#73
Post
by walterkaschner » 18 Apr 2004, 03:16
The subject of the British attack on the French Fleet in Mers-el-Kebir has been exhaustively ventilated in previous threads on this or the previous Forum, but for those not privy to those posts, I think in order to place the issue in its proper perspective it might be helpful to again review the chronological background and considerations underlying the incident, as to which several of the posts on this thread seem to be a bit confused.
On March 28, 1940, the governments of France and Great Britain entered into an agreement whereby neither would enter into armistice or peace negotiations separate from the other.
By mid June, 1940 it became clear that the battle for France proper had been lost. The French government fled to Tours, and then further South to Bordeaux. On June 15 the French Council of Ministers met in Bordeaux and, against the resistance of the French Prime Minister, Paul Reynaud, who wished to move the government to North Africa and contiue the war from there with the French fleet and colonies, the Council determined to ask the British Government to consent to its seeking armistice terms from the Germans. Reynaud was of the view that although Metropolitan France had been lost to the enemy, the French government should move to North Africa and - following the example of the Dutch government - continue the battle with its colonies and Fleet. But his view did not prevail.
About noon on the 16th, the British government informed the French that it would consent to the French request, "provided, and only provided, that the French Fleet is sailed forthwith for British harbours pending negotiations." At about 4:00, the British government formally proposed the famous "Declaration of Union" between France and Great , whereby the two countries were to be united as one, which would fight on to victory with its combined resources. This proposal was telephoned to Reynaud in time for the meeting of the French Council of Ministers scheduled for 5:00 that afternoon.
At the meeting of the French Council of Ministers the British proposal for union elicited a furious discussion, but apparently the British offer to consent to French negotiations for a separate armistice was not considered. As Reynaud was unable to carry a majority of the Council with him in favor of the union proposal, he felt obliged to hand in his resignation, which Président Lebrun accepted and called upon Marshall Pétain to form a new government.
Pétain immediately accepted and proceeded to form a new government with the main purpose of seeking an armistice with Germany. The British government again, both formally and informally, informed the new Pétain government that its consent to French negotiations for an armistice was conditioned upon the French Fleet sailing to British harbours. The French government took no heed and proceeded to negotiate an armistice through the good offices of the Spanish government without British consent, thereby breaching ite previous agreement with Great Britain.
The armistice was signed on June 24. Article 8 provided that the French Fleet was to assemble in ports to be designated in the future, to be disarmed and demobilized under the control of Germany and Italy. It also conveyed Germany's "solemn assurance" that it had no intention of utilizing the French Fleet for Germany's own purposes, except for coastal surveillance and mine sweeping.
On the same day, Admiral Darlan, the French Minister of Marine, sent a top secret message to the French admirals and préfects of the Fleet giving orders to the effect that if Germany were to breach the Armistice Agreement or if any French warships were threatened to be taken over, the Fleet was to be taken to the United States or scuttled in order that the ships not fall into German hands. This order was, unfortunately not known to the British, who, in light of past events, were unwilling to rely on the assurances of Germany contained in Section 8 of the Armistice. As Churchill put it:
"Who in his senses would trust the word of Hitler after his shameful record and the facts of the hour?"
(On the one hand, the German breach of the Armistice Agreement by its occupation of the French free zone on November 11, 1942 proved Churchill to be correct in his distrust of Hitler's word; on the other hand, the scuttling of the French Fleet at Toulon immediately thereafter seems to demonstrate that the French Navy was true to Darlan's orders to scuttle the Fleet before allowing it to fall into German hands.)
As Bordeaux became part of occupied France under the Armistice, the French government, now with Marshall Pétain at its head, transferred to Clermont-Ferrand on June 29 and then on to Vichy on July 1.
At the time, the French Fleet was approximately the 4th largest in the world. The British believed that its combination with the German and Italian Fleets, and most likely at some point in the near future with the Japanese Fleet, would overwhelm the British Fleet's ability to defend its colonies and its own island stronghold against invasion by a united enemy. Accordingly, the British Admiralty had previously planned "Operation Catapult", intended to prevent the French Fleet from falling into German hands. On July 1 it ordered the Operation to go forward during the night of July 2/3.
This involved, in brief:
1. Taking under control the 2 French battleships, 4 light cruisers, eight destroyers, several submarines (including the Surcouf, then the largest submarine in the world), and a host of minor warships which lay in Portsmouth or Plymouth harbors;
2. Neutralizing a French battleship and 4 French cruisers at anchor in Alexandria, Egypt;
3. Neutralizing the modern battle cruisers Dunkerque and Strasbourg, two of the finest ships in the French Fleet, together with two battleships and several light cruisers, destroyers, submarines and lighter ships at anchor in Mers-el-Kébir off Oran;
4. Neutralizing the seven French heavy cruisers in Algiers harbor, as well as other major French naval vessels at Casablanca, Dakar and Martinique.
The operation in the British ports went reasonable well; casualties on both sides were limited to two killed and three wounded.
At Alexandria, protracted negotiations led to the neutralization of the French warships without casualties.
The French cruisers in Algerian ports fled without injury to Toulon.
Other French major ships in Martinique and Dakar were either immobilized or put out of action with relatively little loss of life.
But the operation at Mers-el Kébir was a different story. British "Force-H", consisting of the battle cruiser Hood as well as two other battleships, the aircraft carrier Ark Royal , two cruisers and 11 destroyers, all under the command of Admiral Sommerville, were ordered to set sail for Mers-el-Kébir and to convey to Admiral Gensoul, in command of the elements of the French Fleet there, a demand in effect that his forces act in accordance with one of the following alternatives:
a) Join forces with the British and continue the fight against the Germans and Italians;
b) Sail with reduced crews to a British port;
c) Sail with reduced crews to a French port in the Caribbean, where the ships can be demilitarized;
d) Entrust the ships to the United States where they can remain safe until the war's end, their crews being repatriated; or
e) Failing to choose any of the above, the French warships must be scuttled within 6 hours or the British fleet will use whatever force may be necessary to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy.
Admiral Sommerville arrived off Oran at about 9:30 AM and immediately sent a representative to deliver the ultimatum to Admiral Gensoul. Negotiations dragged on until about 6:30 PM, during which Admiral Gensoul showed the British representative Admiral Darlan's secret order of June 24, and pledged upon his personal honor that should Germany fail to respect the terms of the Amistice Agreement he would follow Darlan's orders and either sail his ships to a French port in the Carribean or scuttle them.
In the meantime the British Admiralty had signaled to Admiral Sommerville that if the French ships had not complied with the British terms they must be sunk before dark. In turn, Sommerville notified Gensoul that "A moins qu'une de mes propositions ne soit acceptée, à 17 h 30, [6:30 French time] je suis forcé de couler vos batiments." (Unless one of my proposals is not accepted by 5:30, I will be compelled to sink your ships.)
At a few minutes before 7:00 PM French time the British opened fire. The battle cruiser Strasbourg, although damaged, escaped along with two light cruisers and fled to Toulon. In about 15 minutes the other French major ships were either sunk or put out of action. On July 6, 3 waves of British torpedo planes attacked again and sank some smaller ships. All in all the French casualties amounted to 1,297 killed or missing and 351 wounded.
Churchill described the decision to institute Operation Catapult as follows:
"This was a hateful decision, the most unnatural and painful in which I have ever been concerned. It recalled the episode of the destruction of the Danish Fleet in Copenhagen Harbour by Nelson in 1801; but now the French had been only yesterday our dear allies, and our sympathy for the misery of France was sincere. On the other hand, the life of the State and the salvation of our cause were at stake. It was a Greek tragedy. But no act was ever more necessary for the life of Britain and for all that depended on it."
Was the British action at Mers-el-Kébir a war crime? I know of no principle of international law that was violated, and would welcome any authoritative source to the contrary.
Was it even, if not criminal, at least "shameful" as certain posts on this thread suggest?
IMHO it was not, given the circumstances that Britain found itself in at that point of time. France, its only effective ally, had been soundly defeated and had signed an Armistice Agreement separately despite its solemn vow not to do so. Britain and her colonies stood virtually alone against the threat of the combined Axis powers, who controlled the vast majority of Continental Europe and were on the best of terms with Japan, the most powerful nation in the far East. It had at the time no hope of an alliance with the Soviet Union, nor with the United States. The threat of an imminent German invasion of Britain was paramount and the predominance of the British Fleet was the principal shield against such an invasion. The combination of the French Fleet with the German and Italian - and quite possibly the Japanese - would so tilt the balance of naval power as to jeopardize Britain's ability to defend her own shores, as well as those of her colonies, against invasion by her enemies, whose strength on land was far superior to the British.
Was it at least a mistake? Although the view is always clearer through the rear view mirror, I think in hindsite that quite possibly it was indeed a mistake. It might have been far wiser for the British to have waited a bit until the new French government had sorted itself out. The Armistice Agreement required the French Fleet to stay in place, whereever in French controlled waters it found itself, so there would appear to have been no urgency to neutralize the Fleet until at least a threat developed for its takeover. Moreover, there can be no question but that Operation Catapult insensed many of the French against Great Britain, including those who might have been otherwise disposed to establish North Africa as a center for a relatively independant consortium of French colonies which could help bolster the Vichy government's position of power vis-à-Germany. But that of course is an issue more properly addressed in the "What-If" section.
My Sources for the above are primarily, but not exclusively, Winston S Churchill, Their Finest Hour , (Houghton Miflin Company, 1949) at 199-241, and Robert Aron, Histoire de Vichy, ( Productions de Paris, no date) at 37-90. And please note, there seems to be considerable confusion, primarily because the difference of time between France and great Britain, as to the exact timing of events at Mers-el Kébir.
With apologies for length (and for the many typos, which I have now tried to edit out) and with regards, Kaschner
Last edited by
walterkaschner on 19 Apr 2004, 06:28, edited 1 time in total.
I love it, a poster with the screen name of Ostuf Charlemagne accusing me of impartiality because of my screen name :roll: 
