Two types of Holocaust Deniers?

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Scott Smith
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POLITICAL PUGILISM...

#121

Post by Scott Smith » 19 Jun 2002, 13:43

In a boxing match both sides have agreed apriori to certain rules and to accept the judgment and finality of the referees. That is not the case in wars among sovereigns and not by LAWS. Sovereign states or coalitions of sovereigns determine what their objectives are and the means to achieve them, which might as easily include killing noncombatant enemy citizens and hostages if it is felt by the powers-that-be that victory is otherwise impossible.

However, no boxing match would be "fair" if only one side were allowed to kick when it was down, even if that side was never down and therefore never kicked. This is the fallacy of the "rules" of war; nobody makes them. They are agreements made by sovereigns. We only have history and situational comparisons to determine what is appropriate--and that includes the propriety of the objectives in the first place. Unconditional Surrender is as brutal as any genocidal scheme.
A war crime is a war crime regardless of who the criminal and who the victim is. It just happens that in order to put a criminal on trial, you first have to catch him. And unfortunately total defeat in war is what it takes to catch criminals acting on behalf or with the backing of a state.
Which only raises the stakes for the next round. Wars are fought not only today but for tomorrow against future coalitions of sovereigns, and the stakes very much determine the scale of brutality considered. If wars have to be fought to settle conflicts, the objectives should at least be reasonable. And the most unreasonable objectives of all are the most abstract: Wars fought as Crusades or to "make the world safe for Democracy." These and civil wars have the most potential for brutalities because the stakes are so high.

World War II was both a European Civil War and a World Crusade. That is why it is necessary to argue that the Good War was not fought for reasonable objectives on the German side but just some weird race-murder idiosyncrasy on Hitler's part. Atrocity-propaganda and Victimology is a form of Groupthink and a way of blowing smoke that is amenable to the psychology of the Hollywoodized masses and the plastic-spoon generation of Germans that in reality obfuscates why wars are really fought and why the global plutocracy always benefits.
:)
Last edited by Scott Smith on 19 Jun 2002, 19:13, edited 1 time in total.

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Roberto
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Re: POLITICAL PUGILISM...

#122

Post by Roberto » 19 Jun 2002, 14:28

Scott Smith wrote:In a boxing match both sides have agreed apriori to certain rules and to accept the judgment and finality of the referees. That is not the case in wars among sovereigns and not LAWS. They determine what their objectives are and the means to achieve them, which might as easily include killing noncombatant enemy citzens and hostages if it is felt victory is otherwise impossible.
In the days of Genghis Khan and Tamerlane that may have been so, perhaps. In the Twentieth Century there were detailed rules of conduct in wartime, however, to which the belligerants mostly adhered in the First World War. The Second World War, on the other hand, saw a reversion to the no-holds-barred warlord approach of earlier ages. Especially by Nazi Germany, which also went a step further, systematically killing millions of unarmed non-combatants in actions that bore little if any relation to the war effort.
Scott Smith wrote:However, no boxing match would be fair if only one side were allowed to kick when it was down, even if that side was never down and therefore never kicked.
Kicking people when they were down was what Adolf did in Poland, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, especially certain segments of the local populations. And he would have done so to an even greater extent if final victory had been his.
Scott Smith wrote:This is the fallacy of the "rules" of war; nobody makes them. They are agreements made by sovereigns.
The bi- and multilateral agreements among nations are the rules of international law on the conduct of warfare. Such rules were in force at the time of the Second World War and were copiously breached by the belligerents, first and foremost Nazi Germany.
Scott Smith wrote:We only have history and situational comparisons to determine what is appropriate--and that includes the propriety of the objectives in the first place.
Nonsense. What was considered appropriate at the time of Julius Caesar (whose forces butchered 1,192,000 Gauls by his own count in the conquest of Gaul) was no longer considered appropriate at the time of the Second World War, because a number of agreements among nations had ruled it out.
Scott Smith wrote:Unconditional Surrender is as brutal as any genocidal scheme.
That depends on the treatment accorded to the vanquished enemy surrendering unconditionally, which may be but need not be genocidal.
Roberto wrote:A war crime is a war crime regardless of who the criminal and who the victim is. It just happens that in order to put a criminal on trial, you first have to catch him. And unfortunately total defeat in war is what it takes to catch criminals acting on behalf or with the backing of a state.
Scott Smith wrote:Which only raises the stakes for the next round.
Where did such happen, Mr. Smith? Failure to bring defeated war criminals to trial makes a next round far more likely, I would say.
Scott Smith wrote:If wars have to be fought to settle conflicts, the objectives should be reasonable. And the most unreasonable objectives are the most abstract: Wars fought as crusades or to "make the world safe for Democracy."
Are such objectives more unreasonable than concrete objectives like building the empire of the Master Race in the Russian East at the expense of the Slav sub-humans who happen to live there? And what about wars fought for the purpose of putting an end to a rapacious and murdering dictatorship? The objective of such is far less unreasonable and abstract, in my opinion.
Scott Smith wrote:These and civil wars have the most potential for brutalities because the stakes are so high.
Well, the war fought for the "reasonable" objective of building a Teutonic empire in Eastern Europe was far richer in atrocities than the "unreasonable" war fought to "make the world safe for Democracy". How come?
Scott Smith wrote:That is why is is necessary to argue that WWII was not fought for reasonable objectives on the German side but just some weird race-murder idiosyncrasy on Hitler's part.
What is there to argue when the evidence shows that Hitler's war, which would have been horrible enough if it had been fought for the most noble of objectives, was fought for the "reasonable" purpose of building a German empire in Eastern Europe at the expense of the local population?
Scott Smith wrote:Atrocity-propaganda


Given the rarely equaled scale of documented Nazi atrocities, who needs propaganda?
Scott Smith wrote:and Victimology is a form of Groupthink and a way of blowing smoke that is amenable to the psychology of the Hollywoodized masses and the plastic-spoon generation of Germans


Smith is again letting off steam by throwing around his beaten, hollow phrases.
that in reality obfuscates why wars are really fought and why the plutocracy always benefits.
Why are wars of aggression - such as Hitler's wars against Poland and the Soviet Union - really fought, Mr. Smith?


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#123

Post by cobalt » 19 Jun 2002, 18:33

Mr. Roberto apparently tries to compare a war to a ball game where everyone is expected to play by the rules. To suggest that a total war be fought by rules is absurd. Wars a fought by people and not by robots and computers, and when emotions, anger and frustrations enter into it the only rule that remains is the rule of survisval. Wenever there is a casualty on one side the other side wants 10 fold retribution and so the story goes. He seems to totally deny that the Soviets carried out massive attrocities before, during and after WWII. His brushes with reality are most likely limited to round table discussions or classroom projects. I would suggest he gets a life.

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#124

Post by Roberto » 19 Jun 2002, 19:42

cobalt wrote:Mr. Roberto apparently tries to compare a war to a ball game where everyone is expected to play by the rules.
No, but rules tuning down the horror if war is what international conventions on the conduct of warfare try to bring about, with a greater or lesser degree of success.
cobalt wrote:To suggest that a total war be fought by rules is absurd..
About as absurd as suggesting that however total a war implies the organized and systematic murder of millions of non-combatants outside the scope of anything resembling acts of war.
cobalt wrote:Wars a fought by people and not by robots and computers, and when emotions, anger and frustrations enter into it the only rule that remains is the rule of survisval. Wenever there is a casualty on one side the other side wants 10 fold retribution and so the story goes...
Only tenfold retribution? The rate ordered by Keitel for the occupied territories of the Soviet Union was 50 to 100 people executed for every German soldier killed by partisans. A rate that was often exceeded, the victims usually being unarmed civilians.
cobalt wrote:He seems to totally deny that the Soviets carried out massive attrocities before, during and after WWII.
Mr. Cobalt is one hell of a lousy observer. A little browsing of the threads on this forum and the old Third Reich forum would reveal to him that I have provided more information about Soviet atrocities than most other posters.
cobalt wrote:His brushes with reality are most likely limited to round table discussions or classroom projects.
That's the picture Mr. Cobalt is giving of himself in the most favorable of cases, I would say. Ever seen people shot at close range with a machine pistol, buddy? I have. It happens every day where I come from.
cobalt wrote:I would suggest he gets a life.
Unlike silly howlers like Mr. Cobalt, who vent their frustration by producing hollow and insulting nonsense, I have no lack of fun to complain about. Kicking folks like him around this board is only one of the many leisure activities I enjoy.

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#125

Post by cobalt » 19 Jun 2002, 21:30

As a courtesy to Mr. Roberto:In response to of one of his questions about having seen a person killed at close range with a machine pistol I can only say I have seen worse, buddy. My question would be, did Mr. Roberto in any way, shape or form put his talents to work to prevent this from happening in the future or did he just cut and run?
BTW: the retribution ratio in the Vietnam war was more than 60 to 1. This is about within Mr. Roberto's ballpark. Of course, the retribution was carried out by B-52 bombers carrying 500 pound bombs and napalm dropped in raids after raids. In addition the place was heavily dusted with a deadly poison called Agent Orange. So much for playing it by the rules. It is ironic that these acts of attrocity were carried out by a nation , that after WWII, gave the most lip service in expressing outrage over Nazi attrocities. This clearly demonstrates that Mr. Roberto's rules of conduct in any conflict go out the window whenever one of the participants can see an advantage. Terrorizing the civilian population is still the most favorite weapon used, no matter how much it is denied or how many rules are written against it.

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#126

Post by Roberto » 19 Jun 2002, 22:10

cobalt wrote:As a courtesy to Mr. Roberto:In response to of one of his questions about having seen a person killed at close range with a machine pistol I can only say I have seen worse, buddy. My question would be, did Mr. Roberto in any way, shape or form put his talents to work to prevent this from happening in the future or did he just cut and run?
A rather silly question, to which the answer is: neither. Personal vendettas and killings by and among common criminals, guerrillas, paramilitary forces, etc., have been a way of life in my native Colombia for the past twenty years.
cobalt wrote:BTW: the retribution ratio in the Vietnam war was more than 60 to 1.
What "retribution ratio" was that? A ratio of civilian hostages to be executed in retaliation for military casualties?
cobalt wrote:This is about within Mr. Roberto's ballpark. Of course, the retribution was carried out by B-52 bombers carrying 500 pound bombs and napalm dropped in raids after raids. In addition the place was heavily dusted with a deadly poison called Agent Orange. So much for playing it by the rules.
Not exactly the same thing, unless the raids were carried out for the purpose of producing as many casualties among the civilian population as possible. Some documentation on a 60:1 ratio between civilian casualties caused by American bombing and American military casualties would be appreciated. Anyway, why these comparisons, once again? I don't remember having said that the American war in Vietnam was a chivalrous affair. My point is that whatever the Americans did in Vietnam doesn't make what the Nazis did in Eastern Europe look any better. Which is why so-and-so-also-did-this-and-that - arguments are utterly pointless.
cobalt wrote:It is ironic that these acts of attrocity were carried out by a nation , that after WWII, gave the most lip service in expressing outrage over Nazi attrocities.
Yes indeed.
cobalt wrote:This clearly demonstrates that Mr. Roberto's rules of conduct in any conflict go out the window whenever one of the participants can see an advantage. Terrorizing the civilian population is still the most favorite weapon used, no matter how much it is denied or how many rules are written against it.
Unfortunately that is so. And I don't remember having said anything to the contrary.

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#127

Post by cobalt » 20 Jun 2002, 01:49

I did not know about Mr. Roberto's back ground in Columbia, thus the question was not as silly as perceived. As far as the 60 to 1 ratia is concerned, it is a ballpark figure based on an estimate of aprox. 3 to 4 million civilians having been killed in Vietnam. Laos and Cambodia by US bombing raids and aprox. 40 to 45 thousand US sodiers being killed by enemy action. I also want to add here that nearly twice the tonnage of bombs was dropped during the Vietnam war as there was in WWII. Thus, the stated civilian estimates might be on the low end.
A fleet of B-52 bombers dropping their payload could devaste several square miles of real estate and vaporize nealry every living thing in its path. As far as proving that it was done to maximize civilian casualties, I guess one could argue that the main targets were water buffaloes and monkeys, while the civilians were merely collateral damage. When you are a superpower who is to question that, and what court would challenge that?
There was no need to go through a ritual of rounding up and killing hostages. You just exterminate every living thing in the area.
The US military pretty much follows corporate structure in which goals are outlined and carried out. The order is given to get rid of a problem and "don't tell me how you do it, just get it done." In contrast to the German chain of command where orders were very specific, in the US decisions are made in a way which provides lots of room for denials by the upper echelons whenever the need should arise.At least that is how it was during the Vietnam war. An order to "get rid of a problem" or to "pacify" or "neutralize" can always be interpreted later as meaning somethin else, and orders as they were carried out were simpy misunderstood. The result is that ther would never be any serious accountability at the top. Something that they learned from WWII but ,sadly - the wrong thing.
The example of the Vietnam war was not intended to point a finger or to diminish the reality of the holocoust. It only serves as an example of how well, or should I say how badly, the lessons of the past are applied to the present and the future. Thus, my question to Mr . Roberto is: What benefits does the continued reopening of old wounds offer to mankind ? And please, be specific.

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#128

Post by Roberto » 20 Jun 2002, 11:39

cobalt wrote:I did not know about Mr. Roberto's back ground in Columbia, thus the question was not as silly as perceived.
The name of the country is Colombia, and the question betrays even more ignorance in regard to that country than the misspelling. If you read Spanish, I can show you an online article that will help you understand why.
cobalt wrote:As far as the 60 to 1 ratia is concerned, it is a ballpark figure based on an estimate of aprox. 3 to 4 million civilians having been killed in Vietnam. Laos and Cambodia by US bombing raids and aprox. 40 to 45 thousand US sodiers being killed by enemy action.


The former figures seem to be way too high, at least if applied only to civilians. What's the source? Three to four million is the overall military and civilian death toll from all causes (not only US bombing) during the war in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia between 1964 and 1975, if I'm not mistaken.
Second Indochina War (1960-75)
Vietnam War: Most historians of the Second Indochina War concern themselves primarily with the American Phase of the conflict, 1965-73; however, many do not specify whether their estimated death tolls cover only this phase of the war or the whole thing. An asterisk(*) indicates that the number seems to cover the entire conflict rather than just the American Phase, but check the "Sources" section to see exactly which years are covered by each authority:
South Vietnam military: 185,000 to 225,000 (Britannica) or 220,357 (Lewy) or 223,748 (Summers) or 224,000 (Kutler, Olson) or 250,000 (Clodfelter, Grenville*) or 254,257 (Wallechinsky*) or 650,000 (Small & Singer)
North Vietnamese military and Viet Cong: 500,000 (S&S) or 660,000 (Olson) or 666,000 (Lewy, with the possibility that as many as 222,000 (1/3) of these were actually SVN civilians mistaken for VC) or 666,000 (Summers) or 700,000-1,000,000 (Wallechinsky*) or 900,000 (Britannica; Grenville*) or 1,000,000 (Clodfelter) or 1,100,000 (Tucker* 1954-75, citing an official 1995 announcement by Hanoi)
South Vietnamese civilians: 287,000 (Clodfelter = 247,600 war deaths + 38,954 assassinated by NLF) or 300,000 (Kutler; Summers) or 340,000 (Lewy's estimate, with the possibility that an additional 222,000 counted as VC (above) belong in this category) or 430,000 (The Sen. E. Kennedy Commission, according to Lewy, Olson) or 250,000 (Olson) or 522,000 (Wallechinsky*) or 1,000,000 (Britannica [in both North and South]; Eckhardt; Grenville*) or 2,000,000 (Tucker* [N&S, 1954-75] citing an official 1995 announcement by Hanoi)
North Vietnamese civilians: 65,000 (Kutler, Lewy, Olson, Summers, Wallechinsky) by American bombing.
USA: 58,000 (Britannica) or 58,153 (Wallechinsky*) or 58,159 (Kutler) or 47,244 KIA + 10,446 other = 57,690 (Olson, Summers, 1961-80) or 56,146 (Lewy: 46,498 KIA + 10,388 other + 719 MIA) or 56,000 (S&S)
South Korea: 4,407 (Lewy, Olson, Summers); 4,687 (Wallechinsky); 5,000 (S&S)
Philippines: 1,000 (S&S)
Thailand: 351 (Lewy, Olson, Summers, Wallechinsky); 1,000 (S&S)
Australia: 469 (Lewy, Summers, Olson [w/NZ]); 492 (S&S); 494 (Wallechinsky); 520 (AWM)
TOTAL: 1,216,000 (military only, S&S) or 1,312,000 (Summers) or 1,353,000 (Lewy) or 1,520,453 (WHPSI: S. Vietnamese only, 1965-75) or 1,637,000 (Olson) or 1,721,000 (Kutler) or 1,749,000 (Wallechinsky*) or 1,800,000 (B&J, 1960-75) or 2,058,000 (Eckhardt) or 2,163,000 (Britannica) or 2,500,000 (Grenville*) or 3,000,000 (1965-75, Chomsky* (1987)) or >3,100,000 (Tucker*)
Misc. Atrocities:
Lewy:
36,725 civilians assassinated by VC/NVA, 1957-72
2,800 civilians executed and 3,000 missing after Hue was captured by VC/NVA, 1968
400 civilians massacred by USAns in the area of Son My village, incl. 175-200 in My Lai hamlet, 1968
Because of the lack of weapons recovered from many bodies, Lewy considers the possibility that up to 222,000 VC KIA may have actually been innocent bystanders. (Or maybe not. Poor evidence either way.)
Harff & Gurr: 475,000 civilians in NLF areas were victims of repressive politicide, 1965-72
Young: Hue massacre, 1968:
Officially: 2,800-5,700
Len Ackland: 300-400
Chomsky (1987): 21,000 VC civilian officials assassinated under US/GVN Phoenix project (-in text. Endnote gives estimates ranging 40-48,000.). Lewy considers these to be (mostly) legitimate military targets.
Rummel:
90,000 democides by South Vietnam:
1954-63: 39,000, incl. 24,000 dead in forced resettlement programs
1963-75: 51,000, incl. 30,000 executions
166,000 democides by NVN/VC in SVN:
Officials assassinated: 17,000
Civilians assassinated: 49,000
Refugees killed, 1975: 50,000
Misc: 50,000
In addition to the American Phase of the War, there are four tangental conflicts which are sometimes discussed as part of the Vietnam War, but usually considered peripheral:
Vietnamese Civil War, internal phase, 1960-65
Clodfelter, 1961-64
South Vietnam, military: 21,442
Communist: 71,000
Civilian: 160,000
TOTAL: 252,442
Chomsky (1987):
1957-61: 66,000 VC (p.274, citing B. Fall), 80,000 Vietnamese (p.323)
1961-4/65: 89,000 VC
to mid 1966: 60,000 ("enemy" (McNamara) - "probably" including civilians (Chomsky))
Total, 1954-65: 160-170,000 VNese (p.324)
S&S: 300,000 battle deaths, 1960-65
Eckhardt: 200,000 civ. + 100,000 mil. = 300,000 (1960-65)
Young: NLF lost 100,000 dead 1961-(?)64
WHPSI:
21,686 deaths by political violence in South Vietnam, 1960-64
4,021 from 1955 to 1959
Cambodian Civil War (1970-75)
Chomsky (1987): half a million to a million.
Rummel, 1954-75:
War Dead: 429,000
Democide: 288,000
TOTAL: 717,000
Tucker: 10% of 7M, which comes to 700,000
Clodfelter; also Wallechinsky (1970-75)
Cambodian govt.: 50,000
Total violent deaths, incl. Comm. and civ.: >250,000
Total war-related deaths, incl. hunger: 600,000
T. Lomperis, From People's War to People's Rule (1996), citing a Finnish commission: 600,000
Chirot: 500,000
B&J: 300,000
SIPRI 1989: 156,000
S&S, 1970-73
Cambodia: 150,000
USA: 500
SVietnam: 5,000
NVietnam: 500
TOTAL: 156,000
Eckhardt: 156,000
WHPSI: 55,750 k. by pol.viol., 1970-75
Laos
Wallechinsky, 1959-75: 250,000
Martin Stuart-Fox A History of Laos: 200,000 by 1973, incl. 30,000 Hmong.
Rummel, 1954-75:
War Dead: 32,000
Democide: 38,000
TOTAL: 70,000
Eckhardt: 12,000 civ. + 12,000 mil. = 24,000 (1960-73)
S&S, 1960-73
Laos: 5,000 (1960-62), 15,000 (1963-73)
USA: 500
NVietnam: 3,000
TOTAL: 23,500
WHPSI: 22,355 k. by pol.viol., 1963-72
T. Lomperis, From People's War to People's Rule (1996): 20,000 Meo irregulars and 15,000 Royal Lao Army
Harff & Gurr: 18-20,000 Meo tribemen were victims of genocide, 1963-65
Vietnamese Civil War, final phase, 1973-75
Young, citing Pentagon estimates:
ARVN: 26,500 (1973) + 30,000 (1974)
PRG/DRV: 39,000 (1973) + 61,000 (1974)
Civilians: 15,000
TOTAL: 171,500 killed in the "Cease-Fire War".
Sources:
Britannica: not specified, but the implication is that the statistics cover the entire war.
Clodfelter, Michael, Vietnam in Military Statistics (1995)
Eckhardt: covers the years 1965-75 (unless otherwise noted)
Grenville: does not specify which years are covered, but by context, it seems to be 1960-75
Kutler, Stanley: Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War (1996)
Lewy, Guenter, America in Vietnam (1978): Lewy's estimates cover the years 1965-74. (u.o.n.)
Olson, James: Dictionary of the Vietnam War (1988): covers the years 1965-74 (u.o.n.)
Summers, Harry: Vietnam War Almanac (1985)
Tucker, Spencer, Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War (1998)
Wallechinsky: death tolls apparently cover the years 1957-75. (u.o.n.)
Young, Marilyn, The Vietnam Wars: 1945-1990 (1991)
Source of quote:

http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/warstat2.htm#Vietnam

Emphasis is mine.
cobalt wrote:I also want to add here that nearly twice the tonnage of bombs was dropped during the Vietnam war as there was in WWII. Thus, the stated civilian estimates might be on the low end.
Considering the above quoted figures, I'd say your civilian estimates are greatly exaggerated. The death toll from bombing in North Vietnam mentioned in the above quote shows the so-called weapons of mass destruction to have been rather inefficient if compared to rifles and machetes. If set against the bomb tonnage dropped and the cost thereof, it also shows that the expense of technological killing was much higher in Vietnam than it had been in World War II.
cobalt wrote:Thus, my question to Mr . Roberto is: What benefits does the continued reopening of old wounds offer to mankind ? And please, be specific.
The issue is not "reopening of old wounds". It is rememberance, the effect of which in those few countries that have cared to face up to the horrors of their past is definitely positive. In chapter 4 of The Gulag Archipelago, which deals with the various “organs” of Lenin’s and Stalin’s terror (“Die blauen Litzen”, in the German translation by Anna Peturnig, the term being a reference to the blue berets worn by the henchmen of the secret services), Alexander Solshenizyn mentions and praises the fact that, until 1966, 86,000 Nazi criminals were convicted in West Germany, while lamenting that, on the other hand, no more than a dozen of Stalin’s killers were ever sentenced by a Soviet court. In Solshenizyn’s opinion:
A country that has condemned an evil eighty six thousand times through its judges (and definitely condemned it in its literature and among its youth) will be purified from that evil year by year, step by step.
Solshenizyn's figure is way too high, but the message he conveys is pertinent. Solshenizyn laments that the Soviet Union never dealt with its past in the same way and thus failed to become cleansed from what he calls the "vice" of totalitarian despotism.

While a given country may learn the lessons of its pastl, others will unfortunately make the same mistakes. But does this mean that it is wrong for a country to face up to its past? I don't think so. It has been beneficial for Germany to face up to its Nazi past, just as it has been/would be beneficial for the US to learn the lessons of the Vietnam War.

If you still think it is useless to talk about the past atrocities of National Socialism or any other regime, I suggest that you address the moderators and request them to close down this forum.

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#129

Post by Tarpon27 » 21 Jun 2002, 17:36

Frankly, I am unsure of why Cobalt uses Viet Nam era bombing campaigns as relevant to the Holocaust, but since it has been posted, I think there needs to be some clarification of several issues.

[/b]Cobalt writes:
I did not know about Mr. Roberto's back ground in Columbia, thus the question was not as silly as perceived. As far as the 60 to 1 ratia is concerned, it is a ballpark figure based on an estimate of aprox. 3 to 4 million civilians having been killed in Vietnam. Laos and Cambodia by US bombing raids and aprox. 40 to 45 thousand US sodiers being killed by enemy action. I also want to add here that nearly twice the tonnage of bombs was dropped during the Vietnam war as there was in WWII. Thus, the stated civilian estimates might be on the low end.


In an earlier post he writes:

The French form of colonialism was particularly ruthless and exacted millions of lives in Indochina alone



Well, a start would be, that 58,169 US military personnel were killed in the Viet Nam War. Of this number, 47,358 were direct combat deaths and 10,824 "non-hostile" deaths.

Roberto's post above has sourced what others have estimated deaths at; in April of 1995, the Hanoi government issued a news release to the French AP:

HANOI (AP) - April 4. Cinq millions de morts: 20 ans apregraves la fin de la guerre du Vietnam, le gouvernement de Hanoi a reacute veacute leacute, lundi, le bilan d'un conflit dent le nombre de victimes avait eacute teacute minore a l'eacutepoque pour ne pas affecter le moral de la population.
Selon Hanoi, il y a eu pres de deux millions de morts dans la population civile du Nord et deux autres millions dans celle du Sud. Quant aux combats proprement dits, les chiffres sent d'un million cent mille militaires tueacutes et de 600.000 blesseacutes en 21 ans de guerre.
Ce dernier bilan comprend a la fois les victimes de la guerilla vietcong et les soldats nord-vietamiens qui les eacute paulaient. Les preacute ceacute dentes estimations de source occidentale faisaient eacute tat d'un bilan de 666.000 morts parmi Ies combattants Vietnamiens.



Loosely translated, 2 million civilians died in the north, another 2 million in the south, with 1.1 million dead NVA/Viet Cong, with 600,000 wounded over 21 years.

http://www.rjsmith.com/kia_tbl.html


Cobalt writes:
BTW: the retribution ratio in the Vietnam war was more than 60 to 1. This is about within Mr. Roberto's ballpark. Of course, the retribution was carried out by B-52 bombers carrying 500 pound bombs and napalm dropped in raids after raids.


In earlier post, Cobalt wrote:

I did not know about Mr. Roberto's back ground in Columbia, thus the question was not as silly as perceived. As far as the 60 to 1 ratia is concerned, it is a ballpark figure based on an estimate of aprox. 3 to 4 million civilians having been killed in Vietnam. Laos and Cambodia by US bombing raids and aprox. 40 to 45 thousand US sodiers being killed by enemy action. I also want to add here that nearly twice the tonnage of bombs was dropped during the Vietnam war as there was in WWII. Thus, the stated civilian estimates might be on the low end.


It appears to be as silly as it seems, unless Cobalt has some source material that 1), confirms that "3 to 4 million" Viet Namese civilians were in fact killed, and 2) that they were all killed in "retribution" by, I guess, B52 bomber raids.

Considering that Hanoi does not state this, nor does one know if their figures are even accurate, but suppose they are for argument's sake: from 1954--1975 (the time period for Hanoi's claim), the Hanoi government claims 4 million civilains dead. The use of B52 or ANY US bomber in Viet Nam did not begin until February 24, 1965 with Operation Rolling Thunder, that ended in March of 1968 (a peace offering from LBJ).

According to Cobalt, all civilian deaths in North and South Vietnam are and were the direct effects of US involvement and "retribution". A position I would like to see defended.

Finally, to add to the confusion, the French, likewise, killed "millions", according to Cobalt in Indochina; apparently Hanoi is unaware of this total of 3 to 4 million from the US retribution and the then millions killed by the French.

And of course, no civilians were ever killed by the North, the NVA, the NLF, or the VC in this tortured history, and Tet in '68 did not produce Hue, or the ideological camps after the "people's victories" either in the North or in reunification in 1975.


Cobalt wrote:
Of course, the retribution was carried out by B-52 bombers carrying 500 pound bombs and napalm dropped in raids after raids.


B52s do not carry and drop napalm. Napalm is best deployed with "treetop" level bombing at 100 feet or so, and is not dropped from a B52 cruising eight miles above its intended targets. In other words, by the time an Arc Light raid hit, the bombers were several miles from the targeted area. They also flew this high to evade the SAM and AA defenses of North Viet Nam. Buffs were big, slow, and at one time, due to operating orders from their political leadership, were routinely shot down by their orders tactically.

Cobalt wrote:
A fleet of B-52 bombers dropping their payload could devaste several square miles of real estate and vaporize nealry every living thing in its path. As far as proving that it was done to maximize civilian casualties, I guess one could argue that the main targets were water buffaloes and monkeys, while the civilians were merely collateral damage. When you are a superpower who is to question that, and what court would challenge that?
There was no need to go through a ritual of rounding up and killing hostages. You just exterminate every living thing in the area.


I suggest to Cobalt that he look at the following bombing campaigns of the Viet Nam War:

1. Operation Rolling Thunder
2. Operation Arc Light
3. Operation Linebacker (including Operation Freedom Train)
4. Operation Linebacker II

I doubt if this will make any difference, but it is difficult to imagine why any US commandeer would target Cobalt's "rural areas" of either South or North Viet Nam for bombing by B52s for retribution, i.e., extermination of civilians; it is absurd.

There was no "front" to the war, with NVA and VC operating throughout the country. If B52 raids are Cobalt's "retribution", then bombing the rice paddies and villages of rural Viet Nam are not going to kill the millions of Viet Namese he asserts happens. (Why wouldn't B52 strike the largest population centers indiscriminitely; certainly it is easier to kill thousands in Hanoi, correct?)

There were tremendous B52 strikes in suport of ground troops, and especially in certain areas of South Viet Nam; Khe Sanh and I Corps AO used B52 strikes for strike and suppression against NVA and VC troops, movements, supply lines, and fortified areas. For those who know, the Ashau was an area of high activity. In fact I Corps AO accounted for over 50% of all US combatant casualities of the war. When the supply lines into the South were shut down by US operations, the NVA then used the Ho Chi Minh trail through neutral, non-combatant countries (Laos and Cambodia) to move men and munitions from the North to new campaign areas in the South. B52 strikes were targeted at the North and at the flow of supplies and marshalling areas.


Cobalt wrote:
A fleet of B-52 bombers dropping their payload could devaste several square miles of real estate and vaporize nealry every living thing in its path. As far as proving that it was done to maximize civilian casualties, I guess one could argue that the main targets were water buffaloes and monkeys, while the civilians were merely collateral damage. When you are a superpower who is to question that, and what court would challenge that?
There was no need to go through a ritual of rounding up and killing hostages. You just exterminate every living thing in the area.


Cobalt's belief in the efficacy and efficiency of B52 bombing nonwithstanding, there seems to be several rather contradictory problems with this paragraph. What prisoners or hostages and where? If Cobalt is stating that B52 bomb raids are in the North, no American troops crossed the DMZ; if in the South, we are going to take hostage the villagers we supposedly are there to defend against the VC and the NVA?

So far, I do not think Cobalt understands the geography of South Viet Nam, nor the fact that villages in Viet Nam were exactly brimming with young males of soldiering age; IOW, potential VC that would then require US forces to potentially undertake missions to neutralize the threat. The young men in villages were taken by VC, NVA, ARVN, or even US units, and on grunt missions...or trying to hide in the bush. What was left in the villages were the women, children, and the old; the young men had long ago gone with either the VC or the ARVN.

Make no doubts about it; the villagers were caught between US sweeps in the day, and VC raids at night, but then, that wasn't the contention: bombing was.

Cobalt writes:
The US military pretty much follows corporate structure in which goals are outlined and carried out. The order is given to get rid of a problem and "don't tell me how you do it, just get it done." In contrast to the German chain of command where orders were very specific, in the US decisions are made in a way which provides lots of room for denials by the upper echelons whenever the need should arise.At least that is how it was during the Vietnam war. An order to "get rid of a problem" or to "pacify" or "neutralize" can always be interpreted later as meaning somethin else, and orders as they were carried out were simpy misunderstood. The result is that ther would never be any serious accountability at the top. Something that they learned from WWII but ,sadly - the wrong thing.


Oh, please!

There was never a war in US history that did not have more "rules of engagement" and strictures on the military tactical strategy than Viet Nam. It was not done by the military; it was ordered by the civilian political leadership over the years of the conflict.

The bombing campaigns were stopped and started, mostly due to spur the peace process on; LBJ stopped the bombing in March of 1968 as a token of good will, hoping to get the North to negotiate; Nixon twice ordered bombing to resume (and halt), the last time after the North left the peace talks in Paris. The air war was never allowed full access to targets in the North, although subsequent campaigns certainly allowed much more targeting of assets in the North, and US ground forces were never allowed to strike the North directly on their soil. Giap feared that Khe Sanh would be the marshalling point for a US invasion of the North, which led to the heavy escalation of the whole area, and the fierce battles.

MacArthur couldn't strike across the Yalu, but he could make amphibious landings; in the whole history of the Viet Nam War, there was never forces deployed to go into the North in a major ground campaign. Air tactical missions were not even allowed to strike stockpiled SAMs in the North due to political decisions and domestic US pressures.

Cobalt wrote:
While the misdeeds of the Nazis were lamented ad nauseum, B-52 bombers blanket and firebombed the rural populations in Vietnam causing millions of deaths in an effort to pursue a victory by high" kill ratio" and "enemy bodycounts".


Again, this is more nonsense. Which "rural populations": in the North or the South? If in the North, how did we count (we had no ground presence there); if in the South, why did we bomb them? Your "retribution"?

Did Viet Namese civilians die from US bombing? Yes, in both the South and the North, but if you are going state that it was US military policy to use B52 raids deliberately to exterminate the rural populations of both countries, you have yet to offer any evidence of said activity. Not even Hanoi has ever made such a claim, and they were eager to display to the world's press when a US bombing mission destroyed civilian assets such as schools or hospitals.

Apparently, this series of threads is to somehow link US bombing in Viet Nam to Nazi war crimes and the Holocaust as equivalent actions. Yet, B52 missions were neither directed at specifically rural populations, except in areas such as the I Corps theater, but then, those were enemy strongholds (there were 60,000 NVA troops plus all their logistical needs around Khe Sanh). The bombing campaigns were directed at military and infrastructure targets in the North, as infantry support, in areas in the South were the NVA and VC marshalled men and supplies, and along the infiltration supply routes from the North.

If you were a grunt in Viet Nam, you knew when the bombing was stopped and started. Especially in areas like the Ashau and the central highlands.

Now, if you wish to assert there were US war crimes in Viet Nam, please do so, but you have stated in several posts about the US military using a deliberate air campaign of targeting the rural populations of, I assume, both the South and North Viet Nam, quoting dead from the US and the French that far outnumber even Hanoi's own claims (over 21 years).

You do not use wings (not "fleets") of B52 bombers dropping 500 and 750 lb bombs (not "napalm") that are highly vulnerable to SAMs on tactical missions of carpet bombing villages and rice paddies for no conceivable purpose. And it did not happen, regardless of your assertions; even the North Viet Namese, ever so skilled in the political nuances, never made such claims.

Regards,

Mark

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speedy express

#130

Post by cobalt » 21 Jun 2002, 23:52

In response: It was not my intention to get into a squabble about statistics. I realize this has always been a favorite way to sidestep the issue at hand which was about lessons learned. I suggested that the effort of revisiting German attrocities has not produced a positive lesson. A prime example of that is the War in Vietnam.
I know there are still some hardliners who still try to justify that debocle as being a just war when it was no more than a frivolous adventure that was totally unnecessary. It was an outgrowth of the arrogance of power and the gun boat deplomacy that ran rampant at the time.
I have served in the US Air Force and am aware of a Wing of B-52s, but not everyone is familiar with military convention and jargon. I am also aware that napalm was dropped from A-1's and F-4's but the main point was that it was employed abundantly. I'm also aware that B-123s dropped 19 million gallons of Agent Orange which were supposed to be used as an antifoliant with the added ''benefit" of destroying the rice crops. It has left large areas of Vietnam contaminated with Dioxins and has produced approx 1 million (verified) deformed births not to mention the high incidences of cancer and nervous system deseases.
The point of all this is that the US has not assumed responsibility for her actions, supposedly one of the lessons I earlier referred to.

If there is still any doubt that the war was conducted to "cull" the rural population I want to draw your attention to an article in Newsweek called "Pacification's Deadly Price" (June 19, 1972) which describes "Operation Speedy express" and the indiscriminate killing of civilians by the US Ninth Division. This happened after B-52 raids on the region. The Helicopter gunships massacred civilians with the motto "Kill 'em before they get to their guns" or "killing is our business and business is good". This is only one episode of many.

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OPERATION: MILITARY TARGETS...

#131

Post by Scott Smith » 22 Jun 2002, 01:57

Mark, by your own figures millions of civilians were killed in the North and the South, and that excludes the military killed and wounded in Vietnam.

Those are millions more than would have perished if the United States had not gotten involved in this colonial can-of-worms. And how did any of those civilians in the North die other than by bombing? The U.S. military never tried to invade the North, as was needed to win, because it would spook China, as happened with the Korean conflict.

Instead, the wise-men tried to win by combat attrition in the South after the CIA's "insurrgent war" and later war of "assassination of VC cadre" didn't work, and least not as long as support came from other Communist superpowers likewise feeding the vortex.

Your position, as I understand it, is that the U.S. bombing campaigns did not deliberately target civilians, and therefore it was not genocidal and shouldn't be compared with anything from WWII.

Well, the RAF bombing campaign in WW II was aimed at maximizing civilian carnage in order to put political pressure on the enemy. This revolt never happened in part because Nazi civil defense was very good. However, the policy of the U.S. Army Air Force in WWII was not actually to kill civilians but to hit "military targets," and thus, civilian deaths were just an unlucky happy-outcome. Same with Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It is interesting that the conventional firebombing attacks on Japan closely resembled genocidal RAF tactics in Germany.

Similarly, in Vietnam, with millions of deaths from "collateral damage," I find it a stretch that this is not comparable in any way to a Holocaust. Dead Vietnamese probably don't care that the Jews have coopted THE word, HOLOCAUST™. They may not have been gassed in ovens or basements but they still died as a result of American imperialism--sticking our noses into conflicts where we don't belong and thus magnifying the carnage. Mass-murder is okay as long as it plays well in Peoria. :wink:

But let's not forget the genocidal carpet bombing of North Korea with our venerable B-29s, another war at the wrong place at the wrong time and against the wrong enemy--a direct legacy of our muddled WWII diplomacy. I wonder how many Godless North Korean civilians and North Korean and Chinese soldiers were killed north of the 38th parallel...

Best Regards,
Scott

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#132

Post by cobalt » 22 Jun 2002, 20:51

A few more things I like to add here in response to Tarpon's input:
The reasons for the terror campaign by the US forces against the rural population in Vietnam was clearly stated in the report I referenced. And B-52 carpet bombing tactics were indeed employed particularly in "free fire zones" where anything was free game as the name implies.
Tarpon also seems to imply that US forces were somehow restricted by domestic politics to pursue the war more efficiently. This is a myth.
Equally laughable was the claim that the war was intended to "win the hearts and minds of the people in Vietnam". This, as it turned out, was the palatable part of that slogan intended for public consumption. A sign in the Nixon Whitehouse read: "You can win their hearts and minds--------when you have 'em by the balls", and crudely expressed the cynicism regarding the conduct of that war at the highest level of government. It leaves little doubt how this attitude translated and filtered down to the so called strict "rules of engagement".
There was one simple and painless way for the US to to do the right thing, and that was a rapid and clean withdrawal, but the arrogance of power would not allow it.
This war is also a an example that the horrors inflicted by humans on other humans are not motivated by ideology but by arrogance, egotism and obsessive pride by the wrong type of people in position of authority. Sadly enough, this can happen in an autocratic or, as it was clearly demonstrated, in a democratic form of government.

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#133

Post by Tarpon27 » 23 Jun 2002, 13:09

Scott wrote:
Mark, by your own figures millions of civilians were killed in the North and the South, and that excludes the military killed and wounded in Vietnam.[/

The figures I quoted were from Hanoi, and I chose them deliberately to use the communist government's claims of dead vs. other estimates to make the point that not even Hanoi makes the claims of civilian dead that Cobalt does, and that the figures are over a period of 21 years, while US bombing was in place for roughly seven years.

I do not claim that Hanoi's figures are accurate, and during the US war years, casuality figures were deliberately misstated by the North for political reasons (they were underestimated); you also may wish to consider that in the NVA order of battle, removal of NVA dead from the field had a higher priority than a removal of their wounded, again for political reasons (US domestic politics).

I also have no idea how Hanoi totaled its civilian dead...does the 2 million in the South include the North's almost immediate violation of the Paris Peace Accords, and its invasion of the South? The pacification of resistance in the North to the Viet Minh, keeping in mind that in the forties and the fifties some have estimated one million Viet Namese fled the North's communists, and that another one million have left since the mid-seventies? Or the programs of the NLF in the South, eliminating intellectuals, priests, teachers, those opposed to the communists, or the 2,800 killed and 5,000 or so missing in Hue after Tet?

Those are millions more than would have perished if the United States had not gotten involved in this colonial can-of-worms. And how did any of those civilians in the North die other than by bombing?

I am somewhat confused here Scott; your usual finely honed sense of skepticism over historical accounts appears to have taken holiday.

"Knowing" you as I do from this forum, do you actually believe that US bombing killed the 3-4 million Cobalt claimed, along with his "millions" killed by the years of French rule in Indochina?

Who says, besides Hanoi (and Cobalt), that 4 million civilians in the North and the South were killed by US bombing missions? If you stop and comtemplate that number, and that charge, does it make any sense whatsoever, given the use of propaganda claims by Hanoi during the war years, and secondly, have you read anything on the bombing campaigns and the timeline here?

In March of 1965, the Marine Expeditionary Force landed in-country in Da Nang, numbering 4,000. General Paul Harkness had set-up MACV in '64, with 4,000 men. During the years from 1965 to 1972, the US had several bombing operations that were started, then halted, under civilian control, with very specific ROE ("rules of engagement") per targeting and even tactics.

In December of 1972, the final bombing campaign, Linebacker II, was ordered by Nixon to force the North Vietnamese back to the Paris peace talks. It lasted 12 days; in late January of 1973 the peace accords were signed; it worked. In '72, de-escalation and Vietnamization of the war had ended all ground operations by US forces, with 60,000 US military still in country...advisers, technical specialists, MPs, helocopter crews.

To clarify, while Hanoi claims 4 million dead from 1954 to 1975, are you agreeing that US forces killed 4 million from 1965 to 1972? Do you likewise claim that, indeed, 2 million North Vietnamese were killed in the US bombing campaigns?
Your position, as I understand it, is that the U.S. bombing campaigns did not deliberately target civilians, and therefore it was not genocidal and shouldn't be compared with anything from WWII.

To clarify: my position is that in earlier posts on Viet Nam and bombing, Cobalt has made statements that are, in my opinion, nonsensical.

Again, Scott, if you wish to assert that the bombing campaigns of Viet Nam were "genocidal", and deliberately designed to kill civilians, please do so. Cobalt's posts certainly imply the bombing was deliberately designed to kill civilians and was also retribution, while at the same time saying it was directed at rural populations. As a practical matter, tell me of an air war campaign designed to kill the maximum number of civilians that was aimed at sparsely populated rural areas; perhaps you may understand why I have some skepticism over these assertions.

I do not object to comparing the history of bombing in Viet Nam to the history of WWII bombing; I object to the specious claims made, including these:

Cobalt wrote:
1. The French form of colonialism was particularly ruthless and exacted millions of lives in Indochina alone.

2. The worst form of hipocracy I have experienced was in the US during the Vietnam War. While the misdeeds of the Nazis were lamented ad nauseum, B-52 bombers blanket and firebombed the rural populations in Vietnam causing millions of deaths in an effort to pursue a victory by high" kill ratio" and "enemy bodycounts".

3. TW: the retribution ratio in the Vietnam war was more than 60 to 1. This is about within Mr. Roberto's ballpark. Of course, the retribution was carried out by B-52 bombers carrying 500 pound bombs and napalm dropped in raids after raids.

4. As far as the 60 to 1 ratia is concerned, it is a ballpark figure based on an estimate of aprox. 3 to 4 million civilians having been killed in Vietnam. Laos and Cambodia by US bombing raids and aprox. 40 to 45 thousand US sodiers being killed by enemy action.

5. The US military pretty much follows corporate structure in which goals are outlined and carried out. The order is given to get rid of a problem and "don't tell me how you do it, just get it done." In contrast to the German chain of command where orders were very specific, in the US decisions are made in a way which provides lots of room for denials by the upper echelons whenever the need should arise.At least that is how it was during the Vietnam war.

Scott wrote:
Similarly, in Vietnam, with millions of deaths from "collateral damage," I find it a stretch that this is not comparable in any way to a Holocaust.

Well, the first "stretch" is your apparent unquestioned belief that "...millions of deaths from 'collateral damage'..." is actually factual.

You apparently have no doubt of it, and therefore, it is a valid comparison not to WWII bombing military campaigns and debate over war crimes, but that it is comparable to "...a Holocaust".

Best regards,

Mark

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Bombing or Genocide...

#134

Post by Scott Smith » 23 Jun 2002, 15:16

Mark, I do not know how many were killed in the war or by the U.S. bombings as I am not an expert on the Vietnam War. I agree that the bombing put diplomatic pressure on the North Vietnamese. I vaguely recall ex-POW Senator McCain (R-AZ) who is an advocate of reconciliation with Vietnam using the figure of two-million dead but I may be mistaken, and so might he.

As far as skepticism, I do not find the notion that the U.S. killed at least two-million Vietnamese (North and/or South) by air particularly hard to believe, nor that 5.1 million Jews perished by all means during WWII. I really do not like to use the term Genocide, particularly in war, because it depends on whose ox is being gored. Wars DO kill people.

Best Regards,
Scott

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#135

Post by Tarpon27 » 23 Jun 2002, 15:39

To start, I refer to an earlier post:

Cobalt wrote:
]In response: It was not my intention to get into a squabble about statistics. I realize this has always been a favorite way to sidestep the issue at hand which was about lessons learned. I suggested that the effort of revisiting German attrocities has not produced a positive lesson. A prime example of that is the War in Vietnam.
This is not a "squabble about statastics"; while you have indeed made claims involving numbers, you have yet to source any of them, and normally on such forums as this, readers appreciate some documentation of claims.

It is also not an attempt to "...sidestep the issue at hand..." on your thesis of "lessons learned".

Your contention is that examining the history of Nazi Germany (as an example) has not prevented future conflict or the inevitable devastation of armed conflict, and your "proof" apparently is your claims made about the air war in Viet Nam.

My problem is that I find your posted "proof" of your thesis, using Viet Nam, is opinionated hyperbole.

]I know there are still some hardliners who still try to justify that debocle as being a just war when it was no more than a frivolous adventure that was totally unnecessary. It was an outgrowth of the arrogance of power and the gun boat deplomacy that ran rampant at the time.
If you are trying to label me as a "hardliner" on my views on Viet Nam, you are mistaken; if not, then forgive me an inability to accurately interpret the post.


The reasons for the terror campaign by the US forces against the rural population in Vietnam was clearly stated in the report I referenced.

I assume you refer to the _Newsweek_ article, "Pacification's Deadly Price", June 19, 1972, pp. 42-43.

Normally, relevant quotes, a post of the article, or a URL is appreciated so that others may view the materials. It is online at:

http://www.chss.montclair.edu/english/f ... ckley.html

A few more things I like to add here in response to Tarpon's input:
The reasons for the terror campaign by the US forces against the rural population in Vietnam was clearly stated in the report I referenced.
The report deals with a _Newsweek_ reporter's article, published in June of 1972, on Operation Speedy Express which began on December 1, 1968, and ran until May 31, 1969. The article estimates 5,000 civilians died in the seven months of the operation.

Interestingly enough, Cobalt, Buckley also states this:

[...]

It has now become generally accepted that the American use of massive firepower has caused the deaths of thousands of innocent civilians – perhaps, some U.S. officials admit privately, as many as 100,000. Aside from such aberrant incidents as the massacre at My Lai, the commonly cited culprit is "indiscriminate use of firepower," a phrase that means American military recklessness. But in my opinion, the U.S. military has been guilty of more than recklessness. It can, I believe, be documented that thousands of Vietnamese civilians have been killed deliberately by U.S. forces.

[...]

http://www.chss.montclair.edu/english/f ... ckley.html


Writing in 1972, when the ground war involving American troops was finished, in an article that is quite explicit as to Buckley's findings of deaths of civilians, he mentions a figure mentioned privately, that US fire may be responsible for as many as 100,000 civilian deaths in the South. As bad as that is, it is certainly nothing close to your claims of 3-4 million, nor are they solely killed by bombing missions.

Christopher Hitchens has written a book on Kissinger, in which he directly accuses Kissinger of war crimes; here is a quote from a review:
On the exact point of war crimes, Hitchens’ case is not airtight. Take the deadly “Operation Speedy Express,” for instance, carried out under Kissinger’s watch. In the first six months of 1969, U.S. troops “cleansed” the civilian population of Kien Hoa, in the Mekong Delta. Perhaps 5,000 civilians died — a death toll, Newsweek reported, that “made the My Lai massacre look trifling by comparison.” Although “Speedy Express” had been hatched in the Johnson administration, Hitchens argues, “We can be sure that the political leadership in Washington was not unaware” of the atrocities. “Indeed,” he goes on, “the degree of micro-management revealed in Kissinger’s memoirs quite forbids the idea that anything of importance took place without his knowledge or permission.” But this, as lawyers say, is hardly dispositive.
http://www.laweekly.com/ink/01/23/wls-goldin.shtml

And B-52 carpet bombing tactics were indeed employed particularly in "free fire zones" where anything was free game as the name implies.
Ahhh, we can, perhaps, reach some agreement. "Free Fire Zones" were again the product of what you deny occur: the Rules of Engagement in Viet Nam. Lewis Simons was a combat correspondent in Viet Nam who wrote a book, _Crimes of War_. Simons on free fire zones:

Free Fire Zones
By Lewis M. Simons

In the mid-1960s, when I was covering the war in Vietnam for the Associated Press, U.S. commanders were issued wallet-size cards bearing the warning to “use your firepower with care and discrimination, particularly in populated areas.” Often, these cards ended up in a pocket of a pair of tropical fatigues, where they remained, ignored, for the duration of the bearer’s tour of duty.

The intention of the Department of Defense in issuing the cards was to help prevent jittery U.S. soldiers from mistakenly, or intentionally, declaring a suspect village a “free fire zone,” then destroying it and its residents. All too often, postmortem investigations revealed that such zones had been peaceful and should not have been assaulted. This type of incident with its attendant hostile publicity—My Lai was perhaps the most infamous, if not necessarily the most egregious—was a recurring nightmare of the military high command and a succession of U.S. administrations.

But the cards only served to accent official naiveté. In reality, U.S. troops in Vietnam seldom knew with any certainty which villages were friendly, siding with the Americans and their Saigon-based allies, and which supported the Hanoi-backed Viet Cong Communist guerrillas.

The practice of establishing free fire zones was instituted because many villages in what was then South Vietnam willingly provided safe haven to Viet Cong fighters. Some, by contrast, were forcibly occupied by marauding bands of guerrillas, who used the villages for cover. Many more were devotedly anti-Communist. Yet, the American forces often had fundamental difficulty in distinguishing among any of these villagers. The fact that the guerrillas commonly dressed in black cotton pajama-style outfits, like those worn by most Vietnamese peasants, served only to heighten the confusion.

But despite the GIs’ confusion, international law enjoins armies to avoid targeting any but military objectives and assures protection to civilians, in almost any circumstance. Free fire zones as defined by Department of Defense doctrine and the rules of engagement are a severe violation of the laws of war for two reasons. First, they violate the rule against direct attack of civilians by presuming that after civilians are warned to vacate a zone, then anyone still present may lawfully be attacked. The rule prohibiting direct attacks on civilians provides no basis for a party to a conflict to shift the burden by declaring a whole zone to be “civilian free.” And second, they violate the rule against indiscriminate attack by presuming without justification in the law that warning civilians to leave eliminates the legal requirements to discriminate in targeting its weapons.

Where the protection of the Geneva Conventions does not provide a mantle to civilians is when they take “a direct part in hostilities.” There were, of course, occasions when Vietnamese civilians directly attacked U.S. troops, but those which drew the attention of news reporters were overwhelmingly those in which a village was labeled a free fire zone and innocent lives were taken in outbursts of indiscriminate fire and brutality.

Faced with this negative coverage and with severe difficulty in enforcing international laws limiting the imposition of free fire zones, as well as other elements of the rules of engagement, the Pentagon over time added more directives to its pocket cards: a village could not be bombed without warning even if American troops had received fire from within it; a village known to be Communist could be attacked only if its inhabitants were warned in advance; only once civilians had been removed could a village be declared a free fire zone and shelled at will.

According to an article by Maj. Mark S. Martens of the U.S. Army’s Judge Advocate-General’s Corps and a distinguished graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, Oxford University, and Harvard Law School, all these rules were “radically ineffective.” Often they were simply ignored. In some cases, illiterate peasants couldn’t understand leaflets dropped to warn them that their villages would soon become a free fire zone. In other cases, hurried, forcible evacuations left large numbers of defenseless civilians behind, to be killed by bombing, shelling, small arms assaults, or burning. “The only good village,” went one bit of cynical GI wisdom, “is a burned village.”

Ineffective efforts to rein in the GIs’ propensity to create free fire zones in Vietnam resulted in a sense among many Vietnamese as well as Americans that U.S. forces were undisciplined. More important, perhaps, the widely touted grand plan to capture the “hearts and minds” of the Vietnamese was immeasurably diminished by the perception—let alone the outbreaks of reality—that Americans did not value Vietnamese lives.

Toward the end of the 1960s, the term free fire zone itself was dropped from the U.S. military lexicon in no small part because that doctrine embraced actions that the United States today would regard as illegal. Subsequent U.S. military manuals and rules of engagement, whether for ground, air, or naval forces, tend to track quite closely with the central principle of international humanitarian law on civilian immunity and the prohibition on the targeting of civilians.
http://www.crimesofwar.org/thebook/free-fire-zones.html

Tarpon also seems to imply that US forces were somehow restricted by domestic politics to pursue the war more efficiently. This is a myth.
Really? A myth? Your original contention was on bombing; the air war.

The Effects Of Restrictive Rules Of Engagement On The Rolling Thunder
Air Campaign

CSC 1995

SUBJECT AREA - Aviation

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: The Effects of Restrictive ROEs on the Rolling Thunder Air Campaign
Author: Major Matthew J. Dorschel, United States Air Force

Thesis: The ROEs that were in place for the Rolling Thunder air campaign were overly restrictive and made the conduct of the air campaign inefficient and hampered its effectiveness.

Background: The air war over North Vietnam has been at the center of many heated debates on the proper application of air power and how it should be used and controlled. Rolling Thunder provides an excellent example of how difficult the task of planning and executing a successful air campaign is. Restrictive rules of engagement were put in place for Rolling Thunder chiefly due to the fear of escalation and direct involvement of the Soviet Union or China in the war. The goals of the air campaign were limited and President Johnson hoped to achieve results through tightly controlled, applied pressure on the N. Vietnamese government. The controls however, violated accepted air doctrine and tied the hands of the military commanders that were tasked to meet the arduous objective of the campaign. Rolling Thunder barely achieved any of the desired results -- restrictive rules of engagement undoubtedly played a major part in the failure of U.S air power in this singular black mark on the record of American military aviation.

Recommendation: US leaders must evaluate national objectives in future wars and decide if they can be met with military means. Then, rules of engagement must allow those tasked to accomplish the mission, to do so in a way consistent with proven doctrine and strategy. As Desert Storm illustrated, airpower can achieve decisive results without restrictive rules of engagement.

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Rolling Thunder ROE: -- Violation of Doctrine

Restrictive ROEs not only made it difficult to damage the most important targets in North Vietnam, they had an equally negative affect on the commanders and aircrews that were tasked to plan and fight with the tight restrictions. Civilian leaders believed that the restrictions were necessary to keep the war limited and achieve the objectives of reducing the supply flow and sending a clear message to North Vietnam leaders; they imposed the restrictions hoping that the threat of future destruction would force North Vietnam to thenegotiation table.5 This philosophy was not embraced by military planners and aircrews who felt it was in violation of their training and contrary to Air Force doctrine.

U.S. Military planners and airmen realized that the limited style of warfare they were fighting was not producing the needed results. Air commanders proposed a set of tasks that was designed to achieve decisive results and reduce the war-making capability of North Vietnam. They wanted to disrupt external assistance being provided to North Vietnam and impede the flow of supplies into the south, and directly attack the resources, facilities, and operations in North Vietnam which were contributing the most to the enemy's war effort.6 However, civilian leaders were not convinced and the ROEs that protected these targets were kept while weak blows to the North Vietnamese periphery continued. The fear inside the beltway was that a more efficient air campaign would risk unacceptable civilian losses and collateral damage.

The disagreement between the military and civilian leaders continued throughout the Vietnam War, partly due to a mistrust that civilian leaders had for military leaders. The president and his advisors often disregarded the advice of military experts, believing that: "Generals know only two words: spend and bomb."7 The often referred to Tuesday lunches at the White House (where President Johnson did much of the planning and targeting for the air campaign) did not even regularly include the chairman of the JCS until late 1967.8

Due to the lack of military expertise, the targeting and planning effort was weak and very ineffective. There was never a lack of significant targets in North Vietnam, but aircrews were forced to fly against seemingly insignificant targets and even re-attack destroyed targets, while SAM sites and MiG airfields were off limits until 1967.9 The JCS target list was virtually ignored and targets remained protected for almost all of the Rolling Thunder campaign. Two of the most significant target areas on the list were Hanoi and Haiphong; targets in these areas could only be attacked if approved by LBJ's Tuesday lunch group. Often, these targets were approved for short periods or during periods of poor weather, which made it difficult (if not impossible) to achieve any desired effect.

Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara testified before Congress in 1967, in response to the targeting questions and stated that the targets influencing operations in South Vietnam were the roads and material moving over these roads. McNamara's testimony was an attempt to explain U.S. policy; he insisted that other North Vietnam targets were not fundamental to the operations in South Vietnam.10 Many military commanders disagreed with this assessment to no avail, "the President and the Secretary of Defense continued to make the final decisions on what targets were authorized, the size and frequency of sorties, and in many instances even the tactics used by the American pilots."11

Another restriction that tied the hands of American military commanders was the ROE that restricted the use of the B-52 in North Vietnam. This weapon had great range, armament capacity, and it struck fear into the enemy like no other weapon; it was extremely effective in South Vietnam. The B-52 was prohibited from extensive use in Rolling Thunder because civilian authorities believed it would have signaled a higher level of escalation, and that it might cause Chinese or Soviet intervention.12 This prohibitive measure to maintain the limited objectives of the war denied air commander from using the principal of mass, and forced them to fly multiple fighter sorties where one B-52 would have accomplished the job more effectively.

The crews that flew the aircraft found the ROEs not only overly restrictive but extremely complicated, confusing, and difficult to learn and remember. The list of restrictions and limitations was so long and changed so often that they were difficult to comprehend on the ground, much less remember and keep straight while in a fast moving combat situation.13 Crews depended on daily study and on radar controllers to keep them from violations of the complex ROEs, and from flying where they might not be able todefend even when fired on.

Several incidents of ROE violations led to court-martial charges; one that led to charges against the commander and the aircrew was the strafing of the Soviet ship Turkestan in 1967 near Haiphong.14 Fear of ROE violations and the consequences of them led to a dilemma; many aircrews felt as if they could not accomplish their mission without either getting killed by the enemy or brought up on court-martial charges by their own governrnent.15

American air losses over North Vietnam rose continuously with over 500 aircraft lost during 1966 and 1967. Crews began to see that it was highly unlikely they would survive a 100-mission tour in Southeast Asia.16 Many of these losses resulted from restrictions against attacking SAM sites or other significant targets in or around populated areas. The ROE restrictions allowed the North Vietnamese to continuously build up their air defense systems in the most critical areas of the region (with Hanoi being the most significant). The combination of restrictive ROEs and the heavy enemy air defenses made the job of air commanders and each aircrew member more difficult than it should have been.

North Vietnam Exploits U.S. ROE:

The restrictive ROEs in North Vietnam aided the enemy by providing sanctuaries and restricted areas where they had the space and time to build up their air defenses to engage U.S. aircraft. The piecemeal approach to attacks in North Vietnam did not allow concentrated bombing and actually strengthened the will of the North Vietnamese as opposed to weakening it. American leaders made it clear in public statements that we had no intention of destroying the government of North Vietnam; the leaders in North Vietnam saw this as an opportunity to exploit an American weakness.17

The most significant restricted areas that provided sanctuary were the 30 mile area around Hanoi, the 10 mile area around Haiphong, and a 25 to 30 mile "buffer zone" along the Chinese border. These sanctuaries prevented attacks against key targets in the north without prior approval from Washington. The North Vietnamese took advantage of this by offsetting the damage done by our aircraft in non-protected areas. Because Haiphong Harbor was a safe port, they were able to ship up to 85% of their war goods by sea and download them with impunity 24 hours a day at that location.18 These safe havens allowed the enemy to stockpile war materials until they could be moved to the south.

The "buffer zone" along the Chinese border was thousands of square miles where the North Vietnamese could store and transport materials with no fear of U.S. attack. This made any attempts at reducing the ability of the enemy to sustain their combat operations almost futile.
The enemy also took advantage of the restrictions in areas where attacks might result in civilian casualties. North Vietnamese put air defense systems and war materials in or near populated areas to protect them. Because of improvements in air defense systems, the enemy was able to effectively identify/target U.S. aircraft from these sanctuaries. Even when U.S. intelligence showed these areas to be crowded with supplies (and a legitimate target according to the laws of war), ROEs prevented our aircraft from hitting them.19

When restrictions were lifted in some areas (1967) any collateral damage was used by the enemy as a propaganda tool to charge the U.S. with indiscriminate bombing of innocent people. Exaggerated reports of collateral damage were effective in destroying the already decaying support for U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

Because U.S. airmen were required to positively identify targets, they were normally restricted to fly during the day and in periods of good weather. When the enemy realized this they took advantage by concentrating forces and materials in protected areas during the day, and moving at night or during periods of poor weather. They were able to do this in part because of the relatively short distances between prohibited areas; large quantities of rolling stock could be moved the short distances at night or in periods of lousy weather.

Possibly the greatest advantage that restrictive ROEs gave the enemy was time. The ability of the enemy to build up their air defenses was due in large part to the freedom of movement they enjoyed in the havens protected by ROEs. The air defense system in North Vietnam was almost non-existent in 1965, but by the end of 1967 it became one of the most complete and sophisticated systems in the world. SAM sites increased from 15 in 1965 to 270 by 1968; missiles fired from these sites increase from 200 in 1965 to almost 3,500 in 1967. The number of AAA guns grew from 700 in 1965 to over 7,400 in spring of 1968.20

The predictable nature of the American offensive also gave a distinct advantage to the enemy in Southeast Asia; because of restrictions on where aircraft could fly -- the North Vietnamese knew our likely routes and concentrated their defenses is these areas. The redundancy of the attacks allowed the enemy to predict with measured success what the most likely targets were and when they would be hit.

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5 Department of Defense Pentagon Papers, Senator Gravel ed. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971-1972). p388.

6 Drake, Ricky J., The Rules of Defeat: The Impact of Aerial Rules of Engagement on USAF Operations in North Vietnam, 1965-1968. Air University Press, 1993. p 20.

7 Gelb Leslie H., & Richard K. Betts., The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked. (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1979) p 137.

8 Broughton, Jacksel M., Going Downtown: The War against Hanoi and Washington. (New York:Pocket Books. 1990). p 90.

9 Broughton, Jacksel M., Thud Ridge. (New York: Bantam Books, 1985), p 6.

10 McNamara, Robert S., Text of Hearings before Armed Services Committee on Air War Against N. Vietnam, Part 4. (90th congress, 1st session, 25 August 1967), p 278.

11 Momyer, William W., Airpower in Three Wars. (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Air Force. 1978). p 19.

12 Schlight John., The War in South Vietnam: The Years of the Offensive, 1965 - 1968. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1988). p 49.

13 Broughton, Jacksel M., Going Downtown: The War against Hanoi and Washington. (New York: Pocket Books, 1990), p 202.

14 Broughton. Jacksel M., Thud Ridge. (New York: Bantam Books, 1985), p 261.

15 Basil, G.I., Pak Six: (Associated Creative Writers, 1982). p 93-94.

16 Broughton, Jacksel M., Going Downtown: The War against Hanoi and Washington. (New York: Pocket Books, 1990),p 179.

17 Parks, W. Hays, Rolling Thunder and the Law of War. (Air University Review, Jan-Feb, 1982), p 3.

18 Sharp, Ulysses S. Grant., Report on the War in Vietnam. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1968),p3.

19 Sharp, Ulysses S. Grant., Strategy for Defeat: Vietnam in Retrospect. (San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1968), p 118-119.

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http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ ... 995/DM.htm


Regards,

Mark

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