German documents on anti-semitism in the Ukraine

[David Thompson]

Operational Situation Report USSR No. 117; October 18, 1941

Einsatzgruppe D
Location: Nikolayev

Working Report by [Einsatzgruppe] D for 1 - 15 October 1941 During the time to which the report relates, the settlement of the Jewish question was tackled, particularly in the territory to the east of the Dnieper. Investigations concerning the followers of Bandera and partisans are next in importance.

1. The districts occupied by the kommandos were cleaned of Jews. 4,091 Jews and 46 Communists were executed during the time span covered by the report, bringing the total to 40,699.
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3. On the Odessa front, a partisan leader of a five-man group was arrested after offering violent resistance. His task included fixing artillery positions and reporting them to a Soviet command stationed on the east bank of the Suchoi-Liman; carrying out attacks on German soldiers; destroying telephone cables. Names of members of the group were established. House searches yielded weapons and munitions. It is remarkable that partisan groups had no support whatsoever from the population.

4) Concerning Bandera members: 16 arrests in searches in Nikolayev. Three leaders under arrest, among others Machilynsky and Martynok. The rest were given appropriate warning. Political material confiscated. Members were gathered in small groups in at the beginning of the campaign in Lvov or in Sanok where they received short training, propaganda material, and money. Martynok took over the leadership of Lvov group. Machilynsky was in charge of these groups from Sanok. On the way, under the pretext of performing police duties, they continued political work such as installing mayors, organizing military units, and finishing off Jews and Communists, etc. The two immediately took up leading positions with the militia. Their participation in murder in Zhitomir is not confirmed. They declared, however, that they would remove rivals.

5) Ethnic German settlements east of the Dnieper were taken under protection; part of them were passed on to the command of VOMI. (Volksdeutche Mittelstelle - Liason Office for Ethnic Germans) Concerning the preservation of German nationalism, the observations are similar to those between the Bug and the Dniester. In some areas, situation substantially better.

6) In the course of the work in Nikolayev, Party instructions concerning work in the navy were seized.

[David Thompson]

Operational Situation Report USSR No. 119; October 20, 1941

Einsatzgruppe C
Location: Kiev

Security Police measures

According to observations made by Einsatzkommando 5, the last few weeks a large number of Jews from the near and far have gathered in Uman. The population of Uman before the outbreak of the war was about 55,000; about 10,000 of these were Jews. In spite of large departures of Jews originally living in Uman after the outbreak of the war, due to [new] migration, the number has been reported at about 8,000. A good intelligence net was discovered among the Jews of Uman. Information about the events at the front and behind was passed by the Jews not only to their coreligionists, but also to the Ukrainian population. They received very quickly information about actions against Jews in the vicinity. A two-day action was agreed upon in order to combat this source of danger in Uman.

On September 21, 1941, contrary to the plan, excesses were perpetrated against the Jews by members of the militia with participation of numerous German soldiers.

During these events, Jewish apartments were completely demolished and robbed of all utensils and valuables. In this action, German soldiers also participated. Spot checks of the apartments of militia members which were undertaken immediately after arrival in Uman of a platoon of Einsatzkommando 5 were without any result.

Naturally, the systematic action of Einsatzkommando 5 suffered greatly by these planless excesses against the Jews in Uman. In particular, a large number of the Jews were now forewarned and escaped

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from the city. Besides numerous Jews, many of the Ukrainian officials and activists still living in Uman were warned by the excesses, and only two co-workers of the NKVD were found and liquidated. The results [i.e., damage] of these excesses were cleaned up immediately by Einsatzkommando 5 [shortly] after its arrival.

In the remainder [of the action], 1,412 Jews were executed by Einsatzkommando 5 in Uman on September 22 and 23, 1941. The South Armies Group was informed about the part played by the Wehrmacht in the anti-Jewish excesses.

13 Ukrainian members of the Communist Party and 35 Jews, among them the village council, who continuously spread rumors about the retreat of German troops, frightening and alarming the population, were shot by Einsatzkommando 5 in Yustungrad on September 19, 1941.

Two Ukrainians who asked the population to destroy all machines, to drive off cattle, and to destroy grain supplies, were arrested by the militia in Volodarka and handed over to Einsatzkommando 5 and executed. One of these Ukrainians was a leader of the village council and a party member since 1939. The other was a schoolteacher, candidate for the Party, and agitator from the county economic office.

Two more Ukrainians (both candidates for the Party), who actively participated in the destruction of farm-machinery and the driving off of cattle (which took place before the entry of the German troops), were executed in Tychy-Chutor by Einsatzkommando 5 on September 23. One more Ukrainian in the same town, who kept the population under continuous pressure by rumors that the Red troops were likely to return soon, was likewise taken care of.

On September 14, 1941, in Cherepin, the same Einsatzkommando executed two kolkhoz leaders (Ukrainians), and a half-Jew, a member of the Komsomol. After the departure of the Red Army and under threat of the death penalty, they ordered the other kolkhoz workers to destroy machines and grain supplies.
The leader of the village council (Ukrainian) in Shuralivka, who, according to his own testimony, deported 15 persons to Siberia during his time in office, was executed. Furthermore, the former mayor

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of the town and 13 more male Jews and three Jewesses were finished off.

In Tsybulov, where there are 3,000 inhabitants, the Jews comprise about 3% of the population. They were particularly insolent to the Ukrainian population. Therefore, on September 25, 1941, 78 Jews were shot.

An action against the Jews was carried out on October 4, 1941, in Pereyaslav by the Vorkommando of Sonderkommando 4a with the aid of reliable Ukrainian men. A total of 537 Jews (men, women and adolescents) were apprehended and liquidated. The Ukrainian population and the Wehrmacht looked upon this action with satisfaction.

On October 8, 1941, the town of Yagotin was searched by Sonderkommando 4a for, suspicious elements. In this action 125 Jews were apprehended and liquidated.

An action was carried out in Ivankov on September 19, 1941, by Sonderkommando 4a with the aid of the militia, in which 168 persons were apprehended and liquidated. In the same town, a search for Communists took place on September 21, 1941. One woman Communist, the leader of a "secret department," was arrested and executed. On the same day, 29 more Jews were shot.

[David Thompson]

Operational Situation Report USSR No. 126; October 27, 1941

Political Survey Occupied Territories

General Gouvernement

The Commander of the Security Police and the SD in Lvov reports:

In a letter signed OUN (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists) sent to the Secret State Police in Lvov, the Bandera Group again advocates the political independence of the Ukraine.

It is stated in the letter that Hitler cheated the Ukraine and that America, England, and Russia would create an independent Ukraine reaching from the River San to the Black Sea. "Long live greater independent Ukraine without Jews, Poles and Germans. Poles behind the San, Germans to Berlin, Jews to the gallows." Moreover, the letter expresses doubts in Germany's victory in the war, stating that Germany could not win the war without the Ukraine.

It is also demanded that Ukrainians under arrest be released.

Execution activity

As for the executions to date, about 80,000 persons have been liquidated by the Kommandos of the Einsatzgruppe.

Among them, about 8,000 persons were convicted, as a result of interrogations, on the grounds of activity against Germans or for being Communists.

The remaining have been finished off as reprisal measures.

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Several reprisal measures were carried out within the framework of Grossaktionen [large-scale actions].

The most extensive of these actions took place immediately after Kiev was taken; it exclusively concerned Jews with their entire families.

The difficulties in carrying out such a large action — first of all with respect to sowing disunity [among the Jews] — were overcome in Kiev by a call via posters to the Jewish population that they were to move.

Although at the start, one could [reasonably] count on the participation of about 5,000-6,000 Jews, more than 30,000 Jews turned up who, due to extraordinarily skillful organization, believed in the transfer [ruse] right up to the moment of their execution.

Thus, even if about 75,000 Jews had been liquidated so far, it has already become clear that a solution of the Jewish question will not be possible in this way. True, we have succeeded in bringing about a total solution to the Jewish problem, particularly in smaller towns and also in the villages. However, in bigger towns it was observed that all the [remaining] Jews have disappeared after such an execution. Yet, if a Kommando returns after a period, a number of Jews is always found that is significantly larger than the number of executed Jews.

[David Thompson]

Operational Situation Report USSR No. 127; October 31, 1941

Einsatzgruppe C
Location: Kiev

Work carried out to date by the Security Police

Around July 1, 1941, Einsatzgruppe C started to go into action in Galicia together with its Kommandos. It is located in the area of Army Group South. As agreed with the commanding officer of the rear area of the Army Group, General von Roques, the Einsatzkommandos, as well as the staff of the Einsatzgruppe itself, were to move as close as possible to the fighting troops.

Two broad areas of activity became evident during the work itself: first, the occupied territory of Galicia, that is, the area that has been under Russian rule for only one year and nine months; secondly, the Ukraine proper, which had to suffer twenty-three years of Bolshevik rule.

In Galicia, particularly in Lvov, the German-speaking element was predominant. This made matters easier in practical terms since one was hard put to find any Bolshevik influence in the country. Measures were, therefore, mainly directed against the Jewish part of the population for they had used the short period of Bolshevik rule for a brutal display of power against the rest of the population. The country here still had a markedly West European character which also significantly facilitated the work of the Security Police.

The deeper, however, the Einsatzgruppe advanced into Ukrainian territory, the more the traces of former Bolshevik rule became evi-

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dent. The country was particularly characterized by the lack of bigger towns. The surrounding area had a decidedly rural character.

First, very little industry was found. Through the confiscation of all private property and the installation of kolkhoz and sovkhoz farms, the entire population had been subjected to such a strong Soviet suppression and exploitation that the appearance of the Security Police Kommandos elicited deep satisfaction everywhere. In conclusion, it may be stated today that the entire Ukrainian population has remained free of any Bolshevik ideology. In the beginning, as the German troops rapidly advanced, only superficial control was required in that area since hardly any Bolshevik seditious elements were found there.

After the advance of the German troops had come to a standstill and larger towns like Zhitomir, Berdichev, Kirovograd, and Krivoy-Rog in the southeast were reached, the work of the Security Police assumed a different character. Again, lack of pronounced Bolshevik influence could be noted. Industry in these areas and the halt of military operations caused more intensive work in the interior areas of the newly [conquered] territories.

While it could be noted that in the Galician part, all those circles that were of interest to the Security Police were uncovered except for the Bolsheviks, the situation changed significantly later on. This concerned the Jews initially, who thanks to information rapidly transmitted, learned that the measures of the Security Police were directed mainly against them. One could observe, for example, in the course of further advances into the Ukraine, that, from a Security Police point of view, the Kommandos arrived in evacuated areas. The part of the population hostile to the Germans and sympathetic to the Soviets retreated in order to return later, if only partly. Therefore, in the beginning, the Kommandos changed their tactics, abstaining from Security Police measures in order to gain an overview of the situation, and [instead] installing a network of informants. Deceived by this apparent inactivity, the elements in question, in this instance, first of all the Jews, slowly returned, and a high percentage of them could [then] be caught.

Following this procedure, the Kommandos greatly depended on the cooperation of the population. In this respect, very strong support was given by the ethnic Germans who live scattered all over the area. In most cases in the beginning it was not easy to gain the co-operation of the Ukrainian population. The population that had lived

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for many years under the terror of the NKVD at first lived in fear that the Russians might return and then take their revenge.

Through skillful propaganda on the part of the German Army, [though] mainly, however, by the Einsatzkommando itself, it was possible to win over these circles to gradual, active support. It was, how-ever, observed that the Ukrainian is able to provide any real cooperation only in a limited way: first, because of his indolence, and also because of years of suppression. He is still indifferent to such an extent that often we Germans simply do not understand. As a result of years of terror and suppression, he has become resigned to his fate and is satisfied if he has work and bread for the future.

Security Police has found two large groups of enemies in this area. They are:
1) the Jews;
2) active members of the former Soviet regime.

It must here be stated that in the Ukraine, a high percentage of the circles sympathizing with the Soviets is composed of Jews.

It can be stated positively today that the Jews without exception served Soviet Bolshevism. Again and again, mainly in the towns, the Jews were named as the actual Soviet rulers, exploiting the people with indescribable brutality and delivering them to the NKVD. About 10,000 interrogations have been conducted by the Kommandos during these four months. Repeatedly it has become clear that the Jews especially worked for the Soviets, if not in responsible positions, then as agents or informants. The large number of mass graves do not contain Jewish corpses, not even in one single instance. It is, however, established that the Jews in particular share maximum responsibility for the slaughter of the Ukrainian population and the ethnic Germans.

Thus, the Security Police saw the necessity for special measures against the Jews.

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[David Thompson]

Operational Situation Report USSR No. 128; November 2, 1941

Einsatzgruppe C
Location: Kiev
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Execution activities

As to purely execution matters, approximately 80,000 person have been liquidated by now by the Kommandos of the Einsatzgruppe. Among these are approximately 8,000 person convicted after investigation of anti-German or Bolshevist activities.

The remainder was liquidated in retaliatory actions. Several retaliatory measures were carried out as large-scale actions. The largest of these actions took place immediately after the occupation of Kiev. It was carried out exclusively against Jews and their entire families. The difficulties resulting from such a large-scale action, in particular concerning the round-up, were overcome in Kiev by requesting the Jewish population to assemble, using wall posters. Although at first only the participation of 5-6000 Jews had been expected, more than 30,000 Jews arrived who, until the moment of their execution, still believed in their resettlement, thanks to extremely clever organization [propaganda]. Even though approximately 75,000 Jews have been liquidated in this manner, it is evident at this time that this cannot be the best solution of the Jewish problem. Although we succeeded, particularly in smaller towns and villages, in bringing about a complete liquidation of the Jewish problem, nevertheless, again and again it has been observed in the larger cities that after such an action, all Jews have indeed been eradicated. But, when after a certain period of time a Kommando returns, the number of Jews still found in the city always surpasses considerably the number of executed Jews. Besides, the Kommandos have also carried out military actions in numerous cases. On request of the Army, separate platoons of the Kommandos have repeatedly combed the woods searching for partisans, and have accomplished successful work there.

Besides, prisoners-of-war marching along the highways were systematically overtaken [by the Kommandos of the EG]. All those elements were liquidated who did not possess identification papers and who were suspected, once set free, of [possibly] committing acts of sabotage against the German Army, the German authorities, or the population. In numerous cases, systematic searches for parachutists were carried out, with the result that approximately 20 parachutists were captured, among them a Russian who, at his interrogation supplied extremely important information to the Army. Finally, it should be mentioned that prisoners-of-war were taken over from the prisoner assembly points and the prisoner-of-war transit camps, although at times, considerable disagreements with the camp commander occurred.

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Collaboration with the Wehrmacht and the Secret Field Police

This concerns the relation of the Einsatzgruppe and its Kommandos with other offices and authorities. Its relation to the Army is especially noteworthy. From the outset, the Einsatzgruppe succeeded in establishing excellent terms with all Army headquarters. This made it possible for the Einsatzgruppe never to operate in the rear of the military zone. On the contrary, the request was frequently made by the Army to operate as far on the front as possible. In a great number of cases, it happened that the support of the Einsatzkommandos was requested by the fighting troops. Advance detachments of the Einsatzgruppe also participated in every large military action. They entered newly captured localities side by side with the fighting troops. Thus, in all cases, the utmost support was given. For example, in this connection, it is worth mentioning the participation in the capture of Zhitomir, where the first tanks entering the city were immediately followed by three cars of Einsatzkommando 4a.

As a result of the successful work of the Einsatzgruppe, the Security Police is also held in high regard, in particular by the HQ of the German Army. The liaison officers stationed in Army HQ are loyally briefed of all military operations, and, besides, they receive the utmost cooperation. The Commander of the 6th Army, Generalfeldmarschall von Richenau, has repeatedly praised the work of the Einsatzkommandos and, accordingly, supported the interests of the SD with his staff. The extraordinary success of the Kommandos was a contributing factor: for example, the capture of Major-General Sokolov, then information concerning a plan by parachutists to blast a bridge, and the transmission of other important military information. Only with respect to the Jewish problem could a complete understanding with junior Army officers not be reached until quite recently. This was most noticeable during the taking over of prisoner-of-war camps. As a particularly clear example, the conduct of a camp commander in Vinitsa is to be mentioned. He strongly objected to the transfer of 362 Jewish prisoners-of-war carried out by his deputy, and even started court martial proceedings against the deputy and two other officers. Unfortunately, it often occurred that the Einsatzkommandos had to suffer more or less hidden reproaches for their persistent stand on the Jewish problem. Another difficulty was added by the order from the Army High Command prohibiting entry by the SD into the POW transit camps. (1) These difficulties have probably been overcome by now due to a new order from the Army High Command. This order clearly states that the Wehrmacht has to cooperate in the solution of this problem, and, in particular, that the necessary authorizations must be granted the SD to the fullest extent. However, it became evident in the past few days that this policy-making order still has not reached lower [military] authorities. In the future, further cooperation and assistance by the Wehrmacht authorities can be expected. As far as the province of the 6th Army HQ is concerned, Generalfeldmarschall von Reichenau issued an order on October 10, 1941, which states clearly that the Russian soldier has to be considered in principal to be a representative of Bolshevism and thus to be treated accordingly by the Wehrmacht.

No difficulties whatsoever resulted from the cooperation with the Secret Military Police. To be sure, it was noted that the Security Military Police preferred to handle matters concerning the Security Police only, evidently because of a lack of other duties; however, these defects were always eliminated following consultation. Besides, the latest order of the Chief of the Military Police has probably eliminated any remaining doubts. The exchange of informational material between the SD and the GFP took place without any disagreement. The original doubts whether the GFP would not retain some of the cases were not justified. Besides, it has already been ordered by Army HQ and its staff that matters concerning the Security Police have to be immediately transferred to the Kommandos.

As for the counter-intelligence offices in the rear, the work there is running smoothly. Counter-intelligence officers regularly visit [EK Hqts] and Kommandos in order to transfer files, as well as to receive orders. Since the work of the Security Police has been carried out smoothly and has won high recognition, it can be assumed that this present relationship will also be maintained in the future.

[David Thompson]

Operational Situation Report USSR No. 129; November 5, 1941

Einsatzgruppe D
Location: Nikolayev

During the last two weeks, the activity of the Kommandos and Einsatzgruppen consisted mainly in searches and in finishing off partisan groups. Besides, more places were freed of Jews, and inquiries were made concerning Bandera followers. During the time under report, 11,037 Jews and 31 Communist officials and saboteurs were executed. In all: 31,767.

[David Thompson]

Operational Situation Report USSR No. 132; November 12, 1941

Einsatzgruppe C
Location: Kiev

II. Nationality problems

4.) Jews

It need not be particularly stressed that Communist agitators received very warm support from the Jews. Under the prevailing conditions, it is important to stop the activity of the Jews in Volhynia and to remove thereby the most fertile soil from Bolshevism. The extermination of the Jews, who are, without any doubt, useless as workers and more harmful as the carriers of the bacillae of Communism, was [unavoidably] necessary.

V. Mood of the population

Following a thoroughly hopeful mood within the population at the time of the entry of the German troops, under the impact of the liberation from the Bolshevist blood terror, there can now be felt considerable ill-humor because of the aforementioned conditions. Even though Bolshevik propaganda is ineffective within wider circles, the propaganda activity of the Ukrainian political parties does not contribute towards improving trust in the German troops. This is particularly so with Bandera's propaganda, but also in Melnyk's. It was apparently not yet possible to present the German administration as the [supreme] power above all [Ukrainian] parties, having the best of Ukrainian interests in mind. The ill-humor is also nourished by Jewish activity, whose influence in economic matters cannot at all be regarded as broken. Also the events and measures which have been mentioned above under Section II — Nationality problems, affect the mood. Though the question of the Church has not yet been solved, it seems to be of little importance with respect to influencing the opinion of the Ukrainian people. This problem will probably be tackled only after a decision has been reached here.

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[David Thompson]

Operational Situation Report USSR No. 135; November 19, 1941

Einsatzgruppe C
Location: Kiev

Mood and situation in Kiev

The population would hardly dare to express its admiration for the Germans had it not gradually become convinced that the Bolsheviks would never come back. The capture of Kharkov has had an extraordinarily wholesome effect on the mood. At the same time, however, a gradual change occurred in the attitude of the people towards the Bolsheviks. The animosity against Communists and Jews finds expression not only in increased denunciation but also in conversations among the population. The returning deportees and war prisoners are, on the one hand, bearers of information against Bolshevism; on the other hand, and much more effectively, they are witnesses of the [positive] steps taken up to now in the occupied areas.

Executions

In the course of the systematic mopping-up operations and the complete rounding-up of all Jews and Communists in the neighborhood of Kiev, Sonderkommando 4a dispatched a number of Teilkommandos who were able to complete their assignments without any difficulties in cooperation with the local commanders of the German Army. Thus, on October 22, 1941, at Koselets, apart from 11 Communists and partisans who were handed over by the German Army, 125 Jews were executed. They were the survivors of a population which, before the war, had numbered over 2,000. On this occasion, the Ukrainian militia, recruited at Koselets, made itself useful in the round-up by recruiting the required manpower to dig mass graves.

On October 23, 1941, a Teilkommando of Sonderkommando 4a arrived in the town of Chernigov which, before the war, had a population of 70,000 of which only 40,000 remain today. Of more than 10,000 Jews, not more than 260 have stayed behind. The town itself was a scene of almost complete destruction. It is said that the inner part was set afire by the Jews before the German troops entered the

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town. Apart from eight Communists and partisans who again were handed over by the local military commander, the Kommando shot 116 Jews on October 23, 1941, and 144 the following day. The same Kommando again passed through Chernigov on October 23, 1941.

49 Jews were arrested who, after the executions on October 24, 1941, believed that the danger had passed and returned from their flight. On the same day, too, the request of the director of the mental asylum in Chernigov to liquidate 270 incurables was complied with.

On October 29, 1941, in Oster, 215 Jews, partisans as well as a few functionaries of the Communist Party were arrested and executed.

The attempt by Sonderkommando 4a to take action against Nieshin, where approximately 325 Jews are living, failed three times since it was impossible to reach on roads made impassable for motor vehicles by the mud following the rain.

For the same reason, the plan of Sonderkommando 4a to strengthen the Vorkommando already sent to Kharkov had to be deferred for the time being.

Further arrests were made by Sonderkommando 4a in the course of the investigations made in Kiev in connection with the closing of the illegal Party machinery of the Communist Party. The arrest of the Ukrainian Michael Chernish, a member of the Secret Kyrov-Rayon Party Committee, led to the discovery and seizing of approximately 50 kilos of leaflets and propaganda pamphlets. These were intended for illegal activities of the Communist Party in the Ukraine.

From October 22 to 24, 1941, Sonderkommando 4b carried out 205 executions. These were:
11 political functionaries,
13 saboteurs and looters,
and 181 Jews.

During the period October 25 to 30, 1941, Sonderkommando 4b executed:
7 political functionaries,
2 saboteurs and looters,
and 381 Jews.

According to a report by Sonderkommando 4b, there is a mental asylum in Poltava with 865 inmates; attached to it is a 1250 acre farm. Its produce is used to feed the insane and the staff living there. The food situation in Poltava is extremely critical. For example, there is no whole milk available for the three large military hospitals. Thus, the commander of Sonderkommando 4b, with the approval of the

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High Command of the 6th Army and the local military commander, contacted the woman doctor in charge of the asylum with the object of reaching an agreement on the execution of at least part of the insane.

The woman doctor in charge understood quite well that the problem should be solved in this manner. However, she objected because the measure would cause unrest among the population, which ought not to be disregarded, especially since the Soviets, naturally for propaganda reasons, gave every conceivable assistance to this asylum. A way out of this difficulty was found. It was decided that the execution of 565 incurables should be carried out in the course of the next few days under the pretext that these patients were being removed to a better asylum in Kharkov. It could then be taken for granted that the remaining 300 patients (light cases) will be released from the asylum shortly. A commissioner appointed by the local military commander will care for the vacated parts of the building, [including] the furniture, linen and clothing, while a district leader will take over the farm.

The work of Sonderkommando 4b in Poltava was severely handicapped by extremely unfavorable weather and road conditions since a number of neighboring villages, where the appearance of partisans and Communist elements had been reported, could not be reached with any of the available motor vehicles. Activities, therefore, had to be confined to the area of Poltava itself. Cooperation with the German Army and the Ukrainian police ran smoothly.

As to the activities of the Bandera group, no observations of importance could be made in the area of Sonderkommando 4b. On the other hand, the Melnyk group is beginning to become rather active. Obviously, attempts are being made to exclude German influence and to establish a free and independent Ukraine. For the time being, however, [more] detailed reports cannot be made.

On November 2, 1941, the total number of executions carried out by Einsatzkommando 5 was 21,250.
Included in this number are
36 functionaries,
32 saboteurs and looters,
and 4372 Jews
who were shot between October 20 and 26 inclusive. In the week of October 26 to November 1, 1941, inclusive, Einsatzkommando 5 executed

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40 political functionaries,
16 saboteurs and looters,
and 2658 Jews.

Included in this number are
1) 414 hostages, shot in reprisal for various incendiary crimes,
2) 1,391 executions carried out by a Teilkommando of EInsatzkommando 5 which had returned from the area of Skvira-Pogrebishche-Plyskiv.

Since October 5, 1941, Einsatzkommando 6 has been busy in the district of the Dnieper Bend. Apart from [covering] extensive rural districts, the following towns, all of a definitely industrial character and densely populated, were dealt with: Dniepropetrovsk, Dnieproderzhinsk (150,000 inhabitants), Vorkhnedpeprovsk (30,000 inhabitants), Novo-Moskovsk (30,000 inhabitants), Zaprozhye (350,000 inhabitants), and Nikopol (60,000 inhabitants). In the area of Einsatzkommando 6, the total number of town dwellers is around 1.2 million, not including those of smaller places. Naturally the amount of work to be accomplished is proportionally high and can hardly be accomplished with the forces available. Apart from the cases which are really of interest to the Security Police, there is the work, unfortunately unavoidable, to be done in connection with the immense number of denunciations with which the Einsatzkommando is simply swamped. Here, the low level of the moral character of the population becomes apparent. Almost everyone of the inhabitants considers it necessary and laudable if, for selfish interests, he denounces to the German police his relatives, friends, etc. as having been Communists.

During the time covered by the report, Einsatzkommando 6 was able to find out about a number of [Soviet] functionaries. However, again and again it appeared that here, too, the most active people had escaped in time. On October 26, after a long search, an NKVD murderer of the worst kind was arrested. Lately, partisans and saboteurs have caused Einsatzkommando 6 more trouble than ever. Five different arms caches, including two of considerable size, were discovered and destroyed. A large-scale operation, which took place on October 22 against partisans in a forest district on the other side of the Dnieper, ended with the arrest of nine partisans, some of whom were armed and others had buried their weapons. The execution by shooting of these partisans contributed considerably to the pacification of this district.

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On October 24, 1941, a similar action was carried out by Einsatzkommando 6 in cooperation with the Military Police in a large forest district. The only result of this was the discovery of some arms and other partisan supplies.

Of approximately 100,000 Jews originally living in Dniepropetrovsk, about 70,000 escaped before the German troops entered the town. Of the remaining 30,000, approximately 10,000 were shot on October 13, 1941, by a detachment of the Higher SS and Police Chiefs.

To date, during the period of the report, a further 1,000 Jews were shot by Einsatzkommando 6. In spite of the shortage of skilled workers, it was impossible to avoid sparing, for the time being, the lives of Jewish artisans who were urgently needed for repair work, etc. Steps are being taken for the extermination of 1,500 inmates of the provincial lunatic asylum.

Finally, it is important to pass on a report of the commander of Einsatzkommando 6, according to which the behavior of Italian and Hungarian troops has often caused annoyance to the German authorities. It was noticed, for instance, that Italians and Hungarians had abundant supplies of German cigarettes which they sold at exorbitant prices to our soldiers. For instance, Italians selling them in the street are demanding 2 RM for six cigarettes.

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[David Thompson]

Operational Situation Report USSR No. 142; December 5, 1941

Einsatzgruppe C
Location: Kiev

The Ukrainian people's mood in Kiev

There are almost no intellectuals among the population of Kiev. The intellectuals came as a rule from the ranks of the party functionaries and the NKVD. The Jew was the dominant and vitalizing factor in the face of whom Ukrainians felt inferior and subordinate. For this reason until today, Ukrainians resent not having been able to formulate a concrete view concerning the Jewish question. They merely regard the Jewish question as a religious conflict and not as a race problem.

Einsatzgruppe D Location: Simferopol

Work in Yevpatoria/Crimea, in particular the fight against partisans

Regarding the registration of ethnic Germans and of Jews at the

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same time, it became clear that the Germans had been totally deported only from the villages. However, some of them managed to remain in the town.

During the registration of the Jews, the question concerning non-Jewish inhabitants of Jewish faith had to be clarified when the question of the Karaites and the Krimchaks was dealt with. The following facts were established:

According to their own testimony, the Karaites have nothing in common with the Jews apart from their religion. They are said to originate from a group of Mongols who lived in former times around the Black Sea.

The Karaites had, contrary to the Jews, full citizens' rights during the time of the Tsar, of which they are proud to this day.

According to the statement of the Jews, the Krimchaks are Jews who emigrated from Italy about 400 years ago. They arrived in the Crimea and adopted the Tartar language as their everyday language. The Krimchaks themselves maintain that they are a branch of the Tartar people. It can be assumed that both are right. They are Jewish emigrants from Italy who, in the course of the centuries, intermarried with the Tartars whose language they adopted. They kept their faith, however.

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[David Thompson]

Operational Situation Report USSR No. 143; December 8, 1941

Einsatzgruppe C
Location: Kiev

Security police measures of the Einsatzkommandos

On November 9, 1941, the number of people executed by Sk 4a amounted to 97,243.

On November 7, 1941, a Teilkommando of SK 4a shot 385 Jews after summary proceedings in Gornostaipol. The Jews had mostly been rounded up from the surrounding villages. On their way back to Kiev, the same Kommando on the same day shot 120 Jews in Dymer and 30 Jews and partisans in Oster. In cooperation with the German Army, this action was carried out without incident.

From October 31, 1941 to November 5, 1941, the SK shot a total of 740 people after summary proceedings, among them: 3 political officials
1 saboteur
137 Jews
599 mentally ill persons.

This Aktion was carried out without difficulties due to the advance preparations. The farm freed after the greater part of the inmates of the Poltava lunatic asylum had been shot is primarily used by the local field hospitals. Underwear, clothing, and household articles have also been placed at the disposal of the field hospitals. The remaining 200 inmates of the asylum, who are curable, have been set to work in the agricultural plant.

-251-

A Teilkommando of SK 4b has started to purge the prison camp in Losovaya.

The total number of persons shot after summary proceedings by Einsatzkommando 5 on November 10, 1941, amounted to 2,514.

Between November 2 and November 18, 1941, EK5 shot
15 political officials
21 saboteurs and looters
10,650 Jews
and 424 hostages.

The hostages were shot by agreement with the Military Commander of Kiev in retaliation for increased incidents of arson and sabotage. In a proclamation to the population of Kiev, the City Commander publicized the shooting of the hostages. He also stressed that for every new case of arson and sabotage, a large number of people would be shot. Furthermore, he stressed that it was the duty of all the inhabitants to report immediately to the German police any suspicious thing they observe.

Since November 6 and 7, 1941, an action against the Jews that had been prepared for some time was carried out in Rovno, where about 15,000 Jews were shot. According to the orders of Higher SS and Police Chiefs, the organization of this action was in the hands of the German Order Police. Aussenkommando Rovno of Einsatzkommando 5 participated substantially in carrying out this Aktion.

From October 26, 1941 to November 11, 1941, EK 6, after summary proceedings, shot:
26 political officials
10 saboteurs and looters
43 Jews;

in the period November 3 to 9, 1941:
20 political officials
3 saboteurs
113 Jews;

and from November 10 to 16, 1941:
4 political officials
10 saboteurs and looters
and 47 Jews.

The total number of people whom EK 6 executed between November 17 and 23, 1941, amounts to 105, including
24 political officials
20 saboteurs and looters
61 Jews.

[David Thompson]

Operational Situation Report USSR No. 145; December 12, 1941

Einsatzgruppe D
Location: Simferopol

Shootings

An additional 2,910 Jews and 19 Communist officials were shot after summary proceedings. The total number of executions has thus risen to 54,696.

Jews

Work with Jews is rendered much more difficult because of the Karaite/Krimchaks and Gypsy problem. The total number of Jews is approximately 40,000. Of these, a quarter live in Simferopol. The Crimean population is anti-Jewish and occasionally brings Jews to the Kommando for liquidation. The village heads ask for permission to liquidate the Jews themselves. Until now, executions were made very difficult because of weather conditions.

Mood of the population

The population shows a positive attitude towards the German occupation. They expect to be included in the Reich after the final victory of Germany. However, they hope that they will be granted maximum self-administration and independence [autonomy].

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[David Thompson]

Operational Situation Report USSR No. 149; December 22, 1941

Einsatzgruppe D
Location: Simferopol
...................

Jews [in Yevpatoria]

After a Jewish Council was set up, the Jews were registered; 750 persons were counted; they were concentrated [into ghettos] on November 21, 1941. In connection with the action against the Jews, six localities and several kolkhozes are to be searched in the environs of Yevpatoria where a few Jewish families are still living.

[David Thompson]

Operational Situation Reports USSR No. 150; January 2, 1942

Einsatzgruppe D reports:

Situation and general mood

General mood is governed, as before, by the food problem.The attitude towards the Jews has been confirmed. In general, the shooting of Jews has been positively received after the initial fear of similiar treatment for the rest of the population has subsided.
....................

Jews

Simferopol, Yevpatoria, Alushta, Krasubasar, Kerch, and Feodosia and other districts of western Crimea are free of Jews. From November 16 to December 15, 1941, 17,645 Jews, 2,504 Krimchaks, 824 Gypsies, and 212 Communists and partisans have been shot. Altogether, 75,881 persons have been executed.

Rumors about executions in other areas complicated the action in Simferopol. Reports about actions against Jews gradually filter down from fleeing Jews, Russians, and also from the loose talk of German soldiers.

[David Thompson]

Operational Situation Report USSR No. 153; January 9, 1942

Einsatzgruppe D
Location: Simferopol

1) The operational areas of the Teilkommandos, particularly in smaller villages, were made free of Jews. During the period covered by the report 3,176 Jews, 85 partisans, 12 looters, and 122 Communist officials were shot. In all: 79, 276. In Simferopol, apart from Jews, the Krimchak and Gypsy question was also solved. The population generally welcomed the elimination of these elements.

........................

General mood

The attitude towards German occupation continues to be positive. A larger part of the population is afraid of a Russian return. 7,000 prisoners from Feodosia on the march via Simferopol-Dznakoy, partly under guard, [made] no attempt to go over to the Russians.

Food supplies already very difficult. Presently attempting to send parts of the town population to the countryside.

Tarters are in general positively inclined towards the German occupying forces. They constantly offer active help against partisans, setting up of independent armed units and actively destroying the partisan [units].

[David Thompson]

Operational Situation Report USSR No. 156; January 16, 1942

Einsatzgruppe C
Location: Kiev

The Jewish question in Kharkov

At the moment discussions are being conducted with a view to the most thorough registration of the Jews. According to experience gained so far, the lines between the saboteurs and the partisans are mainly being kept open by the Jewish segment of the population of Kharkov. The registration of all Jews would seem to indicate a considerable contribution to the solution of the partisan problem in this area. In agreement with the authorized Army HQ (1) and the Field Kommandatur, preliminary steps to a major action against the Jews are to be taken by SK 4a, as soon as arrangements for the accommodation of the Kommando has been made.

Activity of Teilkommando SK 4a in Poltava

On November 17, 1941, Teilkommando SK 4a took over the arrangements of the proceedings left behind by SK 4b. Future cooperation with the Security Service, Secret Military Police, Field Gendarmerie, the German police and local Kommando was outlined in a meeting with militia organized in Poltava. In this context the so-called political department of the Poltavian Ukrainian militia was dissolved. In the period ending November 20, 1941, quite a number of arrested Communists were interrogated and most of them were shot.

A major Jewish action took place on November 23, 1941, after the Jewish population, on the previous day, had been requested by means of posters to assemble. In all, 1,538 Jews were shot. Their clothing was handed over to the mayor of Poltava who gave special priority to ethnic Germans when distributing it.

Activity of Teilkommando SK 4a in Lubny

On November 18, 1941, the Teilkommando of SK 4a at Lubny took over the evaluation of the NKVD files left behind by the Vorkommando as well as the handling of current correspondence.

Together with the Ukrainian militia set up in Lubny, it was possible, with the aid of the acquired files, to arrest a considerable number of NKVD agents and several leading Communists. 34 agents and Communists, and 73 Jews were shot.

The total number of people shot by Sonderkommando 4a as of November 30, 1941, was 59,018.

Einsatzkommando 5 has, up to December 7, 1941, shot 36,147 people. Of this number, during the period November 23 through 30, 1941.
64 political functionaries
46 saboteurs and looters
2,615 Jews
were shot. During the period December 1 through 7, 1941, EK 5 shot
60 political functionaries
47 saboteurs
1,417 Jews.

....................

SK 4b had to limit its activity again to work in the places that it passed through during the march toward Kramaetorskya. According to the information gathered so far, active partisan activity has to be counted upon in the new location. While communist elements appear to exist in respectable numbers, it could generally be noted that the Jews living in towns occupied by SK 4b in the environs of Kramaetorskya is estimated to be no more than 1,500. During the search for suspicious elements, the mayor of Kremenchug, Vershovsky, was arrested and shot. He frequently managed to carry out his duties in gross defiance of German orders and wishes that were well known to him. In his order of September 28, 1941, he succeeded in sabotaging the handling of the Jewish problem by having a great number of Jews baptized in order to remove them from German control.

Einsatzkommando 6

During the period November 24 through 30, 1941, EK 6 carried out 274 shootings. This figure includes:
19 political functionaries
29 saboteurs and looters and
226 Jews
Up to November 12, 1941, EK 6 shot 800 of a total of 1160 mentally deficient patients of the Igrin mental hospital near Dniepropetrovsk.

....................

Einsatzgruppe D
Location: Simferopol

On November 23, 1941, towards 16:00 hours, partisans shot at an army convoy, 9 km north-west of Alushta, on its way to Yalta with guns and grenade-throwers. The Army suffered the following casualties: eight dead and six wounded. In addition, three trucks were so badly damaged that they had to be towed away.

In reprisal 32 Communists and 30 Jews from Bium-Lambat and Alushta were shot on November 21, 1941.