The Hossbach Memorandum (Text)

[David Thompson]

This is the text of a memorandum prepared by then-Lieutenant Colonel Friedrich Hossbach in November, 1937, following a conference he attended on the 5th of that month. At that conference, Hitler set forth his plans for aggressive war in Europe:

"Document 386-PS [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Volume III, US Government Printing Office, Washington (DC): 1947. pp. 295-305.

Berlin, 11/10/1937

NOTES on the Conference in the Reichskanzlei on 11/5/1937 from 1615-2030 hours

Present: The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor, The Reichsminister for War, Generalfeldmarschall v. BLOMBERG, The C-in-C Army, Generaloberst Freiherr von FRITSCH, The C-in-C Navy, Generaladmiral Dr. h. c. RAEDER, The C-in-C Luftwaffe, Generaloberst GOERING, The Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs Freiherr v. NEURATH, Oberst HOSSBACH

The Fuehrer stated initially that the subject matter of today's conference was of such high importance, that its further detailed discussion would probably take place in Cabinet sessions. However, he, the Fuehrer, had decided NOT to discuss this matter in the larger circle of the Reich Cabinet, because of its importance. His subsequent statements were the result of detailed deliberations and of the experiences of his 4 1/2 years in Government; he desired to explain to those present his fundamental ideas on the possibilities and necessities of expanding our foreign policy and in the interests of a far-sighted policy he requested that his statements be looked upon in the case of his death as his last will and testament.

The Fuehrer then stated:

The aim of German policy is the security and the preservation of the nation, and its propagation. This is, consequently, a problem of space.

The German nation is composed of 85 million people, which, because of the number of individuals and the compactness of habitation, form a homogeneous European racial body which cannot be found in any other country. On the other hand, it justifies the demand for larger living space more than for any other nation. If no political body exists in space, corresponding to the German racial body, then that is the consequence of several centuries of historical development, and should this political condition continue to exist, it will represent the greatest danger to the preservation of the German nation [Volkstum] at its present high level. An arrest of the deterioration of the German element in Austria and Czechoslovakia is just as little possible as the preservation of the present state in Germany itself. Instead of growth, sterility will be introduced, and as a consequence, tensions of a social nature will appear after a number of years, because political and philosophical ideas are of a permanent nature only as long as they are able to produce the basis for the realization of the actual claim of existence of a nation. The German future is therefore dependent exclusively on the solution of the need for living space. Such a solution can be sought naturally only for a limited period, about 1-3 generations.

Before touching upon the question of solving the need for living space, it must be decided whether a solution of the German position with a good future can be attained, either by way of an autarchy or by way of an increased share in universal commerce and industry.

Autarchy: Execution will be possible only with strict National-Socialist State policy, which is the basis; assuming this can be achieved the results are as follows:

A. In the sphere of raw materials, only limited, but NOT total autarchy can be attained:

1. Wherever coal can be used for the extraction of raw materials autarchy is feasible.

2. In the case of ores the position is much more difficult. Requirements in iron and light metals can be covered by ourselves. Copper and tin, however, can NOT.

3. Cellular materials can be covered by ourselves as long as sufficient wood supplies exist. A permanent solution is not possible.

4. Edible fats possible.

B. In the case of foods, the question of an autarchy must be answered with a definite "NO".

The general increase of living standards, compared with 30-40 years ago, brought about a simultaneous increase of the demand for an increase of personal consumption even among the producers, the farmers, themselves. The proceeds from the production increase in agriculture have been used or covering the increase in demands, therefore they represent no absolute increase in production. A further increase in production by making greater demands on the soil is not possible because it already shows signs of deterioration due to the use of artificial fertilizers, and it is therefore certain that, even with the greatest possible increase in production, participation in the world market could NOT be avoided.

The considerable expenditure of foreign currency to secure food by import, even in periods when harvests are good, increases catastrophically when the harvest is really poor. The possibility of this catastrophe increases correspondingly to the increase in population, and the annual 560000 excess in births would bring about an increased consumption in bread, because the child is a greater bread eater than the adult.

Permanently to counter the difficulties of food supplies by lowering the standard of living and by rationalization is impossible in a continent which had developed an approximately equivalent standard of living. As the solving of the unemployment problem has brought into effect the complete power of consumption, some small corrections in our agricultural home production will be possible, but NOT a wholesale alteration of the standard of food consumption. Consequently autarchy becomes impossible, specifically in the sphere of food supplies as well as generally.

Participation in World Economy. There are limits to this which we are unable to transgress. The market fluctuations would be an obstacle to a secure foundation of the German position; international commercial agreements do NOT offer any guarantee for practical execution. It must be considered on principle that since the World War (1914-18) an industrialization has taken place in countries which formerly exported food. We live in a period of economic empires, in which the tendency to colonize again approaches the condition which originally motivated colonization; in Japan and Italy economic motives are the basis of their will to expand, the economic need will also drive Germany to it. Countries outside the great economic empires have special difficulties in expanding economically.

The upward tendency, which has been caused in world economy, due to armament competition, can never form a permanent basis for an economic settlement, and this latter is also hampered by the economic disruption caused by Bolshevism. It is a pronounced military weakness of those States who base their existence on export. As our exports and imports are carried out over those sea lanes which are ruled by Britain, it is more a question of security of transport rather than one of foreign currency, and this explains the great weakness in our food situation in wartime. The only way out, and one which may appear imaginary, is the securing of greater living space, an endeavor which at all times has been the cause of the formation of states and of movements of nations. It is explicable that this tendency finds no interest in Geneva and in satisfied States.

Should the security of our food position be our foremost thought, then the space required for this can only be sought in Europe, but we will not copy liberal capitalist policies which rely on exploiting colonies. It is NOT a case of conquering people, but of conquering agriculturally useful space. It would also be more to the purpose to seek raw material producing territory in Europe directly adjoining the Reich and not overseas, and this solution would have to be brought into effect in one or two generations.

What would be required at a later date over and above this must be left to subsequent generations. The development of great world-wide national bodies is naturally a slow process and the German people, with its strong racial root, has for this purpose the most favorable foundations in the heart of the European Continent. The history of all times Roman Empire, British Empire has proved that every space expansion can only be effected by breaking resistance and taking risks. Even setbacks are unavoidable; neither formerly nor today has space been found without an owner; the attacker always comes up against the proprietor.

The question for Germany is where the greatest possible conquest could be made at lowest cost.

German politics must reckon with its two hateful enemies, England and France, to whom a strong German colossus in the center of Europe would be intolerable. Both these states would oppose a further reinforcement of Germany, both in Europe and overseas, and in this opposition they would have the support of all parties. Both countries would view the building of German military strong points overseas as a threat to their overseas communications, as a security measure for German commerce, and retrospectively a strengthening of the German position in Europe.

England is NOT in a position to cede any of her colonial possessions to us owing to the resistance which she experiences in the Dominions. After the loss of prestige which England has suffered owing to the transfer of Abyssinia to Italian ownership, return of East Africa can no longer be expected. Any resistance on England's part would at best consist in the readiness to satisfy our colonial claims by taking away colonies which at the present moment are NOT in British hands, e.g. Angola. French favors would probably be of the same nature.

A serious discussion regarding the return of colonies to us could be considered only at a time when England is in a state of emergency and the German Reich is strong and well-armed. The Fuehrer does not share the opinion that the Empire is unshakable. Resistance against the Empire is to be found less in conquered territories than amongst its competitors. The British Empire and the Roman Empire cannot be compared with one another in regard to durability; since the Punic Wars the latter did not have a serious political enemy. Only the dissolving effects which originated in Christendom, and the signs of age which creep into all states, made it possible for the Ancient Germans to subjugate Ancient Rome.

Alongside the British Empire today a number of States exist which are stronger than it. The British Mother Country is able to defend its colonial possessions only allied with other States and NOT by its own power. How could England alone, for example, defend Canada against an attack by America or its Far Eastern interests against an attack by Japan.

The singling out of the British Crown as the bearer of Empire unity is in itself an admission that the universal empire cannot be maintained permanently by power politics. The following are significant pointers in this respect.

a. Ireland's tendency for independence.

b. Constitutional disputes in India where England, by her half-measures, left the door open for Indians at a later date to utilize the nonfulfillment of constitutional promises as a weapon against Britain.

c. The weakening of the British position in the Far East by Japan.

d. The opposition in the Mediterranean to Italy which by virtue of its history, driven by necessity and led by a genius expands its power position and must consequently infringe British interests to an increasing extent. The outcome of the Abyssinian War is a loss of prestige for Britain which Italy is endeavoring to increase by stirring up discontent in the Mohammedan world.

It must be established in conclusion that the Empire cannot be held permanently by power politics by 45 million Britons, in spite of all the solidity of her ideals. The proportion of the populations in the Empire, compared with that of the Motherland is 9:1, and it should act as a warning to us that if we expand in space, we must NOT allow the level of our population to become too low.

France's position is more favorable than that of England. The French Empire is better placed geographically, the population of its colonial possessions represents a potential military increase. But France is faced with difficulties of internal politics. At the present time only 10% approximately of the nations have parliamentary governments whereas 90% of them have totalitarian governments. Nevertheless we have to take the following into our political considerations as power factors:

Britain, France, Russia and the adjoining smaller States. The German question can be solved only by way of force, and this is never without risk. The battles of Frederick the Great for Silesia, and Bismarck's wars against Austria and France had been a tremendous risk and the speed of Prussian action in 1870 had prevented Austria from participating in the war. If we place the decision to apply force with risk at the head of the following expositions, then we are left to reply to the questions "when" and "how". In this regard we have to decide upon three different cases.

Case 1. Period 1943-45. After this we can only expect a change for the worse. The re-arming of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, as well as the formation of the Officers' Corps, are practically concluded. Our material equipment and armaments are modern, with further delay the danger of their becoming out-of-date will increase. In particular the secrecy of "special weapons" cannot always be safeguarded. Enlistment of reserves would be limited to the current recruiting age groups and an addition from older untrained groups would be no longer available.

In comparison with the re-armament, which will have been carried out at that time by the other nations, we shall decrease in relative power. Should we not act until 1943/45, then, dependent on the absence of reserves, any year could bring about the food crisis, for the countering of which we do NOT possess the necessary foreign currency. This must be considered as a "point of weakness in the regime". Over and above that, the world will anticipate our action and will increase counter-measures yearly.

Whilst other nations isolate themselves we should be forced on the offensive.

What the actual position would be in the years 1943-1945 no one knows today. It is certain, however, that we can wait no longer.

On the one side the large armed forces, with the necessity for securing their upkeep, the aging of the Nazi movement and of its leaders, and on the other side the prospect of a lowering of the standard of living and a drop in the birth rate, leaves us no other choice than to act. If the Fuehrer is still living, then it will be his irrevocable decision to solve the German space problem no later than 1943-45. The necessity for action before 1943-45 will come under consideration in cases 2 and 3.

Case 2. Should the social tensions in France lead to an internal political crisis of such dimensions that it absorbs the French Army and thus renders it incapable for employment in war against Germany, then the time for action against Czechoslovakia has come.

Case 3. It would be equally possible to act against Czechoslovakia if France should be so tied up by a war against another State, that it cannot "proceed" against Germany.

For the improvement of our military political position it must be our first aim, in every case of entanglement by war, to conquer Czechoslovakia and Austria simultaneously, in order to remove any threat from the flanks in case of a possible advance Westwards. In the case of a conflict with France it would hardly be necessary to assume that Czechoslovakia would declare war on the same day as France. However, Czechoslovakia's desire to participate in the war will increase proportionally to the degree to which we are being weakened. Its actual participation could make itself felt by an attack on Silesia, either towards the North or the West.

Once Czechoslovakia is conquered and a mutual frontier, Germany-Hungary is obtained then a neutral attitude by Poland in a German-French conflict could more easily be relied upon. Our agreements with Poland remain valid only as long as Germany's strength remains unshakeable; should Germany have any setbacks then an attack by Poland against East Prussia, perhaps also against Pomerania, and Silesia, must be taken into account.

Assuming a development of the situation, which would lead to a planned attack on our part in the years 1943-45, then the behavior of France, Poland and Russia would probably have to be judged in the following manner:

The Fuehrer believes personally that in all probability England and perhaps also France have already silently written off Czechoslovakia, and that they have got used to the idea that this question would one day be cleaned up by Germany. The difficulties in the British Empire and the prospect of being entangled in another long-drawn-out European War, were decisive factors in the non-participation of England in a war against Germany. The British attitude would certainly NOT remain without influence on France's attitude. An attack by France without British support is hardly probable assuming that its offensive would stagnate along our Western fortifications. Without England's support, it would also NOT be necessary to take into consideration a march by France through Belgium and Holland, and this would also not have to be reckoned with by us in case of a conflict with France, as in every case it would have as consequence the enmity of Great Britain. Naturally, we should in every case have to bar our frontier during the operation of our attacks against Czechoslovakia and Austria. It must be taken into consideration here that Czechoslovakia's defence measures will increase in strength from year to year, and that a consolidation of the inside values of the Austrian army will also be effected in the course of years. Although the population of Czechoslovakia in the first place is not a thin one, the embodiment of Czechoslovakia and Austria would nevertheless constitute the conquest of food for 5-6 million people, on the basis that a compulsory emigration of 2 million from Czechoslovakia and of 1 million from Austria could be carried out. The annexation of the two States to Germany militarily and politically would constitute a considerable relief, owing to shorter and better frontiers, the freeing of fighting personnel for other purposes and the possibility of re-constituting new armies up to a strength of about 12 Divisions, representing a new division per 1 million population.

No opposition to the removal of Czechoslovakia is expected on the part of Italy; however, it cannot be judged today what would be her attitude in the Austrian question since it would depend largely on whether the Duce were alive at the time or not.

The measure and speed of our action would decide Poland's attitude. Poland will have little inclination to enter the war against a victorious Germany, with Russia in its rear.

Military participation by Russia must be countered by the speed of our operations; it is a question whether this need be taken into consideration at all in view of Japan's attitude.

Should Case 2 occur - paralyzation of France by a Civil War - then the situation should be utilized at any time for operations against Czechoslovakia, as Germany's most dangerous enemy would be eliminated.

The Fuehrer sees Case 3 looming nearer; it could develop from the existing tensions in the Mediterranean, and should it occur he has firmly decided to make use of it any time, perhaps even as early as 1938.

Following recent experiences in the course of the events of the war in Spain, the Fuehrer does NOT see an early end to hostilities there. Taking into consideration the time required for past offensives by Franco, a further three years duration of war is , within the bounds of possibility. On the other hand, from the German point of view a 100% victory by Franco is not desirable; we are more interested in a continuation of the war and preservation of the tensions in the Mediterranean. Should Franco be in sole possession of the Spanish Peninsula it would mean the end of Italian intervention and the presence of Italy on the Balearic Isles. As our interests are directed towards continuing the war in Spain, it must be the task of our future policy to strengthen Italy in her fight to hold on to the Balearic Isles. However, a solidification of Italian positions on the Balearic Isles can NOT be tolerated either by France or by England and could lead to a war by France and England against Italy, in which case Spain, if entirely in white (i.e. Franco's) hands, could participate on the side of Italy's enemies. A subjugation of Italy in such a war appears very unlikely. Additional raw materials could be brought to Italy via Germany. The Fuehrer believes that Italy's military strategy would be to remain on the defensive against France on the Western frontier and carry out operations against a France from Libya against North African French colonial possessions.

As a landing of French-British troops on the Italian coast can be discounted, and as a French offensive via the Alps to Upper Italy would be extremely difficult and would probably stagnate before the strong Italian fortifications, French lines of communication by the Italian fleet will to a great extent paralyze the transport of fighting personnel from North Africa to France, so that at its frontiers with Italy and Germany France will have at its disposal solely the metropolitan fighting forces.

If Germany profits from this war by disposing of the Czechoslovakian and the Austrian questions, the probability must be assumed that England being at war with Italy would not decide to commence operations against Germany. Without British support a warlike action by France against Germany is not to be anticipated.

The date of our attack on Czechoslovakia and Austria must be made dependent on the course of the Italian-English-French war and would not be simultaneous with the commencement of military agreements with Italy, but of full independence and, by exploiting this unique favorable opportunity he wishes to begin to carry out operations against Czechoslovakia. The attack on Czechoslovakia would have to take place with the "speed of lightning" [blitzartig schnell].

Feldmarschall von Blomberg and Generaloberst von Fritsch in giving their estimate on the situation, repeatedly pointed out that England and France must not appear as our enemies, and they stated that the war with Italy would NOT bind the French army to such an extent that it would NOT be in a position to commence operations on our Western frontier with superior forces. Generaloberst von Fritsch estimated the French forces which would presumably be employed on the Alpine frontier against Italy to be in the region of 20 divisions, so that a strong French superiority would still remain on our Western frontier. The French would according to German reasoning, attempt to advance into the Rhineland. We should consider the lead which France has got in mobilization, and quite apart from the very small value of our then existing fortifications which was pointed cut particularly by Generalfeldmarschall von Blomberg the four motorized divisions which had been laid down for the West would be more or less incapable of movement. With regard to our offensive in a South-Easterly direction, Feldmarschall von Blomberg draws special attention to the strength of the Czechoslovakian fortifications, the building of which had assumed the character of a Maginot line and which would present extreme difficulties to our attack.

Generaloberst von Fritsch mentioned that it was the purpose of a study which he had laid on for this winter to investigate the possibilities of carrying out operations against Czechoslovakia with special consideration of the conquest of the Czechoslovakian system of fortifications; the Generaloberst also stated that owing to the prevailing conditions he would have to relinquish his leave abroad, which was to begin on 10 November.

This intention was countermanded by the Fuehrer who gave as a reason that the possibility of the conflict was not to be regarded as being so imminent. In reply to the remark by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that an Italian-English-French conflict be not as near as the Fuehrer appeared to assume, the Fuehrer stated that the date which appeared to him to be a possibility was summer 1938. In reply to statements by Generalfeldmarschall von Blomberg and Generaloberst von Fritsch regarding England and France's attitude, the Fuehrer repeated his previous statements and said that he was convinced of Britain's non-participation and that consequently he did not believe in military action by France against Germany. Should the Mediterranean conflict already mentioned lead to a general mobilization in Europe, then we should have to commence operations against Czechoslovakia immediately. If, however, the powers who are not participating in the war should declare their disinterestedness, then Germany would, for the time being, have to side with this attitude. In view of the information given by the Fuehrer, Generaloberst Goering considered it imperative to think of a reduction or abandonment of our military undertaking in Spain. The Fuehrer agreed to this in so far as he believed this decision should be postponed for a suitable date. The second part of the discussion concerned material armament questions.

(Signed) HOSSBACH.

[michael mills]

Careful reading of the whole memorandum, which is undoubtedly genuine, shows that it is not a plan for making aggressive war in stages, but rather an assessment of a number of possible future developments that could lead to war, and what action Germany should take in each of them.

The assessment states from the premiss that Britain and France were both rivals of Germany, and would act to prevent the emergence of Germany as the dominant power in Central Europe; that premiss seems to me an entirely accurate reading of the situation.

The assessment assumes that the opposition of Britain and France to any attempt by Germany to use its temporary predominance in military strength to assert its economic domination over Central Europe could well lead to the outbreak of war, and describes a number of different scenarios for such an outbreak. It attempts to determine the reaction of Germany's eastern neighbours (Poland and the Soviet Union) to the outbreak of war between Germany and France, and describes the measures that Germany would need to take to prevent any attempt by them to take advantage of the situation at the expense of Germany.

Czechoslovakia is realistically assessed as an inveterate enemy of Germany and an ally of France in any future Franco-German war. It was joined with France in an anti-German alliance, and Hitler's assessment was that in a future Franco-German war it would attack German territory, moving into Silesia, a realistic assumption since Czechoslovakia was a relatively powerful country militarily. Accordingly, Hitler's assessment was that in the case of a war with France, Czechoslovakia would need to be knocked out immediately.

It is interesting that the memorandum does not canvass in any way a German attack on either Poland or the Soviet Union. Those countries are assessed as potential exploiters of a future Franco-German war; in particular, Poland is identified as having designs on Germany's eastern territories (and it did!), and Hitler foresees the need to use the Soviet Union to ward off aggression by Poland and Japan to ward off aggression by the SAoviet Union. But no German aggression against either Poland or the Soviet Union is referred to.

The references to Austria are puzzling, since Hitler's aim was to bring about the reunification of rump Austria with Germany, which was also the aim of the majority of Austria's population. It is possible that he saw Austria as under the domination of a hostile government allied with France, which would necessitate its occupation by Germany in the case of a Franco-German war.

In summary, the meeting documented in the Hossbach Memorandum was not a planning session for a general war of aggression, but a discussion of possible future developments in the light of the identified 1943-45 window of opportunity for Germany to assert its economic hegemony over Central Europe. The only countries which Hitler saw Germany attacking were Czechoslovakia and Austria. Although the strong possibility of war with both Britain and France is assumed, there is no reference to deliberate aggression against; rather the assumption seems to be that both countries would declare war on Germany in order to prevent it assuming hegemony. The proposed attacks on Czechoslovakia and Austria seem to be predicated on knocking them out as potential allies of Britain and France, although the economic advantages of their annexation are also taken into account.

The issue is not whether the Hossbach Memoramdum is genuine. The issue is the misuse of the document by the Prosecution at the post-war trials as proof positive of a German plan for general aggression. In fact, it is to be seen as an example of contingency planning for a future possible war.

The fact that the actual course of events bore almost no resemblance to the various scenarios canvassed at the meeting demonstrates that what Hitler presented was not a definitive plan for military aggression, although the possible need for military action was part of it; it was a proposal for asserting German economic hegemony in 1943-45, and an assessment of possible scenarios accompanying such an attempt.

[David Thompson]

Michael -- You said:

The issue is the misuse of the document by the Prosecution at the post-war trials as proof positive of a German plan for general aggression. In fact, it is to be seen as an example of contingency planning for a future possible war.

Is it fair to speak of a "misuse of the document by the Prosecution at the post-war trials as proof positive of a German plan for general aggression," given this description of the conference by the German Foreign Minister at the time, Dr. h.c. Konstantin von Neurath (in IMT proceedings vol. 16, pp. 639-41):

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: We now come to the change in policy. Herr Von Neurath, when did you realize that Hitler's foreign policy plans, above all the achieving of equal rights for Germany, went beyond peaceful means, and that the waging of wars and the use of violence began to be considered as a possibility?

VON NEURATH: I realized it for the first time when I heard Hitler's speech to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Armed Forces on 5 November 1937, which has been mentioned here frequently, and at which I was present. It is true that the notes on the contents of this speech, as we have seen from the Hossbach minutes, were made

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from memory 5 days later as an excerpt from a speech which lasted 2 or 3 hours. Although the plans set forth by Hitler in that long speech had no concrete form, and various possibilities were envisaged, it was quite obvious to me that the whole tendency of his plans was of an aggressive nature. I was extremely upset at Hitler's speech, because it knocked the bottom out of the whole foreign policy which I had consistently pursued-the policy of employing only peaceful means. It was evident that I could not assume responsibility for such a policy.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: In connection with this I should like to refer to the affidavit of Baroness Hitter already mentioned by me as Number 3 in Document Book 1. From this affidavit I should like to quote a paragraph under Figure 17 of my document book, a paragraph which seems to me to be so important that I should like to ask the Tribunal to grant me permission to quote this paragraph.

I quote:

"When for the first time Herr Von Neurath recognized from Hitler's statement on 5 November 1937 that the latter wanted to achieve his political aims by the use of force toward the neighboring states, he was so severely shaken that he suffered several heart attacks.

"He discussed this with us in detail on the occasion of his visit on New Year's Day 1938, and we saw that this had affected him both physically and spiritually. Above all, he was very upset because meanwhile Hitler had refused to receive him and in these circumstances he could not see how Hitler was to be dissuaded from his plans, which he severely condemned. He often said 'It is horrible to play the part of Cassandra.' He categorically declared that on no account could he support this policy, and that he would face the issue. He did not falter in this decision when on 2 February 1938, on the occasion of his sixty-fifth birthday, Hitler told him that he could not do without him as Foreign Minister. He told us about this the same evening in a telephone conversation when we sent him birthday greetings."

What did you do when this speech forced you to realize these things?

VON NEURATH: About 2 days after this speech I went to see General Von Fritsch, who had also been present on the occasion of this speech; and together with him and the Chief of the General Staff, Beck, I discussed what could be done to get Hitler to change his ideas. We agreed that first of all General Von Fritsch, who was due to report to Hitler during the next few days, should explain to

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him all the military considerations which made this policy inadvisable. Then I intended to explain the political reasons to him.

Unfortunately Hitler left for the Obersalzberg soon afterward and could not or did not wish to receive me before his departure. I could not see Hitler until 14 or 15 January. On that occasion I tried to show him that his policy would lead to a world war, and that I would have no part in it. Many of his plans could be realized by peaceful means, even if the process was slower. He answered that he could not wait any longer. I called his attention to the danger of war and to the serious warnings of the generals. I reminded him of his speech to the Reichstag in 1933 in which he himself had declared every new war to be sheer madness, and so forth. When despite all my arguments he still held to his opinions, I told him that he would have to find another Foreign Minister, and that I would not be an accessory to such a policy. At first Hitler refused to accept my resignation, but I insisted, and on 4 February he granted my release without further comment.

[michael mills]

My view is that the significance of the meeting on 5 November 1937 should be evaluated on the basis of a careful and thorough analysis of what the Hossbach memorandum actually says, rather than on the basis of a spin put on the document in hindsight.

Von Neurath is saying, in essence: the meeting revealed a plan for aggression to which I objected, and that is why I resigned the post of Foreign Minister in February 1938. Perhaps the main reason for Hitler's acceptance of Von Neurath's resignation on 4 February was that the latter had turned 65 two days before; most probably Hitler simply thought that Von Neurath was too old for such a demanding job.

I note that Von Neurath did not knock back the position of Reichsprotektor of Bohemia-Moravia when it was offered to him one year later, on the final dissolution of Czecho-Slovakia in March 1939.

I suggest we now all proceed to an analysis of what the Hossbach Memorandum actually says, and what it tells us about what was in Hitler's mind at the time.

[David Thompson]

Michael -- You said:

My view is that the significance of the meeting on 5 November 1937 should be evaluated on the basis of a careful and thorough analysis of what the Hossbach memorandum actually says, rather than on the basis of a spin put on the document in hindsight.

Truly. That's why von Neurath's characterization seems so plausible -- there was no need to "put a spin" on his heart attack and resignation as German foreign minister after what he heard at the conference. That's probably also why Hossbach produced the memo -- he understood that it was not just another Fuehrer monologue but something more significant.

Hitler's proposals and scenarios may be vague but it looks like he was planning on starting a major conflict in the near future if he didn't get what he wanted. That was von Neurath's "take" after attending the conference and Hitler confirmed it when von Neurath tried to talk him out of his aggressive outlook:

I could not see Hitler until 14 or 15 January. On that occasion I tried to show him that his policy would lead to a world war, and that I would have no part in it. Many of his plans could be realized by peaceful means, even if the process was slower. He answered that he could not wait any longer. (My emphasis -- DT)

For that reason I cannot agree with your statement about "the misuse of the document by the Prosecution at the post-war trials as proof positive of a German plan for general aggression." So far from being a misuse of the document, I think the IMT characterization is apt.

You also said:

I suggest we now all proceed to an analysis of what the Hossbach Memorandum actually says, and what it tells us about what was in Hitler's mind at the time.

Please proceed.

[michael mills]

David Thompson wrote:

This is the text of a memorandum prepared by then-Lieutenant Colonel Friedrich Hossbach in November, 1937, following a conference he attended on the 5th of that month. At that conference, Hitler set forth his plans for aggressive war in Europe:

Was Hitler really presenting his plans for aggressive war?

If so, they were exceedingly vague plans.

To be sure, he spoke of a window of opportunity in 1943-45 when Germany would have the edge in military strength, after which it would start to fall behind its opponents. Therefore, it would have to do something during that window of opportunity.

But what? Launch a general war? Against whom? Hitler's disquisition on the geopolitical problem facing Germany does not make it at all clear what he was proposing to do during the window of opportunity in 1943-45.

Hitler expresses the basis of his policy for securing Germany's future as the acquisition of "vital space" (that is control over land and resources) in the "East". But he does not make it clear how Germany's temporary military advantage is to be used to that end; for example he does not speak of invading any of the countries that could provide that "vital space" (Poland, the Baltic States, the Soviet Union, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia).

Later in the disquisition, Hitler does speak a number of times of launching strikes against two neighbours, Austria and Czechoslovakia. But that is in the context of his analysis of a number of possible scenarios for the outbreak of hostilities with Britain and France, apparently due to their forecast opposition to German expansion during the window of opportunity.

For example, he discusses the likely reaction of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Soviet Union in the case of Germany's becoming embroiled in a war with France. He sees all of them as potential enemies of Germany, some with designs on German territory, who will take advantage of the situation to attack Germany, and suggests ways in which any attack by them could be deterred, eg Poland could be deterred by the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union by Japan.

Nowhere does Hitler speak of launching wars of conquest against those countries. It is obvious that he sees the strikes against Austria and Czechoslovakia as preventive in nature, to knock them out as allies of France, although he does see economic advantages that would accrue from their occupation.

The preventive nature of his considerations is expressed in the following passage:

For the improvement of our military political position it must be our first aim, in every case of entanglement by war, to conquer Czechoslovakia and Austria simultaneously, in order to remove any threat from the flanks in case of a possible advance Westwards. In the case of a conflict with France it would hardly be necessary to assume that Czechoslovakia would declare war on the same day as France. However, Czechoslovakia's desire to participate in the war will increase proportionally to the degree to which we are being weakened. Its actual participation could make itself felt by an attack on Silesia, either towards the North or the West.

In the above passage, Hitler's assumption seems to be that France might at some future date declare war on Germany, and that Czechoslovakia might then take the opportunity to attack Germany from the rear, particularly if Germany were weakened in the conflict with France. It is interesting that Hitler does not seem to be considering a German first strike against France.

In all three scenarios analysed by Hitler, Czechoslovakia is the main enemy that he wants to attack and eliminate. The context suggests that that was due to Czechoslovakia's status as the ally of France, with a level of military power that could pose a threat to Germany in the case of the latter's becoming entangled in war with France.

In summary, there is nothing in the Hossbach Memorandum that suggests a concrete German plan for an aggressive war of conquest. It certainly canvasses the idea of using the window of opportunity in 1943-45 to establish domination over Germany's "vital space" in Eastern Europe, but only in a theoretical way; it does not present any concrete plans for military action.

The Memorandum does recognise the strong possibility that a German attempt to establish hegemony could result in war with Britain and France, which would inevitably try to prevent the emergence of Germany as a dominant power. All the references by Hitler to attacks by Germany on Austria and Czechoslovakia are in the context of action that Germany would need to take in the case of such a war; they are essentially reactive rather than aggressive per se.

The Memorandum canvasses two situations of French weakness, civil conflict in France or a French war with Italy, in which Germany could seize the initiative to knock out Czechoslovakia. The motivation here seems to be the need to eliminate that country as an ally of France in any Franco-German conflict. The economic benefits to Germany of annexing Czechoslovakia (and Austria) are mentioned, but tthey do not seem to be the prime reason for the postulated attack.

[Dan]

I tried to show him that his policy would lead to a world war, and that I would have no part in it.

I guess accepting a post as what amounted to military governer makes you part of it. It seems to me the guy was just another one out to cover his butt.

[Peter H]

I wonder if David Irving has changed his view on the Hossbach Conference as detailed in his book The WarPath,page 63,1978?:

Speaking from a sheaf of loose notes,Hitler had reiterated his determination to launch a war to solve Germany's Lebensraum "problems" within the next five or six years,since Germany could not hope to become self-sufficient in food production,and the countries enjoying excess food-production capacity would hardly part with it voluntarily.Indeed,as a first stage in solving this Lebensraum problem,Hitler might,under certain circumstances,order a "lightning attack" on neighbouring Czechoslovakia during 1938--e.g. if civil war broke out in France between the Left and Right,or if Italy's operations in the Mediterranean should lead to a full-scale war between her and Britain and France next summer.

And on page 64:

As anyone who has read Chapter 14 of Mein Kampf knew,Hitler had set his sights much further afield[than Czechoslovkia].Throughout these years his eyes had remained fixed on Russia.In his first speeches he had drawn attention to her open spaces;and if we apply the only proper yardstick to gauge his inner aims over the years that followed,if we examine his long-term material preparations,only one conclusion remains--that his "dream land",his new empire,awaited him in the east.

One such material clue is in German admiralty files,a letter from the naval commandant in East Prussia reporting a conversation between Hitler and the local gauleiter,Oberpräsident Erich Koch,in June 1937:Hitler had,he said,warned of Pillau's coming importance as a naval base"even more powerful than Kiel or Wilhelmshaven",to accomodate a bigger fleet in future years:"In the Fuhrer's view the time will come--in say six or seven years--when Germany can progress from her present defensive posture to an offensive policy.Within Europe,this kind of development will only be possible towards the east."

[michael mills]

Whether Irving has changed his view of the purpose of the conference or not is irrelevant.

What is at issue is what Hitler said at the conference, and what exactly he was talking about. Why not keep the discussion to that issue, rather than to somebody's interpretation.

Certainly he mentioned several times an attack on Czechoslovakia, either in the period 1943-45, or earlier if French weakness gave an opportunity. But what did he say was the purpose of such an attack?

And why did he refer to the danger of an attack by Czechoslovakia on Germany in the case of Germany becoming involved in a war with France?

[Peter H]

...but Michael you must concede that if such a fervent researcher of the Third Reich like Irving supports the standard view that the Hossbach Conference was a plan for aggressive war then the alternate view is not shared by many.

In your travels have you come across any historians that also refute the aggressive war interpretation?

[michael mills]

Peter H,

I have not gone trawling for historians' views on the Hossbach Memorandum.

But I have eyes to read what is written in the Memorandum, and a mind to understand what it says.

After reading through it several times, it appears to me that Hitler conceives of a future state of war between Germany on the one hand and on the other Britain and France, whom he sees as Germany's sworn enemies, as coming about through their declaring war on Germany rather than the reverse. That does not seem to me a plan for a general war of aggression.

In any case, the Memorandum does not appear to be the "smoking gun" that the Allied prosecutors claimed it to be.

What is your take on the document, Peter H? Can you find in it any passage suggesting that Hitler was planning to launch a first strike on Britain and/or France? Can you find any indication of a plan to attack Poland or the Soviet Union?

[Peter H]

Ludwig Becks comments on the Hossbach notes might also be of interest:

Ludwig Beck Handwritten Comments on the Hossbach Notes, 12 November 1937

Doubtlessly the problem of space for Germany arises primarily because of its central position in Europe and as such has always existed and will probably continue to exist for all times, and the problem has been complicated also by the territorial changes brought about by the Versailles Treaty. But one must not overlook, on the other hand, that the areas of nationalities have been stabilized in Europe for a thousand years and even longer, and fundamental changes can scarcely be implemented without the most difficult and incomprehensibly lengthy convulsions. One cannot draw parallels in Europe for the territorial changes such as Italy has carried out in Africa or Japan in East Asia. And no attempt at changes should be permitted to endanger the unity of the German people, the racial heart of Germandom.

According to our previous views, all plans for autarchy -- such as those which underlay in part the Four-Year Plan -- were only emergency measures, and were never intended to be permanent solutions. It is certain that every attempt at autarchy which endangers in a prejudicial fashion the very future of its own possessions and substance cannot be but a misplaced solution in the long run.

It is only too true that in view of our participation in a world economy we cannot be truly independent. But to deduce from this fact, that the sole remedy is to conquer an enlarged living space appears to me to require that we master numerous difficulties that have been too little thought out. In so far as I understand these things, we must continue for all time to participate in the highest degree possible in the world's economy, or else the German people must slowly shrivel up.

The extent of the French and English opposition to any expansion in territory and growth in power by Germany is not misplace. But to view this opposition as irrevocable, that is insurmountable, in the face of the totally inadequate attempts till now to set this opposition aside, appears to me not justified. Politics is the art of the possible. All three nations exist simultaneously in this world, and all three are in Europe. Thus, it would be most advisable first to exhaust all possibilities to work out something among them, especially in view of the mutual power relationships. More over, such a procedure would be clever should some war break out later.

Certainly, the British Empire is not indestructible. But it appears much more probable to me that it will continue for quite some time to be the most influential world power next to America. And therefore for the immediate future England will not stand alone but will always have allies. The short, and general remarks over England and France -- Russia as a power factor is unfortunately not mentioned at all -- have nothing whatsoever to do with the final conclusions of the "Führer." He appears to be satisfied with only one question: where will England and France, etc., stand in 1938.

It is probably not historically correct to say that Bismarck's wars against Austria and France contained unheard-of risks; what risks were present had been amply foreseen by the statesman, who took them into account in his planning and therefore had success. The entire historical parallels here are of questionable validity.

The chronological distinctions into three separate cases are also of questionable validity, because they proceed only upon a part of the factors which will come into play, namely those which can be known beforehand.

CASE I: The military information is not the proper subject for a statesman and needs to be reviewed by specialists. The military- political, financial, economic, and morale issues are not even discussed at all. The conclusion that the German space question must be resolved at the latest by 1943/1945 is presented with such a lack of adequate reasoning that its effect is depressingly shattering.

CASE II: As before, such an eventuality is considered totally unlikely -- this is only wishful thinking.

CASE III: France will always have sufficient power at its disposal to proceed against Germany.

To consider Austria and Czechoslovakia as land with excess profits is certainly an exaggeration. Even in the most favorable conditions, they will supply only a relatively small improvement in our potential supply of food and raw materials.

The military-political situation possible after annexation of Czechoslovakia and Austria requires a more basic investigation.

I do not object to the advisability of ordering investigations and inaugurating preparations that will make possible the solution of the case of Czechoslovakia (and eventually also Austria) at some opportune moment. The preconditions necessary for such an opportunity to be seized, and the considerations surrounding it, however, require a much more fundamental and comprehensive investigation than can be found in the notes of this conversation.

http://www2.bc.edu/~heineman/roadi.html

If not a plan for war,it could be seen as an expansionary policy that would lead to war.

[michael mills]

The comments by Beck on Hossbach's summary of the conference are very interesting.

They constitute a trenchant critique of the assumptions on which Hitler's evaluation of the strategic situation facing Germany rest.

But where in Hossbach's notes can be found a plan for a general war of conquest?

It is quite correct that Hitler was proposing an expansionary policy aimed at establishing German hegemony over Central and Eastern Europe with the aim of making Germany and its area of hegemony self-sufficient and independent of world trade. It is also true that Hitler foresaw that such an attempt to establish German hegemony would be opposed by Britain and France, and could lead to those two countries going to war with Germany in order to prevent that attempt.

But where is the plan for military invasion of other countries? The only military actions mentioned are against Czechoslovakia and Austria, and only in the context of France having declared war on Germany.

As I wrote in my initial post, the conference was a presentation of Hitler's views of the strategic situation facing Germany, the possible measures that Germany could undertake in that situation, and the different scenarios that could determine Germany's actions. Beck obviously disagreed with Hitler's analysis, but there is nothing in his comments to indicate that he saw Hitler's monologue as a plan for a Europe-wide war of aggression.

Again I ask you, where is the timetable for military conquest, and where is the list of countries in Eastern Europe that Hitler proposes to invade?

[Hans Kloss]

More doubts coming up after reading that review :

http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v04/v04p372_Weber.html

Since that just review of Kluge's book my question would be if anyone is familar with it?

[David Thompson]

Hans -- The 20 year old book review you linked to is both polemical and unsourced. From the H&WC section rules:

Undocumented claims undercut the research purposes of this section of the forum. Consequently, it is required that proof be posted along with a claim. The main reason is that proof, evidence, facts, etc. improve the quality of discussions and information. A second reason is that inflammatory, groundless threads attack, and do not promote, the scholarly purpose of this section of the forum.

This requirement applies to each specific claim. In the past, some posters have attempted to evade the proof requirement by resort to the following tactics, none of which are acceptable here:

A general reference to a website, or a book without page references; citations or links to racist websites; generalized citations to book reviews; and citations to unsourced articles.

Noncomplying posts are subject to deletion after warning.

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=53962