Anti-partisan warfare and reprisals in WWII Yugoslavia

[David Thompson]

"V: Hostages, Reprisals and Collective Measures in the Balkans. Measures Against Partisans and Partisan Areas: (B) Contemporaneous Documents: Partial Translation of Document NOKW-1806, Prosecution Exhibit 539: Extracts from Report by the High Command of the Army, 2/9/1943, Concerning Chetnik (Mihailovic) Movement", in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. Vol. 11: United States of America v. Wilhelm List, et al. (Case 7: 'Hostage Case'). US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1950. pp. 1015-1020.

Headquarters, 2/9/1943
High Command of the Army General Staff of the Army
Department Foreign Armies East (III)
No. 100/43 Top Secret
70 copies - 2d copy

Commander in Chief Southeast (Army Group E)
Department Ic/Counterintelligence Officer
No. 446 Top Secret, 3/1/1943

Enclosures: [10]
[Office sections and initials illegible]

Croatia-Serbia

The Draja Mihailovic movement [Chetnik movement, led by Draja Mihailovic] as of 2/1/1943

[Signed] Gehlen

The present report issued in limited distribution may not be forwarded to other offices.

[Stamp] to No. 256/43 Top Secret, Commander in Chief Southeast (Army Group E) Army Report.

A. General Information

1. Development - Among the various insurgent movements which increasingly cause trouble in the area of the former Yugoslav state, the movement of Draja Mihailovic stands in first place with regard to leadership, armament, organization, and activity.

It is composed of the following groups:

a. "Chetnik-units".

b. "Followers of D.M.".

In the former Yugoslavia the "Chetniks" were a reliable voluntary combat organization which, however, was organized by the state and supported with arms and money. At the beginning of the war they were organized as shock (Jurisni) battalions for the carrying out of special tasks. Immediately after the capitulation of the Yugoslavian Army most of these Chetniks grouped together in greater Serbian combat units under the leadership of their officers, thus forming the foundation of the D.M. movement.

In order to be able to work unmolestedly in the scope of their over-all organization they camouflage themselves in Serbia under the cover of "Chetnik units loyal to the government," in Montenegro as "National Militia," in Dalmatia as "anti-Communists," and in Bosnia as "loyal Chetnik Units."

The followers of D.M. come from all classes of the population and at present comprise about 80% of the Serbian people. Hoping for the liberation from the "alien yoke" and for a better new order and an economical and social new balance, their number is continuously increasing.

2. Aims of the movement - The aim of the D.M. movement is the creation of a greater Serbian state which is to comprise former Yugoslavia as well as the frontier regions of Hungary, Albania, and Bulgaria under the leadership of King Peter II from the House of Karadjordje.

The D.M. movement, the attitude of which is more Greater Serbian Nationalistic than Yugoslav, conceives as its primary task the liberation of the Serbian people.

The future state shall therefore be governed by Serbian leaders only. To all other peoples, being "minorities", rising to leading positions in the new state is to be made impossible.

3. The personality of Draja Mihailovic - Draja Mihailovic was in 1893, as the son of a Serbian officer in Cacak. His ancestors were Serbian peasants. Shortly after he had joined the Serbian Army the Balkan Wars began, in the course of which he twice decorated and rose to the rank of second lieutenant. On 9/1/1918, he was promoted to lieutenant and, holding that rank, took part in combat at the Salonika front. After having been wounded he was decorated for his courage by the King with the order of the "White Eagle."

He was taken over into the Yugoslav Army, graduated from the War Academy, and was then employed alternately in offices of the general staff and with the troops.

As Military Attache in Prague and Sofia he was able to gain a good insight into the political relations in the Balkans.

In 1937, Draja Mihailovic was relieved as colonel in the general staff. The reason for this was presumably his continuous differences of opinion with his superiors and his morbid ambition and self-willedness.

Soon after the breaking up of Yugoslavia he tried to take into his own hands the fate of his people.

As a fanatic fighter for the Greater Serbia idea and an enthusiastic follower of the Royal House he began to build in western Serbia a movement which today extends over all of Serbia, Bosnia, Dalmatia, as well as into the frontier areas of Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria.

The center of the movement is located in Montenegro. There, Draja Mihailovic believes himself to be out of danger of being caught by the German occupation troops.

In 1/1942, the Yugoslav Government in exile appointed Draja Mihailovic, General of the Army, and at the same time he was appointed "Commander in Chief of the Yugoslav Home Army"; a short time afterwards he was appointed Minister of War.

On account of his absolute, undisputed position as military leader, the large majority of the Serbian people also look toward him as the coming political leader of the new Yugoslavia.

B. Political Relations

1. Political organization of the D.M. movement - In order to group all forces in the Yugoslav area, the movement as ascertained up to now is territorially divided into the following regions: Belgrade, western Serbia, northwestern Serbia, central Serbia, northeastern Serbia, southern Serbia, The Kopaonik Mountains, southern Bosnia, central Bosnia, and northern Bosnia.

Each region is under the orders of a "regional commander". He supervises within his region the entire political and military organization and propaganda. At the time of the "general revolt" he is responsible for the quick reestablishing of peace and order.

The regions are subdivided according to their size into districts. The district commanders have in their areas essentially the same tasks as the regional commanders. In addition, at the time of the general revolt they are commissioned to take over the offices of heads of community.

The political organization of the regions Dalmatia, Slovenia Montenegro, Syrmia, Backa, and Banate is not completely know at present.

In the area of old Serbia the "Organization Staff Serbia" is responsible for all political measures. At the time of the general revolt it is to take over the provisional duties of the government after having abolished the present government. The chief is Brigadier General Trifunovic.

For Bulgaria a special staff was created under the leadership of Professor Trklja. Its task consists of recruiting the Bulgarian population for the D.M. movement.

2. Relation to the Yugoslav Government - Draja Mihailovic depends only partially on the Yugoslav Government in exile in London. Therefore, as a rule, he takes the decisive political and military measures on his own initiative.

3. Relation to the Allies - England aids the movement by supporting it with funds, war materials, and by sending officers and men. For this reason Draja Mihailovic approves of the relation of his government to England. He is, however, opposed to English attempts to gain stronger political influence on the movement.

The relations with Russia are at present characterized by the combatting of Communist bands. Draja Mihailovic, however, regards this conflict as an internal Yugoslav affair and he himself strives to achieve good relations with the Soviet Russian Government. Therein he is supported by the efforts of the Yugoslav Government in exile in London.

At the time of the general revolt, therefore, one must count on large parts of the Communist bands joining Draja Mihailovic.

4. Relations with the occupying powers - Germany is considered to be the main adversary. Her occupation troops must, as the "occupiers," be destroyed. In order to avoid measures of reprisal against the Serbian population, however, Draja Mihailovic always warns against premature single operations.

The Serbian Government, headed by General Nedic, is considered traitorous toward the Serbian people. The removal of this government is, therefore, one of the first demands.

The Italian forces of occupation tolerate the D.M. movement or even support it. Often, Chetnik units are employed by the Italians for combating Communists.

The Bulgarian troops of occupation are also considered to be "occupiers." Increasing attempts to destroy their morale by planned inflammatory propaganda become apparent.

C. Military Organization

1. Over-all organization of the armed D.M. units - Within the D.M. movement there are armed units organized militarily which form the "Yugoslav Home Army."

This has at present a strength of about 150000 men in the entire Yugoslav area and is composed as follows:

a. High Command of the Yugoslav Home Army.

b. Higher commanders of insurgents.

c. Corps of insurgents.

d. Brigades of insurgents.

e. Mobile brigades.

f. Other units.

To a) D.M. being the Chief of the High Command of the Yugoslav Home Army is the Commander in Chief of the Yugoslav Home Army. He has unlimited authority over all armed units of the movement, appoints all commanders, and is the supreme judiciary. He orders the establishing of new units and negotiates with foreign countries. He gives the signal for the "general revolt."

* * *

7. Sabotage and espionage - Sabotage is essentially concerned with the destruction of installations important to communications. In order to carry out this sabotage, "the main staff for railway sabotage" was created in Belgrade in the summer of 1942 with its subordinate regional railway staffs 1, 2, 3, and 4. The persons who execute the tasks are Serbian railway employees who are aided by so-called Trojkas ("groups of three").

A further task of the main staff for railway sabotage consists of observing all military transport movements of the occupying troops.

* * *

E. Final Conclusions

By the creation of the D.M. movement an organization has been formed which - based on the fanatic will of every individual may gain, as a revolutionary movement, considerable political and military importance in critical situations in the Balkans. The combatants' excellent knowledge of the country and the positive attitude of the majority of the Serbian population favor the movement.

The fighting value of the D.M. movement does not correspond to that of a modern unit. The reason for this lies in their inadequate leadership, armament, and equipment.

The leaders are young and have little military training. They have no experience in commanding large units.

The armament is insufficient except for rifles. Heavy infantry weapons and artillery exist only in small numbers, antitank and antiaircraft weapons are almost completely lacking.

In its present composition the D.M. movement is inferior to the occupying powers if the latter employ sufficient forces.

In order to suppress successfully a revolt started suddenly and at the right moment, supplementary forces in addition to the present occupation forces will be necessary.

[David Thompson]

"V: Hostages, Reprisals and Collective Measures in the Balkans. Measures Against Partisans and Partisan Areas: (B) Contemporaneous Documents: Translation of Document NOKW-382, Prosecution Exhibit 263: Order of Commanding General Serbia, 2/28/1943, Concerning Reprisal Measures and Reducing Reprisal Ratios", in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. Vol. 11: United States of America v. Wilhelm List, et al. (Case 7: 'Hostage Case'). US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1950. pp. 1020-1023.

[Handwritten] Enclosure 96
Headquarters, 2/28/1943
[Stamp] Secret
The Commanding General and the Commander in Serbia
Section Ia No. 652/43 Secret

Subject: Reprisal by taking human life

In combatting the insurgent movements in Serbia, the increasing importance of a uniform and clear procedure with regard to the severest measure - the taking of human life - makes it necessary that a new and comprehensive summary of the orders in effect in this field be issued.

All officers and heads of offices who participate in the carrying out of reprisal measures are charged by me with the duty of observing carefully the following regulations.

I. In What Cases Are Reprisal Measures Applicable

1. Security of personnel - Reprisal measures will be applied in the case of any attack directed against the person or the life of:

a. A national or ethnic German (armed forces, armed forces employee or German civilian).

b. A member of the Bulgarian occupation corps.

c. A person in the service of the occupying powers regardless of his nationality.

d. A member of the Serbian Government or a high Serbian official (district supervisor, mayor), officers of the Serbian State Guard, a member of the Serbian Volunteer Corps, etc.

However, reprisal measures shall only result if:

a. The perpetrators cannot be apprehended within 48 hours.

b. The attack on the protected person was based on political reasons.

c. The attack resulted in a wounding or killing. Killing is presumed if a kidnapped person has not returned after a certain period.

Whether or not reprisal measures will be taken where members of the occupying powers or of the Serbian armed units were killed or wounded during combat action, depends upon whether these deaths or wounds resulted from an enemy attack, or in the course of our own operations (for instance, searches [raids], or arrests).

In general reprisal measures will not be taken in the latter case.

2. Security of installations - Reprisal measures also will be taken in the event of any attack against installations important to the war effort, in particular against the means of communication, transport and roads, communications installations, industrial installations, and supply installations, provided that: (a) damage has been done, and (b) the perpetrators cannot be apprehended within 48 hours.

II. Reprisal Quotas

Until further notice the following quotas shall apply - unless in individual cases another number is ordered:

1. For 1 German killed, or 1 Bulgarian killed - 50 hostages are to be executed.

For 1 German wounded, or 1 Bulgarian wounded - 25 hostages are to be executed.

2. For the killing of one person in the category listed in I, 1c , and d, Security of Personnel - 10 hostages are to be executed.

For 1 person wounded - 5 hostages are to be executed.

3. For any attack against installations to be protected according to I2, up to 100 hostages may be shot to death, according to the seriousness of the case.

In less serious cases it will be sufficient to make reprisal through imposing collective punishments (burning down of houses, money fines, penal guards, arrests, etc.).

III. What Persons Are to Be Used for Reprisal Executions

1. The confidence in the justice of the occupying power is shaken and the loyal part of the population too is driven into the woods by the procedure of arbitrary arrests of persons in reprisal after an attack or an act of sabotage near the locality where the incident occurred. This form of carrying out reprisal measures is, therefore, forbidden.

If, however, an on the spot investigation reveals - on the part of certain persons - cooperation with or intentionally passive behavior toward the culprits, those persons are to be executed first as bandit helpers. The proclamation is to point out expressly their complicity.

2. If such accomplices cannot be found, one must fall back to persons who are to be considered co-responsible, although they may not have any connection with the particular incident. Primarily those persons are co-responsible who openly sympathize with Draja Mihailovic or with communism.

3. The following are not to be used for reprisal measures:

a. Persons who have demonstrated by their behavior that they oppose the aims of the insurgents, or persons who belong to the categories to be protected, as for instance, officials. Exceptions may be made for special reasons by the commanding general and commander.

b. Women and youths under 16. These may be shot to death only as perpetrators or bandit helpers.

4. Generally the Commander of the Security Police will furnish persons suitable for reprisal measures, in accordance with the above points, from the circle of suspected persons delivered over to him in accordance with Ia No. 509/42 Top Secret, 11/4/1942, from the routine operations of the military and of the police, in so far as these are not to be released as innocent or transported for free or compulsory labor (hostages).

5. These hostages are to be collected in hostage camps by districts. An order will be issued simultaneously regarding the direction of the hostage camps. A sufficient supply is currently to be kept available in the camps.

If in certain cases suitable hostages are not available or the available hostages are insufficient, the number needed is to be taken either from a neighboring camp or from the collecting camp in Belgrade.

6. In the event that special actions for the procuring of hostages should be necessary, suspected persons shown in the reviewed lists of the Serbian district supervisor are to be taken first. (See Ia No. 184/43, 2/4/1943.) The commanders of the administrative area headquarters [Feldkommandanten] with the concurrence of the commanding general and commander (section Ia) will order such operations.

7. In the individual cases hostages are to be selected from those available who are connected by blood or political group with the circle presumed to be guilty. With the enmity existing at present between the two insurgent groups it would be more an inducement than a deterrent for the perpetrators, if Communist party members were killed for attacks carried out by D.M. followers and vice versa. The individual selection of hostages consequently depends on the political adherence of the perpetrators. If this cannot be determined, Communists and D.M. followers are to be used in equal numbers for reprisal measures. If possible, persons provided for the execution should come from the neighborhood of the culprits or from the locality where the incident occurred.

IV. Which Authorities Are Authorized to Carry Out Reprisal Measures

1. The introduction of reprisal measures is the task of the commanders of the administrative area headquarters. These commanders, after hearing the interested parties, will decide whether the conditions for the taking of reprisal measures are present in the specific case. If so, the commander of the administrative area headquarters will submit to the commanding general and commander an application for the taking of reprisal measures. The application must contain a short description of the incident, losses or damages suffered, political origin of the culprits, number of hostages provided for execution.

2. The commanding general and commander will decide on the carrying out of the execution applied for by letter or teletype.

3. The commander of the administrative area headquarters orders the district commander [Kreiskommandant] in whose area the action took place or which is the home of the culprits to carry out the reprisal measures. After contacting the SD branch office concerned and getting the opinion of the competent Serbian district supervisor, the district commander will suggest to the administrative area headquarters commander persons suitable for the execution in accordance with III, paragraph 7.

4. The district commander issues the necessary instructions for the carrying out of the execution. Military and police units are to comply with this request to hold executions. Generally losses of the military will be retaliated for by the military. The police will furnish the execution squad in reprisal actions for their losses and, furthermore, in reprisal actions for all attacks on non-soldiers and installations under protection.

5. In general, the executions of hostages will take place in remote localities without participation of the population. There must be no furnishing of Serbian martyrs. The interment must be sufficiently deep. A list of the names of the people killed must be forwarded via the district headquarters to the administrative area headquarters which will furnish death certificates on special application.

6. The district commander responsible for carrying out the reprisal measures will immediately report the execution to the administrative area commander. The latter will arrange publication and will inform the commanding general and commander in Serbia (section Ia) by teletype of the carrying out of the execution. A file copy of the publication is to be sent in later.

V. Publication of Reprisal Measures

Since the reprisal measure represents not only a punishment for crimes committed but is to serve primarily as a horrifying example and a deterrent to further crimes, every reprisal measure must be published. Reprisal measures must be made public in such a way that they reach the culprits and circles close to them. The proclamation must emphasize the infamy of the deed and the complicity of those executed. Persons executed must not be described then as "persons" but as Communists, D.M. followers, bandit helpers, etc. Publications are to be signed "Commander of Administrative Area Headquarters."

VI. The Taking of Hostages and Reprisal Prisoners

1. All the reprisal prisoners in the camps of the district headquarters are to be considered hostages. The names of the camp inmates, therefore, are to be published in the area of the headquarters for the population, with the threat that these inmates will have to pay with their lives for specified disturbances affecting the public order in accordance with section I. If in individual cases a military unit requires hostages, these are to be taken generally from the camps of the local district commander.

2. As far as persons are detained as hostages by subordinate units and offices by reason of orders issued previously, the chiefs of the offices in agreement with the SD will decide, in accordance with section III, paragraph 1, which persons are appropriate as hostages and are to be transferred to hostage camps. There will no longer be an exchange of these persons as before. All other persons are to be released.

[Marginal note] T. carrying out of this order is to be reported by 3/20/1943.

3. If arrests of persons as hostages become necessary for the prevention of anticipated conspiracies or attacks in certain individual cases, procedure will be according to [section] III, paragraph 6. In the execution of reprisal detainees as hostages as far as jurisdiction and procedure is concerned, section IV is to be applied.

VII. Validity of Orders

In cases of reprisals procedure is to be according to this order immediately after the time of receipt of this order and not later than 3/5/1943.

The following orders are rescinded:

1. Military Commander in Serbia, Administrative Staff, Diary No. 144/41 Secret, VII dated 7/17/1941, section II, (paragraph 4; section IV, paragraph 3).

2. All orders comprised in the summary Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia Ic No. 759/42 Secret, dated 2/2/1942.

3. Plenipotentiary Commanding General in SerbiaAdministrative Staff/Headquarters Staff Ia Diary No. 197/42 Secret, dated 2/20/1942.

4. Commanding General and Commander in Serbia, Administrative Staff /Ic, Diary No. 532/42 Secret, dated 4/21/1942.

5. Commanding General and Commander in Serbia, Administration Staff /Ic, Diary No. 861/42 Secret, dated 11/14/1942.

6. Commanding General and Commander in Serbia, Section Ia, No. 5993/42 Secret, dated 11/22/1942.

7. Commanding General and Commander in Serbia, Ia No. 6090/42 Secret, dated 12/1/1942.

[Illegible initial]

[Signed] Bader

Distribution:
704th Jaeger Division 3 x [3 copies]
F. Kdtren. [Administrative Area Headquarters]
K. Kdtren. [District Headquarters]
DVO Bulgarian Occupation Corps [German Liaison Officer with Bulgarian Occupation Corps]
Higher SS and Police Leader
Commander of the Regular Police
Commander of the Security Police Bw. [Bv.] d. AA. [Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Office]
Organization Todt
Senior Signal Officer

War Diary

[David Thompson]

"V: Hostages, Reprisals and Collective Measures in the Balkans. Measures Against Partisans and Partisan Areas: (B) Contemporaneous Documents: Partial Translation of Document NOKW-380, Prosecution Exhibit 283: Extracts of Report from Commanding General Serbia to Commander in Chief Southeast, 6/18/1943, Concerning Execution of Hostages", in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. Vol. 11: United States of America v. Wilhelm List, et al. (Case 7: 'Hostage Case'). US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1950. p. 1026.

Enclosure [Illegible]

To Commander in Chief Southeast
For information: Commander of the German Troops in Croatia, German Plenipotentiary General in Croatia

Daily Report of 6/18/1943

* * *

1st Royal Bulgarian Occupation Corps

* * *

4. Three hundred and fifty Communists shot to death in reprisal for the murder of three German customs officials and surprise attack on a Bulgarian leave train (see daily reports of 5/16 and 18/1943). Fifty D.M. hostages shot for the murder of an RSK man.

* * *

Commanding General and Commander in Serbia, Ia

[Signature] Bode, Colonel
[Initial] B

[David Thompson]

Title: "V: Hostages, Reprisals and Collective Measures in the Balkans. Measures Against Partisans and Partisan Areas: (B) Contemporaneous Documents: Translation of Document NOKW-155, Prosecution Exhibit 306: Order of the Commander in Chief Southeast, 8/10/1943, Concerning Deportation of Prisoners and Enemy Deserters, and Reprisal and Evacuation Measures", in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. Vol. 11: United States of America v. Wilhelm List, et al. (Case 7: 'Hostage Case'). US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1950. pp. 1027-1029.

Copy

[Handwritten] 111g
Headquarters, 8/10/1943

The Commander in Chief Southeast, simultaneously Acting Commanding General of Army Group E
IaF, No. 604/43 Secret

* * *

For Treatment of Prisoners and Deserters in Bandit Fighting, Reprisal and Evacuation Measures

I. Treatment of prisoners and deserters, execution of revenge measures, and evacuations are not matters of administration but rather measures of combat and/or of combat preparation and of security.

II. The Fuehrer order concerning the importation of human material [Menschenmaterial] into the Reich to ensure the necessary supply of coal (IaF, No. 120/43 Secret of 7/27/1943) is authoritative for the treatment of prisoners; accordingly, all captured bandits are to be deported to the Reich by way of the prisoner collecting points.

III. Orders regarding this matter are in detail as follows:

1. Captured bandit members are to be deported to the prisoner collecting points; the commanders are to examine whether the previously erected prisoner collecting points are sufficient. Further transport from the collecting points into the Reich is to take place according to separate order of the Oberquartiermeister.

An exception to this regulation is possible only if the combat situation does not permit a deportation.

The seizure of individual bandits for intelligence missions A (Counterintelligence units, counterintelligence offices, SD, Secret Field Police [military]) is still necessary.

2. Deserters are also regarded as "prisoners." Considering the good results experienced in Russia when deserters were accorded better treatment, through propaganda, etc., shooting of deserters must be discontinued.

Directives concerning deserter propaganda proceed through the Commander in Chief Southeast, section Ic/counterintelligence officer.

3. As already ordered in the directive of the Commander in Chief Southeast, Ia/Id No. 566/43 Secret of 7/14/1943, reprisal measures are to be executed as heretofore with most severe means, if an inimical attitude is discernible in the population.

In territories occupied by the bandits, in which surprise attacks have been carried out, the arrest of hostages from all strata of the population remains a successful means of intimidation.

Furthermore, it may also be necessary to seize the entire male population, insofar as it does not have to be shot or hanged on account of participation in or support of the bandits, and insofar as it is incapable of work, and bring it to the prisoner collecting points for further transport into the Reich.

Surprise attacks on German soldiers, damage to German property, must be retaliated in every case with shooting or hanging of hostages, destruction of the surrounding localities, etc. Only then will the population announce to the German offices the collecting points of the bandits, in order to remain protected from reprisal measures.

Reprisal measures are to be ordered by the division commanders and/or independent regimental commanders in order to avoid encroachments on subordinate offices and individual soldiers, and to prevent a false, unjust treatment of the population.

4. In the territories especially valuable to the conduct of battle, the male inhabitants between 15-60 are to be evacuated. They are to be collected together in guarded labor camps and/or insofar as they are capable of working, to be transported into the Reich. Evacuations must be carried out decisively in order to prevent a premature escape of the population.

The territories to be evacuated are the strips of coast especially suitable for landings, areas of important pass heights and pass lanes, strips of terrain along especially dangerous railway line stretches, etc. The evacuations completed are to be reported through the commanders to the Commander in Chief Southeast.

5. The order for the treatment of bandits hitherto authoritative - Supplements to Armed Forces Commander Southeast Ia, No. 2868/42 Top Secret of 10/28/1942, to the Fuehrer order re a combatting of so-called commando operations - is herewith rescinded.

Signed: Loehr, General

Certified true copy:
[Illegible signature] First Lieutenant

[David Thompson]

"V: Hostages, Reprisals and Collective Measures in the Balkans. Measures Against Partisans and Partisan Areas: (B) Contemporaneous Documents: Partial Translation of Document NOKW-159, Prosecution Exhibit 417: Order of Military Commander Southeast to Higher SS and Police Leader, 10/23/1943, Directing Reprisal Executions; Report of Military Commander Southeast to 809th Administrative Area Headquarters, 11/26/1943, Concerning Executions: Order of 10/23/1943", in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. Vol. 11: United States of America v. Wilhelm List, et al. (Case 7: 'Hostage Case'). US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1950. pp. 1029-1030.

Headquarters, 10/23/1943
[Handwritten] Supplement 110

Military Commander Southeast
Section Ia/No. 246/43

To the Higher SS and Police Leader

For information:
809th Administrative Area Headquarters;
German Liaison Staff with the 1st Royal Bulgarian Occupation Corps

1. As revenge for the surprise attack on the cattle purchasing detachment at Sljivar (6 km. SW of Zajecar) by a D.M. and a Communist band, through which 8 German, Bulgarian armed forces and police members were killed, 8 German and Bulgarian armed forces members wounded, and from which 2 German Military Policemen are missing, 100 D.M. reprisal prisoners and 300 Communist reprisal prisoners are to be shot under consideration of the reprisal measures which have already taken place consisting of burning down of houses and the losses which the bandits suffered in this operation.

2. As revenge for the surprise attack on the collecting detachment of the 8th Auxiliary Police Battalion on 10/6/1943, at Jelasnica by a D.M. band, during the course of which 3 auxiliary policemen were killed, 8 heavily wounded and 9 slightly wounded, 100 D.M. reprisal prisoners are to be shot.

The Higher SS and Police Leader is charged with carrying out the execution. It is to take place in the Zajecar district.

In the publication of the reprisal measures relating to 1, reference is to be made to the horrible treatment of the wounded who fell into the hands of the bandits and the mutilation of the corpses; in the proclamation concerning 2, it is to be expressed that the reprisal quota would have been considerably higher if the wounded had not been decently treated.

[David Thompson]

"V: Hostages, Reprisals and Collective Measures in the Balkans. Measures Against Partisans and Partisan Areas: (B) Contemporaneous Documents: Partial Translation of Document NOKW-159, Prosecution Exhibit 417: Order of Military Commander Southeast to Higher SS and Police Leader, 10/23/1943, Directing Reprisal Executions; Report of Military Commander Southeast to 809th Administrative Area Headquarters, 11/26/1943, Concerning Executions: Report of 11/26/1943", in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. Vol. 11: United States of America v. Wilhelm List, et al. (Case 7: 'Hostage Case'). US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1950. p. 1030.

Enclosure 92
[Stamp] Secret

To 809th Administrative Area Headquarters

As revenge for the surprise attack on the cattle purchasing detachment at Sljivar, 100 D.M. followers and 200 Communists were shot on 10/29/1943, in Belgrade.

As revenge for the surprise attack on the collecting detachment of the 8th Auxiliary Police Battalion at Jelasnica, 100 D.M. followers were shot on 10/29/1943.

The reprisal measures are to be published in the Zajecar district. In the publication reference is to be made expressly to the horrible treatment of the wounded who fell into the hands of the bandits and the mutilation of the dead in case 1.

An enclosure copy is to be sent here.

Military Commander Southeast
Ia No. 1858/43 Secret

[David Thompson]

"V: Hostages, Reprisals and Collective Measures in the Balkans. Measures Against Partisans and Partisan Areas: (B) Contemporaneous Documents: Translation of Document NOKW-154, Prosecution Exhibit 424: Order of Military Commander Southeast, 1/1/1944, Concerning Competency for Ordering Reprisal Measures", in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. Vol. 11: United States of America v. Wilhelm List, et al. (Case 7: 'Hostage Case'). US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1950. pp. 1032-1033.

[Stamp] Secret
Military Commander Southeast
Section Ia No. 58/44 Secret

[Handwritten] War Diary
Headquarters, 1/1/1944

[Handwritten] Enclosure 1

Subject: Reprisal measures

Reference: Commander in Chief Southeast (Army Group F) Section Ia/F No. 29643 Secret, 12/22/1943

Supplementing letter Commander in Chief Southeast (Army Group F) Ia/F 296 dated 12/22/1943, the following is ordered with regard to Serbia:

1. The commanders of the administrative area headquarters are competent to order reprisals, and can assign their execution to the competent commanders of the district headquarters. For special the military commander reserves to himself the right to issue orders for reprisal measures.

2. Before a reprisal measure is ordered, approval must be obtained through teletype from the Military Commander Southeast. The request must contain brief description of facts; losses, as well as damage, which have occurred; political affiliation of the perpetrators; type and extent of reprisal measures intended.

3. Persons or homes suitable for the execution of reprisal measures are to be determined after prior contact with the competent SD and counter intelligence detachments has been made. The Serbian district administrators are to be given a hearing.

4. Troops and police have to comply with requests to carry out reprisal measures. Generally, losses suffered by the troops will be revenged by them. The police will provide an execution detachment to avenge its own losses and, in addition, all attacks on protected nonmilitary persons and objects.

5. The execution of reprisal measures is to be reported in the daily reports. Copy of the public notice to be signed, "The Commander of the Administrative Area Headquarters," is to be forwarded subsequently.

6. The arrest of hostages to prevent expected outrages or attacks will be ordered by the commander of the administrative area headquarters with approval of the Military Commander Southeast.

For further procedure paragraph 2 applies.

7. Participation by the Serbian Government and administration in the execution of reprisal measures and the employment of armed Serbian formations may take place upon their request.

8. The orders of the commanding general and commander in Serbia Ia No. 652/43 Secret, items 1-3, dated 2/28/1943, 5/9/1943 and 7/31/1943, are rescinded.

Current reprisal procedures not corresponding to this order are to be discontinued.

Signed: Felber

[Illegible signature] First Lieutenant

Distribution: Down to battalion and district headquarters

[David Thompson]

Document D-741 [partial translation], in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Volume VII: US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1947. pp. 196-197.

Secret Reich Matter.

Memo. RAM 7b/43.

Memorandum about the discussion between the Reich Foreign Minister and Ambassador Alfieri in Berlin on 21 February 1943.

Continuing the Reich Foreign Minister brought the discussion round to the Balkan area, where a certain concern was felt on the German side regarding the attitude of the Italian army, of this concern the Duce had already been informed. The Italian army must become active in Croatia now. He (The Reich Foreign Minister) had to inform Alfieri quite frankly that the policy of arming the Cetnici as pursued by General Roatta, had been a big mistake and would produce devastating results in the event of a British landing. The whole problem had been discussed thoroughly with Ciano and Coballero. Both gentlemen had promised all that Germany desired, but nothing had happened.

Three to four German divisions were at the moment engaged in clearing up the bandits. But the collaboration of the Italian army was absolutely necessary for the attainment of really final results. Roatta believed that he could play off one party against the other, but in doing this he overlooked the fact that the apparently opposed elements like the Tito gangs, the Cetnici and the followers of Mihailovic were united in their hatred of anything Italian or German and were quite frankly referred to by Eden as the British advance guard in a possible invasion attempt.

The continued existence of these gangs, which carried out acts of sabotage like the demolition of bridges and such like, and who would thereby endanger the supplies, which had to rely on a single railway line, were so dangerous owing to this very possibility of an English landing on the Adriatic coast of the Balkans.

Alfieri remarked in this connection that, as far as he remembered, Cabellero had entirely agreed with the policy of force suggested by Germany, and had already told him (Alfieri) that he had made the necessary arrangements.

Continuing, the Reich Foreign Minister emphasized that the conditions which Roatta's policy had helped to produce in Croatia were causing the Fuehrer great concern. It was appreciated on the German side that Roatta wished to spare Italian blood, but it was believed that he was, as it were, trying to drive out Satan with Beelzebub by this policy. The gangs had to be exterminated, and that included men, women and children, as their continued existence imperiled the lives of German and Italian men, women and children.

Berlin, 22 February 1943.

[signed] Schmidt
Ambassador Schmidt.

[THECLASH]

very informative - especially about the individual cases of Partisan attacks and sabotage against the Axis and so on.

[David Thompson]

Document D-735 [partial translation], in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Volume VII: US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1947. p. 190.

Note

Reich Foreign Minister.
5/ /42 Secret Reich Matter.
Secret Reich Matter.

Note

On the discussion between the Reich Foreign Minister and Count Ciano in the presence of Field Marshal Keitel and Marshal Cavallero in the Fuehrer's HQ after breakfast on the 19 December 1942.

The Reich Foreign Minister began by pointing out that ... and said that ... Field Marshal Keitel had told the Italian gentlemen that the Croatian area was to be cleaned up by German and Italian troops working in cooperation, and this while it was still winter, in view of the strong British influence in this area. The Fuehrer had declared that the Serbian conspirators were to be burnt out, and that no gentle methods might be used in doing this. Field Marshal Keitel here interjected that every village in which partisans were found had to be burnt down. Continuing, the Reich Foreign Minister declared that Roatta must not leave the third zone, but must on the contrary advance, and this in the closest collaboration with the German troops. In this connection Field Marshal Keitel requested the Italian gentlemen not to regard the utilization of Croatian troops to help in this cleaning up operation as a favoring of the Croatians. The Reich Foreign Minister stated in this connection that the Poglavnik (Croatian Fuehrer), to whom he had spoken very clearly, was 100% ready to come to an agreement with Italy.

Berlin, 23 December 1942.

[Sgd] SCHMIDT.

[David Thompson]

From Arad, Yitzak, Shmuel Krakowski and Shmuel Spector (ed.), The Einsatzgruppen Reports, Holocaust Library, New York: 1989.

Operational Situation Report USSR No. 120; October 21, 1941

The Chief of the Security Police and the Security Service
Berlin
October 21, 1941
30 copies (18th copy)
Operational Situation Report USSR No. 120

Political Survey Occupied Territories Serbia
Extraordinary occurrences

Until the installation of the authorized commanding general in Serbia, ruthless action by the troops was bound to fail because of the lack of adequate and unequivocal orders. Then an entirely clear line of action was established at the command of General B. According to this [policy], for each [German] soldier shot 100 Serbians are to be executed, and for each soldier wounded, 50 Serbians. Based on that formula, for example, 2,200 Serbians and Jews were shot as reprisal for an attack on the escorting train near Topols when 22 members of the Army lost their lives. 1,738 inhabitants and 19 Communist women from Kraljovo were executed for the soldiers who fell in the battle of Kraljovo.