A thought

[michael mills]

Taking away the cultural, religious, and most of all, the political reasons why both the US and Japan had little choice in the matter of ending the war, I find it difficult to understand why several million Americans and Japanese needed to die when a weapon was available that could end the fighting and posturing in a matter of days, and not months of what would have been the bloodiest fighting of WWII.

There were three real reasons why the two atomic bombs were dropped on Japanese cities, and saving lives was not one of them.

The reasons were:

1. To test the effectiveness of the new weapon - for that reason, both Hiroshima and Nagasaki had been spared conventional bombing, so that the effects of atomic bombing could be accurately measured.

2. To intimidate the Soviet Union.

3. To knock Japan out before the Soviet Union could come into the war and occupy Japanese territory.

At Yalta, the Soviet Union had promised to enter the war against Japan at the latest three months after the end of the war in Europe. The surrender of the German forces to the Soviet Union had occurred on 9 May, so the Soviet Union was due to attack Japan on 9 August.

By the end of July 1945, the US Government knew that the Soviet Union was about to attack Japan, in accordance with its Yalta promise. It also knew that Japan was on its last legs, and that the Red Army attacked, the Japanese forces would immediately crumble, allowing the red Army to sweep down through Manchuria and Korea and to invade Kyushu in the south, and to sweep down through Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands and invade Hokkaido in the north. The US Government needed to force Japan to surrender to the US alone, thereby depriving the Soviet Union of any excuse for invading, and allowing the US to be the sole occupying force (with token representation from the Western Allies). The US wanted Japan as an aircraft carrier for the coming war with the Soviet Union, then seen as inevitable by the US military.

The scenario foreseen by the US Government did come to pass. The Red Army attacked on 9 August, one day after the dropping of the bomb om Hiroshima, and the million-strong Kanto Army collapsed almost immediately. The Red Army swept to the south of Korea. It also occupied Southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands, and was on the point of landing on Hokkaido. If Japan had not surrendered at that point, the Red Army would have landed on Kyushu and Hokkaido and may well have occupied the whole of the country before US forces could get close to the place.

The rapid collapse of the Kanto Army and the occupation of Manchuria, Japan's last industrial base, and the occupation almost without opposition of Sakhalin and the southern Kuriles, which were regarded as part of the Japanese homeland, give the lie to the claim that there would have been fanatical resistance costing millions of casualties to any landing on the Japanese mainland. The partial extermination of the civilian population of Okinawa by the sub-humans of the US Marine Corps had probably extinguished the will to resist of the Japanese people.

[Roberto]

The rapid collapse of the Kanto Army and the occupation of Manchuria, Japan's last industrial base, and the occupation almost without opposition of Sakhalin and the southern Kuriles, which were regarded as part of the Japanese homeland, give the lie to the claim that there would have been fanatical resistance costing millions of casualties to any landing on the Japanese mainland.

When were Sakhalin and the southern Kuriles occupied? Before or after the dropping of the atomic bombs? Before or after Japan had communicated its willingness to surrender?

The partial extermination of the civilian population of Okinawa by the sub-humans of the US Marine Corps had probably extinguished the will to resist of the Japanese people.

Or bolstered it and provided a foretaste of what was to be expected in the event of an American invasion of the Japanese homelands, as the suicidal defense of Iwo Jima and other islands in the Pacific had before. As to the “partial extermination”, what evidence is there that the invaders not only fought without any regard whatsoever for the fate of the civilian population – which they undoubtedly did – but also deliberately killed Okinawan civilians in considerable numbers?

[Tarpon27]

Scott Smith wrote:
The only reason that an immediate invasion of Japan was deemed necessary was because the Soviets were entering the Japanese war (to fulfill their treaty obligations) and Truman's diplomatic and military geniuses realized that the Communists were poised to inherit half of Asia from the Japanese. OOPS!

Considering that the US and Britian did not even consult with Russia in releasing the Potsdam proclamation, nor was the US unaware that an invasion of Japan was going to be almost a completely US operation (Churchill remarks on the amount of US casualities and the related small exposure of the British), Russia most certainly wanted a blockade and protracted end to the war to consolidate or gain new territory.

On the other hand, the Russians were reticent in information about the talks with Japan.

Per a Russian invasion of Japan, in August of 1945 the Russians entered the Aisan fray be invading Manchuria, the last hope of military production for the Japanese. They also made amphibious landings on the islands of Sakhalin (August 12, 1945) and Shumushu (August 18, 1945).

OF course, they did so with American equipment. Russian sailors went to Cold Bay, Alaska under the code name HULA, for training on their new vessels. The escort ships were to be US Navy vessels, under command of (Frank) Jack Fletcher, but the landing craft forces and close support escort (28 frigates were transferred to the Russian Navy) were to be Russian manned and commanded. These vessels did indeed land Russian forces on some of the Northern Kuriles, and did so as occupiers after Japan's surrender.

However, the threat of a large Russian amphibious operation depended entirely on the supply of US naval assets to enable it to even occur.

How many amphibious operations did Russia commit in WWII?

In the 1960s Cold War, there came a school of thought to certain revisionist ( a term far different than our use of it usually here) historians that the use of the atomic bombs was a display of force to the Russians, which, to some extent, it undoubtably was. Whether that is the main reason, a postulate you apparently accept, is certainly subject to scrutiny.

It seems much more probable that politicians would view the non-use of a weapon costing a billion dollars and then not deploy it while instead putting 40% of all US military personnel (4.5 million) into an invasion where casualities were estimated at one million, would be political suicide. Dean Acheson, taking a hardline approach to the issue of the survival of the Emporer (a policy of a non-guarantee to the Japanese, and he was not alone in Truman's inner circle) remarked after the war that his approach had been wrong and it appears to have been a political stance.

Again, American use of incendiaries killed ca. 80,000 in a single Tokyo raid, and raids on five of Japan's major cities produced 260,000 deaths alone prior to the atom bomb use. Targets were picked for atom bomb deployment as much for weather, although all had been bombed during the war. Nagaski was, in fact, the secondary target that day when weather precluded the primary target.

I also find your contention that blockading Japan and garrisoning troops was, as I recall, no "big deal", I guess, just a shrug. With two uncles in the Pacific, one for four years, and one for three, and after VE Day, it was a very "big deal" to Americans that the Pacific forces come home as rapidly as possible. In my family, my father was getting ready to leave the European theater after three years while his brothers stood a very real chance of getting killed or wounded (again) in the Pacific, creating domestic pressures on the Truman Administration you seem to find unimportant.

There was a multitude of forces, considerations, and political pressures in the attempt to end the Pacific war after the end of the European war, and I do not find the decision to use the Bomb as simplistic, obviously, as you do.

Nor do I consider it a war crime, especially in lieu of the amount of deaths that would undoubtably be many times greater in prolonging the war, and the Japanese would be the ones who would pay with far more blood.

Regards,

Mark

[Roberto]

The USSBS Summary Report for the Pacific war states (page 26, emphasis added):

On 6 August the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, and on 9 August Russia entered the war. In the succeeding meetings of the Supreme War Direction Council, the differences of opinion previously existing as to the Potsdam terms persisted exactly as before. By using the urgency brought about through fear of further atomic bombing attacks, the Prime Minister found it possible to bring the Emperor directly into the discussions of the Potsdam terms. Hirohito, acting as arbiter, resolved the conflict in favor of unconditional surrender.
The public admission of defeat by the responsible Japanese leaders, which constituted the political objective of the United States offensive begun in 1943, was thus secured prior to invasion and while Japan was still possessed of some 2,000,000 troops and over 9,000 planes in the home islands. Military defeats in the air, at sea and on the land, destruction of shipping by submarines and by air, and direct air attack with conventional as well as atomic bombs, all contributed to this accomplishment.
There is little point in attempting precisely to impute Japan's unconditional surrender to any one of the numerous causes which jointly and cumulatively were responsible for Japan's disaster. The time lapse between military impotence and political acceptance of the inevitable might have been shorter had the political structure of Japan permitted a more rapid and decisive determination of national policies. Nevertheless, it seems clear that, even without the atomic bombing attacks, air supremacy over Japan could have exerted sufficient pressure to bring about unconditional surrender and obviate the need for invasion.
Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts, and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated.

Source of quote:

http://www.anesi.com/bomb.htm

[Tarpon27]

Michael Mills wrote:

There were three real reasons why the two atomic bombs were dropped on Japanese cities, and saving lives was not one of them.

A statement, Mr. Mills, that I find borders on the extreme hyperbolic.

If you are seriously stating, as you appear to be, that in 1945 America, the Truman Administration, having landed the Presidency on the death of FDR, had ZERO consideration for the death toll to American soldiers, sailors, and pilots if an invasion was required of the Japanese islands, you are totally discounting the political pressures in the domestic US, let alone assigning the entire American government as being cynically completely unconcerned with the lives of its military.

The rapid collapse of the Kanto Army and the occupation of Manchuria, Japan's last industrial base, and the occupation almost without opposition of Sakhalin and the southern Kuriles, which were regarded as part of the Japanese homeland, give the lie to the claim that there would have been fanatical resistance costing millions of casualties to any landing on the Japanese mainland.

Conjecture and reading tea-leaves, let alone the advantage of the passage of six decades. It also completely ignores the death toll at Okinawa on April 1, and the nearly 3 months of fighting there, or the response of the Japanese when their main islands begin to be invaded, and without the dropping of two atom bombs that preceded the Russian landings in the Kuriles.

The partial extermination of the civilian population of Okinawa by the sub-humans of the US Marine Corps had probably extinguished the will to resist of the Japanese people.

"Sub-humans"?

Would that be the entire US Marine Corps, Mr. Mills? What a colorful phrase.

Mark

[michael mills]

Conjecture and reading tea-leaves, let alone the advantage of the passage of six decades. It also completely ignores the death toll at Okinawa on April 1, and the nearly 3 months of fighting there, or the response of the Japanese when their main islands begin to be invaded, and without the dropping of two atom bombs that preceded the Russian landings in the Kuriles.

Indeed, what was the response of the Japanese when their main islands began to be invaded? I do not recall reading about any substantial resistance. I doubt that it was news of the atomic bombing that had destroyed the Japanese will to resist the Soviet forces when they landed on the Kurile Islands. The Japanese simply did not have anything left to fight with, no fuel, hardly any ammunition.

It is likely that it was the collapse of Japanese resistance in the face of the Red Army that induced the Japanese Government to accept the terms offered by the United States (which were NOT unconditional surrender, since the Japanese State headed by the Emperor was allowed to reamin in existence) before the Red Army landed on the main islands.

"Sub-humans"?

Would that be the entire US Marine Corps, Mr. Mills? What a colorful phrase.

Indeed it is a colourful phrase. US naval personnel that I have talked all seem to consider it an adequate description of the US Marine Corps. I recall one telling me that it was useless asking marines questions since they did not have the power of human speech, hence their appellation "grunts".

[Tarpon27]

Indeed, what was the response of the Japanese when their main islands began to be invaded? I do not recall reading about any substantial resistance.

What "main islands" were invaded? Perhaps you misread my sentence's clause.

Indeed it is a colourful phrase. US naval personnel that I have talked all seem to consider it an adequate description of the US Marine Corps. I recall one telling me that it was useless asking marines questions since they did not have the power of human speech, hence their appellation "grunts".

Did those same US Naval personnel also claim those "sub-humans" were responsible for the "partial extermination" of civilians at Okinawa?

And "hence their appelation 'grunts'"...ROFL!

Now, even squids know better than that. Combat US foot soldiers, whether Army or Marine, are called "grunts", and it is for those who have seen combat. You may make your own determination on its merits and its use with that in mind.

And it also came into widespread use (note: common acceptance and usage) in my era, from the Viet Nam war.

Mark

[Victor´s Justice?]

Nor do I consider it a war crime, especially in lieu of the amount of deaths that would undoubtably be many times greater in prolonging the war, and the Japanese would be the ones who would pay with far more blood.

Mark, I understand completely your kind of justification toward the atom bombs over Japanese territory; indeed it is a very reasonable statement.

But warcrimes cannot be considered by the number of casualties (in reality or just estimated), but simply by the way war acts and war procedures are taken during such times.

So, as to the atom strategic bombing procedure, I would call it a warcrime just because it was a demonstration of power, and, much more importantly, a bombing over civilian populations which have nothing or very little to do with the WWII.

No doubt about the possible fierce will of resistance by the Japanese, but Mr. Mills was very keen to point out that no one CAN fight without the MEANS to fight.

A logistical breakdown was already under way in Japan (as what happened in Germany or other defeated countries, in the late times of WWII), so it was practically unnecessary to bomb 2 relatively unimportant cities of Japan, just to achieve inconditional surrender by the Emperor.

Following your argument of "Japs Never Surrender" to the last possible extent, the Emperor would simply fight ´till the end, until all territory was completely nuked, so I can´t agree with you on that, if this was true.

The taste of defeat and inevitability of surrender would be the same, either on the ground or by nuclear mushrooms, and don´t think Japs would have to face total obliteration, in order to surrender.

Just my thoughts, of course.

[tonyh]

>>...if an invasion was required of the Japanese islands<<

An invasion of the Japanese home Islands by the US was NOT required or necessary at all to end the war. Neither was dropping the A-bombs. As I said earlier in another post, the conventional bombing was doing just fine and was being carried out with impunity. The Country was completely blockaded. Nothing was getting in or out that the Allies did not know about and mass starvation was on the cards. The Japanese couldn't even use their fishing lanes. Surrender was absolutely inevitable and eventual. The Japanese war was over long before the official surrender was voiced.

Tony

[Roberto]

&#61623; The Survey assumed that continued conventional attacks on Japan -- with additional direct and indirect casualties -- would be needed to force surrender by the November or December dates mentioned;
&#61623; The Survey's estimate of Japan's likelihood of surrender without the atomic bombings, subject only to continued conventional attack, was based largely on information collected after the end of the war, and not known to decision makers in August, 1945;
&#61623; The Survey acknowledged that use of the atomic bombs hastened the end of the war; and
&#61623; The Survey did not, in any way, criticize the use of the atomic bombs or suggest that they were not the most humane and least costly means for ending the war. (They merely opined that Japan's surrender could have been achieved through conventional air power only; they did not say that the use of conventional air power would have been more merciful or less costly.)
Writers who question the wisdom of the atomic bombings ignore all these points. As a result, these writer impute to decision makers a knowledge they did not possess. These writers also fail to ask the obvious question: what casualties would have occurred if the United States had used only conventional air power to force Japan out of the war? Would they have been worse than those caused by the atomic bombings?
The following table lists the casualties of various kinds that would have occurred had the war been prolonged and unconditional surrender forced by conventional air power, instead of by the atomic bombs.
Souce of additional casualties Notes and Survey References
Japanese military and civilian casualties resulting from continued air attack. The Survey's pet scheme was to interdict transportation. It believed this would have "reduced Japan to a series of isolated communities, incapable of any sustained industrial production, incapable of moving food from the agricultural areas to the cities, and incapable of rapid large-scale movements of troops and munitions." (Summary Report, p. 19).
In addition, the Survey said, "In order to bring maximum pressure on the civilian population and to complicate further the Japanese economic problems, night and bad weather attacks on urban areas could have been carried out simultaneously with the transportation attack." (Summary Report, p. 20)
Given that 185,000 casualties were sustained during the first Tokyo attack on 9 March 1945 (Summary Report, p. 20), it seems likely that direct casualties from continued conventional bombardment would have exceeded those caused by the atomic bombs.
Civilian casualties from malnutrition and disease. "The average diet suffered even more drastically from reductions in fats, vitamins and minerals required for balance and adversely affected rates of recovery and mortality from disease and bomb injuries. Undernourishment produced a major increase in the incidence of beriberi and tuberculosis." (Summary Report, p.21)
Obviously significant casualties would have accrued, had the war been prolonged several months, from malnutrition and disease. (Remember that antibiotic treatment for tuberculosis and other bacterial infections was not available to Japanese civilians at that time.)
Japanese military casualties in bypassed areas. "In the Central Pacific, many of the islands the Japanese expected us to attack were bypassed, and the garrisons left to wither and die. Survey examination of the bypassed islands in the Pacific and interrogation of the Japanese survivors confirmed their intolerable situation. Their planes and ground installations were destroyed by air attack. Cut off from any supplies or reinforcements, except occasionally by submarine, their food ran out. On certain of the islands, Japanese actually ate Japanese." (Summary Report, p. 13)
Prolonging the war would have resulted in even greater suffering for these soldiers, and for any civilians unfortunate enough to be on the same islands.
Civilian casualties in Japanese-occupied areas. The savage mistreatment of civilians in Japanese-occupied China (e.g. germ warfare experiments and promiscuous slaughter of civilians) and French Indo-China (more slaughter, including the use of mustard gas) is well known. These areas were still in Japanese possession at the time of the Japanese surrender. Prolonging the war would have prolonged the agony of these civilian populations.
United States military casualties. Although those who criticize the use of the atomic bombs seem not to care at all about U.S. military casualties, the result of continuing the war for several additional months would have been substantial casualties -- from combat, tropical diseases, accidents and losses at sea.
Economic cost of continuing the war. False piety aside, war is a very expensive business, and delaying our demobilization by several months would have been very, very costly. I assume here that readers understand that human life cannot be viewed as priceless, and is not viewed so by any civilized country on earth.
This is probably the first time you have seen an analysis of this sort. This is because most historians and nearly all journalists couldn't analyze their way out of a paper bag. It's unfortunate, but it's true. Any attempt to enumerate and quantify the costs of various decision alternatives is beyond them.

Source of quote:

http://www.anesi.com/bomb.htm

I don’t necessarily agree with the opinions stated above, but they sure provide food for discussion.