Western Allies hostage-takings in West Germany 1945-1947

Discussions on the Holocaust and 20th Century War Crimes. Note that Holocaust denial is not allowed. Hosted by David Thompson.
walterkaschner
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#31

Post by walterkaschner » 20 Jan 2005, 07:14

Panzermahn wrote:
David Thompson wrote:The point is that in 1945 posting a proclamation about reprisals, without acting on it, was not a war crime.
I'm troubled by the fact that in today's law, having a motive to commit crimes is enough to have you convicted but what David says that posting a proclamation about reprisals without acting on it in 1945 was not a war crime
I have been a practicing lawyer for almost 50 years, and I know of no law, at least no Federal law or law of any of the jurisdictions in the U.S. I am authorized to practice in, in which motive alone will constitute a crime. Indeed, I can not think offhand of any crime for which "motive" is an essential element for conviction. For example, I may have a substantial motive to murder a rich uncle who has named me his sole heir in his will, but that alone does not make me guilty of murder. And if a jury should find beyond a reasonable doubt that I shot my uncle with intent to kill him, I would be guilty of murder whatever my motive - or even if no motive whatsoever could be proven (although the latter might be relevant to the issue of my sanity at the time of the event.)

Prior to adoption of the Fourth Geneva Convention, Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, adopted on August 12, 1949 and entered into force on October 21, 1950, even the taking of civilian hostages was not a war crime, much less the bare threat of their execution. And although Article 3, Section 1 (b) of that Convention now prohibits the taking of non-combatant hostages, the Convention is silent as to the legality of merely threatening their taking and execution, which as far as I know is still an open question.

As our moderator has pointed out above, under the Common Law (and as far as I am aware in Civil Law jurisdictions as well) a mere threat, even to commit a clearly illegal act, is in and of itself not criminal. It must be coupled with something else: for example, in the case of simple criminal assault (in those jurisdictions, which seem to be few, where an actual physical injury is not an essential element of the crime) to constitute a crime the threat must be accompanied by an immediate ability to carry out the threat and a reasonable fear on the part of the specified intended victim that the threat would be immediately carried out. The classic case taught in law school (at least in my day, but the citation to which I've long ago forgotten) arose in Britain centuries ago, where the defendant was accused of assault in that he laid his hand on his sword and shouted angrily at the accuser "Were it not Assize time [i.e. the period when courts were open and judges sitting in session] I would run you through!" The threat was certainly there as well as the means to carry it out, but the immediacy of the threatened action was lacking and the Court held that the victim could not reasonably have believed he was in danger of immediate bodily harm, because it was, in fact, Assize time.

As an isolated example, here is the provision of the Minnesota Criminal Code regarding the essential components of the lowest degree of criminal assault:
609.224 Assault in the fifth degree.

Subdivision 1. Misdemeanor. Whoever does any of the following commits an assault and is guilty of a misdemeanor:

(1) commits an act with intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily harm or death;
And here for another example is how a Web site describes the Ontario Canada definition of Criminal Assault without an accompanying battery:
Threat to apply force

An assault may also take the form of an attempt or threat, by an act or gesture, to apply force to another person. In this case, however, the Crown must prove you had the present ability to carry out the assault or that the victim believed you did. The degree of alarm felt by the person threatened is irrelevant to a finding of guilt as is your intent to carry out the threat.

The threat must cause apprehension of immediate personal violence; a threat to inflict harm at an unspecified time in the future is not an assault. Words alone, while they may be a threat, cannot constitute an assault.
It is, at least in my mind, highly questionable that even the prohibition of the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention criminalize simply the threat , in and of itself and with nothing more, to take reprisals against hostages.

The December 18, 1979 International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages is also of interest, in that it provides :
ARTICLE 1

1. Any person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure or to continue to detain another person (hereinafter referred to as the "hostage") in order to compel a third party, namely, a State, an international intergovernmental organization, a natural or juridical person, or a group of persons, to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the hostage commits the offence of taking of hostages ("hostage-taking") within the meaning of this Convention.
2. Any person who:
1. attempts to commit an act of hostage-taking, or
2. participates as an accomplice of anyone who commits or attempts to commit an act of hostage-taking likewise commits an offence for the purposes of this Convention.
This was directed primarily at terrorists and kidnappers, and extends the scope of the Fourth Geneva Convention cited above, which was directed to governments, to cover individuals as well, but the essential elements of the crime are (a) the taking of a hostage, (b) a threat to kill, injure or detain the hostage, and (c) in order to compel someone to take or refrain from taking any act. Here again, a mere threat, in and of itself, does not constitute a crime.

I would strongly urge Panzerman, unless he wishes to see his projected book about war crimes derided into oblivion, to acquire before final publication at least a faint understanding of legal principles and at least a passing notion of what has previously, and is presently today, deemed a war crime under international law. It is clearly a fatal error to believe that something that one thinks is "bad", "evil" or "outrageous" is thereby ipso facto criminal.

Regards, Kaschner

Panzermahn
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#32

Post by Panzermahn » 20 Jan 2005, 12:22

walterkaschner wrote:
Panzermahn wrote:
David Thompson wrote:The point is that in 1945 posting a proclamation about reprisals, without acting on it, was not a war crime.
I'm troubled by the fact that in today's law, having a motive to commit crimes is enough to have you convicted but what David says that posting a proclamation about reprisals without acting on it in 1945 was not a war crime
I have been a practicing lawyer for almost 50 years, and I know of no law, at least no Federal law or law of any of the jurisdictions in the U.S. I am authorized to practice in, in which motive alone will constitute a crime. Indeed, I can not think offhand of any crime for which "motive" is an essential element for conviction. For example, I may have a substantial motive to murder a rich uncle who has named me his sole heir in his will, but that alone does not make me guilty of murder. And if a jury should find beyond a reasonable doubt that I shot my uncle with intent to kill him, I would be guilty of murder whatever my motive - or even if no motive whatsoever could be proven (although the latter might be relevant to the issue of my sanity at the time of the event.)

Prior to adoption of the Fourth Geneva Convention, Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, adopted on August 12, 1949 and entered into force on October 21, 1950, even the taking of civilian hostages was not a war crime, much less the bare threat of their execution. And although Article 3, Section 1 (b) of that Convention now prohibits the taking of non-combatant hostages, the Convention is silent as to the legality of merely threatening their taking and execution, which as far as I know is still an open question.

As our moderator has pointed out above, under the Common Law (and as far as I am aware in Civil Law jurisdictions as well) a mere threat, even to commit a clearly illegal act, is in and of itself not criminal. It must be coupled with something else: for example, in the case of simple criminal assault (in those jurisdictions, which seem to be few, where an actual physical injury is not an essential element of the crime) to constitute a crime the threat must be accompanied by an immediate ability to carry out the threat and a reasonable fear on the part of the specified intended victim that the threat would be immediately carried out. The classic case taught in law school (at least in my day, but the citation to which I've long ago forgotten) arose in Britain centuries ago, where the defendant was accused of assault in that he laid his hand on his sword and shouted angrily at the accuser "Were it not Assize time [i.e. the period when courts were open and judges sitting in session] I would run you through!" The threat was certainly there as well as the means to carry it out, but the immediacy of the threatened action was lacking and the Court held that the victim could not reasonably have believed he was in danger of immediate bodily harm, because it was, in fact, Assize time.

As an isolated example, here is the provision of the Minnesota Criminal Code regarding the essential components of the lowest degree of criminal assault:
609.224 Assault in the fifth degree.

Subdivision 1. Misdemeanor. Whoever does any of the following commits an assault and is guilty of a misdemeanor:

(1) commits an act with intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily harm or death;
And here for another example is how a Web site describes the Ontario Canada definition of Criminal Assault without an accompanying battery:
Threat to apply force

An assault may also take the form of an attempt or threat, by an act or gesture, to apply force to another person. In this case, however, the Crown must prove you had the present ability to carry out the assault or that the victim believed you did. The degree of alarm felt by the person threatened is irrelevant to a finding of guilt as is your intent to carry out the threat.

The threat must cause apprehension of immediate personal violence; a threat to inflict harm at an unspecified time in the future is not an assault. Words alone, while they may be a threat, cannot constitute an assault.
It is, at least in my mind, highly questionable that even the prohibition of the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention criminalize simply the threat , in and of itself and with nothing more, to take reprisals against hostages.

The December 18, 1979 International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages is also of interest, in that it provides :
ARTICLE 1

1. Any person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure or to continue to detain another person (hereinafter referred to as the "hostage") in order to compel a third party, namely, a State, an international intergovernmental organization, a natural or juridical person, or a group of persons, to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the hostage commits the offence of taking of hostages ("hostage-taking") within the meaning of this Convention.
2. Any person who:
1. attempts to commit an act of hostage-taking, or
2. participates as an accomplice of anyone who commits or attempts to commit an act of hostage-taking likewise commits an offence for the purposes of this Convention.
This was directed primarily at terrorists and kidnappers, and extends the scope of the Fourth Geneva Convention cited above, which was directed to governments, to cover individuals as well, but the essential elements of the crime are (a) the taking of a hostage, (b) a threat to kill, injure or detain the hostage, and (c) in order to compel someone to take or refrain from taking any act. Here again, a mere threat, in and of itself, does not constitute a crime.

I would strongly urge Panzerman, unless he wishes to see his projected book about war crimes derided into oblivion, to acquire before final publication at least a faint understanding of legal principles and at least a passing notion of what has previously, and is presently today, deemed a war crime under international law. It is clearly a fatal error to believe that something that one thinks is "bad", "evil" or "outrageous" is thereby ipso facto criminal.

Regards, Kaschner
Okay Walter....and thank you for the interesting post.

I know this is off-topic, but i remember a case back in the late 90s that an American was arrested for sending emails to the White House threatening to kill President Clinton. He did not commit the crime but yet he was arrested and spend some time in jail (i think it is perjury). Any explaination for this? Isn't that there are laws that prohibit from threatening or harming a person's or nation's security/ In my country, malaysian citizen deemed by the Interior Minister to make threats (or even just words) sufficient enough to threaten national security can be arrested under the ISA law and kept in a detention camp for 2 years without any habeas corpus


walterkaschner
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Location: Houston, Texas

#33

Post by walterkaschner » 21 Jan 2005, 02:40

Hi Panzermah! I don't think your last post is off topic (although that is for our moderator to decide) as it relates to the issue of a threat constituting a crime.

I will have to admit that my post was not as carefully drafted as it should have been, for although I believe that my statement that "under the Common Law (and as far as I am aware in Civil Law jurisdictions as well) a mere threat, even to commit a clearly illegal act, is in and of itself not criminal. It must be coupled with something else.... [emphasis newly added]" I did not make it clear that the "something else" is often defined on top of the Common Law by a specific statute in terms of the context in which or the manner by which the threat is made, or the specific intent or purpose of the person making the threat, or the identity or office of the person against whom the threat was made, or on some other specific and limited basis which the legislature felt compelling.

For a few examples among many, a threat to kidnap or injure another person made by way of interstate commerce is a crime under 18 USC (United States Code) Section 875 (c); it is a crime to threaten the President of the US under 18 USC Section 871 (and this may be the basis for the conviction you recalled, but I have no specific recollection of it) or any former President under USC Section 879, and indeed, 18 USC § 115(a)(2) now criminalizes any threat against any Federal employee when such threat is done "with intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere with" such Federal employee "while engaged in the performance of official duties, or with intent to retaliate against" such Federal employee. Threats by debt collectors against debtors are a crime under Federal law, as are terrorist threats against passenger airplanes. And at the State level a variety of threats made in a specific or limited context have been criminalized; these vary widely from State to State, but include threats for the purpose of ethnic or religious intimidation, threats of domestic violence, threats made anonymously, and undoubtedly many others that I am unaware of.

But the fact remains that I know of no US jurisdiction (and of the 51 that exist, I am only qualified to practice law in 5, so I can in no way speak with certainty as to them all) where a general threat to kill a number of unidentified hostages as a reprisal constitutes the "something else" which would serve to make an otherwise bare threat criminal.

As far as I am aware, we have nothing in the US comparable to the Malaysian law you cited; and this is not an area I claim to have researched or have any expertise in, but (without knowing the precise details of the Malaysian law, which could have a determinative bearing on the matter) I would be astonished if such a law as you describe it would ever be adopted, or if adopted would not ultimately be struck down as unconstitutional under Article I, Section 8, of the U.S. Constitution, which declares that:
The Priviledge of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.

In Ex Parte Milligan, 71 US 2 (Wall) 1866, the Supreme Court of the US unanimously held that the President of the United States could not, under the legislation then in effect, legally suspend the priviledge of the writ in the case of a non-combatant US citizen in areas of the US where the civil courts were in session; a 5 to 4 majority went much further by holding that neither the President nor Congress could suspend the privilege of the writ in a case such as Milligan's under the provisions of the Constitution quoted above. There have been glosses thrown on that decision by subsequent Supreme Court decisions dealing with other facts and considerations, and the issue is very much alive today in light of action taken by the present administration against suspected terrorists and al-Quaeda supporters, but the US Supreme Court has failed to clarify certain of those issues by refusing last June to decide the case of Rumsfeld v. Padilla on its merits (Padilla being a US citizen and alleged al-Quaeda supporter and trainee who supposedly entered the US for terrorist purposes, and is being held in military prison without court order.)

But all of this is really venturing too far afield from the topic of this thread, for which I apologize to all and sundry. But then you all know how lawyers are - and we become progressively more prolix with age.

Regards, Kaschner

David Thompson
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#34

Post by David Thompson » 21 Jan 2005, 02:49

For our readers -- Ex parte Milligan, http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/g ... 71&invol=2 , is one of those cases which reaffirms the fundamental values of the American republic, and which is always an inspiration to read. And as always, it's a pleasure to hear from you, Walter.

walterkaschner
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#35

Post by walterkaschner » 21 Jan 2005, 09:06

David Thompson wrote:For our readers -- Ex parte Milligan, http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/g ... 71&invol=2 , is one of those cases which reaffirms the fundamental values of the American republic, and which is always an inspiration to read. And as always, it's a pleasure to hear from you, Walter.
Thanks for your kind words, David. I thoroughly agree with your sentiments regarding Ex Parte Milligan, and hope that those Forum readers who have a cynical view of the nobility of the values embraced in our Constitution or of the integrity and dedication toward those values demonstrated by the legal profession (at least by certain members and at one time) in that age will visit the site indicated by our moderator and read the arguments that the lawyers for Milligan presented to the Supreme Court. In those long gone days, the published syllabus of a Supreme Court decision included the arguments of counsel on both sides of the matter at issue - and the arguments themselves, particularly on Constitutional issues, often reflect a rhetorical skill, a command of the basis, essentials and ideals of the Constitutional framework of our government, and an unwavering conviction and devotion to those ideals, which rarely if ever can be found adequately expressed today - and which in great part probably explains why the arguments of counsel are no longer published in the official reports of the Court's decisions. Sic transit gloria......

To fully comprehend the practical difficulties and threats to their futures confronting Milligan's lawyers, an understanding of the background of the case is essential. Lambdin Milligan had been a prominent leader of the Democratic Party in Indiana in opposition to the Civil War. Almost all of the counties south of what is now US Highway 40 (which in effect divides the State in halves) had held meetings of their local Democratic parties and had passed resolutions that Indiana should, along with the Confederate States to the South, secede from the Union. The Confederate Cavalry General Morgan had already invaded Southern Indiana some monthe previously in the hope of inciting the local population to an uprising, and had committed some depredations and aroused considrable unrest. Milligan, a prominent anti-war Democrat, was one of the organizers of a subversive movement which planned to take up arms against the Federal and the Indiana State government, free and furnish arms to the many Confederate prisoners of war who were incarcerated in Indiana and lead them south to rejoin the Confederate Army and fight once more against the Federal forces. The plot was discovered, the perpetrators lost their nerve and were arrested and tried by a military commission ordered by Presidential Decree under an enabling act passed by Congress, and Milligan was sentenced to death. He applied to the local Federal District Court, which was in session, for a writ of Habeas Corpus, but which President Lincoln had by decree suspended. That judicial writ - of ancient lineage - requires that the person held in confinement be brought before the Court so that a judge may determine the legality of his confinement.

The case came before the Supreme Court in 1866, scarcely one year after the Civil War was over. Feelings were still extremely high on the victorious Union side, to the point where President Johnson was impeached for his conciliatory attitude towards the South and survived conviction by only one vote.

And who were the lawyers who agreed to represent Milligan in his appeal to the Supreme Court and on a pro bono publico basis? Certainly no one that might have been expected to take up his defense.

The first in line was David Dudley Field, who was a Republican, a Unionist, an ardent Lincoln supporter and one of the most prominent lawyers in the State of New York, who stood much to lose and nothing material to gain by taking on the case. And his second on the brief was James A. Garfield (which the syllabus erroneously refers to as James H. Garfield, see Allan Peskin, Garfield: A Biography (Kent State University Press, 1999) at 270-75.

Garfield had been a General in the Union Army during the Civil War, was currently a Federal Congressman from Ohio and was a member of the extreme Radical wing of the Republican Party, which favored exceedingly harsh retribution against the South and its individual Confederate supporters. He voted to impeach President Grant and to impose stern and harsh measures of retribution on the Southern States of the Confederacy. He had further political ambitions, but surely must have seriously considered the probability that in the bitter post-war atmosphere prevailing at the time, a defense of Milligan was in no way designed to further those ambitions.

Nonetheless, both Field and Garfield went on to present to the Supreme Court two of the most articulate, compelling and highly moving arguments in favor of rigorously respecting those rights which our Constitution was designed to guarantee that I have ever come across. And the beauty was not only that they prevailed before the Court, whose Chief Justice was a Lincoln appointee and probably as rabid a Radical Republican as could be found, but that their representation created no lasting animus against them with the American public. David Dudley Field went on to become the leader of the New York Bar, and the leader of a movement to reform the legal system which led to the almost universal adoption of the "Field's Code" throughout the US; and James Garfield went on to become the 20th President of the US.

Well, how far utterley off topic can one fellow get?!? My apologies again to all, but to grab a favorite line from Mae West: "I only succumb to temptation when I find it irresistible."

Good night and regards, Kaschner

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