Another link to an absolutely first-rate article on the historiography of the Nanjing Incident, written by an Australian scholar.
http://www.japanesestudies.org.uk/artic ... tml#_edn26
The article highlights the essentially fictional nature of much of Iris Chang's sensational book.
The author's conclusion is worth quoting:
A related trend is the recent attempt to overcome some of the limits of the mindsets that underlie much of the previous literature on Nanjing. For instance, one common (if subconscious) assumption that can be seen behind much of the English-language literature on Nanjing is the notion of Chinese as feminised and Orientalised "passive" non-actors. To give a single example, a large part of Nanjing was destroyed by fire during the early weeks of occupation. Despite the official Chinese scorched-earth policy, the well-known existence within the walls of Nanjing of large numbers of Chinese military personnel, and the fact that it was in the interests of the Japanese to maintain a viable urban centre once they had captured it (just as much as it was in the interests of the Chinese government to deny the Japanese this centre), this arson has long been implicitly if not explicitly assumed to be the sole responsibility of the Japanese. The examination of the possibility of a Chinese resistance movement within Nanjing also remains virgin territory. [30]
The existing literature has been very reluctant to examine certain topics that will (I suspect) increasingly become the focus of attention. For instance, the basic assumption that the Japanese were all evil and the Chinese all innocent victims, while emotionally satisfying, does not provide for a complete historical account. To reach a deeper understanding of the events in and around Nanjing, a number of disturbing questions will have to be asked. Was the Chinese decision to make a stand at Nanjing, despite the large numbers of civilians trapped within its walls, the correct one? Did the Chinese custom of using units of what were known as "plain-clothes soldiers" (soldiers fighting in civilian clothes) contribute to the execution of plain-clothed male civilians of weapons-carrying age? Did the Chinese military decision to change out of military uniform after Nanjing fell and hide among the civilian population contribute to such executions? Was the Japanese decision to execute men in civilian clothes found (in some cases at least) with weapons hiding among the civilian population legal? The English language literature here may well come into its own. The Japanese clearly would be extremely reluctant to tackle these issues, and many of these questions will remain taboo in the Chinese-language discourse for the foreseeable future. To ask these questions is not to deny the events that occurred in and around Nanjing, but merely to demonstrate that the causes of this incident are more complex than a black-and-white good-versus-evil position might initially assume.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have attempted to shed some light on the state of research of the Nanjing Incident today. In conclusion, I would like to make a number of points about researching Nanjing.
First, to put it mildly, Nanjing is a controversial topic. Although our understanding of the events of Nanjing do not even begin to approach our understanding of the holocaust, it is certainly possible to demonise anyone who budges from the orthodox position as being a denier on par with a David Irving. The problem is that the orthodox position is completely different in China and Japan, and within Japan itself there are three distinct orthodoxies. Although there is real debate in Japan, no one there now accepts the figure of 300,000 victims as plausible, while in China the figure is set in concrete (in both senses of the word) at the entrance of the Memorial for the Compatriot [Chinese] Victims of the Japanese Massacre in Nanjing. Unless the debate is to continue to run on parallel lines, never to come together to produce a deeper, more complete and transnational understanding of this historical event, this is not a situation to be welcomed. How to overcome it, on the other hand, poses a dilemma. As long as much of the debate is dominated by ideologues, the sensible option for historians may well be to keep their heads low and research other topics. That, however, cannot be a desirable outcome. Historians surely have an obligation to combat the trend to use Nanjing as a weapon in contemporary ideological and international contests.
Secondly, too many Japanese researchers in particular are either completely ignorant of, or do not care about, the fact that Nanjing for better or for worse has become a central plank in the construction of the modern self-identity of the Chinese. To discuss Nanjing is to threaten this self-identity. Once aware of this fact, all who participate in the debate need to show some sensitivity to it. I am not arguing that the Chinese orthodoxy needs to be accepted without question because the feelings of so many will be hurt if it is questioned. Indeed, I strongly believe that human beings have to come to terms with the "real" past and accept it, and that it is more dangerous (at least in the long term) to found national identity on a lie than to discover the truth and live with it. However, some effort does need to be made (on both extremes of the debate) to avoid the use of inflammatory language, and to show a much greater awareness of and sensitivity to the moral implications of historical inquiry.
Thirdly, as historians, it is our obligation to examine calmly the primary materials and reconstruct the history of Nanjing on the basis of what those materials say. Some clearly want to absolve the Japanese of all blame, while others want to depict the Japanese as a uniquely brutal and ruthless race. Neither position should form the starting point of any discussion of the events in Nanjing - although, of course, either might be the conclusion of any such examination. The publication of as many primary materials as possible is clearly a basic condition for this approach, so we need to encourage the discovery and publication of as much as possible.
Finally, a dialogue between historians working on the Nanjing Incident needs to be promoted. Again, I have great hopes for the forum provided by the English language, where researchers from both Japan and China can debate with researchers from third-party countries such as the USA, Canada and Australia. The problem with the Chinese and Japanese language discourses is that they are both so insular and the political environments are so charged. It is in the market of ideas and through constant debate (and perhaps the mediation provided by "neutral", third-party historians), that the truth will be approached.
I recommend the above article to the Chinese chauvinist members of this Forum.