Nazi attrocities in Greece

[michael mills]

With regard to the Dhistomo massacre:

If there was indeed a truce between ELAS and the German forces for the purpose of allowing the German forces to evacuate Greece, then it was broken by the partisans who blocked the main road to Arakhova and then attacked the German forces on 10 June 1944.

Given the breaking of the truce (if indeed there was one), it is no wonder that the German forces were extremely angry, and desperate with the fear that their line of retreat might be cut off.

Why did the partisans block the main road to Arakhova? That suggests that the truce negotiated by ELAS was a ruse, and they never intended to keep it. Conversely, the partisnas who blocked the main road and attacked the german forces might have been a rogue group acting against the orders of the ELAS leadership. Either way, the German reaction, although extremely savage, is understandable.

[David Thompson]

Michael -- You wrote:

I made the explicit comparison with the current policy of the United States Government, which refuses to treat members of the Afghan forces who opposed the United States invasion of Afghanistan as prisoners of war but as "enemy combatants" not protected by the Geneva Convention, and which considers the use of weapons against the invading United States forces as a war-crime, an acto of murder or attempted murder.

This is an apolitical forum for the discussion of historical subjects. Please keep it that way and avoid discussion of current events.

[michael mills]

When we examine a feature of the Second World War such as the German massacre of Italian soldiers in Greece after the Italian surrender in September 1943, we have to ask ourselves relevant questions, such as why the Germans did not treat the Italians who had surrendered as prisoners of war subject to the nomral protections, and how they did regard them.

I consider reference to current events relevant if they help to provide answers to the above questions. For example, the present concept of enemy personnel captured in an international armed conflict not as prisoners of war subject to the conventions governing their treatment, but as "enemy combatants" who may be treated as criminals is to my mind particularly useful in illustrating the thinking of German commanders 60 years ago

Once we have recognised the similarity in the ways of thinking that lead to captured enemy personnel being considered "criminals", we can analyse the difference in the treatment of the "criminals" varying from the humae to the inhumane, and determine the reasons for the difference.

[DrG]

When we examine a feature of the Second World War such as the German massacre of Italian soldiers in Greece after the Italian surrender in September 1943, we have to ask ourselves relevant questions, such as why the Germans did not treat the Italians who had surrendered as prisoners of war subject to the nomral protections, and how they did regard them.

It has been argued that Hitler ordered the massacre of Cefalonia as an example for any Italian (or of his not enthusiastic European allies, that could have left the Axis soon) unit that would have opposed the Germans after the armistice with the Allies. Moreover the liberation of Mussolini gave him the excuse that the Kingdom of Italy wasn't recognized by Germany and that Mussolini's govern was the only legitimate Italian govern.
To these reasons we have to add the deepest hate of Hitler for those Italians that had betrayed the Axis (an hate that led to the most cruel decisions, that were then mitigated by the diplomacy of the RSI) and the fact that the Germans felt betrayed 3 times by Gen. Gandin: in fact not only he had followed the King, not only he hadn't followed Gen. Vecchiarelli's agreement (but he wasn't forced to do so, given the different administration of the Ionian Islands, that were considered as metropolitan Italy, where the Germans hadn't the slightest right on Italian troops), but also because he had ordered to resist to his troops (pratically only because he was forced to act in this way by superior orders and some turmoil by anti-German junior officers, but the Germans didn't know this) after 4 days of negotiations.

But, on the other hand, we shall remember that other forces that, with complete legality (given the explicit text of the Franco-German and Franco-Italian armistices), could have been treated as illegal combatants were those of Gen. De Gaulle. But both Mussolini and Rommel (and, for the latter, I would like to know if he had informed Hitler) decided to grant them the status of legal combatants. Mussolini, in his sad months during the RSI (1943-45), used to remember this fact, comparing himself with De Gaulle and hoping that the Allies would have treated his soldiers as he had treated De Gaulle's ones. And, in fact, the Allies, even though they didn't recognize the RSI and were co-belligerent of the Kingdom of Italy, granted the status of legal combatants to the soldiers of the RSI.
And this happened even though De Gaulle's and Mussolini's soldiers were not simply resisting disarmament and deportation, as the Italians of Cefalonia, but were actively fighting against the Axis or the Allies.

[michael mills]

Dr G

Thanks for your interesting post.

Do you have any information on the treatment received by the men of the RSI police and military forces from the Italian Government at the ned of the war? Were they considered traitors? I believe that Maresciallo Graziani was put on trial.

I know that some fairly harsh treatment was handed out to supporters of Petain after the war. The harshest punishment was given to those French who had actively fought for Germany, but even members of the French Armed forces who had just refused to join De Gaulle, and had only fought the Allies when attacked by them, were subject to reprisals. I know that General Dentz, who had commanded the French forces in Syria resisting the British invasion of summer 1941, was put on trial after the war, although I do not know what the outcome was.

To my mind, the very fact of the existence of RSI forces shows that what happened on Kefallinia was not the typical fate of italian soldiers after the Italian surrender. It was not universally a case of the Italian garrisons being attacked by their former German allies and either massacred or sent to concentration camps. Obviously many Italian servicemen must have volunteered to continue fighting against the Allies on the side of Germany.

It seems to me that there must have been many millions of Italians who saw Communism as a greater threat than Germany, and were prepared to turn a blind eye to the slaughter of those of their countrymen who wanted to fight against Germany (just as I suppose there must have been many millions of Italians who saw Germany as the greater threat, and were prepared to turn a blind eye to the slaughter of the fellow Italians who were pro-German).

As for the Italian troops on Kefallinia, I do not think it was a case of their simply resisting disarmament and deportation. It seems to me that there were elements among them who actively wanted to fight Germany, regardless of what the German action toward them might be. Captain Apollonio is a case in point; he was obviously determined to fight the Germans, and he seems to have deliberately set off the tragic events on Kefallinia by firing on the German forces that were coming to occupy the island. His subsequent joining the Greek communist partisans is an indication of his attitude.

While with the Greek partisans, Apollonio himself committed acts that could be termed atrocities. For example, he has openly confirmed that he and his partisan group killed all the prisoners they took; he stated that they cut the throats of their prisoners in order to save bullets. Those statements were made on the TV documentary "The Real Captain Corelli".

Although on a smaller scale, that was the same offence as the German killing of the Italian soldiers they took prisoner on Kefallinia.

[Topspeed]

Here's a very interesting excerpt from Richard Lamb's War in Italy 1943-45, regarding Cephalonia:

Reading the evidence of Lanz and his defence witnesses reminds one vividly of the old adage that the bigger the lie the more likely it is to be believed. It also pinpoints how dangerous it is for historians to rely on evidence produced at the Nuremberg Trials in reaching conclusions. The judges accepted that Lanz had prevented the massacre and that it never took place. As a result Lanz received a lighter sentence than General Rendulic;, who had been responsible for executing several hundred Italian officers after bogus court martials in Split and Yugoslavia. Rendulic was sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment, although his actions in no way approached the enormity of Lanz's massacre of the Acqui Division on Cephalonia.

Rendulic was commissioned to Lapland after the austrian general Eduard Dietl had died in a He 111 crash. Renculic was indeed considered an evil nazi. Read more about the war in Lapland ( finns against germans ) here at this site.

regards,

Juke T

[DrG]

Thanks for your interesting post.

Do you have any information on the treatment received by the men of the RSI police and military forces from the Italian Government at the ned of the war? Were they considered traitors? I believe that Maresciallo Graziani was put on trial.

Besides those who were captured by partizans, and thus had to suffer the worst treatment (horrible deaths included), there was an epuration of those officers and NCOs (only those whose work was that, not those drafted because of the war) that had joined the RSI. Most were expelled from the Armed Forces; very few, like Graziani, were imprisoned for a few years (but Graziani, being the commander of the Armed Forces of the RSI and minister of that govern, is a different matter). Graziani lost his rank and decorations, but, for example, Borghese was allowed to keep them (although expelled from the Navy).
In the Air Force the epuration was more mild, so that the ace Luigi Gorrini was allowed to stay in it, and the same, for example, happened to Nino Arena, who even published many books for the Historic Office of the Aeronautica Militare in the 70's-80's.

To my mind, the very fact of the existence of RSI forces shows that what happened on Kefallinia was not the typical fate of italian soldiers after the Italian surrender. It was not universally a case of the Italian garrisons being attacked by their former German allies and either massacred or sent to concentration camps. Obviously many Italian servicemen must have volunteered to continue fighting against the Allies on the side of Germany.

Yes, thanks God Cefalonia was an isolated case. But Hitler had given order to kill all the officers of the units that had resisted along with partizans or had given weapons to them (Nino Arena, in his "Forze Armate della Repubblica Sociale Italiana. 1943", quotes the order of the OKW n.005117 of 9 Sept. 1943), not only in Cefalonia, but everywhere.

As for the Italian troops on Kefallinia, I do not think it was a case of their simply resisting disarmament and deportation. It seems to me that there were elements among them who actively wanted to fight Germany, regardless of what the German action toward them might be. Captain Apollonio is a case in point; he was obviously determined to fight the Germans, and he seems to have deliberately set off the tragic events on Kefallinia by firing on the German forces that were coming to occupy the island. His subsequent joining the Greek communist partisans is an indication of his attitude.

Capt. Apollonio was even tried for insubordination after the war (of course, given the political importance of that sentence, he was acquitted), his own action can be seen as an act of hostility. But, given that the German landing craft were transporting troops to Italian territory without being allowed by the Italian command, the German attempted landing may be considered the first offensive action.

While with the Greek partisans, Apollonio himself committed acts that could be termed atrocities. For example, he has openly confirmed that he and his partisan group killed all the prisoners they took; he stated that they cut the throats of their prisoners in order to save bullets. Those statements were made on the TV documentary "The Real Captain Corelli".

Apollonio is (or was? I don't remember) a disgusting person, but this doesn't change the fact that the Germans executed Italian soldiers (not only officers) that had only done their duty and instead the Germans didn't made any investigation to find the officer that had ordered to open fire on them for the first time (capt. Apollonio himself, who even survived).

[Peter H]

With regard to the Dhistomo massacre:

If there was indeed a truce between ELAS and the German forces for the purpose of allowing the German forces to evacuate Greece, then it was broken by the partisans who blocked the main road to Arakhova and then attacked the German forces on 10 June 1944.

Given the breaking of the truce (if indeed there was one), it is no wonder that the German forces were extremely angry, and desperate with the fear that their line of retreat might be cut off.

Why did the partisans block the main road to Arakhova? That suggests that the truce negotiated by ELAS was a ruse, and they never intended to keep it. Conversely, the partisnas who blocked the main road and attacked the german forces might have been a rogue group acting against the orders of the ELAS leadership. Either way, the German reaction, although extremely savage, is understandable.

Michael,

The German withdrawal from Greece commenced in late August 1944.

http://www.wargamesdirectory.com/html/a ... aOps/3.asp

[michael mills]

The legal situation of the Italian troops on Greek territory after the italian surrender in September 1943 is an interesting and complicated one, to my mind.

Although Greece was occupied by both German and Italian forces, with Italy having by far the larger zone of occupation, the Greek State continued to exist, ruled by a collaborationist government in opposition to the Royal Government-in-Exile that had been set up in Cairo under british protection.

The collaborationist Greek Government consisted of conservative and liberal politicians who were united in their opposition to Communism, and were to a large extent remnants from the former Metaxas dictatorship. The Greek Government was pro-German, since it saw Germany as the main guardian of Greece against Communism, and in that respect continued the political stance of General Metaxas, who had died in January 1941. Furthermore, Germany had no territorial claims on Greece, and Hitler admired the Greek people as the originators of "Aryan" civilisation.

By contrast, the Greek Government at Athens regarded Italy with suspicion, fearing Italian expansionist ambitions in regard to ethnic Greek territory dating right back to the Venetian seizure of Constantinople in 1204. More recently, in the early 1920s, Italy had seized the Dhodhekanisi Islands (including Rhodes), which had previously been Ottoman territory but had been awarded to Greece in the peace settlement at the end of the First World War.

It needs to be recalled that the Axis occupation of Greece was due entirely to Mussolini's invasion at the end of October 1940, which he had carried out totally contrary to the wishes of Hitler, who had hoped to make greece an ally or at least a benevolent neutral. Greece was then under the rule of General Metaxas, who had set up an ultra-nationalist, quasi-fascist regime that was pro-German.

Mussolini had sought the support of both Yugoslavia and Bulgaria for his invasion of Greece, promising Yugoslavia Thessaloniki and Bulgaria Western Thrace. However, both Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were pro-German, and obeyed Hitler's instruction not to participate; they even informed the Greek Government of the Italian plans.

Although the Greek Army under Metaxas strongly opposed the Italian invasion and even pushed the Italian forces well back into Albania, the Greek regime did not adopt an anti-German attitude, seeing its quarrel with Italy only. The Greek-Italian war was seen by Metaxas as a separate conflict from the war between Germany and Britain. Accordingly, he refused offers of British military help against Italy, since he well knew that the British aim was not so much to help Greece as to obtain air-bases on Greek soil from which it could threaten Germany's main source of oil in Romania.

It was only after General Metaxas died in Janaury 1941 that the Greek Government accepted the British offer of aid, and allowed British forces to take up positions in Greece. It was that action by the Greek Government that led to Hitler's decision to invade Greece, in order to deny it to Britain.

The conquest of Greece was entirely an achievement of the German forces, and the military occupation of the greater part of Greek territory by Italian forces was a concession by Germany, not something that the Italian forces had won by their own prowess.

The new Greek Government in Athens and large parts of the Greek population welcomed the German occupation, seeing it as a bulwark against the Popular Front created by the Comintern, which had gained control of the Greek labour movement in the 1920s. The Italians however were always regarded with suspicion because of their expansionist aims (the impressions created by fims like "Mediterraneo" and "Captain Corelli's Mandolin", while they might have some truth at a purely personal or local level, are essentially false).

The Athens Government was prepared to tolerate the presence of Italian forces on its territory as long as Italy was allied with Germany and assisting it in the defence of European civilisation against Bolshevism. However, as soon as the Royal Italian Government surrendered, Italy was no longer an ally of the Greek Government in Athens, and its presence on Greek territory became immediately illegal.

The Athens Government was therefore justified in demanding the removal of Italian forces from its soil, and the German forces could therefore be seen as justified in moving immediately to disarm and intern those Italian forces on behalf of its Greek ally. When pro-Communist and pro-Allied elements within those Italian forces resisted the German attempt to disarm them and liquidate their illegal presence of Greek soil, and moreover attempted to join the Communist terrorists who were waging war against the Athens Government, or hand over their arms to them, the German action in crushing that resistance and punishing those who fired on the German troops could be seen as justified.

The action of Italian troops in firing on German forces who were attempting to disarm and intern them could be seen as a terrorist action carried out on Greek soil that was punished by the German forces acting on behalf of its ally, the Greek Government in Athens.

I note that the punishment meted out by the German forces to Italian troops who had committed terrorist actions on Greek territory did not always take the form of summary execution as in the case of the Kefallinia massacre, which was certainly contrary to international law. In many cases Italian officers who had ordered the terrorist actions were tried before German courts-martial and executed after being found guilty.

As for the contention that Kefallinia was actually Italian territory on which the German forces had no jurisdiction, I know that before 1940 the only Greek territory under Italian rule was the Dhodhekanisi Islands. If Kefallinia had come under Italian rule, it can only be because italy annexed it after the conquest of Greece in 1941. If that is so, it may well be that in September 1943 Germany and the Greek Government in Athens rescinded their recognition of that annexation, making Kefallinia once again Greek territory, and giving German forces legal authority to take action there on behalf of the Greek Government to disarm the Italian forces that were now illegally occupying the island. That point will need to be checked.

It is noteworthy that when the German forces evacuated Greece and British forces took up occupation at the end of 1944, the latter permitted the Athens Government to remain in de facto power, and assisted it in its fight against the Communist partisans. The new Greek Government that was set up by Britain consisted of elements drawn both from the former collaborationsit government in Athens and from the returning Royal Government-in-Exile.

Greece was the only country formerly under German occupation where the Allies allowed a government that had collaborated with the occupation to remain in power, and where the Allies joined the former collaborators in fighting against the Communists who had formerly resisted the German occupation.

[michael mills]

Further to my previous post, I note that DrG states that Hitler ordered the execution of Italian officers who had offered armed resistance to the German forces or had given arms to the partisans.

But on Kefallinia, it was not only officers but whole units, including enlisted men, who were massacred.

Had Hitler in that case ordered the killing of the enlisted men as well? Or did the german forces go beyond what Hitler had ordered?

I personally would regard the action of the German forces in disarming and interning the Italian forces now illegally occupying Greek territory as probably legal. It was also possibly legal to court-martial and punish Italian officers who had ordered resistance to the German forces and had aided the anti-German partisans.

But of course I regard the mass-shooting of enlisted men who had only obeyed the orders of their officers as unjustified and an atrocity.

[DrG]

The status of the Ionian islands was very complex: in fact they were not annexed by Italy de jure, but only de facto (although the Italian govern decided to consider them as annexed land). Of course the fact that Germans disarmed Italian troops even on Italian soil proves pretty well that they didn't feel they had any legal problem even when Italian sovereignity was sure.
I have never heard of a request of the Greek puppet govern (whose pro-German feelings you are underlining a bit too much: the German exploitation of Greek economy and their disinterest for food aids had alienated not a few of the sympaty of the Greek govern, and people, for them) to ask the German help to disarm Italian troops, although it may well be so.

A thing that always confused me was, as you have cleverly pointed out, that Hitler had ordered to kill "only" officers, not also NCOs and soldiers. This different treatment for Cefalonia is usually explained with a Hitler's order specifical for Cefalonia, but I don't know if it's only a post-rationalization or the truth. It might be the decision of local commaders.

[michael mills]

It needs to be remembered that until the Italian surrender in September 1943, German forces occupied only a very small part of Greece, only the northern part centred on Thessaloniki, and the Turkish border, east of the Bulgarian occupation zone.

The rest of Greece was occupied by Italian forces.

So German requisitioning of supplies did not affect most of Greece until after the whole country was occupied by German forces after the Italian surrender. Greek resentment of the occupation really became marked in the final year, September 1943 to September 1944.

The main cause of the food shortage in Greece was the blocking by Britain of the food imports on which Greece was dependant, after the Axis occupation. At one point Britain sent ships to occupied Greece with food aid, with the permission of the occupiers.

[DrG]

So German requisitioning of supplies did not affect most of Greece until after the whole country was occupied by German forces after the Italian surrender. Greek resentment of the occupation really became marked in the final year, September 1943 to September 1944.

Besides requisitionings (for a total of 45,700,500 RM in May-Sept. 1941 alone, not counting the local requisitioning made by the troops for their own use; see: Etmektsoglou-Koehn, "Axis Exploitation of Wartime Greece", page 281, quoted in D. Rodogno, "Nuovo Ordine Mediterraneo"), the true problem of German occupation were the huge and disproportionate costs paid by the Greek govern (that, thus, was forced to print new money, causing hyperinflation: prices of May 1942 were 13,000% higher than in April 1941, E.-K., page 495): Greece had paid to Germany 138,431,000,000 dracmas (equivalent to 2,307,183,000 RM) by 15 Dec. 1942, instead to Italy (that, as you have underlined, occupied most of the country) 51,873,000,000 (864,550,000 RM) by the same date.
Moreover Italy hadn't decreased its own occupation costs only because the Germans refused to do the same (Italian requests to Clodius in January 1942 and of Mussolini to Hitler of July 1942).

The main cause of the food shortage in Greece was the blocking by Britain of the food imports on which Greece was dependant, after the Axis occupation. At one point Britain sent ships to occupied Greece with food aid, with the permission of the occupiers.

While this point is correct, and the Allied blockade was the first cause of food shortages in whole Axis controlled Europe, we shall remember that there were differences between the various European countries, with some (as Greece) kept almost without food. Ciano told of the Greek famine to Goering in Nov. 1941, but the cynical although rather logic reply was negative. I quote the relation of that meeting of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (document DDI, s.IX, VII, p.802, in: R. De Felice, "Mussolini l'alleato. I.1", page 449): "from the German part - [Goering] has told - there is nothing to do. The alimentary difficulities start to be felt in many sectors and if there is a few spare grain he prefers to give it to the Finns who fight well and are hungry [the Italian expression is not translable literally: "che tirano al verde" but has that meaning]. He thinks to the chance of making an appeal to President Roosevelt because he, who has taken the role of the godfather [or: defender] of humanity, may let some South-American grain pass directed to the Greeks. If Roosevelt will refuse the responsability of the consequences will be his. "On the other hand - he [Goering] added - we cannot be worried too much about the hunger of Greeks. It is a calamity that will affect, besides them, many people. In the camps of Russian PoWs, after having eaten everything possible, included the soles of shoes, they have started to eat each other, and, which is more grave, they have eaten also a German sentinel. This year between 20 and 30 millions of people will die of hunger in Russia. Maybe it's good it happens so, because certain peoples must be decimated. But even if it weren't so, there is nothing to do: it is clear that if humanity is condemned to die of hunger, the last ones who will die will be our two peoples."."
Given the British and American refusals to accept Axis requests, the only diplomatic action to save Greeks was of the Vatican (mostly of mons. Angelo Roncalli, the future John XXIII; for further info about Vatican mediation, see this Italian university degree thesis: http://www.larchivio.org/xoom/silviagrecia.htm), that, on 27 Jan. 1942, finally got the British grant of passage for some ships transporting grain paid by Greece (the grain arrived mostly in the Spring of 1942).
Meanwhile the Italian Divisions in Greece had been ordered to cultivate fields (the "orti del soldato") to sustain themselves, but only one division (the Cagliari) reached almost complete self-sustenance.

[michael mills]

Goering's words, although cynical, were quite true.

Axis-occupied Europe was constantly on the verge of starvation due to the Allied blockade.

Before the war, Europe had produced only 90% of its food requirements, the remainder being imported. When imports were cut off by the British blockade, there was an immediate food shortage, with the spectre of famine, particularly if there were harvest failures in Europe itself.

There were great differences between the Axis-occupied countries in terms of their self-sufficiency in food. Some, such as Denmark and France, were self-sufficient, and enjoyed a higher standard of living during the war than did the German population.

Germany was not self-sufficient in food, but fed itself by taking food from other countries, particularly the East. That led to malnutrition and in some cases to starvation in the countries from which Germany confiscated food supplies.

Greece was an extreme food-deficit country; the agricultural production of such an infertile land was nowhere near enough to feed its population, and it depended on trade carried out by its merchant fleet to survive. The cutting off of imports and the capture or blockading of its merchant fleet were sufficient to cause starvation in the absence of food-aid.

I do not think Germany took much food out of Greece, but neither was it in a position to provide food aid. As Goering said to Ciano, if there was not enough food to go around, Germany would reserve what there was for itself and its allies, such as Italy and Finland, and other peoples would have to take their chances.

A good contemporary book to read on the topic is "Starvation over Europe: Made in Germany", published in 1943 by the World Jewish Congress. It shows that Greeks received the next lowest rations after the Jews.

[DrG]

Greece was an extreme food-deficit country; the agricultural production of such an infertile land was nowhere near enough to feed its population, and it depended on trade carried out by its merchant fleet to survive. The cutting off of imports and the capture or blockading of its merchant fleet were sufficient to cause starvation in the absence of food-aid.

Another serious problem was caused by the stop or severe restrictions imposed on fishing, to avoid illegal commerce and introduction of enemy agents from Turkey.

I do not think Germany took much food out of Greece, but neither was it in a position to provide food aid.

Some food was nevertheless requisitioned: in May-Sept. 1941 (in my previous post I had mistakenly, and I really don't know why, written Sept.-Dec. 1941, now I've corrected it) they took away 40,000 t of grapes and 10,500 t of olive oil (source: again E.-K., page 281).
While generally the food situation of Europe was a disaster caused by Allied blockade (plus the restrictions on fishing and the lower use of chemical fertilizers), certainly Germany did nothing positive for Greece, a thing that, along with the occupation costs and requisitionings, didn't help its relations with the governs of Gen. Tsolakoglou and then of Ioannis Rallis.