The term 'holocaust' means 'whole burnt offering' - an illustrated walkthrough

[michael mills]

Sloveneliberal and Nautilus, kindly have another look at my answer of 10 September, post number 9.

You will see that I was not discussing the meaning of the term "Holocaust", or what it referred to.

I was answering this statement by Sergei Romanov:

The moment Endlösung turned from deportation to extermination some time in 1941

That statement alleges that there was a single moment when deportation was replaced by extermination, and that that moment was situated in 1941. My answer refuted that, in that it showed that non-exterminatory deportation of German and Slovak Jews continued well into 1942.

There were exterminatory actions that commenced in 1941, but as I pointed out they were limited in scope and confined to specific areas, in particular the German-occupied parts of the Soviet Union. Thus, there was a period of almost one year when non-exterminatory deportation overlapped with limited exterminatory actions, some of which were not total but limited in scope, and more in the nature of a cull, eg the Sonderbehandlung of 100,000 Jews of Reichsgau Wartheland, one-third of the total Jewish population of that province.

Even the mass-killing of the Jews of the General-Government overseen by the SS and Police Leader of Lublin District, Odilo Globocnik, which began in March 1942, was initially limited in scope and coverage, encompassing only the Jews of the Lublin and Litzmannstadt Districts, and targeting only the Jews deemed incapable of being used for labour, estimated to be 60% of the total Jewish population of those two districts.

The conclusion must be that there was no single point in time at which non-exterminatory deportation was replaced by a comprehensive extermination plan, but that the change occurred gradually, over a period of time and by cumulative stages.

Thus, all the kerfuffle about whether the mass-killing of Soviet Jews was or was not part of an event called "The Holocaust" is really beside the point.

Finally, it should be pointed out that even the mass-killing of Soviet Jews did not begin at a single point in time, but was something that grew by stages, presumably in response to local conditions. The initial orders for Sonderbehandlung of targeted population groups on Soviet territory issued by Heydrich immediately after the German invasion on 22 June 1941 did not include all Jews, but only those in State and Party positions, ie those who were an integral part of the Soviet system of government. Quite soon the killing actions were extended to all Jewish men of military age, and finally, from August, began to include Jewish women and children, wiping out whole communities.

Even so, by the end of 1941 the majority of Jews in German-occupied Soviet territory were still alive, and were only exterminated in the "second wave" of 1942, and some even survived until 1943, when the German retreat began. The letter from Stahlecker to Lohse of 6 August 1941 shows that the original German plan for dealing with the majority of the Soviet Jews was to confine them in isolated rural camps where they would be used for labour in such areas as forestry, pending their expulsion across the Urals after the final German victory.

This is what Stahlecker wrote:

By all possible means, it must be attempted to limit the fertility of Jews as quickly as possible. Sterilization, apart from other arguments, is practically impossible, so in order to reach the goal, the only measure that remains is physical separation of sexes from each other.

Within the larger territory of Ostland, Jewish reservations can be established according to need. The prior occupants of the area and those who are planned to settle there can be pumped into other locations without any difficulty. In the Jewish reservations Jewish men and women must be separated. The boys will remain with their mothers until sexual maturity. The Jews on the reservations can immediately be set to useful labor, as for example construction of their own housing, farm labor, forest work, highway-building. The Jews can be sent as closed teams, as much as the numbers of workmen allow, to do street work outside the reservation. Should it happen that a wholesale clearing of the European Jews should not yet by this time be on the way, then at a later time we could establish in the reservations handcraft and industrial enterprises and thus create new labor possibilities for them. The Jews are to be provided only as much in the way of housing and supplies as is absolutely necessary to maintain their labor. The Jews themselves shall construct simple wooden barracks. The produce of the reservation itself should be enough to supply the food needs.
The fencing off of the reservation should not be any problem. The Jews must be forbidden, at the threat of death, to leave the reservation. The prohibition for the Jews to leave the place can be enforced by relatively small auxiliary police units.

Insofar as is helpful, one could make exceptions to the forced residence in the Jewish reservation, according to the specialties of the Jews, as for example for doctors and craftsmen, who are still urgently needed outside of the reservation. These Jews, as far as it is possible, should be kept near their workplace in a closed camp, separated by sexes. The identification mark, as anticipated in the project, one that I approve of completely, could
be quickly carried out with this small leftover number of Jews.

I want however to note that the commander of the North Army rear has informed the secret field police, by the order of 7/24/41, that the Jews must identify themselves with a yellow six pointed star on the right side of their chest. The project, however, foresees identification with a Star of David on the left side of the chest and on the middle of the back.

It is self-evident that the Jews in reservations also must be externally identifiable. In closing, let me sum up by saying that the Jewish question shall be solved by:

1. A complete and immediate 100% clearing of the Jews from the Ost territory.
2. Preventing the Jews from increasing their numbers.
3. Using the Jews to the fullest as a work force.
4. A considerable facilitation (wesentliche Erleichterung) for the later collective transport to a reservation outside Europe.

In addition, the report of Einsatzgruppe C of 17 September 1941 shows that there was some disagreement with the change to a policy of mass-killing of the Jewish population. In that report, the commander of EG-C, Dr Dr Rasch, complained that the real goal of destroying the "Communist apparatus" was in danger of being replaced by the easier goal of eliminating the Jewish population, which he said would not achieve the destruction of the Communist system since experience had shown that Jews were not the sole "bearers of Bolshevism", but all Soviet nationalities could have that function.

[Sergey Romanov]

Ah no Michael, your argument shows nothing like that, since we're talking about policy decisions, not their implementation, and the decision-in-principle was taken in late 1941.

That it wasn't implemented immediately and everywhere in the same manner is irrelevant to this fact.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Michael Mills,


Regarding, "The moment Endlösung turned from deportation to extermination some time in 1941".

Were the Einsatzgruppen not engaged in the mass killing of hundreds of thousands of Jews in situ from the outbreak of the Eastern Campaign in June 1941?

Cheers,

Sid.

[Sergey Romanov]

More like from late July, but the decision had not yet been taken to expand the same measures to the whole of the European Jewry, for which the Endlösung was mostly limited to deportation, *policy-wise*, until some point in late 1941.

[michael mills]

.…...the decision-in-principle was taken in late 1941.

That is a theory by one historian (Christian Gerlach, if I remember correctly), but not all historians accept it by any means. For example, Peter Longerich considers that as of the end of 1941, no order had as yet been given for the killing of Jews deported from Germany, and that is the reason why Himmler severely reprimanded Jeckeln for including the first convoy of German Jews that arrived at Riga on 30 Nevember in the Rumbula massacre.

[Sergey Romanov]

You show your ignorance, as this is of course not "a theory by one historian", have you even read Browning's Origins?

That one historian you cite may disagree doesn't make the weather.

[Gorque]

Hi Michael:

I thought that the reason for Jeckeln's dressing down was on account of the transport having some Great War veterans on board.

Besides, Babi Yar occurred during the end of September and was orchestrated by HSSPF Jecklyn. It sure reads as if a decision had already been made higher up the line, read Heinrich Himmler, to exterminate the Ostjuden.

Then there is Himmlers paper Treatment of Alien Races in the East from May 1940 that needs to br condidered regarding the above intentions.

[Sergey Romanov]

In his Holocaust, 2010, Longerich acknowledges that the Wannsee conference meant a plan for a total annihilation, p. 320

While Heydrich adhered to the scheme of deportations to the occupied Eastern territories and allowed no doubts that the deportees would be violently killed there, the minutes of the discussion make it clear that other solutions had already been considered, namely the possibility of murdering all the Jews in the General Governmentin situ.

[Sergey Romanov]

To illustrate what Longerich's point is, here's another quote:

The authorities gradually moved away from the idea that the mass murders were anticipations of the ‘Final Solution’ that was to be carried out to its full extent only after the end of the war; instead, in the middle of 1942, the conviction had become established that the ‘Final Solution’ could be achieved by an intensification and expansion of these murders during the war itself.

I.e. he doesn't argue that the decision-in-principle hadn't been taken earlier; he only quibbles about after the war/during the war distinction.

[Sergey Romanov]

Here's a passage from Longerich's Unwritten Order, further elucidating his thoughts:

Once again we see that he doesn't doubt that a genocidal plan existed as early as the Wannsee conference.

He only says it was to be an eventual wholesale extermination, not an immediate wholesale extermination.

He also doubts that there was a "decision" as a momentous event, rather emphasizing the steadily radicalizing continuity of the policy. But that last point is more about terminology, I would posit.

Whether one talks of one policy decision-in-principle or of several decisions having the same effect, the result is the same.

[michael mills]

have you even read Browning's Origins?

I have.

Browning's original thesis was that Hitler's decision to physically exterminate all Jews in his power not long after the commencement of Barbarossa, in July/August of 1941, and it was prompted by his elation at the seeming success of the invasion of the Soviet Union and the prospects for a rapid victory before the end of the year. He subsequently modified that thesis to a certain extent, but has always clung to his position that the decision came earlier in 1941 than December, as proposed by Gerlach.

Gerlach's thesis is that Hitler made his decision for comprehensive extermination in December 1941, after his declaration of war on the United States, and that the decision was prompted by the extension of the war to include the United States as one of Germany's enemies. His thesis is based on the assumption that Hitler's reference in his Reichstag speech of 30 January 1939 to a future World war bringing with it the "annihilation of the Jewish race in Europe" was deliberately setting up a condition precedent under which that annihilation would occur, ie if the Jews caused a war on the same scale as that of 1914-18, he would undertake action to annihilate them. Thus, Gerlach's thesis is quite different from Browning's.

In fact, the threat in his speech does not suggest that at all; rather, it suggests that the annihilation would be wrought by the peoples of Europe, who had been "enlightened" by Germany and Italy about the nature of the "Jewish Problem". Accordingly, the idea that Hitler was setting up a condition under which HE would undertake the annihilation of the Jewish race in Europe is not tenable, which vitiates Gerlach's thesis.

The late Leftist German historian Hans Mommsen theorised that Hitler's reference in his speech to the annihilation of the Jewish race in Europe was more in the nature of a throwaway remark rather than a serious promise, and that he had forgotten about it until reminded of it by Goebbels, and that is the reason why when he later referred to his "prophecy" he misdated it to 1 September 1939. The context in which the reference to annihilation occurs in the speech, and the immediately following explanation by Hitler of what he meant by it, tend to support Mommsen's interpretation rather than Gerlach's.

Of course, Sergei Romanov is entirely free to accept Gerlach's thesis, if that helps him in his strange, obsessive feud with some obscure figure called Mattogno. And I am free to have my own opinion. However, in relation to Peter Longerich's thesis, I suggest that Sergei read his earlier book, "Politik der Vernichtung", written before he became involved in supporting Penguin Books in its defence against Irving's court action against it for libel. In that book, Longerich stated his conclusion that as of the end of 1941, Hitler had not given any authorisation for the killing of German Jews deported into occupied Soviet territory, even though the massacre of Soviet Jews had been underway for some months.

In reaching that conclusion, Longerich analysed the telephone call from Himmler to Heydrich on the afternoon of 30 November 1941, ordering no destruction of the transport of Jews from Berlin that was heading for Riga, and concluded that order did not apply only to that one transport, but to all transports of German Jews being deported into occupied Soviet territory. It is obvious that that conclusion is similar to Irving's own interpretation of that telephone call the latter's 1977 book "Hitler's War", with the difference that unlike Irving Longerich saw the exemption of German Jew's from exterminatory measures as temporary and being later overtaken by a decision in May 1942 to exterminate deported German Jews also.

It is also obvious that the statement in Longerich's book "Politik der Vernichtung", and his interpretation of Himmler's telephone call to Heydrich, did not suit the defence against the libel action brought by Irving, as they could be seen as lending a certain amount of support to irving's own interpretation. That is the most likely reason why, in the abridged English-language translation of "Politik der Vernichtung", published several years after Irving's court action, the statement is entirely omitted.

[michael mills]

Hello Gorque.

You asked:

I thought that the reason for Jeckeln's dressing down was on account of the transport having some Great War veterans on board.

That was a theory advanced by the late Gitta Szereny, in her critique of Irving's 1977 book "Hitler's War". She also theorised that a Dr Jekelius, the son of Molotov, was on board the transport from Berlin. and that was the reason for Himmler's call to Heydrich ordering no liquidation of that transport.

In fact Dr Jekelius was not on that transport, was not the son of Molotov, and was not Jewish. He was in fact an Austrian psychiatrist involved in the Euthanasia Program. Szereny ,in her eagerness to refute Irving, failed spectacularly to do her research.

https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erwin_Jekelius

There is no evidence that more Great War veterans were onboard that first transport to Riga than on any of the subsequent ones. It is also apparent that Himmler's order applied not only to that transport but to all the following transports which arrived at Riga from December 1941 to the end of February 1942, since the Jews on those transports were not killed on arrival, as those on the first transport were, but were housed in the Riga Ghetto, now emptied of the native Jews previously housed there but killed in the Rumbula Massacre. There is one possible exception, a transport from Vienna the fate of which is unknown. Although there were culls of the German Jews, a substantial proportion survived to be evacuated from Latvia to concentration camps in Germany in the summer of 1944, in the context of the general German retreat.

Besides, Babi Yar occurred during the end of September and was orchestrated by HSSPF Jecklyn. It sure reads as if a decision had already been made higher up the line, read Heinrich Himmler, to exterminate the Ostjuden.

That was one of the localised massacres, perpetrated at the request of the Wehrmacht as a reprisal for the destruction of the Wehrmacht headquarters in Kiev caused by timed explosive charges left by NKVD forces when they retreated from the city. It did occur in the context of an ongoing large-scale massacre of Soviet Jews, but that exterminatory action was limited to Soviet Jews, not all Jews in German-occupied Europe.

Hitler's order to include all Soviet Jews in exterminatory actions seems to have been given in December 1941, in response to a request from Himmler to treat all Jews as partisans and exterminate them as such.

Then there is Himmlers paper Treatment of Alien Races in the East from May 1940 that needs to br condidered regarding the above intentions.

In that paper, Himmler expressly rejected the "Bolshevik method of extermination whole peoples" as un-German, and Hitler expressely agreed with him, writing next to that part of Himmler's paper the words "sehr gut und richtig" (very good and correct).

There is no way that Himmler's paper can be interpreted as proposing physical extermination of the Jews. In fact, so far as I remember, the paper does not mention Jews at all, but only deals with the treatment of Poles and other Slavic peoples inhabiting the General Government.

[Sergey Romanov]

>> have you even read Browning's Origins?
> I have

So you admit to not having been truthful when writing this:

"That is a theory by one historian (Christian Gerlach, if I remember correctly), but not all historians accept it by any means."

?

After all, it makes it at least two leading historians who argue for a decision in late 1941 (October quite obviously being late). (And as you should know, quite a few "current" historians have argued for even earlier dates, so appealing to alternative opinions doesn't help you any).

> Of course, Sergei Romanov is entirely free to accept Gerlach's thesis

Where did I accept Gerlach's thesis, besides using one term of his which applies to what Browning and most others write as well?

I've quoted from Longerich's two most recent works on the topic, one of which is an update of his old book, but what, pray tell, do November events have to do with anything I wrote, November not even being the last month of the year?

[Gorque]

Hi Michael:

Thanks for the reply.

That was a theory advanced by the late Gitta Szereny, in her critique of Irving's 1977 book "Hitler's War".

It appears that her theory still has traction as Gerald Fleming's Hitler and the Final Solution repeats it on page 77:

Himmler knew full well that in the first convoys of German Jews to Riga and Minsk there were men who had earned military decorations in the First World War, and others who were over sixty-five.

We also have this item from the trial of Adolf Eichmann regarding this first transport:

In the convoys to Riga, forty to forty-five cases of unjustified evacuation were reported in a complaint lodged with Gauleiter Lohse by the Jewish elders in Riga and then passed on to SS-Obergruppenführer Heydrich.

Eichmann Trial, Document 119, Düsseldorf, 5 March 1942

That was one of the localised massacres, perpetrated at the request of the Wehrmacht ....

Jeckeln was the primary culprit in the Rieseberg Murders of 1933, Babi Yar, late September 1941, Rumbula, late November and early December 1941, and Kamianets-Podilskyi, late August 1941. I don't know about you but I certainly see a pattern here. Jeckeln shows up and a lot of civilians get murdered.

Hitler's order to include all Soviet Jews in exterminatory actions seems to have been given in December 1941

I'm leaning more towards some time in August although Browning opines it occurred in mid-July.

There is no way that Himmler's paper can be interpreted as proposing physical extermination of the Jews.

My purpose for including mention of the Himmler opinion was to reinforce the earlier arguments, that he regarded Slavs and Jews Untermenschen, suitable only for physical labor and lording over. It goes to proving his state of mind as well as that of Hitler's, sehr gut und richtig.

[michael mills]

hello Gorque.

Jeckeln was indeed a murderous person, and that is probably why he took it into his head to perpetrate the unauthorised killing of the first transport of German Jews to arrive at Riga. The stinging rebuke and threat he received from Himmler two days later obviously brought him to heel, since the German Jews who arrived in the next convoys were all taken into the Riga Ghetto, except possibly for one transport, the fate of which is unknown.

As for the Soviet Jews, we knew from Himmler's appointment book that in December 1941 he sought Hitler's authorisation to "exterminate Jews as partisans". It is most likely that he was referring specifically to Soviet Jews, since they were the only ones who could be considered to be partisans; we know that men of the Waffen-SS were going on training exercises in which they were taught to equate Jews with partisans.

If Hitler had already given an order for the extermination of Soviet Jews in July or August, it is hard to see in December Himmler would still be needing to seek Hitler's authorisation to treat Jews as partisans and exterminate them as such.

With regard to the Poles, in May 1940 he was certainly proposing harsh treatment of them, but he still rejected the wholesale slaughter of them as being a "Bolshevik method", unworthy of Germans. In National Socialist Germany, to describe something as "Bolshevik" was to reject it completely.