I have absolutely no idea. If your point is that German POWs did labor in the victor countries of the West too, you are right. But German prisoners were generally held, I believe, for a much longer time in the East.Qvist wrote:
How much per cent of what? What do you mean?
cheers
Labor! You claimed the USSR made huge use of slave labor. When all labor days of German POW's are 100 %, how much of this concerns the USSR? 99%, 95%, 90% or what?
Right, the POW's were held longer in the east. But I get the intension that people thinking only "evil" Russians made usage of slave labor.I have absolutely no idea. If your point is that German POWs did labor in the victor countries of the West too, you are right. But German prisoners were generally held, I believe, for a much longer time in the East.
You mean the Morgenthau Plan wasn't actually implemented because the Germans weren't actually sterilized (Kaufmann Plan)? The Morgenthau fantasy may not have ever been a serious comprehensive plan, but there is no doubt that Morgenthau was the most powerful member of FDR's cabinet, and parts of the plan were implemented prior to circa 1948 when tensions with the Russians started to rise. The only disagreements before that time were over how much booty (oops, I mean reparations) the Soviets could get. What is hauling away industrial plant (and skilled labor) if not deindustrialization or a "pastoralization policy," i.e., Morgenthau?Qvist wrote:The Morgenthau plan was discarded long before the war ended. It would have been a crime fully comparable to anything the Germans did had it not been, and the shameful part is that both Roosevelt and Churchill actually seem to have supported it for a brief period of time.Scott wrote:
Furthermore, I would argue that the MP was implemented prior to 1948 and the decision to rebuild Germany to assist in the containment of the Soviet Union.
Sure, Churchill was writing his memoirs--his own propaganda. He is going to put his own spin onto things retrospectively. And, I would argue that none of those things "actually happened" only because of the Cold War. By 1948, Germany was slated to be built-up into an economic giant as a counterpoise to the Soviet Union. From the German perspective of 1943-45, they had no diplomatic agreements or guarantees besides Unconditional Surrender, and they did not have any way of knowing what this would mean. Only a fool would think they would be treated BETTER by their victors than they had in the last war; in each case the Allies had dubbed the defeated with absolute War-Guilt.qvist wrote:This ignores the fact that none of the things you describe actually happened. with the possible exception of the slave labor point, if that is the perspective you want to put on the USSR retaining very large numbers of German POWs for a good decade.Scott wrote:What a dissembling hypocrite, our Prime Minister of the Free World. Unconditional Surrender does not mean they will enslave you. NO, they will merely put a few million Germans to work at forced-labor in peacetime and then proceed to implement the Morgenthau Plan. Yeah, you must be disarmed and have no industrial capability whatever, even if you go hungry; you can't fly your gliders or use your brain for that matter, as that will be washed clean of all German militarism and patriotism.
Churchill wanted war--he needed war--and yet the enemy is solely responsible for the war; therefore Unconditional Surrender is warranted, to stamp-out Evil. This is where Churchill's bottomless hypocrisy begins. Forced-labor is "reparations" when practiced by the Allies; it is a Warcrime when practiced by the Germans, who are desperately trying to win a war. We speak not of Stalin's great economic leap forward to fight the war in the first place. Yes, the Allies are all innocent lambs. Sure, Churchill may not have been a big fan of Unconditional Surrender, especially when he was trying to embroil the Americans into saving Albion's nuts in the fire, but this doesn't mean that he ignored the new party-line either. Churchill was good at Orwellian flip-flops, one of which occurred with Barbarossa. To make common-cause with the Soviet Communist empire to Crusade against Evil is hypocrisy enough. Churchill was already worried at Yalta when he saw Albion playing third-fiddle (or worse) instead of the sole arbiter of European and world affairs. By 1946 at Fulton, he was ready for the Cold War--no more anti-German rhetoric now, just a highly-retrospective "spin" for his legacy.And where's the hypocrisy? Churchill argues in favor of Unconditional Surrender, which is the policy he also partook in implementing. He then points out that this doctrine does not in itself say anything about how Germany will actually be treated, but that this will be up to the victors. Which, of course, is exactly what happened.
What historians, Mr. Smith?Scott Smith wrote:It's one guy's view Roberto, and so are the historians that you resorted to.
Cut out the crap, Smith. The issue is not how many or how few people adhere to a given view. The issue is whether someone can show evidence in support of his contentions and finds reasonable and convincing explanations for the evidence speaking against them. Sanning can offer none of the former and conveniently ignores the latter.Scott Smith wrote:You seem to think that if you can get a bunch of people who agree with you on something then that is the gospel truth, and you assume that your opponents do likewise in their methodology.
Well, Sanning's crap obviously belongs in the latter category. And what is the value of "points of view" that are not supported by or even at odds with evidence?Scott Smith wrote:On the contrary, I prefer points-of-view not gospel truths.
Neither has Sanning, as it seems.Scott Smith wrote:I have no idea if Sannings numbers are correct as I'm not a demographer and haven't studied the Unknown War in that aspect.
Of course. The suffering and dying of many millions of Soviet people in World War II was chiefly due not to your beloved Führer's war of aggression and annihilation, but to the Soviet efforts to defend themselves against it, right?Scott Smith wrote:I do, however, agree with Sannings fundamental points.
I was not referring to Smith in particular but to the "Revisionist" public in general, which I expect to include many a true believer taking in Sanning's figures like gospel and not even asking if they are derived from any source other than the author's thumb.Scott Smith wrote:So you can't really say that I am not skeptical of the numbers since I am not endorsing them further than to say that I don't know.
Any apologetic statements of Overy's you can show us that compare to Sanning's all-too-obvious Nazi apologia?Scott Smith wrote:I think I would be skeptical of Overy's Allied apologia
On what basis, Mr. Smith ?Scott Smith wrote:and Gerlach, however;
Is that what you call your beloved Führer's hallowed words, Mr. Smith?Scott Smith wrote:the war-of-extermination thesis is bullshit, AFAIC.
The "Kaufmann Plan" never existed outside the mind of Mr. Kaufmann, a lunatic whom no one ever took seriously, and of "Revisionist" propagandists as imbecile as Kaufmann himself, as Smith well knows.Scott Smith wrote:You mean the Morgenthau Plan wasn't actually implemented because the Germans weren't actually sterilized (Kaufmann Plan)?
So what? His plan nevertheless disappeared in the drawers as early as September 1944.Scott Smith wrote:The Morgenthau fantasy may not have ever been a serious comprehensive plan, but there is no doubt that Morgenthau was the most powerful member of FDR's cabinent,
Really? What parts, and what evidence can Smith show us that there was any connection between the measures he is referring to and the Morgenthau Plan?Scott Smith wrote:and parts of the plan were implemented prior to circa 1948 when tensions with the Russians started to rise.
Has that been done yet? I think not.Sanning wrote:The book has not yet been written which analyses the German military defeat in Russia in terms of her failure to get the economy of the occupied territories organized effectively and producing again.
[Ibidem]
Of course, but the New York Times reviewed the book favorably and I have already posted the rhetoric from a certain American professor who "let loose" on the Germans. Sure, these were just "trial balloons" but when the Nazis say such things it is ipso facto proof of criminal intent, isn't it?Roberto wrote:The "Kaufmann Plan" never existed outside the mind of Mr. Kaufmann, a lunatic whom no one ever took seriously, and of "Revisionist" propagandists as imbecile as Kaufmann himself, as Smith well knows.Scott Smith wrote:You mean the Morgenthau Plan wasn't actually implemented because the Germans weren't actually sterilized (Kaufmann Plan)?
And yet some of the measures were taken...Roberto wrote:So what? His plan nevertheless disappeared in the drawers as early as September 1944.Scott Smith wrote:The Morgenthau fantasy may not have ever been a serious comprehensive plan, but there is no doubt that Morgenthau was the most powerful member of FDR's cabinent,
Well, why don't you read the Morgenthau Plan and then compare it with occupation policies. It wasn't completely dead until Germany was "rehabilitated" for the Cold War. In some sense, Germany has still not fully been rehabilitated--at least the Germans must think so since the Bundestablishment is so paranoid about Germany being seen as a bunch of Nazis. Goggi posted it once. Here it is again.Roberto wrote:Really? What parts, and what evidence can Smith show us that there was any connection between the measures he is referring to and the Morgenthau Plan?Scott Smith wrote:and parts of the plan were implemented prior to circa 1948 when tensions with the Russians started to rise.
Mr. Morgenthau wrote:
THE MORGENTHAU PLAN
TOP SECRET
Program to Prevent Germany from
starting a World War III
1. Demilitarization of Germany.
It should be the aim of the Allied Forces to accomplish the complete demilitarization of Germany in the shortest possible period of time after surrender. This means completely disarm the German Army and people (including the removal or destruction of all war material), the total destruction of the whole German armament industry, and the removal or destruction of other key industries which are basic to military strength.
2. New Boundaries of Germany.
a) Poland should get that part of East Prussia which doesn't go to the U.S.S.R. and the southern portion of Silesia. (See map in 12 Appendix.)
b) France should get the Saar and the adjacent territories bounded by the Rhine and the Moselle Rivers.
c) As indicated in 4 below an International Zone should be created containing the Ruhr and the surrounding industrial areas.
3. Partitioning of New Germany.
The remaining portion of Germany should be divided into two autonomous, independent states, (1) a South German state comprising Bavaria, Wuerttemberg, Baden and some smaller areas and (2) a North German state comprising a large part of the old state of Prussia, Saxony, Thuringia and several smaller states.
There shall be a custom union between the new South German state and Austria, which will be restored to her pre-1938 political borders.
4. The Ruhr Area.
(The Ruhr, surrounding industrial areas, as shown on e map, including the Rhineland, the Keil Canal, and all German territory north of the Keil [sic] Canal.)
Here lies the heart of German industrial power. This area should not only be stripped of all presently existing industries but so weakened and controlled that it can not in the foreseeable future become an industrial area. The following steps will accomplish this:
a) Within a short period, if possible not longer than 6 months after the cessation of hostilities, all industrial plants and equipment not destroyed by military action shall be completely dismantled and transported to Allied Nations as restitution. All equipment shall be removed from the mines and the mines closed.
b) The area should be made an international zone to be governed by an international security organization to be established by the United Nations. In governing the area the international organization should be guided by policies designed to further the above stated objective.
5. Restitution and Reparation.
Reparations, in the form of future payments and deliveries, should not be demanded. Restitution and reparation shall be effected b-y the transfer of existing German resources and territories, e.g.,
a) by restitution of property looted by the Germans in territories occupied by them;
b) by transfer of German territory and German private rights in industrial property situated in such territory to invaded countries and the international organization under the program of partition;
c) by the removal and distribution among devastated countries of industrial plants and equipment situated within the International Zone and the North and South German states delimited in the section on partition;
d) by forced German labor outside Germany; and
e) by confiscation of all German assets of any character whatsoever outside of Germany.
6. Education and Propaganda.
a) All schools and universities will be closed until an Allied Commission of Education has formulated an effective reorganization program. It is contemplated that it may require a considerable period of time before any institutions of higher education are reopened. Meanwhile the education of German students in foreign universities will not be prohibited. Elementary schools will be reopened as quickly as appropriate teachers and textbooks are available.
b) All German radio stations and newspapers, magazines, weeklies, etc. shall be discontinued until adequate controls are established and an appropriate program formulated.
7. Political Decentralization.
The military administration in Germany in the Initial period should be carried out with a view toward the eventual partitioning of Germany. To facilitate partitioning and to assure its permanence the military authorities should be guided by the following principles:
a) Dismiss all policy-making officials of the Reich government and deal primarily with local governments.
b) Encourage the re-establishment of state governments in
c) each of the states (Lander) corresponding to 18 states into which Germany is presently divided and in addition make the Prussian provinces separate states.
d) Upon the partitioning of Germany, the various state governments should be encouraged to organize a federal government for each of the newly partitioned areas. Such new governments should be in the form of a confederation of states, with emphasis on states" rights and a large degree of local autonomy.
8. Responsibility of Military for Local German Economy.
The sole purpose of the military in control of the German economy shall be to facilitate military operations and military occupation. The Allied Military Government shall not assume responsibility for such economic problems as price controls, rationing, unemployment, production, reconstruction, distribution, consumption, housing, or transportation, or take any measures designed to maintain or strengthen the German economy, except those which are essential to military operations. The responsibility for sustaining the German economy and people rests with the German people with such facilities as may be available under the circumstances.
9. Controls over Development of German Economy.
During a period of at least twenty years after surrender adequate controls, including controls over foreign trade and tight restrictions on capital imports, shall be maintained by the United Nations designed to prevent in the newly-established states the establishment or expansion of key industries basic to the German military potential and to control other key industries.
10. Agrarian program.
All large estates should be broken up and divided among the peasants and the system of primogeniture and entail should be abolished.
11. Punishment of War Crimes and Treatment of Special Groups.
A program for the punishment of certain war crimes and for the treatment of Nazi organizations and other special groups is contained in section 11.
12. Uniforms and Parades.
a) No German shall be permitted to wear, after an appropriate period of time following the cessation of hostilities, any military uniform or any uniform of any quasi military organizations.
b) No military parades shall be permitted anywhere In Germany and all military bands shall be disbanded.
13. Aircraft.
All aircraft (including gliders), whether military or commercial, will be confiscated for later disposition. No German shall be permitted to operate or to help operate any aircraft, including those owned by foreign interests.
14. United States Responsibility
Although the United States would have full military and civilian representation on whatever International commission or commissions may be established for the execution of the whole German program, the primary responsibility for the policing of Germany and for civil administration in Germany should be assumed by the military forces of Germany's continental neighbors. Specifically these should include Russian, French, Polish, Czech, Greek, Yugoslav, Norwegian, Dutch and Belgian soldiers.
Under this program United States troops could be withdrawn within a relatively short time.
No I don't, and cannot recall having mentioned anything about sterilization. I mean that the Morgenthau plan was never implemented because it was never approved, and never formed the basis of allied policy.You mean the Morgenthau Plan wasn't actually implemented because the Germans weren't actually sterilized (Kaufmann Plan)?
The fantasy is yours. The plan was - thank God - never approved, and nevr implemented. If you can find policies that can be construed as more or less consistent with some of the elements that it contained, this obviously is not the same thing as parts of it being implemented.The Morgenthau fantasy may not have ever been a serious comprehensive plan, but there is no doubt that Morgenthau was the most powerful member of FDR's cabinet, and parts of the plan were implemented prior to circa 1948 when tensions with the Russians started to rise.
Firstly, disagreements went well beyond that issue, as any account of Anglo-American-Soviet relations will tell you- There was the Polish question, for starters. And the answer to your question you provide yourself. Hauling away industrial plant was not Morgenthau deindustrialization, it was "how much booty the Soviets could get".The only disagreements before that time were over how much booty (oops, I mean reparations) the Soviets could get. What is hauling away industrial plant (and skilled labor) if not deindustrialization or a "pastoralization policy," i.e., Morgenthau?
As is anyone who is writing his memoirs.Sure, Churchill was writing his memoirs--his own propaganda. He is going to put his own spin on things retrospectively
Firstly, this would still not change the fact that your list of grievances are limited to things that did not actually happen. Secondly, perhaps you would like to present some sort of support for your extraordinary claim that these things were planned? Or do you consider your own belief, sorry, scepticism, to be a sufficient foundation?And, I would argue that none of those things "actually happened" only because of the Cold War. By 1948, Germany was slated to be built-up into an economic giant as a counterpoise to the Soviet Union.
Quite. They could in fact reasonably expect a much harsher peace than in the previous war. No-one could argue that unconditional surrender created a strong impetus for Hitler to seek a peaceful solution. And the Allies did not want a peace that left Hitler's regime intact. I suspect we might disagree on the wisdom and justification of this policy.From the German perspective of 1943-45, they had no diplomatic agreements besides Unconditional Surrender and they did not have any way of knowing what this would mean. Only a fool would think they would be treated BETTER by their victors than they had in the last war; in each case the Allies had dubbed the defeated with absolute War-Guilt.
You are putting the eggs in the wrong basket. Churchill did not come up with the Unconditional surrender doctrine, Roosevelt did, and Churchill is on record as a sceptic against it on several occasions, if mainly for tactical reasons. And if you don't believe that, I still don't see where the hypocrisy begins. He did believe that Germany was responsible for war, and clearly said so. He did believe Unc. S. was justified, and said so. He did believe that the war was to stamp out Evil, and said so.Churchill wanted war--he needed war--and yet the enemy is solely responsible for the war; therefore Unconditional Surrender is warranted, to stamp out Evil. This is where Churchill's bottomless hypocrisy begins.
Sure, if ypu want to have someone to hate, call it hypocrisy. Reparations was in fact entirely forfeited by Britain, who obviously could not dictate to Stalin what his victory policy was going to be. If you want to see co-operation with the USSR in the situation Britain was facing in 1941 as hypocrisy, be my guest. Personally, I have no doubt whatsoever that I would have done exactly the same thing in his shoes, and consider anything else suicidal. And Churchill started worrying about Soviet influence in the post-war world well before Yalta. Beyond Greece, for which he took a fair amount of flak, there wasn't much he could do about it, as long as Roosevelt was stuck in the wholly illusory belief that he could work with Stalin after Hitler was finished.Forced-labor is "reparations" when practiced by the Allies; it is a Warcrime when practiced by the Germans who are desperately trying to win a war. We speak not of Stalin's great economic leap forward to fight the war in the first place. The Allies are all innocent lambs. Sure, Churchill may not have been a big fan of Unconditional Surrender, especially when he was trying to embroil the Americans into saving Albion's nuts, but this doesn't mean that he ignored the new party-line either. Churchill was good at Orwellian flip-flops, one of which occured with Barbarossa. To make common-cause with the Soviet Communist empire to Crusade against Evil is hypocrisy enough. Churchill was already worried at Yalta when he saw Albion playing third-fiddle or worse instead of the sole arbiter of European and world affairs. By 1946 at Fulton, he was ready for the Cold War--no more anti-German rhetoric now, just a highly-retrospective "spin" for his legacy.
Your first point is obviously correct. But I do not think this was ever a war of tangible and diplomatically-definable objectives. For the USSR, it was by neccessity (given German war aims) a war of survival. To some extent, it was the same for Britain, though Churchill to a considerable extent shared Roosevelt's basic premise, which was indeed that the war was a crusade against a regime with which there could be no co-existence. And no, this does not imply that Britain and still less the United States wanted or sought war with Germany in the Thirties. Your last point I think is irrelevant, the Allied powers fought Germany with the means they had at their disposal at any given time.Unconditional Surrender was intended to bolster the Allied alliance so that nobody would make a separate-peace with the Germans. It was meant to turn of war of tangible and diplomatically-definable objectives in to a Holy Crusade against Evil, using Soviet cannon-fodder as much as possible.
Like the propaganda of master Goebbels. Big deal.Scott Smith wrote:Roberto,
Sanning's 1986 article is well-written
I don't know, nor do I consider it a particularly interesting topic of study, and I definitely don't think Sanning's nonsense is likely to contribute the least to enhancing historical knowledge in this or any other respect.Scott Smith wrote:and poses some interesting questions. He himself states:
Has that been done yet? I think not.Sanning wrote:The book has not yet been written which analyses the German military defeat in Russia in terms of her failure to get the economy of the occupied territories organized effectively and producing again.
[Ibidem]
My translation:[…]1.) Der Krieg ist nur weiterzuführen, wenn die gesamte Wehrmacht im 3. Kriegsjahr aus Rußland ernährt wird.
2.) Hierbei werden zweifellos zig Millionen Menschen verhungern, wenn von uns das für uns Notwendige aus dem Lande herausgeholt wird.
3.) Am wichtigsten ist die Bergung und Abtransport von Ölsaaten, Ölkuchen, dann erst Getreide. Das vorhandene Fett und Fleisch wird voraussichtlich die Truppe verbrauchen.[…]
Emphasis is mine.[…]1.) The war can only be continued if the whole Wehrmacht is fed out of Russia in the 3rd war year.
2.) Due to this umpteen million people will doubtlessly starve to death when we take what is necessary for us out of the land.
3.) Most important is the collection and shipment of oil seeds and oil cake, only thereafter of grain. The available fat and meat will presumably be consumed by the troops.[…]
My translation:Damit ist das wesentlichste des Problems gekennzeichnet. Die Überschüsse Rußlands an Getreide werden entscheidend nicht durch die Höhe der Ernte, sondern durch die Höhe des Selbstverbrauchs bestimmt. Selbst eine geringe Herabsetzung um 30 kg je Kopf der Bevölkerung (220 kg statt 250 kg) und eine Herabsetzung der Pferderation um 25 % erzeugen einen Exportüberschuß, der fast an die Friedenshöhe heranreicht. […]
b) Da Deutschland bzw. Europa unter allen Umständen Überschüsse braucht, muß also der Konsum entsprechend herabgedrückt werden. Wie groß durch Drosselung des Verbrauchs die Überschussmengen werden können, zeigen die obigen Beispiele.
c) Dieses Herabdrücken des Konsums ist im Gegensatz zu den bisherigen besetzten Gebieten auch durchführbar deshalb, weil das Hauptüberschußgebiet räumlich scharf getrennt ist.
[…]Die Überschußgebiete liegen im Schwarzerdegebiet (also im Süden, Südosten) und im Kaukasus. Die Zuschußgebiete liegen im wesentlichen in der Waldzone des Nordens (Podsolböden). Daraus folgt: Eine Abriegelung der Schwarzerdegebiete muß unter allen Umständen mehr oder weniger hohe Überschüsse in diesen Gebieten für uns greifbar machen. Die Konzequenz ist die Nichtbelieferung der gesamten Waldzone einschließlich der Industriezentren und Petersburg. […]
1. Aufgabe der gesamten Industrie im Zuschußgebiet, im wesentlichen der Verarbeitungsindustrie im Moskauer und Petersburger Industriegebiet, desgleichen des Industriegebiets im Ural. Man kann wohl annehmen, daß diese Gebiete heute einen Zuschuß aus der Produktionszone von 5-10 Mill.t [Getreide] beziehen. […]
2. […]
3. Jede weitere Ausnahme zwecks Erhaltung dieses oder jenes Industriebezirks oder Industrieunternehmens in der Zuschußzone muß abgelehnt werden.
4. Erhalten werden kann die Industie nur, soweit sie im Überschußgebiet liegt. […]
Aus dieser Lage, die die Billigung der höchsten Stellen erfahren hat, […] ergeben sich folgende Konzequenzen:
I. für die Waldzone: […]
b) Ein deutsches Interesse an der Erhaltung der Erzeugungskraft dieser Gebiete ist, auch hinsichtlich der Versorgung der dort stehenden Truppen, nicht vorhanden. […] Die Bevölkerung dieser Gebiete, insbesondere die Bevölkerung der Städte, wird größter Hungersnot entgegensehen müssen. Es wird darauf ankommen, die Bevölkerung in die sibirischen Räume abzulenken. Da Eisenbahntransport nicht in Frage kommt, wird auch dieses Problem ein äußerst schwieriges sein. […]
Aus all dem folgt, daß die deutsche Verwaltung in diesem Gebiet wohl bestrebt sein kann, die Folgen der zweifellos eintretenden Hungersnot zu mildern und den Naturalisierungsprozeß zu beschleunigen. Man kann bestrebt sein, diese Gebiete intensiver zu bewirtschaften im Sinne einer Ausdehnung der Kartoffelanbaufläche und anderer für den Konsum wichtiger, hohe Erträge gebender Früchte. Die Hungersnot ist dadurch nicht zu bannen. Viele 10 Millionen Menschen werden in diesem Gebiet überflüssig und werden sterben oder nach Sibirien auswandern müssen. Versuche, die Bevölkerung dort vor dem Hungertode dadurch zu retten, daß man aus der Schwarzerdezone Überschüsse heranzieht, können nur auf Kosten der Versorgung Europas gehen. Sie unterbinden die Durchhaltefähigkeit Deutschlands im Kriege, sie unterbinden die Blockadefestigkeit Deutschlands und Europas. Darüber muß absolute Klarheit herrschen. […]
I. Armeeversorgung. Die Ernährungslage Deutschlands in dritten Kriegsjahr erfordert gebieterisch, daß die Wehrmacht in ihrer Gesamtverpflegung nicht aus dem großdeutschen Raum bzw. angegliederten oder befreundeten Gebieten, die diesen Raum durch Ausfuhren versorgen, lebt. Dieses Minimalziel, die Versorgung der Wehrmacht aus Feindesland im dritten und evtl. weiteren Kriegsjahren, muß unter allen Umständen erreicht werden.
II. Versorgung der deutschen Zivilbevölkerung
1) Erst nach der Abdeckung dieses Heeresbedarfs, der unter allen Umständen aus den Osträumen bereitgestellt werden muß, haben Lieferungen nach Deutschland zur Deckung des Zivilbedarfs einzusetzen. Hiebei ist jede Verzettelung auf Nebengebiete unter allen Umständen zu unterlassen. Im Vordergrund steht der Transport von Ölsaaten – insbesondere Sonnenblumenkerne, aber auch Leinsaat, Baumwollsaat, Sojabohnen – nach Deutschland, um die Fettbilanz zu verbessern. […]
2) Erst nach der Bewältigung des Transports der Ölsaaten kann eine Getreideausfuhr stattfinden, die selbstverständlich außerordentlich erwünscht ist, da ja Großdeutschland in steigendem Maße die besetzten Gebiete beliefern muß und auch selbst für die Zukunft seiner Reserven nach der schlechten Ernte 1940 und der bestenfalls zu erwartenden mittleren Ernte in diesem Jahr auffüllen muß. […]
3) […]
V. Diese Ausführungen zeigen, worauf es ankommt. Das Minimalziel muß sein, Deutschland im 3. Kriegsjahr völlig von der Versorgung der eigenen Wehrmacht zu befreien, um der deutschen Ernährungswirtschaft die Möglichkeit zu geben, einerseits die bisherigen Rationen beizubehalten, andererseits gewisse Reserven für die Zukunft anzulegen. Außerdem wird es notwendig sein, auf den drei entscheidenden Lebensmittelgebieten – Ölsaaten, Getreide und Fleisch – Zufuhren in einem größtmöglichen Umfang für Deutschland freizumachen, um die Ernährung nicht nur Deutschlands, sondern auch der besetzten Gebiete im Norden und Westen zu gewährleisten. […]
Abschließend sei nochmals auf das Grundsätzliche hingewiesen. Rußland hat sich unter dem bolschewistischen System aus reinen Machtgründen aus Europa zurückgezogen und so das europäische arbeitsteilige Gleichgewicht gestört. Unsere Aufgabe, Rußland wieder arbeitsteilig in Europa einzubeziehen, bedeutet zwangsläufig die Zerreißung des jetzigen wirtschaftlichen Gleichgewichts der UdSSR. Es kommt also unter keinen Umständen auf eine Erhaltung des Bisherigen an, sondern auf bewußte Abkehr vom Gewordenen und Einbeziehung der Ernährungswirtschaft Rußlands in den europäischen Rahmen. Daraus folgt zwangsläufig ein Absterben sowohl der Industrie wie eines großen Teils der Menschen in den bisherigen Zuschußgebieten.
Diese Alternative kann nicht hart und scharf genug herausgestellt werden.
Emphases are mine.Thus the essence of the problem has been outlined. The grain excesses of Russia are primarily determined not by the quantities harvested but by the amounts they consume themselves. Even a small reduction of 30 kg per head of the population (220 kg instead of 250 kg) and a reduction of the horse ration by 25 % will create an export excess almost reaching peacetime levels. […]
b) As Germany and Europe need excesses under any circumstances, consume must be reduced accordingly. How large the excess amounts resulting from a restriction of consume may become is shown by the above examples.
c) Contrary to the situation in the hitherto occupied areas this reduction of consume is feasible also because there is a clear geographical separation of the main excess region.
[…]The excess regions are located in the black earth region (i.e. in the south and southeast) and in the Caucasus. The food importing regions are mainly located in the northern forest zone (podsol[?] soil). This means that sealing off the black earth regions must under any circumstances make more or less high excesses available to us in these areas. The consequence is the non-supply of the entire forest zone including the industrial centers and Petersburg. […]
1. We will give up all industry in the food importing region, mainly the manufacturing industry in the Moscow and Petersburg industrial area and the Ural industrial region. It can be assumed that these regions are currently importing an excess from the production zone in the amount of 5-10 million tons of grain. […]
2. […]
3. Any further exception for maintaining this or that industrial district or enterprise in the importing area must be rejected.
4. Industry can be maintained only insofar as located in the excess region. […]
From this situation, which has been approved by the highest entities, […] there result the following consequences:
II. for the forest zone: […]
b) There is no German interest in maintaining the productive capacity of these regions, also in what concerns the supplies of the troops stationed there. […] The population of these regions, especially the population of the cities, will have to anticipate a famine of the greatest dimensions. The issue will be to redirect the population to the Siberian areas. As railway transportation is out of the question, this problem will also be an extremely difficult one. […]
From all this there follows that the German administration in these regions may well attempt to milder the consequences of the famine that will doubtlessly occur and accelerate the naturalization process. It can be attempted to cultivate there areas more extensively in the sense of an extension of the area for cultivating potatoes and other high yield fruits important for consume. This will not stop the famine, however. Many tens of millions of people will become superfluous in this area and will die or have to emigrate to Siberia. Attempts to save the population from starvation death by using excesses from the black earth zone can only be made at the expense of the supply of Europe. They hinder Germany’s capacity to hold out in the war, they hinder the blockade resistance of Germany and Europe. This must be absolutely clear.[…]
III. Army food supplies. The food situation of Germany in the third year of the war makes it mandatory that the Wehrmacht does not take its food supply out of the greater German area or the annexed or allied areas supplying this area through exports. This minimal goal, the supply of the Wehrmacht out of enemy territory in the third and eventually further years of the war, must be achieved under any circumstances.
IV. Food supplies for the German civilian population
1) Only after covering the army’s needs, which under any circumstance must occur out of the eastern areas, may there be shipments to Germany to cover civilian needs. Deviations to secondary areas are to be avoided under any circumstances. Priority is to be given to the shipment of oil seeds – especially sunflower seeds, but also linen seed, cotton seed and soy beans – to Germany in order to improve the fats balance. […]
2) Only after the transport of the oil seeds has been handled can there be shipments of grain, which of course are extremely desirable as Greater Germany must increasingly supply the occupied areas and also stock up its own reserves after the bad harvest of 1940 and the at best average harvest to be expected this year. […]
3) […]
V. These considerations show what the key issues are. The minimal goal must be to completely free Germany from the feeding of its own Wehrmacht in the 3rd year of the war in order to give German food economy the possibility of on the one hand keeping the rations so far issued and on the other to create certain reserves for the future. It will further be necessary to make available supplies for Germany to the greatest extent possible in the three key fields of nourishment – oil seeds, grain and meat – in order to guarantee the feeding not only of Germany, but also of the occupied areas in the north and west. […]
Finally the basics must be again pointed out. Russia under the Bolshevik system has withdrawn from Europe for pure reasons of power and thus disturbed the European work-sharing balance. Our task of reintegrating Russia into this balance necessarily implies tearing apart the present-day economic balance of the USSR. There is no question of maintaining what is there, but we are consciously moving away from it and integrating the food economy of Russia in the European area. This will necessarily lead both the industry and a great part of the people in the hitherto food importing areas to die off.
This alternative cannot be pointed out clearly and harshly enough.
My translation:[…] Hinsichtlich der Ernährung bemerkte er [Göring], daß die Truppe ihren Bedarf an Konserven wesentlich einschränken müsse. Der Wehrmacht machte er den Vorwurf, dass sich im Gebiet um Minsk in den Wäldern noch grosse Viehherden herumtreiben, die aber wegen der Partisanen nicht geborgen werden können. Einsatz von Truppen sei unbedingt notwendig.
Das Schicksal der Grosstädte insbesondere Leningrads sei ihm völlig schleierhaft. In diesem Kriege werde das grösste Sterben seit dem dreissigjährigen Krieg sein.
Wenn das Getreide nicht abbefördert werden kann, soll dieses zur Schweinezucht verwandt werden. Ab 1943 verlange er eine Höchstausnutzung der Ukraine. Die Versorgung ganz Europas müsse dann sichergestellt sein. […]
[…] In regard to food matters he [Göring] remarked that the troops must significantly reduce their consume of conserves. To the Wehrmacht he addressed the reproach that in the area around Minsk there are still huge herds of cattle running around in the woods which cannot be collected due to the partisans. The deployment of troops was absolutely necessary.
The fate of the major cities, especially Leningrad, was completely indifferent to him. [Translator’s note: the German term “schleierhaft” literally means “veilful” and may also be translated as “unexplainable”. Translating the term as “indifferent” (in the sense of “I don’t know what will happen to them, and I couldn’t care less”) was considered to better fit the context, however] This war would see the greatest dying since the Thirty Years War.
If the grain could not be shipped off it should be used for raising pigs. From 1943 onward he required a maximum exploitation of the Ukraine. The food supply of the whole of Europe must then be guaranteed. […]
My translation:[…]Bemerkungen des Generalquartiermeisters [Wagner] nach dem Abendessen.
[…]Die Frage der Ernährung der Zivilbevölkerung ist katastrophal. Um überhaupt zu einem Ergebnis xu kommen, mußte man zu einer Klassifizierung schreiten. Es ist klar, daß innerhalb dieser Klassifizierung an oberster Stelle die Truppe und ihre Bedürfnisse stehen müssen. Der Bevölkerung kann nur ein Existenzminimum zugebilligt werden. Dabei wird das flache Land noch einigermaßen erträglich darstehen. Unlösbar dagegen ist die Frage der Ernährung der Großstädte. Es kann keinem Zweifel unterliegen, daß insbesondere Leningrad verhungern muß, denn es ist unmöglich, diese Stadt zu ernähren. Aufgabe der Führung kann es nur sein, die Truppe hiervon und von damit verbundenen Erscheinungen fern zu halten.
Emphases are mine.[…]Remarks of the General Quarter Master [Wagner] after lunch.
[…]The issue of feeding the civilian population is catastrophic. In order to achieve a result at all there must be made a classification. It is clear that within this classification the troops and their needs occupy the uppermost rank. The population can only be granted an existence minimum. The situation in the countryside will still be fairly bearable. The feeding of the great cities can however not be solved. There can be no doubt that especially Leningrad must starve to death, because it is impossible to feed this city. The task of the leadership can thus only be to keep the troops away from this and from the phenomena related hereto.
Roberto wrote:The "Kaufmann Plan" never existed outside the mind of Mr. Kaufmann, a lunatic whom no one ever took seriously, and of "Revisionist" propagandists as imbecile as Kaufmann himself, as Smith well knows.
Thanks for that one, Mr. Smith.Smith wrote:Of course, but the New York Times reviewed the book favorably and I have already posted the rhetoric from a certain American professor who "let loose" on the Germans. Sure, these were just "trial balloons" but when the Nazis say such things it is ipso facto proof of criminal intent, isn't it?
Source of quote:Theodore Kaufman
The ideology of Holocaust denial necessarily must deal in moral equivalencies. The Daily Express headline and Chaim Weizmann’s letter are two of the most salient examples. However, the most interesting and provocative figure is not a Nazi or even a prominent Jew. Rather, it is an obscure Jewish writer named Theodore Kaufman.
Very little is known about Kaufman. The information available on him suggests that he was a loner with no ties to any organization. Kaufman wrote a book entitled Germany Must Perish in 1941. The theme of his book is that most Germans were an inherently warlike and aggressive people who would forever be starting a war unless something was done to stop them. His solution was to sterilize the Germans so that they could not procreate. However, this sterilization plan did not apply to German-Americans.
Kaufman’s book does not appear to have been reviewed in any publications. It is not listed in the Book Review Digest for 1941 and 1942. This is not unusual since he had to publish the book under the Argyle Press, in Newark, New Jersey. The Argyle Press was a creation of Kaufman himself. Nevertheless, denier Paul Rassinier saw Kaufman’s book as constituting a major threat to Germany. Similarly, Wilhelm Stäglich cited Kaufman as justification for Germany’s anti-Jewish policies.
Both Kaufman and his book would probably have gone completely unnoticed if it had not been for a Time article on March 24, 1941. This is where David Irving, ever the inventor of historical desideratum, enters the Kaufman fiasco. Underneath a photograph of Kaufman, Irving states that Time “lauds the book.” Irving writes: “The [book’s] dust cover carried endorsements from Time magazine, the Washington Post and the New York Times. Irving gives Kaufman prominent attention in his Goebbels book. He even goes so far as to quote from Eichmann’s memoirs that “Kaufman ’s plan for the complete Ausrottung of the German people was known to us at the time when the first order was given for the physical destruction of the Jews.” Thus, there is an implication, subtly stated, that Germany’s destruction of the Jews was a defensive measure. Interestingly, here Irving uses the word ausrottung as meaning extermination.
The cover of the book that Irving reproduces states that this is “The Book that Hitler Fears.” However, this cover and the alleged endorsement cited by Irving on the back cover as not from the original book. Germany Must Perish was republished by Liberty Bell Publications in 1980, a printing arm of the neo-Nazi Liberty Lobby. On the inside of the book’s front cover we are told that “[t]his book so completely unnerved Dr. Goebbels that he denounced it on the front of every newspaper in Germany and over the entire German radio network.”
These claims will now be examined.
Time magazine was said to have called the theme of this book “a sensational idea”. Both the book’s back cover and an article by Irving quote this portion of the Time article. The reason for this is obvious: both Liberty Bell and Irving are attempting to give the impression that a significant American media outlet was endorsing Kaufman’s idea. However, not surprisingly, this quote is taken out of context. Time analogized Kaufman’s idea to that of an early 18th century writer, Dean Swift, who proposed that Ireland cure its economic ills by selling “its starving children as dressed meat.” Time also notes: “no less grisly than the Dean’s it [Kaufman’s idea] was not even supposed to be ironic.”
Time article on Kaufman’s book is totally derisive. Kaufman is subjected to ridicule and compared to Nazi Jew-baiter and publisher Julius Streicher. Kaufman’s book is stated to be “[s]trictly a one man job” and he informed Time that he did not have any organization or backers. He had done all of the legwork in promoting the book. However, the most significant part of the Time article deals with Kaufman’s first sterilization plan. In 1939 he advocated sterilizing “Americans so that their children might not become homicidal monsters. In step with the times, Sterilizer Kaufman had simply transferred his basic idea to the enemy.” Thus, any rational person reading this article would have understood that Kaufman was (1) mentally unbalanced (2) spoke only for himself and (3) had a morbid fascination with sterilization.
The so-called endorsement from the New York Times is non-existent. The back cover of the Liberty Bell edition of the book cites the Times as calling Kaufman’s idea “A plan for Permanent Peace Among Civilized Nations”! However, the New York Times only discusses Kaufman twice in 1941 and neither article speaks favorably of the book. As for the Washington Post “endorsement”, it is as apocryphal as that of the New York Times. Using the methodology of Liberty Bell and Irving one could argue that Irving endorsed the book because he calls it “extraordinary.”
Nevertheless, Irving does give some indication that the book was used for propaganda purposes. Irving notes that Goebbels “gleefully” wrote in his diary: “This Jew has done a disservice to the enemy. If he had composed the book at my behest he couldn’t have done a better job.” Goebbels also “issued the book with a photograph showing President Roosevelt apparently dictating the contents.” The German Press was also claiming that Roosevelt supported and inspired the book. At the time Germany and the United States were not at war. We may someday see a denier accusation that Germany’s declaration of war on the United States was because of Kaufman’s book.
[…]
For obvious reasons deniers prefer to ignore Streicher and focus on Kaufman. Thus, Rassinier goes so far as to claim that “Kaufman’s voice was the [sic] tocsin of the forthcoming entry of the United States into the war …” In an attempt to justify Hitler’s Jewish policies, Rassinier quotes Kaufman as stating the German Jews agreed with his sterilization plans. In fact, Kaufman wrote no such thing. Moreover, Kaufman’s book says very little about Jews under Nazi rule.
[…]
The Kaufman saga does not end with Germany Must Perish in 1941. In 1942 Kaufman wrote a pamphlet entitled No More German Wars. In this pamphlet Kaufman says nothing about sterilization. He offers a ten point peace plan for Germany after the war. Among his proposals were: a system of education to inculcate German youth with democratic ideals; a works program for German soldiers returning from the war; and an economic council to strike a balance between German imports and exports. For obvious reasons, no denier has even mentioned this pamphlet. However, these types of ideas, especially inculcation of democratic ideals, were responsible for the post war West German economic and political resurgence. It would seem only fair that if deniers want to blame Kaufman for having a hand in the events of World War II, they should also credit him with bringing about Germany’s post war emergence as a political and economic force in European affairs.
Scott Smith wrote:The Morgenthau fantasy may not have ever been a serious comprehensive plan, but there is no doubt that Morgenthau was the most powerful member of FDR's cabinent,
Roberto wrote:So what? His plan nevertheless disappeared in the drawers as early as September 1944.
What measures exactly, and how related to the Morgenthau Plan?Scott Smith wrote:And yet some of the measures were taken...
Scott Smith wrote:and parts of the plan were implemented prior to circa 1948 when tensions with the Russians started to rise.
Roberto wrote:Really? What parts, and what evidence can Smith show us that there was any connection between the measures he is referring to and the Morgenthau Plan?
Blah, blah, blah.Scott Smith wrote:Well, why don't you read the Morgenthau Plan and then compare it with occupation policies. It wasn't completely dead until Germany was "rehabilitated" for the Cold War. In some sense, Germany has still not fully been rehabilitated--at least the Germans must think so since the Bundestablishment is so paranoid about Germany being seen as a bunch of Nazis. Goggi posted it once. Here it is again.
Okay, but I say the Morgenthau Plan was implemented in essence. The occupation prior to Germany's rehabilitation ca. 1948 bears striking resemblances to the harsh measures advocated by Morgenthau and the even harsher ones by Professor Bernadotte Schmitt and even Kaufmann. I am not saying that Morgenthau wanted to eliminate Germany completely as the Tsars and the crowned heads had eliminated Poland in the 18th century (only adding sterilization of German soldiers to make it permanent in Kaufmann's Genocide fantasy).Qvist wrote:No I don't, and cannot recall having mentioned anything about sterilization. I mean that the Morgenthau plan was never implemented because it was never approved, and never formed the basis of allied policy.Scott wrote:You mean the Morgenthau Plan wasn't actually implemented because the Germans weren't actually sterilized (Kaufmann Plan)?
Why not? If it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck it's a duck. I don't get where you are coming from on this. It is not a Morgenthau-Befehl but so what? We don't seem to need Hitler Orders...Qvist wrote:The fantasy is yours. The plan was - thank God - never approved, and never implemented. If you can find policies that can be construed as more or less consistent with some of the elements that it contained, this obviously is not the same thing as parts of it being implemented.Scott wrote:The Morgenthau fantasy may not have ever been a serious comprehensive plan, but there is no doubt that Morgenthau was the most powerful member of FDR's cabinet, and parts of the plan were implemented prior to circa 1948 when tensions with the Russians started to rise.
The Americans caved on Poland at Yalta. In order to "compensate" Poland the German border was moved 500 miles Westward without regard to the self-determination of peoples. How Poland was going to stay out of the Soviet orbit was not even imagined. The Morgenthau Plan I posted calls this booty "reparations." And its policy was clearly to eliminate German industrial (i.e., warmaking) potential.Qvist wrote:Firstly, disagreements went well beyond that issue, as any account of Anglo-American-Soviet relations will tell you- There was the Polish question, for starters. And the answer to your question you provide yourself. Hauling away industrial plant was not Morgenthau deindustrialization, it was "how much booty the Soviets could get".Scott wrote:The only disagreements before that time were over how much booty (oops, I mean reparations) the Soviets could get. What is hauling away industrial plant (and skilled labor) if not deindustrialization or a "pastoralization policy," i.e., Morgenthau?
Of course, and Democracy-Capitalist icons are no different.Qvist wrote:As is anyone who is writing his memoirs.Scott wrote:Sure, Churchill was writing his memoirs--his own propaganda. He is going to put his own spin on things retrospectively
Sure it did. Germany was kept a rump-state prior to the "German economic miracle" and there is no coincidence that this was conemporaneous to when Soviets relations cooled, AFAIC. If you and Roberto want to disagree, that's fine with me.Qvist wrote:Firstly, this would still not change the fact that your list of grievances are limited to things that did not actually happen.Scott wrote:And, I would argue that none of those things "actually happened" only because of the Cold War. By 1948, Germany was slated to be built-up into an economic giant as a counterpoise to the Soviet Union.
Some of what things were planned? I'm just talking about standard occupational policies which do not encourage economic growth, let alone prevent disarmament. Price controls is one measure. Morgenthau says that it should be left to the Gemans to worry about feeding themselves, not the occupiers. Now, if the Germans used such rhetoric then that would be Genocide, right? At least Roberto thinks so.Secondly, perhaps you would like to present some sort of support for your extraordinary claim that these things were planned? Or do you consider your own belief, sorry, scepticism, to be a sufficient foundation?
I submit that had Hitler's assassination been successful the Allies would be in a propaganda quandary because they did not want to leave ANY German regime intact but one where they installed their own lackeys. Without Hitler the rhetoric might have shifted to Prussian militarism instead of National Socialism but it wouldn't have mattered. Any German peace offer would be insincere, we would have been told--see they even killed their own Head of State.Qvist wrote:Quite. They could in fact reasonably expect a much harsher peace than in the previous war. No-one could argue that unconditional surrender created a strong impetus for Hitler to seek a peaceful solution. And the Allies did not want a peace that left Hitler's regime intact. I suspect we might disagree on the wisdom and justification of this policy.Scott wrote:From the German perspective of 1943-45, they had no diplomatic agreements besides Unconditional Surrender and they did not have any way of knowing what this would mean. Only a fool would think they would be treated BETTER by their victors than they had in the last war; in each case the Allies had dubbed the defeated with absolute War-Guilt.
I'm not disputing that Unconditional Surrender was not Churchill's preference. I am saying that he was not above Doublethink or an Orwellian flip-flop in order to get Roosevelt's support or that of the Soviet Union. Jointly the two wanted to insure that the Soviets didn't make a separate-peace, so they insisted on Unconditional Surrender.Qvist wrote:You are putting the eggs in the wrong basket. Churchill did not come up with the Unconditional surrender doctrine, Roosevelt did, and Churchill is on record as a sceptic against it on several occasions, if mainly for tactical reasons.Scott wrote:Churchill wanted war--he needed war--and yet the enemy is solely responsible for the war; therefore Unconditional Surrender is warranted, to stamp out Evil. This is where Churchill's bottomless hypocrisy begins.
Churchill might have believed this in his brandy-soaked mind. The man was living hypocrisy, AFAIC. He clamored for war with Germany and hated Hitler as soon as Hitler snubbed him as a minor bourgeois-imperial has-been. Churchill's personal recoup was to be the lone voice against Hitler in order to save the British Empire from Germany. Isn't that right? Then Churchill claims that he wanted peace. Churchill was a dyed-in-the-wool imperialist and very reactionary besides, which hardly befits his image as the Saviour of Europe.And if you don't believe that, I still don't see where the hypocrisy begins. He did believe that Germany was responsible for war, and clearly said so. He did believe Unconditional Surrender was justified, and said so. He did believe that the war was to stamp out Evil, and said so.
I would have made armed-peace and negotiated a settlement with Germany that encouraged border states like France to be neutral and unoccupied by either power. But there was also latent rivalry with the French, wasn't there? That's why it was necessary to attack the fleet of their ally when French broke the alliance and signed an armistice with Germany. "No separate-peace you dirty bastards, bombs away!"Qvist wrote:Sure, if ypu want to have someone to hate, call it hypocrisy. Reparations was in fact entirely forfeited by Britain, who obviously could not dictate to Stalin what his victory policy was going to be. If you want to see co-operation with the USSR in the situation Britain was facing in 1941 as hypocrisy, be my guest. Personally, I have no doubt whatsoever that I would have done exactly the same thing in his shoes, and consider anything else suicidal.Scott wrote:Churchill was already worried at Yalta when he saw Albion playing third-fiddle or worse instead of the sole arbiter of European and world affairs. By 1946 at Fulton, he was ready for the Cold War--no more anti-German rhetoric now, just a highly-retrospective "spin" for his legacy.
There is no reason why the Americans could not have gotten what they wanted from Stalin at the bargaining table. It just required a little will and some backbone. The USA was undamaged and industrially enormous, with its own resource and labor base, and even an army, navy and air force that was relatively undamaged--and there was the atomic bomb soon to peek over the horizon. The Allies had a naïve need to appease the Communists where it was shocking for them to appease Hitler. Their backbone was rather convenient, so I say it was hypocritical and not stemming from a lack of intestinal-fortitude. Simply put, Germany was a threat to Anglo-American notions of world hegemony, and Russia wasn't seen as one prior to their own atomic bomb.And Churchill started worrying about Soviet influence in the post-war world well before Yalta. Beyond Greece, for which he took a fair amount of flak, there wasn't much he could do about it, as long as Roosevelt was stuck in the wholly illusory belief that he could work with Stalin after Hitler was finished.
It was survival of the Soviet SYSTEM, and that system could have made peace with Germany by not being so diplomatically aggressive, which probably would not have been possible under Communist theory and didn't suit Stalin's paranoid temperment. Stalin was not an ideologue but he was still a Communist. However, any fool should have seen that Hitler was not going to be pushed-around by Bolshevik Slavs because he was an anti-Communist German, even if he was in a bind and willing to deal pragmatically. Stalin was the only one of Hitler's opponents shrewd and dangerous enough to be respected by him. Churchill was just a predictable gadfly.Qvist wrote:Your first point is obviously correct. But I do not think this was ever a war of tangible and diplomatically-definable objectives. For the USSR, it was by neccessity (given German war aims) a war of survival.Scott wrote:Unconditional Surrender was intended to bolster the Allied alliance so that nobody would make a separate-peace with the Germans. It was meant to turn a war of tangible and diplomatically-definable objectives into a Holy Crusade against Evil, using Soviet cannon-fodder as much as possible.
But coexistence was certainly possible with the Soviets, wasn't it? There was no hysterical reaction to them prior to the explosion of the Soviet atomic bomb because they had not scrapped the Holy Versailles treaty!To some extent, it was the same for Britain, though Churchill to a considerable extent shared Roosevelt's basic premise, which was indeed that the war was a crusade against a regime with which there could be no co-existence. And no, this does not imply that Britain and still less the United States wanted or sought war with Germany in the Thirties.
No, even General Marshall wanted a Second Front NOW, but Churchill wanted to wait and fiddle around in North Africa and bleed Soviet cannon-fodder at much as possible. Churchill then wanted to invade the Balkans to keep this for the West, but that proved impossible as Kesselring in Italy was a tough nut to crack. Churchill was not far from Truman who thought the Nazi-Soviet war a godsend and that the U.S. should assist whichever power was the weakest to ensure that both dictatorships bled themselves white. This is balance-of-power diplomacy at its finest. Only, for Albion, Germany was certainly not the weakest power!Your last point I think is irrelevant, the Allied powers fought Germany with the means they had at their disposal at any given time.
Without evidence, that's just irrelevant personal opinion.Scott Smith wrote:Okay, but I say the Morgenthau Plan was implemented in essence.
Such as, Mr. Smith?Scott Smith wrote:The occupation prior to Germany's rehabilitation ca. 1948 bears striking resemblances to the harsh measures advocated by Morgenthau and the even harsher ones by Professor Bernadotte Schmitt and even Kaufmann.
Smith keeps rambling about Kaufmann, an isolated nutcase that those who reviewed his self-edited screed in the US made fun of. See my last post.Scott Smith wrote:I am not saying that Morgenthau wanted to eliminate Germany completely as the Tsars and the crowned heads had eliminated Poland in the 18th century (only adding sterilization of German soldiers to make it permanent in Kaufmann's Genocide fantasy).
Qvist wrote:The fantasy is yours. The plan was - thank God - never approved, and never implemented. If you can find policies that can be construed as more or less consistent with some of the elements that it contained, this obviously is not the same thing as parts of it being implemented.Scott wrote:The Morgenthau fantasy may not have ever been a serious comprehensive plan, but there is no doubt that Morgenthau was the most powerful member of FDR's cabinet, and parts of the plan were implemented prior to circa 1948 when tensions with the Russians started to rise.
Nonsense. You'll have to demonstrate that what "walks like a duck and quacks like a duck" was the result of a consciously applied policy, and that such policy pursued the same goals that the Morgenthau plan intended to achieve.Scott Smith wrote:Why not? If it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck it's a duck.
"We" have traced them with a high degree of accuracy, whether Smith likes it or not.Scott Smith wrote:We don't seem to need Hitler Orders...
Which is not what the industrial reparations claimed especially by the Soviet Union were about. These were meant to help rebuild the shattered industry of a country devastated by Hitler's war.Scott wrote:The Morgenthau Plan I posted calls this booty "reparations." And its policy was clearly to eliminate German industrial (i.e., warmaking) potential.
Qvist wrote:Secondly, perhaps you would like to present some sort of support for your extraordinary claim that these things were planned? Or do you consider your own belief, sorry, scepticism, to be a sufficient foundation?
I presume that Qvist is referring to the alleged partial implementation of the Morgenthau Plan that Smith is rambling about, without having presented any evidence thereto.Smith wrote:Some of what things were planned?
Like the Marshall Plan and the 1948 currency reform, for instance?Smith wrote:I'm just talking about standard occupational policies which do not encourage economic growth, let alone prevent disarmament. Price controls is one measure.
Smith should again read the documents related to the Hungerplan that I quoted.Smith wrote:Morgenthau says that it should be left to the Gemans to worry about feeding themselves, not the occupiers. Now, if the Germans used such rhetoric then that would be Genocide, right? At least Roberto thinks so.
I strongly doubt that Smith can demonstrate there was a policy to keep the German population hungry. On the contrary, hunger was the inevitable consequence of the destruction wrought by the war and the breakdown of state organization, and even in the Soviet occupation zone, as it seems, the occupiers did what they could to fight it. This at a time when millions of civilians in the devastated areas of the western USSR were living in caves and dugouts and occasionally even begging the German prisoners of war for food.Smith wrote:Well, in the event the Germans were kept hungry but the occupational governments DID concern themselves with limiting starvation, and even the Red Army distributed some food, as Oleg's Berlin pictures show us.
Sorry to disappoint you, Mr. Smith, but if there had been a policy to keep Germans hungry it would not have been in the sense of Mr. Morgenthau, who on page 62 of his book Germany is our problem wrote the following:Smith wrote:So Morgenthau wasn't followed here?
Morgenthau wrote:The application of 55 per cent more labor to German farms, as proposed here, will not increase this food supply by 55 per cent. But that will not be necessary. An extra 15 per cent would make Germany virtually self-sustaining, even on her high prewar diet. But more probably, Germans will eat a little less for they will have to export food as well as consumer goods in return for such products of heavy industry as they will need, the small amount of foodstuffs that will not grow in Germany and the rather large amount of nitrates and phosphates she will require to keep her soil productive.
Again the “peacetime” crap.Smith wrote:But the Allies were willing to let German POWs held in peacetime starve, ostensibly to keep Germans from starving. Why this "choice" was necessary in peacetime is a mystery to me
I translated the above from an article by German historian Rolf Steininger in: Wolfgang Benz et al, Legenden, Lügen, Vorurteile, 12th edition 2002 by dtv Munich, page 128.The fact is that in 1945 there was a worldwide shortage of food and that the transportation system in Europe was largely destroyed. Already on 14 February Eisenhower had called the attention of the Allied governments to the fact that he feared a severe shortage of food throughout Europe at the war's end. He even feared that there would be famine - and he had no food reserves to feed the Germans, the "displaced persons" and the Allied civilian population. He "urgently" requested immediate food supplies from Great Britain - this at a time when in Great Britain food was still rationed.
Is that submission based on any evidence regarding Allied policies, namely documented statements of their leaders, or is it just Smith’s unsubstantiated personal opinion?Scott wrote:I submit that had Hitler's assassination been successful the Allies would be in a propaganda quandary because they did not want to leave ANY German regime intact but one where they installed their own lackeys.
Again, what evidence to such “Churcillian logic” – can Smith offer?Scott wrote:Since the Germans started the last war, as the Churchillian logic goes, the only acceptable peace for Albion was the one forged at Versailles, which Hitler stood diametrically opposed to, ergo he must be stopped.
Qvist wrote:Your first point is obviously correct. But I do not think this was ever a war of tangible and diplomatically-definable objectives. For the USSR, it was by neccessity (given German war aims) a war of survival.Scott wrote:Unconditional Surrender was intended to bolster the Allied alliance so that nobody would make a separate-peace with the Germans. It was meant to turn a war of tangible and diplomatically-definable objectives into a Holy Crusade against Evil, using Soviet cannon-fodder as much as possible.
Soviet diplomatic aggressiveness was i) mostly in compliance with the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact and ii) but a secondary reason behind Hitler’s attack, if not a mere pretext.Scott wrote:It was survival of the Soviet SYSTEM, and that system could have made peace with Germany by not being so diplomatically aggressive, which probably would not have been possible under Communist theory and didn't suit Stalin's paranoid temperment.
William Shirer wrote:From the captured Nazi documents and from the testimony of many leading German figures in the great drama that was being played over the vast expanse of Western Europe that year, it is plain that at the very moment of Stalin’s monumental complacency Hitler had in fact been mulling over in his mind the idea of turning on the Soviet Union and destroying her.
The basic idea went back much further, at least fifteen years - to Mein Kampf.
And so we National Socialists [Hitler wrote] take up where we broke off six hundred years ago. We stop the endless German movement toward the south and west of Europe and turn our gaze toward the lands of the East ... when we speak of new territory in Europe today we must think principally of Russia and her border vassal states. Destiny itself seems to wish to point our the way to us here ... This colossal empire in the East is ripe for dissolution, and the end of the Jewish domination in Russia will also be the end of Russia as a state.
This idea lay like bedrock in Hitler’s mind, and his pact with Stalin had not changed it at all, but merely postponed acting on it. And but briefly. In fact, less than two months after the deal was signed and had been utilized to destroy Poland, the Führer instructed the Army that the conquered Polish territory was to be regarded “as an assembly area for future German operations.” The date was October 18, 1939, and Halder recorded that day in his diary.
Five weeks later, on November 22, when he harangued his reluctant generals about attacking in the West, Russia was by no means out of his mind. “We can oppose Russia,” he declared, “only when we are free in the West.” At that time the two-front war, the nightmare of German generals for a century, was very much on Hitler’s mind, and he spoke of it at length on this occasion. He would not repeat the mistake of former German rulers; he could continue to see to it that the Army had one front at a time.
It was only natural, then, that with the fall of France, the chasing of the British Army across the Channel and the prospects of Britain’s imminent collapse, Hitler’s thoughts should turn once again to Russia. For he now supposed himself to be free in the West and thereby to have achieved the one condition he had laid down in order to be in a position to “oppose Russia.” the rapidity with which Stalin seized the Baltic States and the two Romanian provinces in June spurred Hitler to a decision.
The moment of its making can now be traced. Jodl says that the “fundamental decision” was taken “as far back as during the Western Campaign.” Colonel Walter Warlimont, Jodl’s deputy at OKW, remembered that on July 29 Jodl announced at a meeting of Operations Staff officers that “Hitler intended to attack the U.S.S.R. in the spring of 1941.” Sometime previous to this meeting, Jodl related, Hitler had told Keitel “that he intended to launch the attack against the U.S.S.R. during the fall of 1940.” But this was too much even for Keitel and he had argued Hitler out of it by contending that not only the bad weather in the autumn but the difficulties of transferring the bulk of the Army from the West to the East made it impossible. By the time of this conference on July 29, Warlimont relates, “the date for the intended attack [against Russia] had been moved back to the spring of 1941.”
Only a week before, we know from Halder’s diary, the Führer had still held to a possible campaign in Russia for the autumn if Britain were not invaded. At a military conference in Berlin on July 21 he told Brauchitsch to get busy on the preparations for it. That the Army Commander in Chief had already given the problem some thought - but not enough thought - is evident from his response to Hitler. Brauchitsch told the Leader that the campaign “would last four to six weeks” and that the aim would be “to defeat the Russian Army or at least to occupy enough Russian territory so that Soviet bombers could not reach Berlin or the Silesian industrial area while, on the other hand, the Luftwaffe bombers could reach all important objectives in the Soviet Union.” Brauchitsch thought that from eighty to a hundred German divisions could do the job; he assessed Russian strength at “fifty to seventy-five good divisions.” Halder’s notes on what Brauchitsch told him of the meeting show that Hitler had been stung by Stalin’s grabs in the East, that he thought the Soviet dictator was “coquetting with England” in order to encourage her to hold out, but that he had seen no signs that Russia was preparing to enter the war against Germany.
At a further conference at the Berghof on the last day of July 1940, the receding prospects of an invasion of Britain prompted Hitler to announce for the first time to his Army chiefs his decision on Russia. Halder was personally present this time and jotted down his shorthand notes of exactly what the warlord said. They reveal not only that Hitler had made a definite decision to attack Russia in the following spring but that he had already worked out in his mind the major strategic aims.
Britain’s hope [Hitler said] lies in Russia and America. If that hope in Russia is destroyed then it will be destroyed for America too because elimination of Russia will enormously increase Japan’s power in the Far East.
The more he thought of it the more convinced he was, Hitler said, that Britain’s stubborn determination to continue the war was due to its counting on the Soviet Union.
Something strange [he explained] has happened in Britain! The British were already completely down. Now they are back on their feet. Intercepted conversations. Russia unpleasantly disturbed by the swift development in Western Europe.
Russia needs only to hint to England that she does not wish to see Germany too strong and the English, like a drowning man, will regain hope that the situation in six to eight months will have completely changed.
But if Russia is smashed, Britain’s last hope will be shattered. Then Germany will be master of Europe and the Balkans.
Decision: In view of these considerations Russia must be liquidated. Spring, 1941.
The sooner Russia is smashed, the better.
The Nazi warlord then elaborated on his strategic plans which, it was obvious to the generals, had been ripening in his mind for some time despite all his preoccupations with the fighting in the West. The operation, he said, would be worth carrying out only if its aim was to shatter the Soviet nation in one great blow. Conquering a lot of Russian territory would not be enough. “Wiping out the very power to exist of Russia! That is the goal!” Hitler emphasized. There would be two initial drives: one in the south to Kiev and the Dnieper River, the second in the north up through the Baltic States and then toward Moscow. There the two armies would make a junction. After that a special operation, if necessary, to secure the Baku oil fields. The very thought of such new conquests excited Hitler; he already had in his mind what he would do with them. He would annex outright, he said, the Ukraine, White Russia and the Baltic States and extend Finland’s territory to the White Sea. For the whole operation he would allot 120 divisions, keeping sixty divisions for the defense of the West and Scandinavia. The attack, he laid it down, would begin in May 1941 and would take five months to carry through. It would be finished by winter. He would have preferred, he said, to do it this year but this had not proved possible.
The next day, August 1, Halder went to work on the plans with his General Staff. Though he would later claim to have opposed the whole idea of an attack on Russia as insane, his diary entry for this day discloses him full of enthusiasm as he applied himself to the challenging new task.
Planning now went ahead with typical German thoroughness on three levels: that of the Army General Staff, of Warlimont’s Operations Staff at OKW, of General Thomas’ Economic and Armaments Branch of OKW. Thomas was instructed on August 14 by Göring that Hitler desired deliveries of ordered goods to the Russians “only till spring of 1941.” In the meantime his office was to make a detailed survey of Soviet industry, transportation and oil centers both as a guide to targets and later on as an aid for administering Russia.
A few days before, on August 9, Warlimont had got out his first directive for preparing the deployment areas in the East for the jump-off against the Russians. On August 26, Hitler ordered ten infantry and two armored divisions to be sent from the West to Poland. The panzer units, he stipulated, were to be concentrated in southeastern Poland so that they could intervene to protect the Romanian oil fields. The transfer of large bodies of troops to the East could not be done without exciting Stalin’s easily aroused suspicions if he learned of it, and the Germans went to great lengths to see that he didn’t. Since some movements were bound to be detected, General Ernst Köstring, the German military attaché in Moscow, was instructed to inform the Soviet General Staff that it was merely a question of replacing older men, who were being released to industry, by younger men. On September 6, Jodl got out a directive outlining in considerable detail the means of camouflage and deception. “These regroupings,” he laid it down, “must not create the impression in Russia that we are preparing an offensive in the East.”
So that the armed services should not rest on their laurels after the great victories of the summer, Hitler issued on November 12, 1940, a comprehensive top-secret directive outlining military tasks all over Europe and beyond. We shall come back to some of them. What concerns us here is that portion dealing with the Soviet Union.
Political discussions have been initiated with the aim of clarifying Russia’s attitude for the time being. Irrespective of the results of these discussions, all preparations for the East which have already been verbally ordered will be continued. Instructions on this will follow, as soon as the general outline of the Army’s operation plans have been submitted to, and approved by, me.
As a matter of fact, on that very day, November 12, Molotov arrived in Berlin to continue with Hitler himself those political discussions.
Source of quote: Alan Bullock, Hitler and Stalin. Parallel Lives 1993 Fontana Press, London, pages 756-758. Emphasis is mine.Alan Bullock wrote:The months from March to the end of October 1941 were a period in which Hitler felt more convinced than ever of his genius, the highpoint of the fantastic career in which he saw himself as the peer of Napoleon, Bismarck and Frederick the Great – characters to whom he referred in familiar terms – pursuing ‘the Cyclopean task which the building of an empire means for a single man.
The character of that empire was a subject which fired his imagination and constantly recurred in his talk. After the evening meal on 27 July he defined its limits as a line 200 – 300 kilometres east of the Urals; the Germans must hold this line in perpetuity and never allow any other military power to establish itself to the west of it.
It should be possible for us to control this region in the East, with 250,000 men plus a cadre of good administrators. Let’s learn from the English, who, with 250,000 men in all, including 50,000 soldiers, govern 400 million Indians. This space in Russia must always be dominated by Germans.
Nothing would be a worse mistake on our part than to seek to educate the masses there …
We’ll take the southern part of Ukraine, especially the Crimea, and make it an exclusively German colony. There’ll be no harm in pushing out the population that’s there now. The German colonist will be the soldier – peasant, and for that I’ll take professional soldiers … For those of them who are sons of peasants, the Reich will provide a completely-equipped farm. The soil costs us nothing, we have only the farm to build … These soldier peasants will be given arms, so that at the slightest danger they can be at their posts when we summon them.
Hitler returned to the subject on the evening of 17 October, when Todt and Gauleiter Sauckel (who was responsible for conscripting foreign workers) provided and appreciative audience:
The Russian desert, we shall populate it … We’ll take away its character of an Asian steppe, we’ll Europeanise it. With this object we have undertaken the construction of road that will lead to the southernmost part of the Crimea and to the Caucasus. These road will be studded along their whole length with German towns and around these towns our colonists will settle.
As for the two or three million men whom we need to accomplish this task, we’ll find them quicker than we think. They’ll come from Germany, Scandinavia, the Western countries, and America. I shall no longer be here to see all that, but in twenty years, the Ukraine will already be a home for twenty million inhabitants, besides the natives …
We shan’t settle in the Russian towns, and we’ll let them go to pieces without intervening. And, above all, no remorse on this subject! We’re absolutely without obligations as far as these people are concerned. To struggle against the hovels, chase away the fleas, provide German teachers, bring out newspapers – very little of that for us! We’ll confine ourselves, perhaps, to setting up a radio transmitter, under our control. For the rest, let them know just enough to understand our highway signs, so that they won’t get themselves run over by our vehicles.
For them the word ‘liberty’ means the right to wash on feast days … There’s only one duty: to Germanize this country by the immigration of Germans and to look upon the natives as Redskins … In this business I shall go straight ahead, cold-bloodedly.
Ten days later he declared:
Nobody will ever snatch the East from us! … We shall soon supply the wheat for all Europe, the coal, the steel, the wood. To exploit the Ukraine properly – that new Indian Empire – we’ll need only peace in the West …
For me the object is to exploit the advantages of continental hegemony … When we are the masters of Europe, we have a dominant position in the world. A hundred and thirty million people in the Reich, ninety in the Ukraine. Add to these the other states of the New Europe and we’ll be 400 millions as compared with the 130 million Americans.
Source of quote:In die russischen Städte gehen wir nicht hinein. Sie müssen vollständig ersterben. Wir brauchen uns da keine Gewissensbisse zu machen […] wir haben überhaupt keine Verpflichtungen den Leuten gegenüber.
Add to that the above mentioned Hungerplan worked out in the spring of 1941 (i.e. before the beginning of the attack on the Soviet Union), and it becomes clear that the Soviet system, despite all its shortcomings and horrors, was still better for the Soviet people than what Hitler had in mind for them.Into the Russian cities we shall not go. They must die away completely. We need to have no remorse in this respect […] we have no obligations whatsoever towards these people.
