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The Common Plan or Conspiracy and Aggressive War
The Tribunal now turns to the consideration of the Crimes against Peace charged in the Indictment. Count One of the Indictment charges the defendants with conspiring or having a common plan to commit crimes against peace. Count Two of the Indictment charges the defendants with committing specific crimes against peace by planning, preparing, initiating, and waging wars of aggression against a number of other states. It will be convenient to consider the question of the existence of a common plan and the question of aggressive war together, and to deal later in this Judgment with the question of the individual responsibility of the defendants.
The charges in the Indictment that the defendants planned and waged aggressive wars are charges of the utmost gravity. War is essentially an evil thing. Its consequences are not confined to the belligerent states alone, but affect the whole world.
To initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole. The first acts of aggression referred to in the Indictment are the seizure of Austria and Czechoslovakia; and the first war of aggression charged in the Indictment is the war against Poland begun on 1 September 1939. Before examining that charge it is necessary to look more closely at some of the events which preceded these acts of aggression. The war against Poland did not come suddenly out of an otherwise clear sky; the evidence has made it plain that this war of aggression, as well as the seizure of Austria and Czechoslovakia, was premeditated and carefully prepared, and was not undertaken until the moment was thought opportune for it to be carried through as a definite part of the preordained scheme and plan.
For the aggressive designs of the Nazi Government were not accidents arising out of the immediate political situation in Europe and the world; they were a deliberate and essential part of Nazi foreign policy.
From the beginning, the National Socialist movement claimed that its object was to unite the German people in the consciousness of their mission and destiny, based on inherent qualities of race, and. under the guidance of the Fuehrer.
For its achievement, two things were deemed to be essential; the disruption of the European order as it had existed since the Treaty of Versailles, and the creation of a Greater Germany beyond the
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frontiers of 1914. This necessarily involved the seizure of foreign territories. War was seen to be inevitable, or at the very least, highly probable, if these purposes were to be accomplished. The German people, therefore, with all their resources, were to be organized as a great political-military army, schooled to obey without question any policy decreed by the State.
Preparation for Aggression
In Mein Kampf Hitler had made this view quite plain. It must be remembered that Mein Kampf was no, mere private diary in which the secret thoughts of Hitler were set down. Its contents were rather proclaimed from the housetops. It was used in the schools and universities and among the Hitler Youth, in the SS and the SA, and among the German people generally, even down to the presentation of an official copy to all newly-married people. By the year 1945 over 6 1/2 million copies had been circulated. The general contents are well-known. Over and over again Hitler asserted his belief in the necessity of force as the means of solving international problems, as in the following quotation:
"The soil on which we now live was not a gift bestowed by Heaven on our forefathers. They had to conquer it by risking their lives. So also in the future our people will not obtain territory, and therewith the means of existence, as a favor from any other people, but will have to win it by the power of a triumphant sword."
Mein Kampf contains many such passages, and the extolling of force as an instrument of foreign policy is openly proclaimed.
The precise objectives of this policy of force are also set forth in detail. The very first page of the book asserts that "German-Austria must be restored to the great German Motherland," not on economic grounds, but because "people of the same blood should be in the same Reich."
The restoration of the German frontiers of 1914 is declared to, be wholly insufficient, and if Germany is to exist at all, it must be as a world power with the necessary territorial magnitude.
Mein Kampf is quite explicit in stating where the increased territory is to be found:
"Therefore we National Socialists have purposely drawn a line through the line of conduct followed by prewar Germany in foreign policy.... We put an end to the perpetual Germanic march towards the South and West of Europe, and- turn our eyes towards the lands of the East. We finally put a stop to
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the colonial and trade policy of the prewar times, and pass over to the territorial policy of the future.
"But when we speak of new territory in Europe today, we must think principally of Russia and the border states subject to her."
Mein Kampf is not to be regarded as a mere literary exercise, nor as an inflexible policy or plan incapable of modification.
Its importance lies in the, unmistakable attitude of aggression revealed throughout its pages.
The Planning of Aggression
Evidence from captured documents has revealed that Hitler held four secret meetings to which the Tribunal proposes to make special reference because of the light they shed upon the question of the common plan and aggressive war. These meetings took place on 5 November 1937, 23 May 1939, 22 August 1939, and 23 November 1939.
At these meetings important declarations were made by Hitler as to his purposes, which are quite unmistakable in their terms.
The documents which record what took place at these meetings have been subject to some criticism at the hands of defending counsel.
Their essential authenticity is not denied, but it is said, for example, that they do not purport to be verbatim transcripts of the speeches they record, that the document dealing with the meeting on 5 November 1937 was dated 5 days after the meeting had taken place, and that the two documents dealing with the meeting of 22 August 1939 differ from one another and are unsigned. Making the fullest allowance for criticism of this kind, the Tribunal is of the opinion that the documents are documents of the highest value, and that their authenticity and substantial truth are established.
They are obviously careful records of the events they describe, and they have been preserved as such in the archives of the German Government, from whose custody they were captured. Such documents could never be dismissed as inventions, nor even as inaccurate or distorted; they plainly record events which actually took place.
Conferences of 23 November 1939 and 5 November 1937
It will perhaps be useful to deal first of all with the meeting of 23 November 1939, when Hitler called his supreme commanders together. A record was made of what was said, by one of those present. At the date of the meeting, Austria and Czechoslovakia
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had been incorporated into the German Reich, Poland had been conquered by the German armies, and the war with Great Britain and France was still in its static phase. The moment was opportune for a review of past events. Hitler informed the commanders that the purpose of the conference was to give them an idea of the world of his thoughts, and to tell them his decision. He thereupon reviewed his political task since 1919, and referred to the secession of Germany from the League of Nations, the denunciation of the Disarmament Conference, the order for rearmament, the introduction of compulsory armed service, the occupation of the Rhineland, the seizure of Austria, and the action against Czechoslovakia. He stated:
"One year later, Austria came; this step also was considered doubtful. It brought about a considerable reinforcement of the Reich. The next step was Bohemia, Moravia, and Poland. This step also was not possible to accomplish in one campaign. First of all, the western fortification had to be finished. It was not possible to reach the goal in one effort. It was clear to me from the first moment that I could not be satisfied with the Sudeten German territory. That was only a partial solution. The decision to march into Bohemia was made. Then followed the erection of the Protectorate and with that the basis for the action against Poland was laid, but I was not quite clear at that time whether I should start first against the East and then in the West or vice versa.... Basically I did not organize the Armed Forces in order not to strike. The decision to strike was always in me. Earlier or later I wanted to solve the problem. Under pressure it was decided that the East was to be attacked first."
This address, reviewing past events and reaffirming the aggressive intentions present from the beginning, puts beyond any question of doubt the character of the actions against Austria and Czechoslovakia, and the war against Poland. For they had, all been accomplished according to plan; and the nature of that plan must now be examined in a little more detail.
At the meeting of 23 November 1939 Hitler was looking back to things accomplished; at the earlier meetings now to be considered, he was looking forward, and revealing his plans to his confederates. The comparison is instructive.
The meeting held at the Reich Chancellery in Berlin on 5 November 1937 was attended by Lt. Col. Hossbach, Hitler's personal adjutant, who compiled a long note of the proceedings, which he dated 10 November 1937 and signed.
The persons present were Hitler, and the Defendants Goering, Von Neurath and Raeder, in their capacities as Commander-in-Chief
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of the Luftwaffe, Reich Foreign Minister, and Commander-in-Chief of the Navy respectively, General Von Blomberg, Minister of War, and General Von Fritsch, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army.
Hitler began by saying that the subject of the conference was of such high importance that in other states it would have taken place before the Cabinet. He went on to say that the subject matter of his speech was the result of his detailed deliberations, and of his experiences during his four and a half years of government. He requested that the statements he was about to make should be looked upon in the case of his death as his last will and testament. Hitler's main theme was the problem of living space, and he discussed various possible solutions, only to set them aside. He then said that the seizure of living space on the continent of Europe was therefore necessary, expressing himself in these words:
"It is not a case of conquering people but of conquering agriculturally useful space. It would also be more to the purpose to seek raw-material-producing territory in Europe directly adjoining the Reich and not overseas, and this solution would have to be brought into effect for one or two generations.... The history of all times--Roman Empire, British Empire--has proved that every space expansion can only be effected by breaking resistance and taking risks. Even setbacks are unavoidable: neither formerly nor today has space been found without an owner; the attacker always comes up against the proprietor."
He concluded with this observation:
"The question for Germany is where the greatest possible conquest could be made at the lowest cost."
Nothing could indicate more plainly the aggressive intentions of Hitler, and the events which soon followed showed the reality of his purpose. It is impossible to accept the contention that Hitler did not actually mean war; for after pointing out that Germany might expect the opposition of England and France, and analyzing the strength and the weakness of those powers in particular situations, he continued:
"The German question can be solved only by way of force, and this is never without risk... If we place the decision to apply force with risk at the head of the following expositions, then we are left to reply to the questions 'when' and 'how.' In this regard we have to decide upon three different cases."
The first of these three cases set forth a hypothetical international situation, in which he would take action not later than 1943 to 1945, saying:
"If the Fuehrer is still living then it will be his irrevocable decision to solve the German space problem not later than
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1943 to 1945. The necessity for action before 1943 to 1945 will come under consideration in Cases 2 and 3.
The second and third cases to which Hitler referred show the plain intention to seize Austria and Czechoslovakia, and in this connection Hitler said:
"For the improvement of our military-political position, it must be our first aim in every case of entanglement by war to conquer Czechoslovakia and Austria simultaneously in order to remove any threat from the flanks in case of a possible advance westwards."
He further added:
"The annexation of the two states to Germany militarily and politically, would constitute a considerable relief, owing to shorter and better frontiers, the freeing of fighting personnel for other purposes, and the possibility of reconstituting new armies up to a strength of about twelve divisions."
This decision to seize Austria and Czechoslovakia was discussed in some detail; the action was to be taken as soon as a favorable opportunity presented itself. The military strength which Germany had been building up since 1933 was now to be directed at the two specific countries, Austria and Czechoslovakia. The Defendant Goering testified that he did not believe at that time that Hitler actually meant to attack Austria and Czechoslovakia, and that the purpose of the conference was only to put pressure on Von Fritsch to speed up the rearmament of the Army.
The Defendant Raeder testified that neither he, nor Von Fritsch, nor Von Blomberg, believed that Hitler actually meant war, a conviction which the Defendant Raeder claims that he held up to 22 August 1939. The basis of this conviction was his hope that Hitler would obtain a "Political solution" of Germany's problems. But all that this means, when examined, is the belief that Germany's position would be so good, and Germany's armed might so overwhelming, that the territory desired could be obtained without fighting for it. It must be remembered too that Hitler's declared intention with regard to Austria was actually carried out within a little over four months from the date of the meeting, and within less than a year the first portion of Czechoslovakia was absorbed, and Bohemia and Moravia a few months later. If any doubts had existed in the minds of any of his hearers in November 1937, after March of 1939 there could no longer be any question that Hitler was in deadly earnest in his decision to resort to war. The Tribunal is satisfied that Lt. Col. Hossbach's account of the meeting is substantially correct, and that those present knew that Austria and
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Czechoslovakia would be annexed by Germany at the first possible opportunity.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn for 10 minutes.
[A recess was taken.]
THE PRESIDENT: I will now ask M. Donnedieu de Vabres to continue the reading of the Judgment.
M.LE PROFESSEUR DONNEDIEU DE VABRES (Member of the Tribunal for the French Republic):
The Seizure of Austria
The invasion of Austria was a premeditated aggressive step in furthering the plan to wage aggressive wars against other countries. As a result Germany's flank was protected, that of Czechoslovakia being greatly weakened. The first step had been taken in the seizure of "Lebensraum"; many new divisions of trained fighting men had been acquired; and with the seizure of foreign exchange reserves, the rearmament program had been greatly strengthened. On 21 May 1935 Hitler announced in the Reichstag that Germany did not intend either to, attack Austria or to interfere in her internal affairs. On 1 May 1936 he publicly coupled Czechoslovakia with Austria in his avowal of peaceful intentions; and so late as 11 July 1936 he recognized by treaty the full sovereignty of Austria.
Austria was in fact seized by Germany in the month of March 1938. For a number of years before that date, the National Socialists in Germany had been co-operating with the National Socialists of Austria with the ultimate object of incorporating Austria into the German Reich. The Putsch of 25 July 1934, which resulted in the assassination of Chancellor had the seizure of Austria as its object; but the Putsch failed, with the consequence that the National Socialist Party was outlawed in Austria. On 11 July 1936 an agreement was entered into between the two countries, Article 1 of which stated:
"The German Government recognizes the full sovereignty of the Federated State of Austria in the spirit of the pronouncements of the German Fuehrer and Chancellor of the 21st May 1935."
Article 2 declared:
"Each of the two Governments regards the inner political order (including the question of Austrian National Socialism) obtaining in the other country as an internal affair of the
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other country, upon which it will exercise neither direct nor indirect influence."
The National Socialist movement in Austria however continued its illegal activities under cover of secrecy; and the National Socialists of Germany gave the party active support. The resulting "incidents" were seized upon by the German National Socialists as an excuse for interfering in Austrian affairs. After the conference of 5 November 1937, these "incidents" rapidly multiplied. The relationship between the two countries steadily worsened, and finally the Austrian Chancellor Schuschnigg was persuaded by the Defendant Von Papen and others to seek a conference with Hitler, which took place at Berchtesgaden on 12 February 1938. The Defendant Keitel was present at the conference, and Dr. Schuschnigg was threatened by Hitler with an immediate invasion of Austria. Schuschnigg finally agreed to grant a political amnesty to various Nazis convicted of crime, and to appoint the Nazi Seyss-Inquart as Minister of the Interior and Security with control of the Police. On 9 March 1938, in an attempt to preserve the independence of his country, Dr. Schuschnigg decided to hold a plebiscite on the question of Austrian independence, which was fixed for 13 March 1938. Hitler, 2 days later, sent an ultimatum to Schuschnigg that the plebiscite must be withdrawn. In the afternoon and evening of 11 March 1938 the Defendant Goering made a series of demands upon the Austrian Government, each backed up by threat of invasion. After Schuschnigg had agreed to the cancellation of the plebiscite, another demand was put forward that Schuschnigg. must resign, and that the Defendant Seyss-Inquart should be appointed Chancellor. In consequence, Schuschnigg resigned, and President Miklas, after at first refusing to appoint Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor, gave way and appointed him.
Meanwhile Hitler had given the final order for the German troops to cross the border at dawn on 12 Mardi and instructed Seyss-Inquart to use formations of Austrian National Socialists to depose Miklas and to seize control of the Austrian Government. After the order to march had been given to the German troops, Goering telephoned the German Embassy in Vienna and, dictated a telegram which he wished Seyss-Inquart to send to. Hitler to justify the military action which had already been ordered.
It was:
"The provisional Austrian Government, which, after the dismissal of the Schuschnigg Government, considers its task to establish peace and order in Austria, sends to the German Government the urgent request to support it in its task and to help it to prevent bloodshed. For this purpose it asks the
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German Government to send German troops as soon as possible."
Keppler, an official of the German Embassy, replied:
"Well, SA and SS are marching through the streets, but everything is quiet."
After some further discussion, Goering stated:
"Please show him (Seyss-Inquart) the text of the telegram, and tell him that we are asking him--well, he does not even have to send the telegram. All he needs to do is to say 'Agreed'."
Seyss-Inquart never sent the telegram; he never even telegraphed "Agreed." It appears that as soon as he was appointed Chancellor, some time after 10 p.m., he called Keppler and told him to call up Hitler and transmit his protests against the occupation. This action outraged the Defendant Goering, because "it would disturb the rest of the Fuehrer, who wanted to go to Austria the next day." At 11:15 p.m. an official in the Ministry of Propaganda in Berlin telephoned the German Embassy in Vienna and was told by Keppler:
"Tell the General Field Marshal that Seyss-Inquart agrees."
At daybreak on 12 March 1938 German troops marched into Austria and met with no resistance. It was announced in the German press that Seyss-Inquart had been appointed the successor to Schuschnigg, and the telegram which Goering had suggested, but which was never sent, was quoted to show that Seyss-Inquart had requested the presence of German troops to prevent disorder. On 13 March 1938 a law was passed for the reunion of Austria in the German Reich. Seyss-Inquart demanded that President Miklas should sign this law, but he refused to do so, and resigned his office. He was succeeded by Seyss-Inquart, who signed the law in the name of Austria. This law was then adopted as a law, of the Reich by a Reich Cabinet decree issued the same day, and signed by Hitler and Defendants Goering, Frick, Von Ribbentrop, and Hess.
It was contended before the Tribunal that the annexation of Austria was justified by the strong desire expressed in many quarters for the union of Austria and Germany; that there were many matters in common between the two peoples that made this union desirable; and that in the result the object was achieved without bloodshed.
These matters, even if true, are really immaterial, for the facts plainly prove that the methods employed to achieve the object were those of an aggressor. The ultimate factor was the armed might of Germany ready to be used if any resistance was encountered. Moreover, none of these considerations appear from the Hossbach
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account of the meetings of 5 November 1937 to have been the motives which actuated Hitler; on the contrary, all the emphasis is there laid on the advantage to be gained by Germany in her military strength by the annexation of Austria.
The Seizure of Czechoslovakia
The conference of 5 November 1937 made it quite plain that the seizure of Czechoslovakia by Germany had been definitely decided upon. The only question remaining was the selection of the suitable moment to do it. On 4 March 1938 the Defendant Ribbentrop wrote to the Defendant Keitel with regard to a suggestion made to Ribbentrop by the Hungarian Minister in Berlin, that possible war aims against Czechoslovakia should be discussed between the German and Hungarian armies. In the course of this letter Ribbentrop said:
"I have many doubts about such negotiations. In case we should discuss with Hungary possible war aims against Czechoslovakia, the danger exists that other parties as well would be informed about this."
On the 11th March 1938 Goering made two separate statements to M. Mastny, the Czechoslovak Minister in Berlin, assuring him that the developments then taking place in Austria would in no way have any detrimental influence on the relations between the German Reich and Czechoslovakia, and emphasized the continued earnest endeavor on the part of the Germans to improve those mutual relations. On the 12th March, Goering asked M. Mastny to call on him, and repeated these assurances.
This design to keep Czechoslovakia quiet whilst Austria was absorbed was a typical maneuver on the part of the Defendant Goering, which he was to repeat later in the case of Poland, when he made the most strenuous efforts to isolate Poland in the impending struggle. On the same day, 12 March, the Defendant Von Neurath spoke with M. Mastny, and assured him on behalf of Hitler that Germany still considered herself bound by the German Czechoslovak Arbitration Convention concluded at Locarno, in October 1925.
The evidence shows that after the occupation of Austria by the German Army on 12 March, and the annexation of Austria on 13 March, Konrad Henlein, who was the leader of the Sudeten German Party in Czechoslovakia, saw Hitler in Berlin on 28 March. On the following day, at a conference in Berlin, when Ribbentrop was present with Henlein, the general situation was discussed, and later the Defendant Jodl recorded in his diary:
"After the annexation of Austria the Fuehrer mentions that there is no hurry to solve the Czech question, because
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Austria has to be digested first. Nevertheless, preparations for Case Gruen (that is, the plan against Czechoslovakia) will have to be carried out energetically; they will have to be newly prepared on the basis of the changed strategic position because of the annexation of Austria."
On 21 April 1938 a discussion took place between Hitler and the Defendant Keitel with regard to "Case Gruen," showing quite clearly that the preparations for the attack on Czechoslovakia were being fully considered. On 28 May 1938 Hitler ordered that preparations should be made for military action against Czechoslovakia by 2 October, and from then onwards the plan to invade Czechoslovakia was constantly under review. On 30 May 1938 a directive signed by Hitler declared his "unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future."
In June 1938, as appears from a captured document taken from the files of the SD in Berlin, an elaborate plan for the employment of the SD in Czechoslovakia had been proposed. This plan provided that "the SD follow, if possible, immediately after the leading troops, and take upon themselves the duties similar to their tasks in Germany ...."
Gestapo officials were assigned to co-operate with the SD in certain operations. Special agents were to be trained beforehand to prevent sabotage, and these agents were to be notified "before the attack in due time ... in order to give them the possibility to hide themselves, avoid arrest and deportation ...." "At the beginning, guerilla or partisan warfare is to be expected, therefore weapons are necessary ...."
Files of information were to be compiled with notations as follows: "To arrest"... "To liquidate"... "To confiscate"... "To deprive of passport" et cetera.
The plan provided for the temporary division of the country into larger and smaller territorial units, and considered various "suggestions," as they were termed, for the incorporation into the German Reich of the inhabitants and districts of Czechoslovakia. The final "suggestion" included the whole country, together with Slovakia and Carpathian Russia, with a population of nearly 15 millions.
The plan was modified in some respects in September after the Munich Conference, but the fact that the plan existed in such exact detail and was couched in such warlike language indicated, a calculated design to resort to force.
On 31 August 1938 Hitler approved a memorandum by Jodl dated 24 August 1938, concerning the timing of the order for the
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invasion of Czechoslovakia and the question of defense measures. This memorandum contained the following:
"Operation Gruen will be set in motion by means of an 'incident' in Czechoslovakia, which will give Germany provocation for military intervention. The fixing of the exact time for this incident is of the utmost importance."
These facts demonstrate that the occupation of Czechoslovakia had been planned in detail long before the Munich Conference.
In the month of September 1938 the conferences and talks with military leaders continued. In view of the extraordinarily critical situation which had arisen, the British Prime Minister, Mr. Chamberlain, flew to Munich and then went to Berchtesgaden to see Hitler. On 22 September Mr. Chamberlain met Hitler for further discussions at Bad Godesberg. On 26 September 1938 Hitler said in a speech in Berlin, with reference to his conversation:
"I assured him, moreover, and I repeat it here, that when this problem is solved there will be no more territorial problems for Germany in Europe; and I further assured him that from the moment when Czechoslovakia solves its other problems, that is to say, when the Czechs have come to an arrangement with their other minorities, peacefully and without oppression, I will be no longer interested in the Czech State, and that as far as I am concerned I will guarantee it. We do not want any Czechs."
On the 29th September 1938, after a conference between Hitler and Mussolini and the British and French Prime Ministers in Munich, the Munich Pact was signed, by which Czechoslovakia was required to acquiesce in the cession of the Sudetenland to Germany. The "piece of paper" which the British Prime Minister brought back to London, signed by himself and Hitler, expressed the hope that for the future Britain and Germany might live without war. That Hitler never intended to adhere to the Munich Agreement is shown by the fact that a little later he asked the Defendant Keitel for information with regard to the military force which in his opinion would be required to break all Czech resistance in Bohemia and Moravia. Keitel gave his reply on 11 October 1938. On 21 October 1938 a directive was issued by Hitler, and countersigned by the Defendant Keitel, to the Armed Forces on their future tasks, which stated:
"Liquidation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia. It must be possible to smash at any time the remainder of Czechoslovakia if her policy should become hostile towards Germany."
It is not necessary to review the evidence of the months which immediately followed. On 14 March 1939 the Czech President Hacha
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and his Foreign Minister Chvalkovsky came to Berlin at the suggestion of Hitler, and attended a meeting at which the Defendants Ribbentrop, Goering, and Keitel were present with others. The proposal was made to Hacha that if he would sign an agreement consenting to the incorporation of the Czech people in the German Reich at once, Bohemia and Moravia would be saved from destruction. He was informed that German troops had already received orders to march and that any resistance would be broken with physical force. The Defendant Goering added the threat that he would destroy Prague completely from the air. Faced by this dreadful alternative, Hacha and his Foreign Minister put their signatures to the necessary agreement at 4:30 in the morning, and Hitler and Ribbentrop signed on behalf of Germany.
On 15 March German troops occupied Bohemia and Moravia, and on 16 March the German decree was issued incorporating Bohemia and Moravia in the Reich as a protectorate, and this decree was signed by the Defendants Ribbentrop and Frick.
The Aggression against Poland
By March 1939 the plan to annex Austria and Czechoslovakia, which had been discussed by Hitler at the meeting of 5 November 1937, had been accomplished. The time had now come for the German leaders to consider further acts of aggression, made more possible of attainment because of that accomplishment. On 23 May 1939 a meeting was held in Hitler's study in the new Reich Chancellery in Berlin. Hitler announced his decision to attack Poland and gave his reasons, and discussed the effect the decision might have on other countries. In point of time, this was the second of the important meetings to which reference has already been made, and in order to appreciate the full significance of what was said and done, it is necessary to state shortly some of the main events in the history of German-Polish relations.
As long ago as the year 1925 an Arbitration Treaty between Germany and Poland had been made at Locarno, providing for the settlement of all disputes between the two countries. On 26 January 1934, a German-Polish declaration of non-aggression was made, signed on behalf of the German Government by the Defendant Von Neurath. On 30 January 1934, and again on 30 January 1937, Hitler made speeches in the Reichstag in which he expressed his view that Poland and Germany could work together in harmony and peace. On 20 February 1938 Hitler made a third speech in the Reichstag in the course of which he said with regard to Poland:
"And so the way to a friendly understanding has been successfully paved, an understanding which, beginning with
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Danzig, has today, in spite of the attempts of certain mischief-makers, succeeded in finally taking the poison out of the relations between Germany and Poland and transforming them into a sincere, friendly co-operation. Relying on her friendships, Germany will not leave a stone unturned to save that ideal which provides the foundation for the task which is ahead of us -- peace."
On 26 September 1938, in the middle of the crisis over the Sudetenland, Hitler made the speech in Berlin which has already been quoted, and announced that he had, informed the British Prime Minister that when the Czechoslovakian problem was solved there would be no more territorial problems for Germany in Europe. Nevertheless, on 24 November of the same year, an OKW directive was issued to the German Armed Forces to make preparations for an attack upon Danzig; it stated:
"The Fuehrer has ordered:
(1) ... preparations are also to be made to. enable the Free State of Danzig to be occupied by German troops by surprise."
In spite of having ordered military preparations for the occupation of Danzig, Hitler, on 30 January 1939, said in a speech in the Reichstag:
"During the troubled months of the past year, the friendship between Germany and Poland has been one of the most reassuring factors in the political life of Europe."
Five days previously, on 25 January 1939, Ribbentrop said in the course of a speech in Warsaw:
"Thus Poland and Germany can look forward to, the future with full confidence in the solid basis of their mutual relations."
Following on the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia by Germany on 15 March 1939, which was a flagrant breach of the Munich Agreement, Great Britain gave an assurance to Poland on 31 March 1939 that in the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence, and which the Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their national forces, Great Britain would feel itself bound at once to lend Poland all the support in its power. The French Government took the same stand. It is interesting to note in this connection that one of the arguments frequently presented by the Defense in the present case is that the defendants were influenced to think that their conduct was not in breach of international law by the acquiescence of other powers. The declarations of Great Britain and France showed, at least, that this view could be held no longer.
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On 3 April 1939 a revised OKW directive was issued to the Armed Forces, which after referring to the question of Danzig made reference to Fall Weiss (the military code name for the German invasion of Poland) and stated:
"The Fuehrer has added the following directions to Fall Weiss:
(1) Preparations must be made in such a way that the operation can be carried out at any time from 1 September 1939 onwards.
(2) The High Command of the Armed Forces has been directed to draw up a precise timetable for Fall Weiss and to arrange, by conferences the synchronized timings between the three branches of the Armed Forces."
On 11 April 1939, a further directive was signed by Hitler and issued to the Armed Forces, and in one of the annexes to that document the words occur:
"Quarrels" -- with Poland -- "should be avoided. Should Poland... however adopt a threatening attitude towards Germany, 'a final settlement' will be necessary, notwithstanding the pact with Poland. The aim is then to destroy Polish military strength, and to create in the East a situation which satisfies the requirements of defense. The Free State of Danzig will be incorporated into Germany at the outbreak of the conflict at the latest. Policy aims ... at limiting the war to Poland, and this is considered possible in view of the internal crisis in France, and British restraint as a result of this...."
In spite of the contents of these two directives, Hitler made a speech in the Reichstag on 28 April 1939 in which, after describing the Polish Government's alleged rejection of an offer he had made with regard to Danzig and the Polish Corridor, he stated:
"I have regretted greatly this incomprehensible attitude of the Polish Government, but that alone is not the decisive fact; the worst is that now Poland, like Czechoslovakia a year ago, believes, under the pressure of a lying international campaign, that it must call up its troops, although Germany on her part has not called up a single man, and had not thought of proceeding in any way against Poland.... The intention to attack on the part of Germany which was merely invented by the international press ...."
It was 4 weeks after making this speech that Hitler, on 33, May 1939, held the important military conference to which reference has already been made. Among the persons present were the Defendants Goering, Raeder, and Keitel. The adjutant on duty that day was Lt. Col. Schmundt, and he made a record of what happened, certifying it with his signature as a correct record.
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The purpose of the meeting was to enable Hitler to inform the heads of the Armed Forces and their staffs of his views on the political situation and his future aims. After analyzing the political situation and reviewing the course of events since 1933, Hitler announced his decision to attack Poland. He admitted that the quarrel with Poland over Danzig was not the reason for this attack, but the necessity for Germany to enlarge her living space and secure her food supplies.
He said:
"The solution of the problem demands courage. The principle by which one evades solving the problem by adapting oneself to circumstances is inadmissible. Circumstances must rather be adapted to aims. This is impossible without invasion of foreign states or attacks upon foreign property."
Later in his address he added:
"There is therefore no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with the decision to attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity. We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair. There will be war. Our task is to isolate Poland. The success of the isolation will be decisive.... The isolation of Poland is a matter of skillful politics."
Lt. Col. Schmundt's record of the meeting reveals that Hitler fully realized the possibility of Great Britain and France coming to Poland's assistance. If, therefore, the isolation of Poland could not be achieved, Hitler was of the opinion that Germany should attack Great Britain and France first, or at any rate should concentrate primarily on the war in the West, in order to defeat Great Britain and France quickly, or at least to destroy their effectiveness. Nevertheless, Hitler stressed that war with England and France would be a life-and-death struggle which might last a, long time, and that preparations must be made accordingly.
During the weeks which followed this conference, other meetings were held and directives were issued in preparation for the war. The Defendant Ribbentrop was sent to Moscow to negotiate a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union.
On 22 August 1939 there took place the important meeting of that day, to which reference has already been made. The Prosecution have put in evidence two unsigned captured documents which appear to be records made of this meeting by persons who were present. The first document is headed: "The Fuehrer's speech to the commanders-in-chief on 22 August 1939 The purpose of the speech was to announce the decision to make war on Poland at once, and Hitler began by saying:
"It was clear to me that a conflict with Poland had to come sooner or later. I had already made this decision in the spring, but I thought that I would first turn against the West
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in a few years, and only afterwards against the East.... I wanted to establish an acceptable relationship with Poland in order to fight first against the West. But this plan, which was agreeable to me, could not be executed since essential points have changed. It became clear to me that Poland would attack us in case of a conflict with the West."
Hitler then went on to explain why he had decided that the most favorable moment had arrived for starting the war.
"Now," said Hitler, "Poland is in the position in which I wanted her.... I am only afraid that at the last moment some Schweinehund will make a proposal for mediation. A beginning has been made for the destruction of England's hegemony." This document closely resembles one of the documents put in evidence in behalf of the Defendant Raeder. This latter document consists of a summary of the same speech, compiled on the day it was made, by one Admiral Boehm, from notes he had taken during the meeting. In substance it says that the moment had arrived to settle the dispute with Poland by military invasion, that although a conflict between Germany and the West was unavoidable in the long run, the likelihood of Great Britain and France coming to Poland's assistance was not great, and that even if a war in the West should come about, the first aim should be the crushing of the Polish military strength. It also contains a statement by Hitler that an appropriate propaganda reason for invading Poland would be given, the truth or falsehood of which was unimportant, since "the right lies in victory."
The second unsigned document put in evidence by the Prosecution is headed:
"Second speech by the Fuehrer on 22 August 1939," and it is in the form of notes of the main points made by Hitler. Some of these are as follows:
"Everybody shall have to make a point of it that we were determined from the beginning to fight the Western Powers. Struggle for life or death ... destruction of Poland in the foreground. The aim is elimination of living forces, not the arrival at a certain line. Even if war should breakout in the West, the destruction of Poland shall be the primary objective. I shall give a propagandist cause for starting the war--never mind whether it be plausible or not. The victor shall not be asked later on whether we told the truth or not. In starting and making a war, not the right is what matters, but victory.... The start will be ordered probably by Saturday morning" (That is to say, 26 August).
In spite of its being described as a second speech, there are sufficient points of similarity with the two previously mentioned
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documents to make it appear very probable that this is an account of the same speech, not as detailed as the other two, but in substance the same. These three documents establish that the final decision as to, the date of Poland's destruction, which had been agreed upon and planned earlier in the year, was reached by Hitler shortly before 22 August 1939. They also show that although he hoped to be able to avoid having to fight Great Britain and France as well, he fully realized there was a risk of this happening, but it was a risk which he was determined to take.
The events of the last days of August confirm this determination. On 22 August 1939, the same day as the speech just referred to, the British Prime Minister wrote a letter to Hitler, in which he said:
"Having thus made our position perfectly clear, I wish to repeat to you my conviction that war between our two peoples would be the greatest calamity that could occur."
On 23 August Hitler replied:
"The question of the treatment of European problems on a peaceful basis is not a decision which rests with Germany, but primarily on those who since the crime committed by the Versailles Diktat have stubbornly and consistently opposed any peaceful revision. Only after a change of spirit on the part of the responsible powers can there be any real change in the relationship between England and Germany."
There followed a number of appeals to Hitler to refrain from forcing the Polish issue to the point of war. These were from President Roosevelt on 24 and 25 August; from His Holiness the Pope on 24 and 31 August; and from M. Daladier, the Prime Minister of France, on 26 August. All these appeals fell on deaf ears. On 25 August, Great Britain signed a pact of mutual assistance with Poland, which reinforced the understanding she had given to Poland earlier in the year.
This, coupled with the news of Mussolini's unwillingness to enter the war on Germany's side, made Hitler hesitate for a moment. The invasion of Poland, which was timed to start on 26 August, was postponed until a further attempt had been made to persuade Great Britain not to intervene. Hitler offered to enter into a comprehensive agreement with Great Britain, once the Polish question had been settled. In reply to this, Great Britain made a counter-suggestion for the settlement of the Polish dispute by negotiation. On 29 August Hitler informed the British Ambassador that the German Government, though skeptical as to the result, would be prepared to enter into direct negotiations with a Polish emissary, provided he arrived in Berlin with plenipotentiary powers by midnight for the following day, 30 August. The Polish Government were informed of this, but with the example of
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Schuschnigg and Hacha before them, they decided not to send such an emissary. At midnight on 30 August the Defendant Ribbentrop read to the British Ambassador at top speed a document containing the first precise formulation of the German demands against Poland. He refused, however, to give the Ambassador a copy of this, and stated that in any case it was too late now, since no Polish plenipotentiary had arrived.
In the opinion of the Tribunal, the manner in which these negotiations were conducted by Hitler and Ribbentrop, showed that they were not entered into in good faith or with any desire to maintain peace, but solely in the attempt to prevent Great Britain and France from honoring their obligations to Poland. Parallel with these negotiations were the unsuccessful attempts made by Goering to effect the isolation of Poland by persuading Great Britain not to stand by her pledged word, through the services of one Birger Dahlerus, a Swede. Dahlerus, who was called as a witness by Goering, had a considerable knowledge of England and of things English, and in July 1939 was anxious to bring about a better understanding between England and Germany, in the hope of preventing a war between the two countries. He got into contact with Goering as well as with official circles in London, and during the latter part of August, Goering used him as an unofficial intermediary to try and deter the British Government from their opposition to Germany's intentions towards Poland. Dahlerus, of course, had no knowledge at the time of the decision which Hitler had secretly announced on 22 August, nor of the German military directives for the attack on Poland which were already in existence. As he admitted in his evidence, it was not until 26 September, after the conquest of Poland was virtually complete, that he first realized that Goering's aim all along had been to get Great Britain's consent to Germany's seizure of Poland.
After all attempts to persuade Germany to agree to a settlement of her dispute with Poland on a reasonable basis had failed, Hitler, on 31 August, issued his final directive, in which he announced that the attack on Poland would start in the early morning of 1 September, and gave instructions as to what action would be taken if Great Britain and France should enter the war in defense of Poland.
In the opinion of the Tribunal, the events of the days immediately preceding 1 September 1939 demonstrate the determination of Hitler and his associates to carry out the declared intention of invading Poland at all costs, despite appeals from every quarter. With the ever-increasing evidence before him that this intention would lead to war with Great Britain and France as well, Hitler was resolved not to depart from the course he had set for himself. The Tribunal is fully satisfied by the evidence that the war initiated
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by Germany against Poland on 1 September 1939 was most plainly an aggressive war, which was to develop in due course into a war which embraced almost the whole world, and resulted in the commission of countless crimes, both against the laws and customs of war, and against humanity.
THE PRESIDENT: Now I shall ask M. Falco to continue the reading of the Judgment.
M. LE CONSEILLER R. FALCO (Alternate member of the Tribunal for the French Republic):
The Invasion of Denmark and Norway
The aggressive war against Poland was but the beginning. The aggression of Nazi Germany quickly spread from country to country. In point of time the first two countries to suffer were Denmark and Norway.
On 31 May 1939 a treaty of non-aggression was made between Germany and Denmark, and signed by the Defendant Ribbentrop. It was there solemnly stated that the parties to the treaty were "'firmly resolved to maintain peace between Denmark and Germany under all circumstances." Nevertheless, Germany invaded Denmark on 9 April 1940.
On 2 September 1939, after the outbreak of war with Poland, Germany sent a solemn assurance to Norway in these terms:
"The German Reich Government is determined, in view of the friendly relations which exist between Norway and Germany, under no circumstance to prejudice the inviolability and integrity of Norway, and to respect the territory of the Norwegian State. In making this declaration the Reich Government naturally expects, on its side, that Norway will observe an unimpeachable neutrality towards the Reich and will not tolerate any breaches of Norwegian neutrality by any third party which might occur. Should the attitude of the Royal Norwegian Government differ from this so that any such breach of neutrality by a third party occurs, the Reich Government would then obviously be compelled to safeguard the interests of the Reich in such a way as the resulting situation might dictate."
On 9 April 1940, in pursuance of her plan of campaign, Norway was invaded by Germany.
The idea of attacking Norway originated, it appears, with the Defendants Raeder and Rosenberg. On 3 October 1939 Raeder prepared a memorandum on the subject of "gaining bases in Norway," and amongst the questions discussed was the question:
"Can bases be gained by military force against Norway's will, if it is
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impossible to carry this out without fighting?"
Despite this fact, 3 days later, further assurances were given to Norway by Germany, which stated:
"Germany has never had any conflicts of interest or even points of controversy with the Northern States, and neither has she any today."
Three days later again, the Defendant Doenitz prepared a memorandum on the same subject, namely, bases in Norway, and suggested the establishment of a base in Trondheim with an alternative of supplying fuel in Narvik. At the same time the Defendant Raeder was in correspondence with Admiral Carls, who pointed out to him the importance of an occupation of the Norwegian coast by Germany. On 10 October Raeder reported to Hitler the disadvantages to Germany which an occupation by the British would have. In the months of October and November Raeder continued to work on the possible occupation of Norway, in conjunction with the "Rosenberg Organization." The "Rosenberg Organization" was the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the NSDAP, and Rosenberg as Reichsleiter was in charge of it. Early in December, Quisling, the notorious Norwegian traitor, visited Berlin and was seen by the Defendants Rosenberg and Raeder. He put forward a plan for a coup d'etat in Norway. On 12 December, the Defendant Raeder and the Naval Staff, together with the Defendants Keitel and Jodl, had a conference with Hitler, when Raeder reported on his interview with Quisling, and set out Quisling's views. On 16 December Hitler himself interviewed Quisling on all these matters. In the report of the activities of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the NSDAP for the years 1933-1943, under the heading of "Political preparations for the military occupation of Norway," it is stated that at the interview with Quisling Hitler said that he would prefer a neutral attitude on the part of Norway as well as the whole of Scandinavia, as he did not desire to extend the theater of war, or to draw other nations into the conflict. If the enemy attempted to extend the war he would be compelled to, guard himself against that undertaking; he promised Quisling financial support, and assigned to a special military staff the examination of the military questions involved.
On 27 January 1940 a memorandum was prepared by the Defendant Keitel regarding the plans for the invasion of Norway. On 28 February 1940 the Defendant Jodl entered in his diary:
"I proposed first to the Chief of OKW and then to the Fuehrer that 'Case Yellow' (that is the operation against the Netherlands) and 'Weser Exercise' (that is the operation against Norway and Denmark) must be prepared in such a way that they will be independent of one another as regards both time and forces employed."
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On 1 March Hitler issued a directive re the Weser Exercise which contained the words:
"The development of the situation in Scandinavia requires the making of all preparations for the occupation of Denmark and Norway by a part of the German Armed Forces. This operation should prevent British encroachment on Scandinavia and the Baltic; further, it should guarantee our ore base in Sweden and give our Navy and Air Force a wider start J line against Britain.... The crossing of the Danish border and the landings in Norway must take place simultaneously.... It is most important that the Scandinavian States as well as the Western opponents should be taken by surprise by our measures."
On 24 March the naval operation orders for the Weser Exercise were issued, and on 30 March the Defendant Doenitz as Commander-in-Chief of U-boats issued his operational order for the occupation of Denmark and Norway. On 9 April 1940 the German forces invaded Norway and Denmark.
From this narrative it is clear that as early as October 1939 the question of invading Norway was under consideration. The defense that has been made here is that Germany was compelled to attack Norway to forestall an Allied invasion, and her action was therefore preventive.
It must be remembered that preventive action in foreign territory is justified only in case of "an instant and overwhelming necessity for self-defense, leaving no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation" (The Caroline Case, Moore's Digest of International Law II, 412). How widely the view was held in influential German circles that the Allies intended to occupy Norway cannot be determined with exactitude. Quisling asserted that the Allies would intervene in Norway with the tacit consent of the Norwegian Government. The German Legation at. Oslo disagreed with this view, although the Naval Attache at that Legation shared it.
The War Diary of the German Naval Operations Staff for 13 January 1940 stated that the Chief of the Naval Operations Staff thought that the most favorable solution would be the maintenance of the neutrality of Norway, but he harbored the firm conviction that England intended to occupy Norway in the near future, relying on, the tacit agreement of the Norwegian Government. The directive of Hitler issued on 1 March 1940 for the attack on Denmark and Norway stated that the operation "should prevent British encroachment on Scandinavia and the Baltic."
It is, however, to be remembered that the Defendant Raeder's memorandum of 3 October 1939 makes no reference to forestalling
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