Documents on German treatment of Soviet POWs

[David Thompson]

This is another research post, with original German documents or extracts from original documents.

"Document 1519-PS [translation]" in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Volume IV: US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1947. pp. 58-65.

The National Socialist German Workers Party Party Chancellery
Fuehrer Headquarters 30 September 1941

The Director of the Party Chancellery
[Stamp] Gau Training Office, Franken
No. 2131
Received: 8 October 1941
Sent:

CONFIDENTIAL Circular No. 21/41 Confidential (not for publication)

Subject: Treatment of Soviet Prisoners of War

For your information please find enclosed a regulation of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, dated 8.9.1941 on the treatment of Soviet prisoners of War. This regulation is confidential!

One appendix overleaf Certified:

Distribution: Gauleiters Kreisleiters

Heil Hitler!
sgd. Bormann

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
Az. 2f 21.11
General Armed Forces Dept./P.W. (I)

No. 3058 41 Confidential Berlin
Schoeneberg, 8.9.1941 2 Appendices
Badenschestrasse 51

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Regulation for the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war.

Reference: 1. OKW/P.W. 26/41 Most Secret dated 16.6.1941 (only for the P.W. commandants in Service Command I and the General Government).

2. OKW/P.W. 2144/41 Secret dated 26.6.1941.

3. OKW/P.W. 2401/41 Secret dated 17.7.1941.

4. OKW/P.W. 15 No. 5015/41 dated 2.8.1941

Appended is a collation of and/or additions to the orders already issued in various directives on the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war. The directives, already issued by Supreme Command General Headquarters for the operational areas, have been considered. By this order any orders on this subject become invalid so long as no direct reference is made to them in the appendix.

Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
By order of Reinecke

Appendix to Diary
No. 3058/41
Confidential dated 8.9.1941.

CONFIDENTIAL

Regulation for the treatment of Soviet PWs in all prisoner of war camps.

1 Treatment of Soviet PWs in general.

Bolshevism is the deadly enemy of Nazi Germany. For the first time, the German soldier is encountering not only a military opponent, but one, at the same time, steeped in the ideas of Bolshevism so pernicious to the people. The fight against National Socialism has become part of his system. He conducts it by every means in his power: Sabotage, seditious propaganda, incendiarism, murder. The bolshevist soldier has therefore lost all claim to treatment as an honourable opponent in accordance with Geneva Convention.

It is therefore in keeping with the respect and honour of the German Armed Forces, that every German soldier should hold itself severely aloof when dealing with Soviet prisoners of war. Treatment must be cool but correct. Any indulgence or even friendly disposition is to be punished very severely. The feeling of pride and superiority of the German soldier ordered to guard Soviet PWs, must at all times be visible even in public.

The order for ruthless and energetic action must be given at the slightest indication of insubordination, especially in the case of bolshevik fanatics. Insubordination, active or passive resistance must immediately be broken completely by force of arms (bayonets, butts and firearms). The regulations on the use of arms in the Armed Forces can be applied only to a limited extent as these regulations apply under the assumption that conditions will be generally peaceful. With Soviet PWs it is already necessary for reasons of discipline, that the use of arms should be severe. Anyone carrying out an order, who does not use his weapons or does so with insufficient energy, is punishable.

PWs attempting to escape are to be fired on without previous challenge. No warning shot must ever be fired. The regulations already made, in particular H. Dv. 38/1, page 13, etc., are invalid with regard to that point. On the other hand, no arbitrary action is permitted. PWs who are obedient and willing to work are to be treated correctly. However, caution and mistrust must never lapse when dealing with PWs. The use of arms against PWs is, as a rule, legal.

Any contact between PWs and the civilian population must be prevented. This applies particularly to the occupied area. The segregation of higher-ranking PWs (Officers and NCOs), which has already been effected by the field forces, must be strictly maintained in the area of the Armed Forces Commanders and within the Reich. Any communication between higher-ranking personnel and the men, even by signs, must be rendered impossible.

Camp-police must be formed from suitable Soviet PWs in the camp and in the larger fatigue details to be employed in carrying out the orders and upholding the discipline of the commandant. Within the wire fence, the camp police may be armed with sticks, whips or other similar weapons to enable them to carry out their duties effectively. The use of this kind of weapon by German soldiers is absolutely forbidden. With the offer of better food, treatment and accommodation, an executive body should be created in the camp; this would decrease the work of the German guard personnel.

II. Treatment of members of racial groups.

In accordance with orders issued to date, PWs have already been divided up, according to their race, in the "Home Organisation" [heimatorganisation] (General Government and Service Command I) as well as in the camps within the Reich. The following racial groups are concerned: Racial Germans, Ukrainians, White Russians, Pales, Lithuanians, Latvians, Esthonians, Rumanians, Finns, Georgians.

In so far as it has been impossible for special reasons to carry out this separation, it must now be done at once. This applies, in particular, to PWs newly captured in the Area of the Armed Forces Commanders.

Members of the following racial groups must be speedily sent home:

Racial Germans,
Ukrainians
White Ruthenians
Latvians
Esthonians
Rumanians
Finns
Lithuanians

Special orders will be issued on the manner in which this release is to be effected.

Should the attitude of individual members of these racial groups arouse the suspicion that they could be detrimental or dangerous to the German people or to National-Socialism, they are to be debarred from release and will be dealt with in accordance with section III.

III. Segregation of civilians and politically undesirable PWs taken during the Eastern campaign.

1. Intentions. The Armed Forces must rid themselves of all those elements among the PWs which must be considered as the driving forces of bolshevism. The special conditions of the Eastern Campaign demand special measures which can be carried out on their own responsibility, free from bureaucratic and administrative influences.

2. The way to reach the appointed goal. A. Apart from directing PWs into camps according to their nationality (see section II) PWs (also members of racial groups) and any civilian in the camps are to be divided as follows:

a. those politically undesirable

b. those politically harmless

c. those especially reliable in the political sense (who could be employed in the reconstruction work in the occupied areas).

B. Whereas the work of separation according to nationality, rank, etc., is undertaken by the camp organisation itself, the Reichsfuehrer-SS has assigned Special purpose units of the Security Police and the Security Service for the work of classifying PWs according to their political opinions. They are immediately subordinate to the Chief of the Security Police and the SD have received special training for their special duties and carry out the measures and inquiries, within the framework of the camp organisation, according to regulations which they have already received from the Chief of Security Police and the SD.

There must be the closest cooperation between the commandants, especially their defense officers, and the special purpose units.

3. Further treatment of groups segregated in accordance with No. 2. A. Military personnel. The special purpose unit of the Security Police and SD decides what persons are to be segregated as "politically undesirable elements". Should individuals, considered as suspicious, later prove themselves to be unsuspicious, the should be sent back to the camp with the other PWs. Request made by the special purpose units for other persons to be handed over, must be complied with. Officers will very often be liable for segregation as "political undesirables". Even soldiers captured in civilian clothes, count as military personnel.

B. Civilians. If they are harmless, efforts must be made to send them back quickly to the occupied area. The competent Armed Forces Commander (and/or the commander in the army area to the rear) decides the time this is to be brought about with the approval of the competent office of the Chief of the Security Police and SD. The condition for this return is the assurance of employment in some work in their hometown or in specially created Labour-formations. The Armed Forces Commander (and/or the commander in the army area to the rear) is responsible for guarding them on the return journey. If possible, the camp will provide an escort unit. Politically undesirable civilians are to be treated as under A.

C. Reliable persons are to be separated from politically undesirable persons and directed into some other work of camp administration.

(Special attention must be paid to racial Germans: it is, however quite possible that, even among these, there may be elements that must be considered as "politically undesirable".)

Should the reliable persons seem especially suited for employment in the reconstruction work in the occupied area, a request for release made by the special purpose unit of the Security Police and SD can be opposed only if there is an interest in any specific individual from the point of view of defense.

IV. Employment of Soviet PWs.

1. General. Soviet PWs may be employed only in squads completely separate from civilians and PWs of other nationalities. (Employment in groups). The only places of work which can be considered are these where the PWs can work under the constant supervision of the guard personnel. The separation from civilians and PWs of other nationalities must be enforced, not only in the billets, but also at the place of work. It must be stressed, in this connection, that the guard personnel must not be prevented from immediate use of their weapons out of consideration for a third person.

2. Special regulations for employment within the Reich. The main principle for the employment of Soviet PWs within the Reich, is the assured security of German life and German property.

The Armed Forces authorities in charge of employment have the ole responsibility for the orderly employment of Soviet PWs.

Therefore employment, first and foremost, must be taken up in work connected with the Armed Forces. In the case of employment in the civil sector, the local employment authorities can make suggestions but the decision, contrary to the regulations on the employment of other PWs, rests with the Armed Forces authorities. In cases where all the conditions for constant supervision and complete separation from the civilian population cannot plied with by a civilian place of work employment cannot be approved. Should one of these conditions lapse later on, the fatigue detail is to be withdrawn forthwith.

In addition the instructions OKW/PW (15) No. 5015/41, dated 2.8.41 is to be followed in detail. Anyone breaking it will be punished.

3. Guard duties. The best possible trained energetic and prudent guard personnel are to be chosen to guard the Soviet PWs and constantly instructed by the Training Officer of the Military base camp [A. O. des M. Stammlagers].

At least one guard must be assigned to each 10 PWs. There must, however, never be one guard alone on duty. Should a fatigue detail consist of no more than 10 men, 2 guards must be employed to guard them. Guards should be equipped with hand grenades if possible. Those guarding larger squads must also be issued with machine guns or sub-machine guns.

Places of work must be frequently examined by officers or experienced NCOs. They are responsible for seeing that the orders given are carried out to the letter.

The notes, attached as an appendix, are to be made available for thorough and detailed perusal.

The billets of Soviet PWs on fatigue details are to be under constant guard, even at night, and are to be inspected from time to time by the supervising authorities.

V. Final remarks.

PW-commandants are to be made personally responsible that under all circumstances the above regulations are strictly observed by subordinate units. This duty may in no case cease or be influenced by a change in offices. Therefore all offices and units newly concerned and employed in this sphere must be made thoroughly acquainted with the content of the regulations.

***************************************

Appendix to the Order of OKW/Gen. Armed Forces Dept. PW section No. 3058/41 Secret dated 8 September 1941 (for free distribution!)

Notes on the guarding of Soviet Prisoners of War.

Bolshevism is the deadly enemy of Nazi Germany

For the first time in this war, the German soldier is encountering not only a military opponent, but one, at the same time, politically educated, who sees in communism his ideal and in National-Socialism, his most provocative enemy. In the fight against National-Socialism, every method is, to him, legal: sniping, guerrilla warfare, sabotage, incendiarism, seditious propaganda, murder. Even a Soviet soldier in captivity, however harmless he may appear on the surface, will snatch any opportunity to show his hatred of everything German. It is quite possible that the PWs received corresponding instructions on how to act in captivity. It is essential, therefore, to treat them with the utmost vigilance, the greatest caution and complete mistrust.

The principles to be followed by guard personnel are:

1. Ruthless action at the slightest indication of insubordination or disobedience. Weapons are to be used unsparingly to put down resistance. PWs attempting to escape are to be fired on immediately (without a challenge) with the firm intention of hitting them.

2. Any conversation-even on the march to and from the place of work -- unless it concerns absolutely necessary official instructions is utterly forbidden. No smoking at all is allowed on the march to and from the places of work -- as well as during work. In the same way, all conversation between PWs and civilians is to be prevented, if necessary by force of arms -- even against the civilians.

3. At the place of work also, a constant and careful supervision by German guard personnel is required. Each guard must always keep a sufficient distance from the PWs to enable him, at any time, to use his weapons without delay. Never turn your back on a PW.

4. Slackness is out of place even with a PW who is obedient and willing to work. He interprets it as weakness and draws his own conclusions.

5. When German soldiers are ruthlessly carrying out given orders with all severity and harshness, any arbitrary action, maltreatment and, above all, the use of clubs and whips is forbidden. This would be out of keeping with the honour of German soldiers as armed men.

6. The appearance of seeming harmless on the part of bolshevist PWs must never lead to the slackening of the above instructions.

[David Thompson]

"Document EC-338: Directives For The Treatment Of Soviet Prisoners Of War [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Volume VII: US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1947. pp. 411-416.

Berlin, 15 September 1941

Amt Ausl/Abw. Nr. 9731/41 geh. Chef Ausl. F XIV, E 1.

Secret
To be submitted to the Chief of OKW

Notes of Speech.

REFERENCE: 2 f 24.11 AWA / Kriegsgef. (I) Nr. 3058,41 secret

To be submitted to the Chief of AWA

I. 1. The legal position is as follows:

The Geneva Convention for the treatment of Prisoners of war is not ["not" is underlined in purple pencil] binding in the relationship between Germany and the USSR, therefore only the principles of general international law on the treatment of prisoners of war apply. Since the 18th century these have gradually been established along the lines that war captivity is neither revenge nor punishment, but solely protective custody [Sicherheitshaft] the only purpose of which is to prevent the prisoners of war from a further participation in the war. This principle was developed in accordance with the view held by all armies that it is contrary to military tradition to kill or injure helpless people; this is also in the interest of all belligerents in order to prevent mistreatment of their own soldiers in case of capture.

2. The decrees for the treatment of Soviet Prisoners of War enclosed as supplement No. 1 are based on a fundamentally different view point, as is shown in the opening phrases. According to this view point military service for the Soviets is not considered military duty but, because of the murders committed by the Russians, is characterized in its totality as a crime. Hence the validity of international legal standards in wartime is denied in the war against Bolshevism. Furthermore much is set aside which, according to previous experience has proved itself not only as militarily useful but was also considered absolutely essential for the maintenance of discipline and efficiency of the own troops.

3. The instructions are very general. But if one considers their basic principles the expressly approved measures will result in arbitrary mistreatments and killings, the formal prohibition of arbitrary actions notwithstanding.

a. This results in the first place from the instructions about the use of arms in cases of insubordination. The guards and their superior officers who are entirely unacquainted with the languages of the prisoners of war will frequently not be able to determine whether non-compliance with orders is caused by misunderstanding of disobedience. The principle: "Use of arms against Soviet prisoners of war is as a rule justified" exempts the guards of any obligation for deliberation.

b. The treatment of the prisoners of war is removed to a large extent from the supervision of the Wehrmacht; to outward appearance, however, the responsibility will remain with the Wehrmacht.

aa. The screening of the civilians and politically undesirable prisoners of war as well as the decision over their fate is effected by the action [purple pencil note "very efficient!"] of detachments of the Security Police [Sicherheits Polizei] [underlined in purple] and the SD along principles which are unknown to the Wehrmacht authorities and the compliance with which they cannot check.

bb. The establishment of a camp police equipped with clubs, whips and similar tools is contrary to military conception, even though the policing is done by camp inmates; furthermore, the Wehrmacht authorities are thus handing over means of punishment to unknown persons without being able to really check on their use.

c. The final phrase of the decree suggests that the commanders of the prisoners of war camps act even more severely than the decrees provide for, in order to be sure not to be held responsible themselves.

4. According to general experience, unfair treatment provokes the spirit of insubordination, so that the guarding of these prisoners of war in all probability will always remain difficult. The instructions already provide for the employment of one guard for each 10 prisoners during work so that with the present number of approximately 1.5 millions of employable prisoners a minimum of 150000 men is required for guard duty.

5. Enclosure No. 2 is a translation of the Russian decree for prisoners of war which complies with the principles of the International Law and to a very large extent also the Geneva Convention for the treatment of prisoners of war. This decree will no doubt be disregarded by the Russian troops at the front but both the Russian as well as the German decree, are mostly for home consumption. Although it can hardly be assumed that the Russian decree will be adhered to in the Russian territory of the Soviet Union, there is the danger that the German decrees will be seized upon by the enemy propaganda and will be compared with the Russian decrees.

6. The reconstruction of the occupied territories, so essential for the German War Economy, will be handicapped. It will be made impossible for these prisoners of war who, because of their anti-Bolshevistic attitude or because of some special training or for other reasons could be used for the administration of these territories, to work for us after their release even though they might be inclined to do so after their experiences in the prisoners of war camps. Instead of taking advantage of the tensions among the population of the occupied territories for the benefit of the German administration, the mobilization of all international opposition forces of Russia for unified hostility will be facilitated.

7. Under the special conditions prevailing in the Russian theatre of operation, the will to resist of the enemy troops will be extremely strengthened by the enemy intelligence service and the very rapidly effective whispering campaign.

8. Possible sources of information will be blocked; prisoners of war who, as internal political opponents of the Bolshevistic regime, especially those belonging to minorities, could be used for counter-intelligence purposes will lose all willingness they may have to be enrolled. This applies especially to the nationalities of the territory of the Caucasus which is so decisive for the war economy.

9. It will be impossible to protest against the bad treatment of German soldiers in Soviet Russian captivity. [purple pencil note: I consider it useless!]

II. Office Ausl/Abw. (Foreign Counter-Intelligence) has not been consulted before issuance of these decrees of the order for their execution. For fundamental reasons as well as for the detrimental results certainly to be expected with regard to political and military matters, the office Ausl./Abw. has had considerable misgivings about them.

Signed: Canaris

2 Enclosures [The following notations appear on first page:]

Ink and pencil:
vol 222-2 pencil:
338 Blue pencil:
v. P 23 Nov. Brown pencil:
submit to chief, office of Foreign Intelligence Berkner (?)
25 Sept. Red stamp: Secret
Purple pencil: K 23 Sept. The Objections arise from the military concept of chivalrous warfare! This is the destruction of an ideology! Therefore I approve and back the measures K.
Indelible ink: -2- chief foreign and chief intelligence III C.
(illegible initials) 1 Oct.
Blue pencil: (initials) 29 Sept.
pencil: (initials) 22 Nov.
Blue pencil: (initials IV 20 Oct. back to staff Ia
20 Nov. (initials) VI
Indelible pencil: Ia [illegible letters]

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
Az. 2f .11
General Armed Forces
Dept. /P.W. (I)
No. 3058/41
Secret
2 Enclosures

**************************************************

Berlin-Schoeneberg, Badenschestrasse 51
8 September 1941

SUBJECT: Regulation for the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war.

Reference: 1. OKW/P.W. 26/41 Most Secret dated 16 January 1941 (only for the P.W. commandants in Service Command I and the General Government.)

2. OKW/P.W. 2144/41 Secret dated 26 June 1941.

3. OKW/P.W. 2401/41 Secret dated 17 July 1941.

4. OKW/P.W. 15 No. 5015/41 dated 2 August 1941.

Appended is a collection of and/or additions to the orders already issued in various directives on the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war. The directives, already issued by OKH/Gen. Qu. for the operational areas, have been considered. By this order, any orders on this subject become invalid so long as no direct reference is made to them in the appendix.

Distribution:

Supreme Command Army/Gen. Staff Army/Gen. Hq.: 10
Reich air force minister and C-in-C of air force: 2
Supreme Command Navy: 2
Armed Forces C-in-C Norway: 2
Service Commands I-XIII, XVII, XVIII, XX, XXI, also for branches 6 each: 102
Military Commander Government General and PW Commander: 25
PW Commander service command I: 15
Armed Forces Commander Baltic territories Riga, and PW Commander with armed forces commander Baltic territories at present Riga: 20
Armed Forces commander Ukraine, Rowne, and PW Commander with armed forces Commander Ukraine, at present Berditschen: 20
Air district hq. II,XI,XII: 3
Naval station North Sea, Wilhelmshaven: 1
Naval station Baltic, Kiel: 1
carry over: 203

[red stamp and blue ink ]to No. 9731/41 secret foreign
carry over: 203
for information:

Reich Labor Ministry, attention Councillor Dr. Hoelk: 1
Reich Leader SS and Chief of German Police, Berlin SW: 11
Reich Labor Service: 10
Supreme Command Armed Forces /staff/ hq.: 2
Supreme Command Armed Forces JAG: 2
Supreme Command Armed Forces Armed Forces Propaganda: 2
Supreme Command Armed Forces foreign office/counter intelligence/foreign: 2
Supreme Command Armed Forces Foreign office/counter intelligence/counter intelligence I: 2 Supreme Command Armed Forces Foreign office/counter intelligence/counter intelligence II: 2 Supreme Command Armed Forces/Foreign office/counter intelligence/counter intelligence III: 2 Supreme Command Armed Forces general armed forces office/inspect./PW: 1
Supreme Command Armed Forces PW: 4 ]
Supreme Command Armed Forces reserve: 20
Supreme Command Armed Forces draft: 1
[total:] 255

Chief of Supreme Command Armed Forces
by order:

[The balance of this enclosure appears in Document Number 1519-PS. [Moderator's note -- see the first post on this thread.] The second enclosure is a translation from Russian into German of a Russian decree pertaining to treatment of German PW's.]

[David Thompson]

Extract from Operational Order No. 8, by Heydrich, Chief of the Security Police and SD, 17 July 1941, and Enclosures, on Segregation and Treatment of Certain Categories in PW Camps: Operation Order No. 8", in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. Vol. 11: United States of America v. Wilhelm von Leeb, et al. (Case 12: 'High Command Case'). US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1950. pp. 5-7.

Berlin, 17 July 1941

The Chief of the Security Police and the Security Service
21 B/41 top secret IV A I c
350 copies - 276th copy
[Stamp] Top secret

Operational Order No. 8

Subject: Directives for the Kommandos of the Chief of the Security Police and the Security Service which are to be detailed to the permanent PW camps [Stalags] and transit camps [Dulags]

Appendices: 2 stapled enclosures, 1 and 2, 1 loose enclosure [The "1 loose enclosure" is a "List of PW camps in the area of Military District [Wehrkreis] I and the Government General", dated 21 August 1941, unsigned. It lists 8 and 6 camps, respectively, and contains the following comment: "The transit camps are, according to the communication by the High Command of the Armed Forces, in the area of operations and are from time to time moved nearer to the front as locally required. Their present location may be found by an inquiry at the Generalquartiermeister, department prisoners of war - Telephone: Anna 757 (military wire) - Captain Sohn."]

I am enclosing directives for the purging [Saeuberung] of the prisoner camps which contain Soviet Russians. These directives have been formulated in agreement with the High Command of the Armed Forces - Prisoner of War Department (see encl. 1). The commanders of the prisoner of war and transit camps have been informed by the High Command of the Armed Forces.

I request that a Kommando consisting of one SS Leader and 4-6 men be detailed for the prisoner of war camps in that area. If additional forces are needed to carry out the required tasks, I am to be informed at once.

* * *

I draw attention, however, to the fact that the regional Gestapo headquarters in the Reich, which are not concerned, are so understaffed, that further forces cannot be taken from them.

In order to facilitate the execution of the purge, a liaison officer is to be sent to Brigadier General von Hindenburg, Commander in Chief of the Prisoner of War Camps in the Army Service Command Area, East Prussia, in Koenigsberg, Prussia, and to Major General Herrgott, Commander in Chief of the Prisoner of War Camps in the Government General in Kielce.

The following are to be detailed at once as liaison officers:

a. Kriminalrat Schiffer, Regional Gestapo headquarters Stettin, to Brigadier General von Hindenburg in Koenigsberg, Prussia and

b. Kriminalkommissar Raschwitz, with the commander of the Security Police and of the SD in Krakow, to Major General Herrgott in Kielce.

The duty of those liaison officers is to ensure from time to time, and especially in the initial stages of the action, that the operations of the Kommandos are carried out uniformly and in accordance with these directives, and to assure smooth working relationship with the offices of the Wehrmacht.

For the execution of the tasks assigned to the Kommandos in the prisoner of war camps, I attach - as enclosure 2 - directives for the Kommandos of the Chief of the Security Police and the SD [Security Service] to be detailed to the permanent camps of which the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces and therefore also the regional commanders and camp commanders have been informed.

Before carrying out of executions [liquidations], the leaders of the Einsatzkommandos are to contact, in each case, the heads of the competent regional Gestapo headquarters or the commanders of the area competent for their camp, with regard to carrying them out. The executions must not be carried out in the camp itself or in its immediate neighborhood. They are not to be public and are to be carried out as inconspicuously as possible.

With regard to the screening of the transit camps in the newly occupied territories, separate instructions are being issued to the chiefs of the Einsatzgruppen of the Security Police and the Security Service. The transit camps which lie in the areas of the additional Einsatzkommandos detailed by the commanders of the Security Police and the Security Service and of the State Police offices, are to be screened by those.

[Signed] Heydrich

[David Thompson]

Partial Translation of Document NO-3414, Prosecution Exhibit 362: Extract from Operational Order No. 8, by Heydrich, Chief of the Security Police and SD, 17 July 1941, and Enclosures, on Segregation and Treatment of Certain Categories in PW Camps: Enclosure 1", in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. Vol. 11: United States of America v. Wilhelm von Leeb, et al. (Case 12: 'High Command Case'). US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1950. pp. 7-9.

Copy
[Stamp] Top Secret

Directives for the segregation of civilians and suspicious prisoners of war from the Eastern Campaign in the prisoner of war camps in the occupied territory, in the operational zone, in the Government General, and in the camps in the Reich

I. Intention

The armed forces must instantly rid itself of all those elements among the prisoners of war who are to be regarded as carriers of bolshevism. The special conditions of the Eastern Campaign therefore require extraordinary measures which must be carried out free from bureaucratic and administrative influences, and with pride in the responsibility of the task.

While the previous regulations and orders concerning prisoner of war matters have been exclusively based upon military considerations the political aim must now be achieved to protect the German people from Bolshevist agitators and to secure the occupied territory quickly.

II. The road to the achievement of the ultimate goal

A. The inmates of the Russian camps are therefore, first of all, to be separated inside the camps according to the following categories:

1. Civilians.

2. Soldiers (those too who are known to have donned civilian clothes).

3. Politically intolerable elements from 1 and 2.

4. Persons from 1 and 2, who appear to be especially reliable politically and therefore capable of being used for employment in the reconstruction of the occupied territories.

5. Racial groups within the categories of civilians and soldiers.

B. While the rough segregation according to A 1-5 will be carried out by the camp authorities themselves, the Reich Leader SS will commission the following units with the task of segregating the persons included in A 3 and 4: "Einsatzkommandos of the Security Police and Security Service".

These units are directly subordinate to the chief of the Security Police and the Security Service; they are specially trained for their special task and carry out their measures and investigations within the framework of the rules prevailing in the camp according to the directives they receive from the Chief of the Security Police and the Security Service. It is the duty of the camp commandants, in particular that of their counterintelligence officers, to collaborate closely with the Einsatzkommandos.

III. Further treatment of the segregated groups

A. Civilians

* * *

B. Military personnel - The Asiatics are to be separated from the soldiers of European appearance, in view of their possible use in the Reich. Officers will often be liable to segregation as "suspicious elements". On the other hand, in order to prevent the officers from influencing the enlisted men, the two are to be separated from each other forthwith. A special order will be issued regarding the final assignment of military personnel. It must be emphasized now that no Asiatics and persons speaking German are to be considered for employment in Germany.

C. The Einsatzkommando of the Security Police and Security Service will decide the fate of the "suspicious elements" (see II A 3) who are segregated.

Should any of the persons suspected turn out later to be unsuspicious, they are to be returned to the rest of the civilians or soldiers in the camp.

Requests from the Einsatzkommando for the handing over of further persons will be granted.

D. Trustworthy persons are to be used to segregate the suspicious one (II A 3) and are also to be assigned to other work in the camp administration. (Special reference is made to "Volga Germans".)

[David Thompson]

"Partial Translation of Document NO-3414, Prosecution Exhibit 362: Extract from Operational Order No. 8, by Heydrich, Chief of the Security Police and SD, 17 July 1941, and Enclosures, on Segregation and Treatment of Certain Categories in PW Camps: Enclosure 2", in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. Vol. 11: United States of America v. Wilhelm von Leeb, et al. (Case 12: 'High Command Case'). US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1950. pp. 9-11.

[Stamp] Top Secret
Berlin, 17 July 1941

* * *

Directives for the Kommandos of the Chief of the Security Police and the Security Service [SD] to be detailed to the Permanent PW Camps [Stalags]

The Kommandos are detailed in accordance with the agreement between the chief of the Security Police and the Security Service and the High Command of the Armed Forces, dated 16 July 1941 (see encl. 1).

Within the framework of the camp regulations the Kommandos operate independently by virtue of special authorization and in accordance with the general directives issued to them. It goes without saying that the Kommandos will keep the closest contact with the camp commander and the counterintelligence officer attached to him.

The task of the Kommandos is the political screening of all inmates of the camp and the segregation and further treatment of

(a) elements intolerable for political, criminal, or other reasons,

(b) those persons who can be used in the reconstruction of the occupied territories.

No aids can be made available for the Kommandos in the performance of their task. The "German [Police] Register of Wanted Persons", the list compiled by the office for the investigation of domiciles and the "Special Register of Wanted Persons, USSR" will be of very little use in most cases; the "Special Register of Wanted Persons, USSR" is not sufficient because only a small proportion of the Soviet Russians classified as dangerous are listed therein.

The Kommandos, therefore, will have to rely on their own specialized knowledge and ability, on their own clues and self-acquired experiences. For this reason they will not be able to start on their task until they have accumulated sufficient material.

For the time being and also later on, the Kommandos in performing their tasks will utilize to the fullest possible extent the experience which the camp commanders have acquired from observation of the prisoners and from interrogation of camp inmates.

Furthermore, the Kommandos must endeavor right at the start to single out those elements among the prisoners which appear to be reliable, regardless of whether or not they are Communists, so as to utilize them for their information service inside the camp and later on, if advisable, also in the occupied territories.

It must be possible through the employment of these confidential agents and by making use of any other means available to single out, as a first step, all those elements among the prisoners which are to be segregated. By short interrogation of the singled-out persons, and possibly by questioning other prisoners, the Kommandos will be in a position to make the final decision in each individual case.

The statement of one confidential agent is as such not sufficient proof to classify a camp inmate as suspicious. Somehow or other, a confirmation should be obtained, if possible.

Above all, it is necessary to find out all important officials of the state and the party, in particular - professional revolutionaries; the officials of the Comintern; all influential party officials of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and its subdivisions in the central committees, the regional and district committees, all People's Commissars and their deputies, and all former political commissars in the Red Army; the leading personalities on the central and intermediate level of the state administration; the leading personalities of the economy; the Soviet Russian intellectuals; all Jews; and all persons found to be agitators or fanatical Communists.

As already mentioned, it is no less important to sort out those persons who may be used for the conquered Russian territories.

Finally, it will be necessary to sort out those persons who will be wanted later for the conclusion of further investigations, no matter whether of a political nature or otherwise, and for the clarification of questions of general interest. This category includes in particular all higher state and party officials who are able to furnish information regarding the measures and working methods of the Soviet Russian state, the Communist Party or the Comintern, owing to their position and their knowledge.

Before any final decision is taken, racial membership should be considered.

The leader of the Einsatzkommando will transmit a weekly brief report to the Reich Security Main Office by teletype or express letter.

* * *

On the strength of these operational reports, the Reich Security Main Office will communicate further measures to be taken at the earliest possible moment.

In order to carry out successively the measures indicated in these instructions, the Kommandos will request the camp authorities to surrender the prisoners in question.

Camp authorities have been instructed by the High Command of the Armed Forces to comply with such requests (see encl. 1).

Executions must not be carried out in or near the camp. If the camps are in the Government General, close to the frontier, prisoners are to be moved to former Soviet territory, if possible, for special treatment.

In the event of executions being necessary for reasons of camp discipline, the leader of the Einsatzkommando has to get in touch with the camp commander for this purpose.

The Kommandos are required to keep records of the completed special treatments.

* * *

Exemplary conduct on and off duty, smoothest possible cooperation with the camp commandants, careful scrutiny is enjoined on the leaders of the Einsatzkommandos and all members.

The members of the Einsatzkommandos have at all times to bear in mind the special importance of the tasks set them.

[David Thompson]

"Partial Translation of Document NO-3417, Prosecution Exhibit 363: Letter of 26 September 1941, from Heydrich's Office, Enclosing Letter of Transmittal, Signed by Defendant Reinecke, and Directives for the Treatment of Soviet Prisoners of War, 8 September 1941: Letter of 26 September 1941", in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. Vol. 11: United States of America v. Wilhelm von Leeb, et al. (Case 12: 'High Command Case'). US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1950. pp. 11-12.

The Chief of the Security Police and the Security Service
Diary No. 539 B/41 secret IV A 1 c
Berlin, 26 September 1941

Subject: Directives for the Kommandos of the Chief of the Security Police and the Security Service to be assigned to permanent PW camps and transit PW camps

Reference: Decree of 17.7.1941, 21.7.1941, and 12.9.1941, Diary No. 21 B-41 Top Secret Operational Orders Nos. 8 and 9

Enclosure: 1 stapled enclosure

As a supplement to my afore-mentioned decrees I herewith enclose for your information the pertinent regulations issued by the High Command of the Armed Forces concerning the treatment of Soviet Russian PW's, dated 8 September 1941, file Nos. 2 f 24 November, General Armed Forces Office PW's, (I) No. 3058/41 secret. The extra copies attached are for the leaders of the Einsatzkommandos.

In case difficulties of any kind should occur during the purging of the camps accommodating Soviet Russian PW's as well as the labor detachments, I would advise you to refer the competent armed forces authorities to the directives laid down in conjunction with the OKW, as well as to the order of the OKW, dated 9/8/1941, which, according to the distribution list, was sent to all the military district commands.

* * *

Signed: Mueller

[David Thompson]

"Partial Translation of Document NO-3417, Prosecution Exhibit 363: Letter of 26 September 1941, from Heydrich's Office, Enclosing Letter of Transmittal, Signed by Defendant Reinecke, and Directives for the Treatment of Soviet Prisoners of War, 8 September 1941: Letter of 8 September 1941", in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. Vol. 11: United States of America v. Wilhelm von Leeb, et al. (Case 12: 'High Command Case'). US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1950. p. 12.

High Command of the Armed Forces
File No. 2 f 24 November, General Armed Forces Office/PW's (I)
No. 8058/41 secret
2 enclosures

Berlin-Schoeneberg
Badenschestr. 51
8 September 1941

* * *

Subject: Regulations for the treatment of Soviet PW's.

Reference: 1. OKW/PW's 26/41 top secret, 16 June 1941 (only to the commanders of PW's in Military District I and Govt. Gen.).

2. OKW/PW's 2114/41 secret, of 6/26/1941.

3. OKW/PW's 2041/41 secret, of 7/17/1941.

4. OKW/PW's 15 No. 5015/41, of 8/2/1941.

Enclosed please find a summary and/or supplement to the directives hitherto issued with various orders concerning the treatment of Soviet PW's. Allowances have been made for the directives already issued for the operational area by the High Command of the Army/Generalquartiermeister with this order, the orders cited in reference, unless especially referred to in the enclosure, are cancelled.

* * *

FOR THE CHIEF OF THE OKW
Signed: Reinecke

[David Thompson]

Partial Translation of Document NO-3417, Prosecution Exhibit 363: Letter of 26 September 1941, from Heydrich's Office, Enclosing Letter of Transmittal, Signed by Defendant Reinecke, and Directives for the Treatment of Soviet Prisoners of War, 8 September 1941: Enclosure to Letter of 8 September 1941", in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. Vol. 11: United States of America v. Wilhelm von Leeb, et al. (Case 12: 'High Command Case'). US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1950. pp. 13-15.

Enclosure to Diary No. 3058/41 secret

* * *

Regulations for the treatment of Soviet PW's in all prisoner of war camps

I. Treatment of Soviet PW's in general - Bolshevism is the mortal enemy of National Socialist Germany. For the first time, the German soldier faces an enemy who has not merely been trained as a soldier but who has also undergone Bolshevist political training calculated to destroy nations. The fight against national socialism has become part of his nature. He carries out this fight with all the means at his disposal - sabotage, seditious propaganda, arson, and murder. For this reason, the Russian soldier loses all claims to treatment as an honorable soldier and according to the Geneva Convention. It is in accordance, therefore, with the authority and dignity of the German Armed Forces, for every German soldier to keep a strict distance as far as Russian PW's are concerned. The attitude to be maintained towards them must be correct, though frigid. Anyone found tobe adopting an indulgent or even a friendly attitude is to be punished severely. The feeling of pride and superiority of the German soldier who has been detailed to guard Soviet PW's must be evident at all times even to the public. Ruthless and energetic action is, therefore, to be ordered at the least sign of insubordination, especially toward Bolshevist instigators. Insubordination, active or passive resistance, must be immediately stamped out by force of arms (bayonets, rifle butts, and firearms). The regulations concerning the use of arms by members of the armed forces are only partly applicable, since these were meant for cases where it was necessary to interfere under generally peaceful conditions. As far as the Soviet PW's are concerned, the strict use of arms is necessary alone for disciplinary reasons. Whoever does not use arms or does not use them energetically enough for the enforcement of an order, is liable to punishment. Escaping PW's are to be fired on immediately, without previous warning. Warning shots are not to be fired at all. The regulations hitherto in force, in particular Army Manual 38/11, page 13, etc., are cancelled to this extent. On the other hand, all arbitrary action is prohibited. Those PW's who are obedient and willing to work will be treated in a correct manner. However at no time should one be off guard when dealing with a PW, or forget to adopt a suspicious attitude towards him. As a rule, the use of arms against Soviet PW's is legal. Any contact between the civilian population and the PW's is to be prevented. This applies in particular to the occupied territory. The segregation of the PW officers and noncommissioned officers from the enlisted men already carried out by the army in the field, is also to be strictly adhered to in the areas of the armed forces commanders and in the Reich. Any communication between these two groups, even by signs, must be made impossible.

Those Soviet PW's suitable for the task are to be formed into a camp police force, both in the camps and in larger work details. They will be appointed by the [camp] commandant to maintain order and discipline. In order to carry out their tasks effectively, the camp police is permitted to carry sticks, whips, or similar weapons within the wire enclosure. German soldiers are expressly forbidden to use any of the afore-mentioned weapons. By the granting of better food, treatment, and billets, it is intended to create an executive organization in the camp which will greatly alleviate the tasks of the German guard personnel.

II. Treatment to be accorded to members of different ethnic groups

* * *

III. Segregation of civilians and PW's from the Eastern Campaign who are politically undesirable

1. Intention - The armed forces must instantly rid itself of all those elements among the PW's who are to be regarded as carriers of bolshevism. The special conditions of the Eastern Campaign therefore require extraordinary measures which must be carried out free from bureaucratic and administrative influences and with pride in the responsibility of the task.

2. The road to the achievement of the ultimate goal

A. In addition to the segregation in the PW camps, according to nationalities, see paragraph II, the PW's (also members of ethnic groups) as well as the civilians in the camps are to be segregated as follows:

a. Politically undesirable persons

b. Politically harmless persons

c. Persons especially reliable politically (who can be used for the reconstruction of the occupied territories)

B. While segregation according to nationalities, officers, etc., will be carried out by the camp authorities themselves, the Reich Leader SS will commission the following units with the task of segregating the PW's in respect to their political ideology Einsatzkommandos of the Security Police an the Security Service.

These units are directly subordinate to the Chief of the Security Police and the Security Service. They are specially trained for their special task and carry out their measures and investigations within the framework of the rules prevailing in the camp, according to the directives they receive from him. It is the duty of the camp commandants, in particular that of their counterintelligence officers, to collaborate closely with the Einsatzkommandos.

3. Further treatment of the groups segregated according to figure 2

A. Military personnel - The Einsatzkommando of the Security Police and Security Service will decide the fate of the "politically undesirable elements" who are segregated.

Should any of the persons suspected turn out later to be unsuspicious, they are to be returned to the rest of PW's in the camp. Requests from the Einsatzkommando for the handing over of further persons will be granted. Officers will often be liable to segregation as "politically undesirable persons". Those soldiers caught in civilian clothes will also be counted as military persons.

* * *

V. Concluding remarks - The commanders of PW's are to be made personally responsible for the strict observance of the aforementioned regulations by their subordinate units. This task must under no circumstances be interrupted or impaired, even by a change of offices. Therefore, all new offices and units must on arrival and commitment be thoroughly instructed as to the context of these regulations.

[David Thompson]

"Partial Translation of Document NOKW-1615, Prosecution Exhibit 257: Teletype from 24th Division to Commander Rear Area Army Group South, 15 October 1941, Initialed by von Roques, Concerning Evacuation of PW's", in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. Vol. 11: United States of America v. Wilhelm von Leeb, et al. (Case 12: 'High Command Case'). US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1950. pp. 30.

Signal Office: CinC Rear Area Army Group South
1st Radio Squad 1st Co., 221st
Out By Signal Bn.
vR [von Roques]

FR. [Handwritten] Ia Pki

Remarks: Certificate of delivery
Receipted for or Received: 16 October 1941 0215 hrs.
Transmitted: Day: 15 October 1941. Time: 2125.

To: CinC Rear Area Army Group South, Ia
Sender: 24th Division.

Message: Devoting every effort to the task, the evacuation of prisoners proceeds according to order. Insubordinations, attempts to escape, and exhaustion of prisoners make the march very difficult. Already there are over 1000 dead as a result of executions by shooting, and exhaustion. In Aleksandriya, no preparations have been made by PW transit camp 182 for the permanent accommodation of 20000. In Novo Ukrainka, allegedly only for 10000.

[David Thompson]

"Partial Translation of Document NOKW-1605, Prosecution Exhibit 272: Excerpt from 'Ten-Day Report,' from Rear Area Army Group South (Commanded by the Defendant von Roques) to the High Command of the Army, 20 December 1941, Concerning PW Deaths in Transit Camps, and Remarks of PW District Commander, 21 December 1941, on the Plan Concerning the Release of Ukrainian Prisoners of War: Letter of 20 December 1941", in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. Vol. 11: United States of America v. Wilhelm von Leeb, et al. (Case 12: 'High Command Case'). US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1950. pp. 31.

Commander Rear Area Army Group South
Section Ia 3172/41 Secret
Headquarters, 20 December 1941
[Stamp] Secret

To High Command of the Army
General Staff of the Army/Generalquartiermeister
Department War Administration

Subject: Ten-day report

Reference: OKH General Staff of the Army/Generalquartiermeister Department War Administration (Quartiermeister 4 B) II 865/41 Top Secret, dated 19 June 1941

* * *

4. Prisoners of war - The mass dying of undernourished prisoners of war in the transit camps increasingly attracts unwelcome attention among the civilian population. The bulk of the prisoners of war is unable to work owing to exhaustion.

Only a speedy release of the Ukrainians and transfer of collective transports to the Reich Commissariats can maintain at least one part of the manpower for the coming spring and prevent a serious change of attitude among the Ukrainian population.

* * *

For information: Army Group South Ib (only enclosure I)

FOR THE COMMANDER REAR AREA ARMY GROUP SOUTH

The Chief of the General Staff
Signed in draft:
v. Krosigk
Certified:
[Illegible signature]
2nd Lieutenant

[David Thompson]

"Partial Translation of Document NOKW-1605, Prosecution Exhibit 272: Excerpt from 'Ten-Day Report,' from Rear Area Army Group South (Commanded by the Defendant von Roques) to the High Command of the Army, 20 December 1941, Concerning PW Deaths in Transit Camps, and Remarks of PW District Commander, 21 December 1941, on the Plan Concerning the Release of Ukrainian Prisoners of War: Letter of 21 December 1941", in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. Vol. 11: United States of America v. Wilhelm von Leeb, et al. (Case 12: 'High Command Case'). US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1950. pp. 32-33.

[Handwritten] War Diary
Commander Rear Area Army Group South
Command Post, 21 December 1941
Department Quartiermeister/PW District Commander N

[Illegible initial] 30 December 1941

Remarks on the plan concerning the release of Ukrainian prisoners of war in Rear Area of Army Group South

1. On 12/20/1941, the total number of prisoners of war in the four prisoner of war camps located in the army group rear area was (Transit PW Camps 160,182, 205, Permanent PW Camp 346) 52513 prisoners of war.

2. Mortality rate of prisoners of war in the camps, to 1 [above].

a. Transit PW Camp 160: from 12959 prisoners of war, an average of 10 deaths per day, 28.0% per year.

b. Transit PW Camp 182: from 7507 prisoners of war, an average of 18 deaths per day, 87.05% per year.

c. Transit PW Camp 205: from 9271 prisoners of war, an average of 21 deaths per day, 82.06% per year.

d. Permanent PW Camp 346: from 22776 prisoners of war, an average of 50 deaths per day, 80.1% per year.

3. Sick from hunger in Permanent PW Camp 346.

I. There are 476 prisoners of war in the hospital among them 250 Ukrainians, 170 Russians, and 56 Asiatics.

II. In the medical ward and in the camp 1500 prisoners of war, among them - 1150 Ukrainians and 350 Russians.

This makes a total of 1976 prisoners of war.

4. Food situation of the camps, to 1 [above]. - With the present number of prisoners of war, the following camps are supplied:

a. Transit PW Camp 160 for 6 weeks.

b. Transit PW Camp 182 for 5-6 days.

c. Transit PW Camp 205 for 8 days.

d. Permanent PW Camp 346 for 25-30 days.

5. Total number of Ukrainian prisoners of war in the camps to 1 [above].

a. Transit PW Camp 160: 7330 prisoners of war.

b. Transit PW Camp 182: 4018 prisoners of war.

c. Transit PW Camp 205: 3320 prisoners of war.

d. Permanent PW Camp 346: 7178 prisoners of war.

Total: 21846 prisoners of war.

[Signed] Gaul,
Colonel and Commandant

[David Thompson]

"Partial Translation of Document Reinhardt 367, Reinhardt Defense Exhibit 92: Extract from Enemy Intelligence Gazette No. 3 of 3rd Panzer Army, 2 March 1942, Concerning Treatment of German Prisoners of War", in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. Vol. 11: United States of America v. Wilhelm von Leeb, et al. (Case 12: 'High Command Case'). US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1950. pp. 33.

Panzer Army 3
Section I c/Counterintelligence Officer
NO. 325/42 Secret
[Handwritten] Army Headquarters, 2 March 1942
Panzer Army Command 3
Ia No. 762/42 secret 2/3
Enclosure to II.12
[Stamp] Secret

Enemy Intelligence Gazette No. 3 (concluded 1 March 1942, 2400 hours)

A. Enemy situation as a whole and its development during the second half of February 1942

* * *

6. Subject: Treatment of prisoners of war

Southwest of Demidov, 24 murdered German soldiers were found, whose legs and hands were chopped off by the Russians on 8 February 1942 and 9 February 1942, and part of whose bodies were burned.

On 23 January 1942, 107 German soldiers were taken prisoner by the Russians while attacking Russian supply columns near Durakovo (approximately 30 kilometers to the northeast of Toropets) . After having been prisoner, they were immediately upon capture "summarily shot" in a forest.

[David Thompson]

"Partial Translation of Document NOKW-3531, Prosecution Rebuttal Exhibit 33: Extract from Order by Commanding General of Rear Area Army Group North, 22 June 1942, Concerning Subordination of Commanders of Prisoners of War, and 'Service Regulations for the Commanders of PW's in the Operational Area': Extract from Order of 22 June 1942", in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. Vol. 11: United States of America v. Wilhelm von Leeb, et al. (Case 12: 'High Command Case'). US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1950. pp. 34-35.

[This document was introduced as part of the prosecution's rebuttal evidence to the claim made by several defendants that the prisoner of war organization was not under their jurisdiction.]

Commanding General of the Security Troops and Commander in Rear Area Army Group North
Section Ia/Qu. Diary No. 1441/42 secret
Headquarters, 22 June 1942

Subject: Prisoners of war units

* * *

1. High Command of the Army/Gen. Staff of the Army/Org. Sect./Generalquartiermeister Dept. War Administration (Quartiermeister, 5 PW's) No. II/3910/42 secret, dated 9 June 1942.

2. Army Group Command North/Oberquartiermeister/Quartiermeister 2 No. 4067/42 secret, dated 16 June 1942.

* * *

1. According to reference 1 above, a commander of prisoners of war will be subordinated to each army group command. His duties are laid down in the attached service regulation.

2. The units prisoner of war - district commandant, transit PW camp and army prisoner collecting point are Army [GHQ] troops (Guard Units [Ordnungsdienste]).

3. They will be subordinated to the army groups or armies (Panzer armies) by the High Command of the Army/General Staff of the Army/Generalquartiermeister. Their subordination is a "subordination in every respect" i.e., in respect to military duties, personnel, disciplinary, and judicial matters. They will receive departmental directives from the commander of prisoners of war of their superior command authority.

4. The army groups may subordinate the units under their command to the commander of the army group rear area, armies and Panzer armies. The provisions of paragraph 3 for the subordination will apply, with the stipulation, however, that the subordination my also be a "tactical subordination" if it is for a temporary duration only. In this case with respect to military duties, personnel, disciplinary, and judicial matters the units remain subordinated to the army groups.

5. If the prisoner of war units are subordinated to armies (Panzer armies) etc., by the army group, they are still bound to the directives in respect to departmental matters to the commander of prisoners of war with the army group command.

* * *

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL
Chief of General Staff
[Illegible signature]
Colonel, GSC

[David Thompson]

"Extract from Order by Commanding General of Rear Area Army Group North, 22 June 1942, Concerning Subordination of Commanders of Prisoners of War, and 'Service Regulations for the Commanders of PW's in the Operational Area': 'Service Regulations'", in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. Vol. 11: United States of America v. Wilhelm von Leeb, et al. (Case 12: 'High Command Case'). US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1950. pp. 35-36.

Copy

Service Regulations for the "Commander of Prisoners of War in the Operational Area"

1. The commander of prisoners of war is subordinated to the command of the army group.

2. The commander of prisoners of war is adviser to the command of the army group (Ib) in all questions concerning prisoner of war matters. He suggests the assignment and subordination of the prisoner of war district commanders, of the transit PW camps, the forward permanent PW camps and the army prisoner collecting points. When assigning prisoner of war units subordinated to armies (Panzer armies) and/or commander of army group rear area, he is to be consulted.

3. The commander of prisoners of war is superior officer for the troops of the prisoner of war agencies and units immediately subordinated to the army group. He has the disciplinary authority of a division commander.

4. The commander of the prisoners of war supervises on behalf of the CinC of the army group, the activity and the condition of prisoner of war agencies and units with regard to personnel material. He is authorized to issue to them directly departmental directives on behalf of the CinC, also if they are subordinated to the armies (Panzer armies) and/or commander of army group rear area. Prior to issuing directives, the competent command authorities are, if possible, to be consulted or to be informed immediately afterwards.

5. The care of the prisoners of war (shelter, food, clothing, medical care, etc.) their guarding, and their labor allocation is in principle the responsibility of the command authorities to which the prisoner of war agencies and units are tactically subordinated. Deficiencies which the commander finds on his inspection must be reported by him immediately to the command authorities with the request for remedy, if necessary he will report to the CinC of the army group.

6. When preparations for strategic operations are being made, the army group has to inform the commander of prisoners of war in advance. He will in agreement with the armies (Panzer armies) and commander of army group rear area, as well as the commanders of prisoners of war in the areas of the armed forces commanders, submit in advance proposals for the care and removal of the prisoners of war, and establish such measures as are necessary for the smooth execution of the directives laid down by the High Command of the Army with respect to treatment, care, and removal of the PW's in general and in individual cases.

7. The commander of prisoners of war will always keep in personal contact with all military and economic agencies which are concerned with PW matters (labor offices, economic inspectorates, etc.). He will supervise the labor allocation of the prisoners of war and will see to it that the instructions of the High Command of the Army concerning the treatment of PW's are observed by those to whom they are allocated for labor.

8. In matters pertaining to personnel of the prisoner of war agencies and units, the commander of prisoners of war is to be consulted. He may be called upon by the competent command authorities to draft qualification evaluations about prisoner of war district commanders, commanders of transit PW camps, forward permanent PW camps, and army prisoner collecting point as well as their deputies.

* * *

[Illegible signature]
Captain

[David Thompson]

Document 2542-PS, Affidavit of Kurt Lindow, in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, vol. V, US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1946, pp. 286-288.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2542—PS

Statement of SS-Sturmbannfuehrer Kurt LINDOW
I, Kurt Lindow, having been duly sworn, make the following statement under oath :

1. I was Kriminaldirektor in Section IV of the RSHA (Chief Reich Security Office) and head of the subsection [Referat] IV A 1, from the middle of 1942 until the middle of 1944. I have the rank of SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.

2. From 1941 until the middle of 1943 there was attached to subsection IV A 1 a special department that was headed by the

286

2542—PS

Regierungsoberinspektor, later Regierungsamtmann, and SSHauptsturmbannfuehrer Franz Koenigshaus. In this department were handled matters concerning prisoners of war. I learned from this department that instructions and orders by Reichsfuehrer Himmler, dating from 1941 and 1942, existed, according to which captured Soviet Russian political commissars and Jewish soldiers were to be executed. As far as I know proposals for execution of such PWs were received from the various PW camps. Koenigshaus had to prepare the orders for execution and submitted them to the chief of section IV, Mueller, for signature. These orders were made out so that one order was to be sent to the agency making the request and a second one to the concentration camp designated to carry out the execution. The PWs in question were at first formally released from PW status, then transferred to a concentration camp for execution.

3. The department chief [Sachbearbeiter] Koenigshaus was under me in disciplinary questions from the middle of 1942 until about the beginning of 1943 and worked, in matters of his department, directly with the chief of group IV A, Regierungsrat Panzinger. Early 1943 the department was dissolved and absorbed into the departments [Laenderreferate] in subsection IV B. The work concerning Russian PWs must then, have been done by IV b 2a. Head of department IV b 2a was Regierungsrat and Sturmbannfuehrer Hans-Helmut Wolf.

4. There existed in the PW camps on the Eastern front small screening teams [Einsatzkommandos] headed by lower-ranking members of the secret police [Gestapo]. These teams were assigned to the camp commanders and had the job to segregate the PWs who were candidates for execution, according to the orders that had been given, and to report them to the office of the secret police [Geheimes Staatspolizeiamt].

5. I also know that in cases of sexual relationships between Poles and German women and girls the Poles, according to an order from Reichsfuehrer Himmler, were to be hanged. The execution of the Poles and the punishment by a court of German women depended upon the opinion of the "racial expert" [Rassereferant] at the HSSPF [Chief SS and Police leader] concerned. If the Poles had serious intentions of marriage, the racial expert would examine if the Pole was, on basis of his entire appearance, racially unobjectionable and therefore capable of being Germanized. If the opinion of the "racial expert" was positive nothing happened, that is to say the Pole was permitted to marry the German girl and was Germanized. But if the judg-

287

2542-PS

ment was negative then the Pole would be hanged and the German girl turned over to the courts for trial. Each individual case had to be reported, by the addition of photos, to the Reichsfuehrer Himmler, who had apparently reserved the decision for himself and who alone gave the order for the hanging. These cases must have been handled by department IV B 2b; head of department IV B 2b was Regierungsrat and Sturmbannfuehrer Tomsen.

That the facts stated above are true; that this declaration is made by me voluntarily and without compulsion ; that after reading over the statement I have signed and executed the same at Oberursel/Germany this 30th day of September 1945.

[signed] KURT LINDOW
Kurt LINDOW
SS-Sturmbannfuehrer

Subscribed and sworn to before me at Oberursel/Germany this 30th day of September 1945.
[signed] B. D. SILLIMAN, MAJOR JAGD
B. D. SILLIMAN, Major JAGD