Scott Smith wrote:The Geneva convention, like all treaties, is nothing more than an international agreement.
International law, unlike national law, is made up of such agreements and of customs observed by a majority of nations over a given period of time. These agreements and customs have the force of law, and their breach is a violation of law subject to sanctions.
Scott Smith wrote:Treaties are based first of all on mutual self-interest and reciprocation; and secondly, upon trust, i.e., that the interests of a long tradition of friendship outweigh any disadvantages of an agreement in the interests of peace and ending continued conflict or potential conflict.
How about showing us, on hand of the texts of the respective instruments, to what extent the signatory’s obligations under the Hague and Geneva Conventions depend on reciprocity, instead of throwing your unsupported wisdom around? You may find the former under this link:
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lawofwar/hague04.htm
and the latter under this one:
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lawofwar/geneva02.htm
Scott Smith wrote:Simply put, the Germans mostly upheld the Geneva convention with their Western enemies because they mostly upheld these agreements with the Germans.
I presume Smith can show us some kind of evidence – a memorandum, or something of the sort – from which it becomes apparent that reciprocity was the reason for the Nazis adhering to the Geneva Convention in regard to the Western Allies. Or is the above just his irrelevant personal opinion?
Scott Smith wrote:This was not the case with the Soviets who did not sign the Geneva convention before the war,
So what? As I explained, the rules of the Hague and Geneva Conventions had become customary international law by the end of the 1930s, according to contemporary prevailing legal opinion. This meant that a belligerent’s obligations to abide by them were not dependent on his or his opponent’s having expressly adhered to either of these conventions.
Scott Smith wrote:and neither side tried to fight under those rules.
So often has Smith been told about the Soviet offer to the German Reich to keep the Hague Rules of Land Warfare on a mutual basis and the Soviet directive on the treatment of POWs dated 1 July 1941, which largely corresponded with the fundamental principles of international law, that the above statement can be called a plain and simple
lie.
Scott Smith wrote:After the first German reversals, when the SS wanted Russian POWs for labor in the winter of 1941-42 as the Germany economy started to gear for Total War, it found that the Wehrmacht had let them all perish (because the General Staff had not planned for such huge intakes nor for a long campaign).
No, Smith, it was not because of that, as you well know. It was because Soviet prisoners of war were considered below the level of humanity and thus hardly any provisions to take care of them were made in the first place, and because at a certain point in time it was consciously decided to let all non-working Soviet prisoners of war starve to death in order to at least partially carry out the
Hungerplan aimed at making it possible to feed the armed forces out of the conquered Soviet lands and the civilian population to enjoy food consumption as in peacetime. Logistical difficulties resulting from "such huge intakes" are no argument, considering i.a. that the Wehrmacht had in the previous year taken about two million prisoners in France within a short period of time and allowed none of them to starve to death.
Scott Smith wrote:And the Russians didn't treat the German POWs any better.
The Russians were in dire straits themselves, as a matter of fact. "One could watch the guards, how in the spring they stood by growing birches, debarked them and fed on the freshly grown bark", reported a German soldier who returned from a Soviet prison camp. The civilian population was even worse off in many places. Numerous Russians even begged to the prisoners when after the war they occasionally received food from the USA and since 1949 also packages from the German Federal Republic.
Scott Smith wrote:In the West, when reciprocation was no longer a factor, such as when the war ended and Allied POWs were released, then conditions for German POWs still held by the Allies deteriorated sharply. With reciprocity no longer a concern, there was simply no longer any reason to follow the Geneva conventions.
Can Smith show us evidence that such ignoble considerations led to a worsening of the treatment of German POWs in the immediate postwar period, or is he again engaging in unsubstantiated speculations?
Scott Smith wrote:And in fact, Eisenhower declared German POWs as "Disarmed Enemy Forces" expressly so that the Americans would not seem "legally" compelled to follow those prior agreements, i.e., without being seen as such.
The purpose of this step was to free food resources for the starving civilian population until help from abroad could become effective. It was still a violation of the Geneva Convention, of course, with the attenuation that it was meant to help out the civilian population.
Scott Smith wrote:If the Victors couldn't feed the POWs after the war, well, the war was over and all, and they had no business holding them in the first place.
This they often took too long to do, for sure.
Scott Smith wrote:Of course, Germany was held to one standard of feeding its prisoners at Nuremberg despite the privations and circumstances of wartime.
What’s that supposed to mean?
Scott Smith wrote:The Allies had no more war to fight and plenty of American largesse to burn judging by the global role intentionally carved out for itself by the Interventionists.
Smith’s diatribes against "Interventionists" don’t interest me. As to America having plenty of "largesse to burn", he may be understating the Allied military government’s problems.
[…]The fact is that in 1945 there was a worldwide shortage of food and that the transportation system in Europe was largely destroyed. Already on 14 February Eisenhower had called the attention of the Allied governments to the fact that he feared a severe shortage of food throughout Europe at the war's end. He even feared that there would be famine - and he had no food reserves to feed the Germans, the "displaced persons" and the Allied civilian population. He "urgently" requested immediate food supplies from Great Britain - this at a time when in Great Britain food was still rationed.[…]
I translated the above from an article by German historian Rolf Steininger in: Wolfgang Benz et al,
Legenden, Lügen, Vorurteile, 12th edition 2002 by dtv Munich, page 128.