Adenauer on the Morgenthau Plan and restitution to Jews

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Roberto
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Post by Roberto » 21 Aug 2002 23:42

Scott Smith wrote:I don't know the figures.


Well, if you maintain that the majority of famine dead occurred after the armistice, you bloody well should.

Scott Smith wrote:I merely suggested that you did not account for the period between the Armistice and Versailles. The ball is in your court, my friend, if you claim that starvation from the British blockade wasn't severe AFTER the war and BEFORE the Versailles Diktat, after which the blockade was lifted.


Smith is again revealing his particular talent for forgetting his own statements:

Scott Smith wrote:The blockade was maintained until the Versailles treaty was signed on June 28, 1919. The war was over on November 11, 1918. Most of the starvation occured during this time, IIRC, particularly of children.


Emphasis is mine.

Roberto wrote:Well, for some reason the German Historical Museum, see above link, speaks of 750,000 famine dead between 1914 and 1918, highlights the "Kohlrübenwinter" and doesn't mention famine during the 1918-1919 period following the armistice.


Scott Smith wrote:Well, that's not a surprise, is it? We are talking about a country increasingly wont to argue that Germany's Evil leaders started WWI so that the Jews could be killed in WWII. Of course, Hitler had no real issues; he was just Evil. Yes, the Germans have to be kept away from Genocide as a drunk has to be kept away from booze.


Tell us, Mr. Smith, what do you call a historian who, faced with a source that contradicts his contentions, breaks out into hollow rambling about fantastic conspiracies for which he can provide no backup whatsoever?

Roberto wrote:But I'm sure that Smith, the great historian, knows more than the German Historical Museum and can demonstrate it.


Scott Smith wrote:I'm curious, but I have other things to do.


Turning tail when you have a chance to demonstrate your superior historical knowledge, Mr. Smith?

Why so?

Scott Smith wrote:AFAIC, keeping the hunger-blockade going AFTER the Armistice was an incomparible warcrime that helped radicalize the Germans for further violence. I don't care if you agree or not.


I didn't say anything to the contrary, IIRC. The issue was whether or not the greatest number of famine dead in Germany due to the First World War occurred in the 1914-1918 or in the 1918-1919 period, wasn't it?

Scott Smith wrote:I don't see Germans as innate wild-eyed goosesteppers the way Americans see Muslims as terrorists today.
:)


Neither do I.

But what does that have to do with the topic under discussion?

An off-topic digression to cover up another of Smith's blunders, perhaps?

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Post by Scott Smith » 21 Aug 2002 23:58

Roberto wrote:
Scott Smith wrote:I don't know the figures.

Well, if you maintain that the majority of famine dead occurred after the armistice, you bloody well should.

Duh! I backed off that assertion because I didn't have the figures. I trust you are not trying to argue that nobody starved from 1918-1919 while the hunger-blockade was still on, are you?

Roberto wrote:
Scott Smith wrote:AFAIC, keeping the hunger-blockade going AFTER the Armistice was an incomparible warcrime that helped radicalize the Germans for further violence. I don't care if you agree or not.

I didn't say anything to the contrary, IIRC. The issue was whether or not the greatest number of famine dead in Germany due to the First World War occurred in the 1914-1918 or in the 1918-1919 period, wasn't it?

I don't care as long as you do not neglect the fact that the hunger blockade WAS MAINTAINED AFTER THE WAR until the Diktat was signed.

An off-topic digression to cover up another of Smith's blunders, perhaps?

I know it is hard for you when I start straying outside of the proverbial box. Nevertheless...
:)

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Post by Roberto » 22 Aug 2002 00:09

Scott Smith wrote:
Roberto wrote:
Scott Smith wrote:I don't know the figures.

Well, if you maintain that the majority of famine dead occurred after the armistice, you bloody well should.


Scott Smith wrote:Duh! I backed off that assertion because I didn't have the figures.


That's good to know.

Scott Smith wrote:I trust you are not trying to argue that nobody starved from 1918-1919 while the hunger-blockade was still on, are you?


If you had read my posts with due attention, you wouldn't need to ask that question.

Roberto wrote:I don't care as long as you do not neglect the fact that the hunger blockade WAS MAINTAINED AFTER THE WAR until the Diktat was signed.


Neglecting historical facts is not one of my habits.

I wish I could say the same of Smith.

Roberto wrote:An off-topic digression to cover up another of Smith's blunders, perhaps?


Smith wrote:I know it is hard for you when I start straying outside of the proverbial box. Nevertheless...
:)


Your good old bullshit phrases don't make it better, old pal.

They are just boring.

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Post by Scott Smith » 22 Aug 2002 00:16

Roberto wrote:Your good old bullshit phrases don't make it better, old pal.

They are just boring.

Easy, my churlish friend. I would still be interested in your research on the hunger-blockade if you choose to pursue it.
:)

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Post by Roberto » 22 Aug 2002 00:22

Scott Smith wrote:
Roberto wrote:Your good old bullshit phrases don't make it better, old pal.

They are just boring.

Easy, my churlish friend. I would still be interested in your research on the hunger-blockade if you choose to pursue it.
:)


Taylor's assessment in The First World War: An Illustrated History, as announced.

Pages 144 - 146:

A.J.P. Taylor wrote:The civilian population felt that the war was drawing nearer to them. The casualty lists were no longer those of remote heroes. They contained the names of everyone's friends and relatives. In this year [1916], too, came the only lasting mark which the First World War made on men's lives: Daylight Saving as it was called then, Summer Time as we call it now. The war did better than Joshua. It made the sun change its place in the heavens, or at any rate made men pretend that it had done so. Yet men were still reluctant to tamper with the workings of free choice and the workings of 'economic law'. Though even the British finally swallowed compulsory military service for all, whether married or unmarried, in May 1916, there was still little direction of labor for civil purposes in any country. Prices were going up everywhere, and little was done about it. There had been stable prices and stable currencies as long as anyone living could remember. Now men could not understand what was happening. They blamed human wickedness - the greed of profiteers, or of trade unions - instead of appreciating that when governments paid their bills with paper money, not from taxation, inflation would follow. Bread was rationed in some countries. Otherwise there was 'rationing by the purse'. Food prices were simply allowed to rise. The Germans had already started the story that their food shortage was due to the British 'hunger blockade'. Yet Germany had not imported food before the war. The truth is that the Germans starved themselves. They took millions of men from the land for the armies. High prices encouraged the peasants to send their pigs and cattle to the market. Then supplies ran short. 1916 saw a bad harvest, followed by a bitter winter. Turnips became the staple diet. The 'turnip winter' remained, for many, the sharpest memory of the war. The British escaped this hardship. Bread was never rationed in Great Britain. The worst the British experienced was the adulteration of wheat by flour - at first rye and maize, later potato. This produced an imaginary, though painful, war-indigestion.


Emphasis is mine.

Pages 263/264:

A.J.P. Taylor wrote:The great practical effect was that both the United States and Great Britain came to the actual peace negotiations with Germany in an almost detached frame of mind. The original intention had been that the Allies should settle among themselves what they wanted, and should then negotiate with the Germans, to see how far they could get it. The victors faced an awkward and increasingly difficult problem. The military superiority of the Allies had compelled the Germans to sue for an armistice. Now this superiority was wasting away by demobilization with every day which passed. If negotiations dragged on long enough, the Germans might reappear as equals, not as the defeated. The Allies had one remaining weapon - the blockade against Germany which was still being enforced. It seemed a barbaric weapon now that fighting was over. British forces in the Rhineland, from the commanding general downwards, protested against the blockade, and shared their food with hungry women and children. The blockade had to be ended before the peace was signed. It was suggested as a compromise that a preliminary peace should be made, containing only the military terms, so that Germany would be effectively disarmed. American objections killed this proposal. Even a preliminary peace would have to be submitted to the American Senate for ratification; and Wilson knew that he would have difficulty enough in getting this once, let alone twice. Besides, Wilson, with the complacency of a true idealist, held that any peace which satisfied him must obviously be beyond criticism and that there was no need to wait for arguments from the Germans. He would know what was best for them as for everyone else. Thus, thanks to Wilson's high principles, the democratic and idealistic powers surpassed even the behaviour of the Germans at Brest-Litovsk, where the Bolsheviks had at least been allowed to argue round the table, and imposed peace by dictation, with hardly a pretence at negotiation.


Emphasis is mine.

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Post by michael mills » 22 Aug 2002 10:51

Qvist wrote:

I cannot help but notice that the quoted passage is hardly a full expression of Adenauer's general views on the subject, but an intervention in cabinet made under quite specific circumstances, obviously with the object of issuing a stern warning to potentially critical members by bringing to their attention a fact that had presumably then not been emphasised in previous discussion.

Also, it is difficult to overlook that Adenauer, in the last sentence, mentions both moral and political considerations before economic ones.


Qvist,

Are you suggesting that Adenauer was not expressing what he actually believed, and was simply trying to sell a policy to a cabinet that was basically anti-Semitic? Is there any reason to think that Adenauer did not believe in Jewish economic power, and that that belief was based on his experience of empirical reality?

I would presume that if Qvist were shown a speech by Adenauer's predecessor in the Chancellor's office referring to Jewish economic power, he would not dismiss it as pandering to the cabinet under specific circumstances.

I recommend the book "The Seventh Million" by the Jewish-State journalist Tom Segev, in which the background to the German Government decision to pay reparations to the Jewish State is examined in detail. Segev shows that the decisive factor was Adenauer's realisation that in order to gain the full support of the United States for the complete rehabilitation of germany as a member of the Western Alliance, it would be necessary to placate the American Jewish Lobby.

The fact that Adenauer mentioned moral reasons for adopting a policy of paying reparations (which of course were not required by any peace treaty, as had been the case after the First World War) is neither here nor there, in my opinion. Of course the German Government was not going to come out and say openly that it was going to give a lot of money to the Jewish Establishment because it was being coerced by Jewish economic power; of course it would dress up its decision in moralistic terms, as all governments do with all their decisions. Adenauer was simply enumerating what would be the official line, ie Germany recognises its moral obligations blah blah blah.

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Post by Roberto » 22 Aug 2002 11:11

michael mills wrote:I recommend the book "The Seventh Million" by the Jewish-State journalist Tom Segev, in which the background to the German Government decision to pay reparations to the Jewish State is examined in detail.


Beautiful. "Israel" seems to be a dirty word.

michael mills wrote:Of course the German Government was not going to come out and say openly that it was going to give a lot of money to the Jewish Establishment because it was being coerced by Jewish economic power; of course it would dress up its decision in moralistic terms, as all governments do with all their decisions.


Well, the "Jewish Establishment" actually didn't get that much. The lion's share of German compensation payments went to ca. one million individual claimants - Jewish and non-Jewish - under the Bundesentschädigungsgesetz.

State payments made by the Federal Republic of Germany in the area of indemnification

Since the foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany the efforts to atone for injustice suffered during the period of National Socialism have been one of the main tasks of German politics. For all the Federal Governments to date it has been clear that no amount of money, however large, could compensate for the crimes perpetrated by the Nazi state. No indemnification agreement, no matter how comprehensive it might be, could do justice to the demands for indemnification for the suffering of people persecuted by the Nazi regime. It should, however, be attempted by means of the compensation payments to relieve the injustice at least in material terms. Hence a comprehensive indemnification system has been built up in the Federal Republic of Germany since 1951, which has been continued and extended by the unified state of Germany since 1990.

The undertaking to make indemnification payments became an integral component part of the Transference Convention which was ratified in 1952 and put into force in 1955. The determination of certain regulations relating to indemnification was made out in the agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany, the state of Israel and various Jewish organisations which was signed in Luxembourg on 10 September 1952. The Federal Republic of Germany committed itself therein to the payment of DM 3 billion to the state of Israel as well as a further DM 450 million to the Jewish Claims Conference.

In the following years the German Bundestag passed a large number of additional laws and the Federal Government concluded an agreement on the payment of indemnification. The most important statutory fundamentals relating to indemnification regulate the respective individual claims. Here, it deals on the one hand with:

Compensation
1 October 1953: Supplementary Federal Law for the Compensation of the Victims of National Socialist Persecution (BEG)

29 June 1956: Federal Law for the Compensation of the Victims of National Socialist Persecution


14 September 1965: The Final Federal Compensation Law


and on the other hand with:

Restitution
19 July 1957: Federal Restitution Law (BRüG)


The BEG regulates the claims of persons who were persecuted on account of their political convictions, for reasons of race, belief or due to their philosophy of life and as a result suffered physical injury or material loss, in particular loss of life, bodily harm or harm to their health, loss of property and assets as well as the hindering of their professional and financial advancement.

In the case of BRüG it concerns the return of individual, ascertainable assets which were taken away from them by the National Socialist persecution measures (for reasons of race, religion, life philosophy, nationality or political opposition) or, in the event that these no longer exist, in the form of compensation for the value of the property or compensation for damages.

In addition, the Federal Republic of Germany concluded overall agreements bilaterally with 12 European states between 1959 and 1964 which benefited nationals from these states and made a sum of almost DM 1 billion available, which should be distributed to the injured parties by the corresponding states themselves.

In the Unification Treaty of 31 August 1990 the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic pledged themselves to the continuation of the Federal Republic's policy of indemnification. Moreover, an additional fund was set up for such victims of Nazi persecution who had not received any or only limited indemnification up to that point in time. In this way the unified state of Germany paid attention to the fact that the German Democratic Republic, for economic and ideological reasons, had not consistently paid out compensation for the injustice perpetrated by the Nazi regime.

The details were laid down in a treaty with the Jewish Claims Conference in October 1992, which extended the catalogue of payments for claimants, to include those from the former communist states, who now were living in different states.

The Federal Government made out indemnification payments to Nazi victims in east European countries via special foundations for those living in the former Warsaw Pact states who had been persecuted. The Federal Republic of Germany provided funds to a value of DM 1.5 billion for the foundations in White Russia, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Poland. Supplementing the foundation agreements, a sum of DM 80 million was approved for victims at the hands of the Nazis in the east European states who were not reached by the above mentioned foundations. Both the one-off payments granted by the foundations and the DM 80 million in individual payments which were granted amount to an average payment of DM 1,000 per individual case. To date the foundations have granted payments to a value of approximately DM 1 billion to 1.4 million entitled persons.

In the "German-Czech Declaration Regarding Mutual relations and their Future Development" of 21 January 1997 the Federal Government approved DM 140 million for the German-Czech future fund, towards which the Czech side donated DM 25 million. The foundation fund should particularly benefit victims of National Socialist violence.

On 12 January 1998 the Federal Government and the Jewish Claims Conference agreed upon the foundation of a fund which will support Jews persecuted in East Europe by the Nazis, who are needy and have not received any indemnification thus far (with the exception of the DM 1,000 mentioned above). The Federal Government will pay out a financial contribution of DM 200 million, spread over 4 years, from 1999 to the year 2002. The terms of agreement relating to the payments will be determined by the legally and economically responsible body of the new fund itself. In particular regular monthly pensions of up to DM 500 are to be paid out of this fund. The appraisal of the payments being made in an individual case and the administration of the funds is the sole responsibility of the Jewish Claims Conference.

The German payments in the area of indemnification amounted to more than DM 100 billion by 1 January 1999. In addition a further sum of far more than DM 20 billion in public sector indemnification payments is planned for the following years.

The total payments from public sector funds based on the various law regulations can be seen from the following overview.

Amount in billion Deutschmarks


I.

Payments to date


1. Federal Indemnification Law (BEG)

79.648


2. Federal Restitution Law (BRüG)

3.955

3. Compensatory Pension Law (ERG)

0.987


4. Israel treaty

3.450



5. Overall agreements with individual states (and similar)

2.563


6. Other payments (payments not covered by I.1 to I.3)

8.800


7. Payments by German federal states not included in BEG

2.546


8. Settlement of hardship cases (without federal states)


1.991


total


103.940


II.

Future payments



BEG

15.352


BrüG

0.045


ERG

0.613


Overall agreements (and similar)

0.357


Other payments

1.200


Payments by the federal states not included in BEG

0.954


Settlement of hardship cases (without federal states)

4.539


total


23.060


III.

Probable total payments


BEG

95.000


BRüG

4.000


ERG

1.600


Israel treaty

3.450


Overall agreements (and similar)

2.920


Other payments

10.000


Payments by federal states not included in BEG

3.500


Settlement of hardship cases (without federal states)


6.530


total

127.000


Status: 1 January 1999


The payments in accordance with the Federal Indemnification Law (BEG) and the Federal Restitution Law (BRüG) are broken down into 20% domestic payments, 40% payments to Israel and the remainder for the rest of the world.

As regards the pension payments in accordance with the BEG, 15% remain in and an 85% share is sent abroad.

In the period from 1 October 1953 to 31 December 1987 4,384,138 claims for indemnification in accordance with the Federal Amending Law for the indemnification of victims of National Socialist persecution (BErgG) of 18 September 1953 (BGBI (Federal Law Gazette).I page 1387), in accordance with the Federal Law to Indemnify Victims of National Socialist Persecution (Federal Indemnification Law - BEG) of 29 June 1956 (BGBI.I page 559) and in accordance with the Second Law on the Amendment of the Federal Indemnification Law (BEG-Final Law) of 14 September 1965 (BGBI.I page 1315), were made and resolved in the following way:

Granted:

2,014,142


Rejections

1,246,571


Other settlements (e.g. retractions)

1,123,425


The number of claimants has not been statistically recorded. It is not identical with the number of claims made, as according to a statement made by the respective federal states responsible for the implementation of the Federal Indemnification Law (BEG), each rightful claimant makes more than one claim on average. The exact number of valid claims made by each claimant cannot be deduced.

The number of claims and settlements made between 1 January 1988 and the present day is so slight that it is longer statistically recorded by the states.

The proceedings in accordance with the BRüG have been concluded all bar an insignificant remainder.

Not included in the overview are sundry payments which cannot be quantified which amount to billions of marks in accordance with other regulations, such as the "Law on the Treatment of Victims of National Socialist Persecution in the Area of Social Security", the "Federal Law on the Reparation for National Socialist Injustice in the Area of War Victims' Relief) and in accordance with the General War Consequences Law.

Payments by federal states not included in BEG up to 31 December 1998


Amounts in DM '000s

Baden-Württemberg

70,982

Bavaria

99,885

Berlin

911,075

Bremen

19,305

Hamburg

139,271

Hesse

109,387

Lower Saxony

152,567

North Rhine-Westphalia

939,314

Rhineland-Palatinate

56,467

Saarland

1,690

Schleswig-Holstein

46,426



total

2,546,369


Source of quote: See my post of Mon Jun 03, 2002 5:36 pm on the thread

Can anyone help me with this
http://www.thirdreichforum.com/phpBB2/v ... e874#28793

Emphases are mine.

The number of individual claimants receiving or having received compensation payments under the Bundesentschädigungsgesetz (ca. one million) I established dividing by two the number of granted claims (2,014,142). This is in line with the estimate of German historian Constantin Goschler in the article [i]Die sogenannte Wiedergutmachung
, published in Bailer-Galanda/Benz/Neugebauer (editors), Die Auschwitzleugner, Berlin 1996, pages 273 to 296.

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Roberto
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Post by Roberto » 22 Aug 2002 11:36

Roberto wrote:
Scott Smith wrote:
Roberto wrote:Your good old bullshit phrases don't make it better, old pal.

They are just boring.

Easy, my churlish friend. I would still be interested in your research on the hunger-blockade if you choose to pursue it.
:)


Taylor's assessment in The First World War: An Illustrated History, as announced.

Pages 144 - 146:

A.J.P. Taylor wrote:The civilian population felt that the war was drawing nearer to them. The casualty lists were no longer those of remote heroes. They contained the names of everyone's friends and relatives. In this year [1916], too, came the only lasting mark which the First World War made on men's lives: Daylight Saving as it was called then, Summer Time as we call it now. The war did better than Joshua. It made the sun change its place in the heavens, or at any rate made men pretend that it had done so. Yet men were still reluctant to tamper with the workings of free choice and the workings of 'economic law'. Though even the British finally swallowed compulsory military service for all, whether married or unmarried, in May 1916, there was still little direction of labor for civil purposes in any country. Prices were going up everywhere, and little was done about it. There had been stable prices and stable currencies as long as anyone living could remember. Now men could not understand what was happening. They blamed human wickedness - the greed of profiteers, or of trade unions - instead of appreciating that when governments paid their bills with paper money, not from taxation, inflation would follow. Bread was rationed in some countries. Otherwise there was 'rationing by the purse'. Food prices were simply allowed to rise. The Germans had already started the story that their food shortage was due to the British 'hunger blockade'. Yet Germany had not imported food before the war. The truth is that the Germans starved themselves. They took millions of men from the land for the armies. High prices encouraged the peasants to send their pigs and cattle to the market. Then supplies ran short. 1916 saw a bad harvest, followed by a bitter winter. Turnips became the staple diet. The 'turnip winter' remained, for many, the sharpest memory of the war. The British escaped this hardship. Bread was never rationed in Great Britain. The worst the British experienced was the adulteration of wheat by flour - at first rye and maize, later potato. This produced an imaginary, though painful, war-indigestion.


Emphasis is mine.

Pages 263/264:

A.J.P. Taylor wrote:The great practical effect was that both the United States and Great Britain came to the actual peace negotiations with Germany in an almost detached frame of mind. The original intention had been that the Allies should settle among themselves what they wanted, and should then negotiate with the Germans, to see how far they could get it. The victors faced an awkward and increasingly difficult problem. The military superiority of the Allies had compelled the Germans to sue for an armistice. Now this superiority was wasting away by demobilization with every day which passed. If negotiations dragged on long enough, the Germans might reappear as equals, not as the defeated. The Allies had one remaining weapon - the blockade against Germany which was still being enforced. It seemed a barbaric weapon now that fighting was over. British forces in the Rhineland, from the commanding general downwards, protested against the blockade, and shared their food with hungry women and children. The blockade had to be ended before the peace was signed. It was suggested as a compromise that a preliminary peace should be made, containing only the military terms, so that Germany would be effectively disarmed. American objections killed this proposal. Even a preliminary peace would have to be submitted to the American Senate for ratification; and Wilson knew that he would have difficulty enough in getting this once, let alone twice. Besides, Wilson, with the complacency of a true idealist, held that any peace which satisfied him must obviously be beyond criticism and that there was no need to wait for arguments from the Germans. He would know what was best for them as for everyone else. Thus, thanks to Wilson's high principles, the democratic and idealistic powers surpassed even the behaviour of the Germans at Brest-Litovsk, where the Bolsheviks had at least been allowed to argue round the table, and imposed peace by dictation, with hardly a pretence at negotiation.


Emphasis is mine.


On page 113 of his Lexikon der Völkermorde, German historian Gunnar Heinsohn writes:

Auf eine Million Zivilisten in Deutschland und Österreich wird die Zahl der Opfer geschätzt, die 1917 und 1918 an Unterernährung sterben, weil die Lebensmittelblockade der Alliierten ungemein effektiv funktioniert. Diese künstliche Hungersnot wird erst im März 1919 wirklich beendet, als Lord Plummer, Kommandeur der englischen Rheinarmee, die Blockade lockert. Er fürchtet dabei auch um die Moral seiner Soldaten, die das Sterben der deutschen Kinder mit ansehen müssen (Heer 1966, 77).


My translation:

A million civilians in Germany and Austria is an estimate of the number of victims who died of undernourishment in 1917 and 1918 because the Allies' food blockade was tremendously effective. This artificial famine was really ended only in March 1919, when Lord Plummer, commander of the British Rhine Army, loosened the blockade. He was led to this also by fear for the morale of his troops, who had to witness the dying of German children (Heer 1966, 77).


Heinsohn's source is:

Heer, F. "Die Kriege und ihre Folgen", in Deschner, K. (editor) Das Jahrhundert der Barbarei, Munich 1966, pages 43-138/495-511.

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Post by michael mills » 22 Aug 2002 12:08

Walter Kaschner wrote:
In the first place, whatever Adenauer might have thought the effect of the Morgenthau Plan might be ( and viewed in light of the obvious political character of his speech quoted by Mr. Mills one may, I think, legitimately question whether it reflected Adenauer's considered judgement of the matter) I know of no evidence that its purpose was to starve 30-40 million Germans, or indeed that that would have been the effect had it been put into practice.


I would presume that Adenauer was referring to the foreseen effect of the Morgenthau Plan rather than a specifically genocidal purpose. But I see no reason to suppose that he did not believe what he was saying. At the very least, his words indicate that there was a widely held belief in the Federal Republic at that time that implementation of the Morgenthau Plan would have resulted in mass-starvation, and that it was equivalent in its nastiness to the crimes of the former National-Socialist Government. Furthermore, it shows that that belief must have been at least tacitly endorsed by the United States Government of the time, since Adenauer had been placed in power by the United States occupation administration, and his Government, and indeed the existence of the Federal Republic, depended on the goodwill of the United States. In other words, Adenauer must have been aware that in attacking the Morgenthau Plan and equating it to National-Socialist crimes, he was not attacking the current United States Government, but rather a faction that had been influential under Roosevelt but was no longer in power. He must have been aware that his view of the Morgenthau Plan was shared by the forces in the United States, in particular in the military and the State Department, that were now determining policy in the new Cold-War situation, and which had been opposed to the attempt by the Treasury Department to take over foregn policy.

Furthermore, the issue of the intent of the Morgenthau Plan is less important; what is important is its logical consequences, which were clearly foreseen. Even the starvation plan which the German Government appears to have intended to impose on the occupied areas of the Soviet Union was not developed for the purpose of starving Russians out of sheer cussedness. Rather, the German Government planned to take out of the occupied territories the food supplies it needed to maintain the German population, which would have the inevitable result that several million Russians would starve; the German planners explicitly recognised this consequence and affirmed it, unlike the initiators of the Morgenthau Plan, who were careful to remain silent on the consequences of what they were proposing.




Moreover, the opposition of the War Department and Department of State was not toward "the Jewish power centred on [sic] the Treasury", but rather toward the very nature of the Plan itself, to which they objected on moral, strategic and pragmatic grounds. Henry Stimpson, the Secretary of War, was indeed upset at the Treasury Department's efforts to take a leading role in deciding the fate of post-war Germany, which he felt was more properly the domain of the Departments of State and of War, and he recognized with some understanding that Morgenthau's harsh position may have been in response to Germany's treatment of the Jews, but from what I have read his opposition to the Morgenthau Plan itself was based on the belief that it was morally wrong to burden the entire German people with the crimes of Nazism and that the practical result would inevitably lead to aggressive revanchisme in the future. I have seen nothing to indicate that either Stimpson or Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State, were opposed to the Plan because it reflected "Jewish power".


Of course the United States military and State Department opposed the Morgenthau Plan for strategic reasons, because they knew that its implementation would create chaos and a revolutionary situation in Germany, which ran counter to the United States' strategic interest in maintaining West Germany as a buffer against the Soviet Union. I did not mean to imply that the military and the State Department opposed the Plan purely because of the Jewishness of many of its proponents, implying that if the Plan had been put forward by, say, Buddhists, they would not have opposed it.

The Jewishness of Morgenthau and many of his minions in the Treasury Department was relevant to the extent that the military and State Department were aware that it was a prime motivating factor in the attempt by treasury to seize control of policy-making in respect to the treatment of Germany after victory. The military and the State Department opposed "Jewish power" at Treasury because they considered the policies being promoted by that power were contrary to the strategic interests of the United States as they saw them.

The Treasury had waged a fairly vicious campaign against the State department in 1944 in the context of its attempt to get control of post-war policy-making. It had not shied from accusing the State Department of Anti-Semitism of of secretly supporting the supposed German Governemnt policy of exterminating the Jews of Europe. The State Department were well aware that the officials of Treasury wh had done that to them were motivated primarily by a strongly pro-Jewish ideology.


Finally, from Mr. Mills' post here and elsewhere on this forum, I have the impression (and again if I'm wrong I would welcome a correction) that he attributes the brutalities of the Third Reich against the Jews to a pervasive, and, in his view, well founded fear of an internationally solidified and powerful Jewish cabal united toward the utilization of whatever means available to quell opposition to the Zionist cause and to punish Germany and all Germans.


A more accurate summation of my position would be that the anti-Jewish actions of the German Government (culminating in the death of millions) were the result of a fear of Bolshevism and the power represented by the Bolshevik domination of Russia, with its potential for expansion and conquest, which were attributed to the machinations of Jews, or of a particular group of Jews. In my view, the fear of Bolshevism, and its interpretation as a manifestation of Jewish interests, was justified, if exaggerated and distorted. The Jewish historian Richard Pipes, in his book "Russia under the Bolshevik regime", expresses the opinion that it was the Bolshevik takeover which changed the motivation of anti-Jewish feeling from one of contempt and dislike into one of fear of "Jewish power", and gave apparent credence to forgeries such as the "Protocols of the Elders of Zion".

Another reason for the National-Socialist animus against the Jews was the belief that the Jews had "sold Germany out" in the First World War and brought about its defeat. There is good reason to believe that the Zionist movement did play a role in bringing the United States into the war on the Allied side, which of course was a decisive factor in swinging the balance of forces against Germany, and that the Balfour Declaration was the payoff to the Zionist Movement for that assistance. The Jewish Lobby in the United States had been a major factor in preventing American intervention on the side of the Entente; it had taken that position because Germany was the enemy of Tsarist Russia, at that time perceived by the Jewish establishment as its main enemy. It seems to have been a promise by the British Government to give Palestine to the Jews, made at the suggestion of the Anglo-Jewish leader Lucien Wolf, that motivated the Zionist movement to cast its lot in with Allies and persuade the American Jewish Lobby to reverse its position and support United States entry into the war on the Allied side; that, coupled with the overthrow of the Tsarist regime, seems to have been what caused American Jewry to change sides.

German nationalists perceived the about-face by the Zionist Movement and American Jewry as a betrayal. However, they were wrong to cast the blame for the "betrayal" onto German Jewry; there is no evidence that German Jews in their great majority were not loyal to their country.

The two factors outlined above explain the anti-Jewish feelings of the National-Socialists and many other Germans, but they are not sufficent to explain the mass killing. I agree with leftist German historians like Aly and Gerlach, who see the motivating force not in ideology but in practical considerations such as the need to conserve scarce food supplies by disposing of unwanted populations.

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Post by michael mills » 22 Aug 2002 12:28

Roberto wrote:

Beautiful. "Israel" seems to be a dirty word.


The Hebrew word "Yisrael", rendered in English as "Israel" is neither dirty nor clean. It has no moral or aesthetic connotation.

It is simply an ethnic denominator, the name of a people. The best rendering of its meaning in English would be "the Jewish people". It is NOT a place name.

The politico-geographical entity that is often incorrectly referred to as "Israel" has the official name, in Hebrew, "Medinat Yisrael". That formulation can most accurately be rendered in English as "state belonging to the Jewish people". Accordingly, by employing the formulation "Jewish State" I am rendering the meaning of "Medinat Yisrael" in the most precise way possible.

The German term coined by Herzl, "Judenstaat", is a precise rendering of the Hebrew "Medinat Yisrael". Although "Judenstaat" is usually translated into English as "Jewish state", the most accurate translation would be "state of the Jews" or more idiomatically "Jew-state". However, if I statrted bandying the term "Jew-state" around, I am sure that Mr Muehlenkamp would affect to find it offensive. Accordingly, I use the softer "Jewish State". If I were writing in German, I would use the term "Judenstaat" to refer to the political entity, "judenstaatlich" as an adjective, and "Judenstaatler" to denote to denote its citizens.

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Post by Roberto » 22 Aug 2002 12:52

michael mills wrote:Furthermore, the issue of the intent of the Morgenthau Plan is less important; what is important is its logical consequences, which were clearly foreseen.


Clearly foreseen by whom?

What evidence – other than “must have been” – speculations based on a political speech by Adenauer – is there that anyone “clearly” foresaw that implementation of the Morgenthau Plan would have disastrous consequences?

michael mills wrote:Even the starvation plan which the German Government appears to have intended to impose on the occupied areas of the Soviet Union was not developed for the purpose of starving Russians out of sheer cussedness. Rather, the German Government planned to take out of the occupied territories the food supplies it needed to maintain the German population, which would have the inevitable result that several million Russians would starve; the German planners explicitly recognised this consequence and affirmed it, unlike the initiators of the Morgenthau Plan, who were careful to remain silent on the consequences of what they were proposing.


Mr. Mills is again invited to substantiate his accusations of a “hidden agenda”, which in the absence of such substantiation are just fantastic conspiracy theories.

Preferably on hand of Morgenthau’s own writings in Germany is our problem, which include the following already quoted statement:

Morgenthau wrote:The application of 55 per cent more labor to German farms, as proposed here, will not increase this food supply by 55 per cent. But that will not be necessary. An extra 15 per cent would make Germany virtually self-sustaining, even on her high prewar diet. But more probably, Germans will eat a little less for they will have to export food as well as consumer goods in return for such products of heavy industry as they will need, the small amount of foodstuffs that will not grow in Germany and the rather large amount of nitrates and phosphates she will require to keep her soil productive.


The German planners of the exploitation of the occupied territories of the Soviet Union did not foresee “several million” dead, by the way:

Eine lineare Senkung des sowjetischen Konsumniveaus nach einem Einmarsch schien den deutschen Agrarexperten nicht erfolgversprechend, weil dann Schwarzhandel und Selbstversorgung der Bevölkerung nicht kontrollierbar seien. Deshalb müsse man die “Zuschußgebiete” innerhalb der UdSSR abriegeln und damit den Hungertod von “zig Millionen Menschen” – man prognostizierte etwa 30 Millionen Tote – herbeiführen. Dieser bis dahin beispiellose Plan zielte einerseits gegen die Bevölkerung der “Waldzone” (Nord-, Mittel- und mit Einschränkungen Weißrußland), andererseits gegen die Einwohner der Städte im europäischen Teil der UdSSR.


Christian Gerlach, Krieg, Ernährung, Völkermord, page 16.

My translation:

A linear reduction of the Soviet consume level after the invasion would not be successful in the opinion of the German agrarian experts, for it would be impossible to control black market trading and food procurement by the population Thus it was considered necessary to seal off the “food-importing areas” within the USSR and thus to cause the death by starvation of “umpteen million people” – 30 million dead were predicted. This hitherto unparalleled plan was directed against the population of the “forest zone” (northern and central Russia and, with restrictions, Belorussia) on the one hand and against the inhabitants of the cities in the European part of the USSR on the other.


Emphasis is mine.

michael mills wrote:The two factors outlined above explain the anti-Jewish feelings of the National-Socialists and many other Germans, but they are not sufficent to explain the mass killing. I agree with leftist German historians like Aly and Gerlach, who see the motivating force not in ideology but in practical considerations such as the need to conserve scarce food supplies by disposing of unwanted populations.


Mr. Mills should again read Gerlach’s above mentioned book. In the epilogue, on pages 262 and following, Gerlach writes:

Die Antworten auf die Frage nach den Motiven für die Mordaktionen gegen die Juden sind immer wieder umstritten und lösen Mißverständnisse aus. Daher ist folgender Gedanke zur Klarstellung hilfreich: Grundlage für die Vernichtungsentscheidungen, wo und durch wen auch immer, was die eben erwähnte radikale antisemitische Gewaltbereitschaft, verbunden mit der systematischen Politik gegen den jüdischen Bevölkerungsteil auf der Basis des modernen Rassenantisemitismus. Doch war die Bereitschaft zur Gewalt gegen jüdische Menschen notwendige, oft aber nicht hinreichende Bedingung für Massenvernichtungsaktionen. In Verbindung mit Zwängen der Besatzungspolitik jedoch ergaben sich starke Impulse zur Ingangsetzung oder Beschleunigung der Vernichtung. Es geht also nicht um ideologische oder materielle (ernährungswirtschaftliche, sozialpolitische usw.) Motive, sondern um ideologische und materielle Motive, um die fatalen Auswirkungen der Dynamik ihres Zusammenwirkens. Beide Faktoren als Gegensätze zu begreifen ist meines Erachtens nicht nützlich.


Italics are Gerlach’s.

My translation follows after lunch.

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Post by michael mills » 22 Aug 2002 13:03

Doch war die Bereitschaft zur Gewalt gegen jüdische Menschen notwendige, oft aber nicht hinreichende Bedingung für Massenvernichtungsaktionen


Exactly what I said: the anti-Jewish ideology was not sufficient ("eine nicht hinreichende Bedingung") to cause the mass killing.

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Post by Dan » 22 Aug 2002 13:42

Why, can agricultural nitrates only be produced by the armament industry?


No, but the very nature of the heavy industry required for fertilizer production is such that it could be quickly converted into the production of explosives, as was clearly seen by the authors of this plan.

The application of 55 per cent more labor to German farms, as proposed here, will not increase this food supply by 55 per cent. But that will not be necessary. An extra 15 per cent would make Germany virtually self-sustaining, even on her high prewar diet. But more probably, Germans will eat a little less for they will have to export food as well as consumer goods in return for such products of heavy industry as they will need, the small amount of foodstuffs that will not grow in Germany and the rather large amount of nitrates and phosphates she will require to keep her soil productive.



I see I must rephrase my original statement. Stripping Germany of heavy industry would have resulted in mass starvation without providing for an affordable source of nitrates, phosphates and potasium products.

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Post by Roberto » 22 Aug 2002 16:33

Dan wrote:
Morgenthau wrote:The application of 55 per cent more labor to German farms, as proposed here, will not increase this food supply by 55 per cent. But that will not be necessary. An extra 15 per cent would make Germany virtually self-sustaining, even on her high prewar diet. But more probably, Germans will eat a little less for they will have to export food as well as consumer goods in return for such products of heavy industry as they will need, the small amount of foodstuffs that will not grow in Germany and the rather large amount of nitrates and phosphates she will require to keep her soil productive.


I see I must rephrase my original statement. Stripping Germany of heavy industry would have resulted in mass starvation without providing for an affordable source of nitrates, phosphates and potasium products.


Well, that seems to have been the least of Morgenthau's intentions, judging by statements of his like the one quoted above.

Maybe the man was daydreaming.

Maybe his failure to take into consideration certain key aspects and factors would have led to disastrous results if the plan had been implemented.

We will never know for sure, of course.

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Post by Roberto » 22 Aug 2002 16:38

Roberto wrote:
michael mills wrote:Furthermore, the issue of the intent of the Morgenthau Plan is less important; what is important is its logical consequences, which were clearly foreseen.


Clearly foreseen by whom?

What evidence – other than “must have been” – speculations based on a political speech by Adenauer – is there that anyone “clearly” foresaw that implementation of the Morgenthau Plan would have disastrous consequences?

michael mills wrote:Even the starvation plan which the German Government appears to have intended to impose on the occupied areas of the Soviet Union was not developed for the purpose of starving Russians out of sheer cussedness. Rather, the German Government planned to take out of the occupied territories the food supplies it needed to maintain the German population, which would have the inevitable result that several million Russians would starve; the German planners explicitly recognised this consequence and affirmed it, unlike the initiators of the Morgenthau Plan, who were careful to remain silent on the consequences of what they were proposing.


Mr. Mills is again invited to substantiate his accusations of a “hidden agenda”, which in the absence of such substantiation are just fantastic conspiracy theories.

Preferably on hand of Morgenthau’s own writings in Germany is our problem, which include the following already quoted statement:

Morgenthau wrote:The application of 55 per cent more labor to German farms, as proposed here, will not increase this food supply by 55 per cent. But that will not be necessary. An extra 15 per cent would make Germany virtually self-sustaining, even on her high prewar diet. But more probably, Germans will eat a little less for they will have to export food as well as consumer goods in return for such products of heavy industry as they will need, the small amount of foodstuffs that will not grow in Germany and the rather large amount of nitrates and phosphates she will require to keep her soil productive.


The German planners of the exploitation of the occupied territories of the Soviet Union did not foresee “several million” dead, by the way:

Eine lineare Senkung des sowjetischen Konsumniveaus nach einem Einmarsch schien den deutschen Agrarexperten nicht erfolgversprechend, weil dann Schwarzhandel und Selbstversorgung der Bevölkerung nicht kontrollierbar seien. Deshalb müsse man die “Zuschußgebiete” innerhalb der UdSSR abriegeln und damit den Hungertod von “zig Millionen Menschen” – man prognostizierte etwa 30 Millionen Tote – herbeiführen. Dieser bis dahin beispiellose Plan zielte einerseits gegen die Bevölkerung der “Waldzone” (Nord-, Mittel- und mit Einschränkungen Weißrußland), andererseits gegen die Einwohner der Städte im europäischen Teil der UdSSR.


Christian Gerlach, Krieg, Ernährung, Völkermord, page 16.

My translation:

A linear reduction of the Soviet consume level after the invasion would not be successful in the opinion of the German agrarian experts, for it would be impossible to control black market trading and food procurement by the population Thus it was considered necessary to seal off the “food-importing areas” within the USSR and thus to cause the death by starvation of “umpteen million people” – 30 million dead were predicted. This hitherto unparalleled plan was directed against the population of the “forest zone” (northern and central Russia and, with restrictions, Belorussia) on the one hand and against the inhabitants of the cities in the European part of the USSR on the other.


Emphasis is mine.

michael mills wrote:The two factors outlined above explain the anti-Jewish feelings of the National-Socialists and many other Germans, but they are not sufficent to explain the mass killing. I agree with leftist German historians like Aly and Gerlach, who see the motivating force not in ideology but in practical considerations such as the need to conserve scarce food supplies by disposing of unwanted populations.


Mr. Mills should again read Gerlach’s above mentioned book. In the epilogue, on pages 262 and following, Gerlach writes:

Die Antworten auf die Frage nach den Motiven für die Mordaktionen gegen die Juden sind immer wieder umstritten und lösen Mißverständnisse aus. Daher ist folgender Gedanke zur Klarstellung hilfreich: Grundlage für die Vernichtungsentscheidungen, wo und durch wen auch immer, was die eben erwähnte radikale antisemitische Gewaltbereitschaft, verbunden mit der systematischen Politik gegen den jüdischen Bevölkerungsteil auf der Basis des modernen Rassenantisemitismus. Doch war die Bereitschaft zur Gewalt gegen jüdische Menschen notwendige, oft aber nicht hinreichende Bedingung für Massenvernichtungsaktionen. In Verbindung mit Zwängen der Besatzungspolitik jedoch ergaben sich starke Impulse zur Ingangsetzung oder Beschleunigung der Vernichtung. Es geht also nicht um ideologische oder materielle (ernährungswirtschaftliche, sozialpolitische usw.) Motive, sondern um ideologische und materielle Motive, um die fatalen Auswirkungen der Dynamik ihres Zusammenwirkens. Beide Faktoren als Gegensätze zu begreifen ist meines Erachtens nicht nützlich.


Italics are Gerlach’s.

My translation follows after lunch.


My translation:

The answers to the questions as to the motivations for the murder actions against the Jews are again and again disputed and lead to misunderstanding. Therefore the following thought is helpful for clarification: The basis of the extermination actions, wherever and by whomsoever, was the aforementioned radical anti-Semitic disposition to violence rooted in modern racial anti-Semitism. The disposition to violence against Jewish people was a necessary, but often not sufficient condition for mass extermination actions. In connection with dictates of occupation policy, however, there came about strong impulses for the initiation or acceleration of the extermination. The issue thus is not ideological or material motivations (such as food economics, social politics, etc.) but ideological and material motivations, the fatal results of their joint dynamic. To consider both factors as opposite to each other is not useful, in my opinion.

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