Oleg wrote:
First two quotes are from the book by the Russian historian Meltuhov “Soviet-Polish wars – Military-Political conflict 1918-1939” It gives excerpts from the reports of Soviet troops (namely 87th and 45th Rifle divisions) that moved into Western Ukraine and Byelorussia (8th Rifle division) in 1939 – to sum them up -with the exception of local Poles aand the upper classes all local population was quite glad to see them. Moreover after the cessation of the hostilities there were some land swaps between Soviet and German occupational zones. Population of the areas that were supposed to go to the Germany seemingly was not too fond of idea at all. Staring with September 30th there was numerous inquires form the locals as of possibility to move to the Soviet zone. Directive # 0271 of Political Directorate of RKKA sated that people who are willing to go to the Soviet zone should be allowed to do so and people who wanted to go to the German zone should not be stopped either; at the same time it strictly forbade any propaganda that would encourage immigration or any forced resettlement. All in all 5th and 6th Armies had to settle over 42000 people in the Soviet zone . 28 people –all ethnic Poles –decided to go to the German zone form the Soviet one.
Care needs to be exercised in using the above reports as sources. Their content suggests that they had a propagandistic function, telling the Soviet Government what it wanted to hear, and supporting the line taken by the Soviet Government that its invasion of East Poland was really a liberation of enslaved Ukrainians and Belorussians from the oppressive yoke of the Polish "pany" (lords).
For a different view of the Soviet occupation, from a Polish perspective, I recommend the book "Revolution From Abroad", by the Polish-Jewish historian Jan Tomas Gross.
However, there is an element of truth in the reports in relation to the attitudes of the local population in the Soviet-occupied areas. As Musial points out in the book to which I have often referred, the Soviet Government did represent itself as liberating the Belorussian and Ukrainian populations from Polish tyranny, and for that reason it undertook measures that favoured those populations, and also the Jewish population, at the expense of the ethnic Poles. Musial states that for the first year of the Soviet occupation, repressive measures, including mass deportation, were directed almost exclusively against the Poles, in particular those in Government employment. For that reason, there was at first a tendency on the part of Belorussians and Ukrainians to accept the Soviet occupation.
However, the reality of sovietisation, in particular the confiscation of property and the collectivisation of peasant holdings, began to turn the population against the Soviet occupier. According to Musial, from the beginning of 1941, the Soviet authorities began to stamp down harshly on any signs of Ukrainian dissidence, with the result that by June 1941 the jails were full of Ukrainians who were the main victims of the massacres perpetrated by the NKVD before its retreat.
As for the exchange of populations, any history of German-Soviet relations from 1939 to 1941 will refer to the agreement on such exchanges, which formed part of the Borders and Friendship Treaty of 28 September 1939. According to that agreement, all ethnic Belorussians and Ukrainians in the German zone of occupation would be permitted to cross into the Soviet zone, and all ethnic Germans in the Soviet zone would be permitted to cross into the German zone; no hindrance would be placed in the way of the exit and entry of those wishing to transfer.
The German authorities took advantage of the agreement to promote the movement of Jews from their zone into the Soviet zone. In some cases, they told Jews to represent themselves to the Soviet border authorities as ethnic Belorussians or Ukrainians of Jewish religion, thereby qualifying for automatic entry. In other cases, Jews were simply pushed across the line of demarcation at unguarded points.
It is estimated that at least 300,000 Jews had crossed from the German into the Soviet zone by the end of 1939. Almost all of these were evacuated by the Soviet authorities to Central Asia, mainly to towns in the vicinity of Tashkent, in 1940.
The exchanges of territory referred to in the reports were made in the Borders and Friendship Treaty, at Soviet request. The original line of demarcation agreed to in the secret appendix to the Non-Aggression Pact of 23 August 1939 ran along the Vistula, ie it divided Warsaw and left the Lublin region on the Soviet zone. Thus, the line ran considerably to the west of the Curzon Line, and left considerable areas with a Polish majority population in the Soviet zone.
Since the Soviet invasion did not begin until 17 September, the German Army overran large areas allocated to the Soviet Union, eg they reached Lwow. Stalin then suggested a change to the division of territory agreed on 23 August; Lithuania, allotted to the German sphere of influence, would be transferred to the Soviet sphere, and the territory between the Vistula and the Bug would be transferred to the German sphere.
In that way, all the territory west of the Curzon Line, the Polish ethnic core, would fall under Germany, and the Soviet Union could more easily claim not to be an invader of Poland but rather the liberator of the Belorussian and Ukrainian majority populations of East Poland.
At the same time, Stalin rejected the German plan to set up a rump Polish puppet state in the areas of both the German and Soviet occupation zones with an ethnic Polish majority, ie in the area not annexed by either Germany or the Soviet Union.
Some historians believe that Stalin's proposal for an exchange of territory had the purpose of ensuring that the Soviet Union would not be seen as annexing purely Polish territory, ie it would annex only the territory east of the Curzon Line, which Britain had earlier proposed as the eastern border of Poland, thereby not offending Britain, and leaving the door open for a later rapprochment between Britain and the Soviet Union against Germany.
Furthermore, it left Germany with the odium of suppressing the Polish people, while Stalin could pose as the liberator of oppressed Belorussians and Ukrainians.
By the way, Oleg, I am still interested in hearing your interpretation for the sudden decline in senior NKVD officers of Jewish origin in 1938-39.
