Yes it is a reason, somekind at least.Under this circumstances, the government decided to decline, English proposal, as maneuver that is designed, on one hand - to cover form working masses of Britain, France and other countries the proportion of new offensive against us , and on the other hand – to play for time in order to restore forces of Poland an Wrangel for the renewal of their offensive
– here is your reason.
But you forgot to mention what "circumstances" they were:
"The note by Lord Curzon indicates that the capitalist governments of the Entente are counting that our successes on the Polish front are extremely dangerous to this unstable international and inner-state system which was implemented after the Versailles' peace (my emphazis). The agents of Entente are doing great labour to bring Romania into war. Military help for Poland and Wrangel is going on full speed."
Interesting that under such circumstances the Soviets declined British proposal. Hey, the Entente seems to be very nervous, they can start a war against us! But the Soviets have no problems with that...
The Curzon note basically was: if you don't stop the war, we will help Poland! That the Soviet leadreship didn't really believe threats by Entente you can read from "Direktivy..." Pp 707 - 708 (Document nr 703) - Lenin to Stalin on 7th August: "The Entente is threatening with war ... I don't believe very much the threats."
The military realities presented by High Command were: Poland will be crushed. Obviously comrade Lenin made plans, what will happen next.I don’t’ have to –it was a rhetoric question –it was impossible . Comrade Lenin would have to deal with military realities, that were presented to him by military command, which obviously not only did not count on “proletariat” but was rather afraid of any kind of military intervention on the part of such weak country as Romania.
The questions about the reality of intervention are dealt by politicians (Lenin) not by military (Kamenev). The fact that Bolos were very eager to finish off Poland and weren't interested in peace proposals made by Poland and England proves that Lenin wasn't much afraid of intervention.
Considering the fact that according to it only had two months of resources worth (actually they ended even earlier than that), what Lenin meant by “great situation” shall remain a mystery, but it definitely has no connection to the RKKA situation. It could not plan any operations beyond the limited war with Poland - period. So Sovetizing Italy and such would have been done by Italian comrades, which is what essential.
The "great situation" was on Comintern Congress: everybody had hopes for World Revolution. It had definitely important connection with the RKKA situation (if there would not have been Soviet-Polish war, then I am sure there wouldn't have been such situation in Comintern and Lenin would not have sent such telegram to Stalin). The successes of the RKKA arised hopes that the appearance of Red Army and Soviet power in the Central Europe will ignite revolution also in other countries (a "revolutionary situation" develops).
Of course most important for the sovetization of Italy would have been that there were many local "revolutionaries" (who are supported by the agents from Russia). Then the Italian Red Army will be created just like there will be Polish Red Army. Then there starts "revolution" for example in Austria or Czhechia. The Italian or Polish and Russian Red Armies rush for "help". And so on and on...
Errr... got what?Maybe- shmaby. 2 month of resources –got it? Maybe you should read the directives instead of just heaving them in front of you.
I will post additional info about the World Revolution tomorrow.
