kallatsa writes (pages 12-13) that German general Heunert gave information about the so called Hungerplan:

"At the end of November 1941 it was reported from Northern-Finland to the chief of general staff at the hq of the Finnish army, lieutenant general Hanell, that German lieutenant general Heunert had presented views concerning the population situation at the German occupied areas. Heunert anticipated that out of 70 million people living at the occupied areas "a notable part will die of hunger" during the winter. According to Heunert it had been estimated in German military circles in Norway already during the spring 1941 that 25-30 million would die of hunger. Heunert did not seem to consider this figure as very high. Germany needed workers, but it could not nourish all the people under its rule during the winter."

According to Kallatsa, Mannerheim estimated already at the end of 1941, that Germany had weakened its chances to victory by its unsuccesful nationalities policy and ruined its reputation in the eyes of Russians and minority nationalities. It is not that far fetched conclusion, as Kallatsa suggests, that Mannerheim realized already in 1941 that racial policy was one of the guiding principles of German military leadership.

Kallatsa also quotes Hannu Rautkallio, according to whom "news about the coming fate of the Jews reached Finland already at the begin of the Eastern campaign".

Miika Kallatsa: Suomen Saksalle luovuttamat sotavangit jatkosodan aikana. University of Tampere, 2009. Online: http://tutkielmat.uta.fi/pdf/lisuri00102.pdf

[David Thompson]

We have a pre-existing, nine-page long open thread on Finnish leaders' knowledge of the war crimes plans of Germany for the occupied USSR at http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=6&t=65867, so please, interested readers, discuss that aspect of the subject there.

[Seppo Jyrkinen]

To get information and understand information are different things (5 steps below is my version, more common is 4):
1. You'll get the information,
2. You'll believe it's true,
3. You'll understand what it means,
4. You'll consider alternatives, and
5. You'll react.

Perhaps 6 person were familiar with Viherluoto's report; matter of Jews was only a part of it. It didn't generate any reactions 1941 so it hardly was a wake up. - Such small pieces information were several others.

On the other hand it is naturally possible that 1942, when Anthoni had ordered to collect all critique, somebody made a larger analyze and included Viherluoto's report there. And got a better picture. But this is only a possibility. I don't even know if those maps still exists.

Similar situation was in the USA with 9/11 terrorist hit. If American authorities had had all information in one point, somebody might have understand what is to come. Small pieces together makes a map but before that somebody must understand to make it.

Messages between Anthoni and Sandberger at December 1942 makes an impression that the nature of holocaust was still unclear at least to Anthoni. Or he wasn't able to admit that.

Open is still the question, what was the thing which woke Finns up?

[Seppo Koivisto]

Finnish decisions seem to coincide also with the Riegner Telegram of August 1942. I wonder if it became known to the Finnish government e.g. through the Jewish society in Finland.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Jewi ... r_Telegram

[Seppo Jyrkinen]

Very interesting information indeed.

Riegner's message 8. August 1942 was not taken seriously instantly, but 17. December 1942 "British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, has told the House of Commons about mass executions of Jews by Germans in occupied Europe." http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/date ... 547151.stm

Western Allie's opinion about what was happening in Germany changed during that period and so did it changed also in Finland. Same thing at same time. Very possible that there had been a connection.

Finnish authorities had three excellent channels to West.

1) President Risto Ryti had been a director of National Bank in Finland and Mr. Charles Hambro had been in a same position in Great Britain. After Turtola Ryti had "excellent relations with the leaders of the Bank of England"; KCVO. During Interim Peace 1940 Hambro visited Finland and met president Ryti. Hambro was already working for SOE, Scandinavian operations.

Jakobson writes that there was a Jewish Hambro family in British Banking World. - Does anybody know if Air Commodore Sir Charles Jocelyn Hambro was a Jew? If he was, then Ryti had direct and private channel to a reliable person, whom Jewish matters were important and who was able to keep contacts to Ryti during the war.

2) The other channel to "West" was Finland's Social Democrat Party's connections to Swedish Social Democrats. Border between Finland and Sweden was lower than between most other countries. Swedish companies had a lot of economic contacts to Germany and businessmen traveled between those countries. Hermann Göring was popular in Sweden and was also known as a great Friend of Sweden.

To this direction points also some facts.
- In the end October Fagerholm had threatened to resign government if Horelli would send 8 Jewish refugees to Germany. He's text was strong, so it is possible that there had been a real reason to be abrupt.
- Also the start of the process in Finland was found out after two important Social Democrats had visited Witting's office with a proposal to send Jewish refugees to Sweden.

3) Third channel was Mannerheim, who had friends all over the Europa, white emigrants and members of Royal families.

[Seppo Jyrkinen]

A Finnish second lieutenant P.G.Schütt, who was a (young ?) contact officer in SS-division Nord, had heard from Germans that until the end of November 1941, 80.000 Jews had been shot in Kiev. Local citizens had been taking care of those shootings when Germans were only supervising massacres.

He made a report to colonel Willamo 22.10.1942. Date fits to other information. Unknown is, when did he heard about this matter and how reliable was he's source.

I don't know if Willamo took this report seriously or did he put this report into the class "Bullshit Broadcasting Company's" news. Swaggering was not unknown matter during the war.

On the other hand, Germans had very harsh discipline to their own soldiers too. If a man in a penalty battalion took three steps out of formation, this was taken as a trial to escape and a man was shoot.