A review about the preventive war

[Roberto]

So, Roberto, you do not object to nice, round numbers like two-million and six-million, then, respectively, since the point does not call for demographic precision and did not demand a canonical figure?

A "canonical figure" exists only in the minds of folks like Smith, who seems unable to even properly word his nonsense.

[Scott Smith]

The discussion seems to be going all over the place and I don't feel like trying to unravel it. But one difference between Hitler and Stalin was that the former had the popular support of the people--but he was impatient, and Hitler being a former soldier himself, was too inclined to resort to military force, IMHO.

Roberto, what is there about SIOC that you don't understand?

Trotsky believed in World Revolution. He lost. Stalin's plan was "Socialism In One Country" to advance Communism using traditonal Russian nationalism/imperialism but with a Marxist-Leninist twist. Instead of Westernizing like traditional Petrinism (Peter the Great having imposed Western technology and values upon the Russian Orthodox Slavs), it involved an industrialization program to rival the West as Marx saw the English Industrial Revolution.

SIOC (1928-1949) would have to modernize Russia in years, whereas classical-liberalism had taken centuries. And the energies of SIOC and Stalin were directed against continental Europe, i.e., Germany, which is why it did not alarm the British prior to Churchill in 1946. (Trotskyism had alarmed Churchill. See 1920 article on Zionism vs. Bolshevism already cited elsewhere.) In the 19th century, Russia was easily contained with the Royal Navy in limiting the Tsar's access to warm-water ports. In the 20th century, German containment was the issue because of German unification in 1871 and the Kaiser's silly naval arms race. Hitler was an infinitely greater danger because he was a populist leader and he understood how to defeat Bourgeois propaganda, at least in the short-term.

Hope that helps.

[Roberto]

Roberto, what is there about SIOC that you don't understand?

I understand everything.

I just want to know what, other than Smith's personal opinion, is behind this statement:

And the energies of SIOC and Stalin were directed against continental Europe, i.e., Germany, which is why it did not alarm the British prior to Churchill in 1946.

[Scott Smith]

What, do you want me to poll professors or something? Take it or leave it, Roberto. You have my views.

[michael mills]

Roberto wrote:

So one of the two colleagues must be wrong.

I'm looking forward to Mr. Mills' demonstration that it's Graml.

I do not think that I have to demonstrate anything.

I drew the attention of readers to a chapter in a book (yes, it is by Joachim Hoffmann - the name had escaped my memory due to early-onset Alzheimers) which detailed information collected by German investigators showing Soviet plans for a westward advance at some time. That was in response to Roberto's claim, based on a statement by Graml, that the German investigators had not found any WRITTEN material indicating a Soviet plan of attack.

If the material given in Hoffmann's chapter is correct, then it casts doubt on Graml's statement, although it does not entirely negate it. There could be disagreement as to what exactly constitutes material indicating a plan of attack; perhaps Graml would not accept anything less than a fully detailed plan of attack with maps and dates, signed by Stalin.

But in drawing readers' attention to the chapter in "Zwei Wege" by Hoffmann, I did not say that Graml's claim is false. I leave to readers of this forum to consult the book (there is an English translation called "From Peace to War: Germany, Soviet Russia and the World 1939-1941" and make up their own minds.

It is Roberto who is casting aspersions on Hoffmann. His phraseology clearly indicates an attempt to dismiss the material in the chapter I referred to on the basis that it is by Hoffmann, therefore by definition untrustworthy.

Furthermore, it is blatantly obvious that Roberto has not even read the book; he is relying purely on a review in "Spiegel".

I suggest that Roberto read the book, in particular the chapter by Hoffmann, and then demonstrate on this forum why the material in that chapter should be disregarded.

It is for Roberto to demonstrate that Hoffmann is wrong.

[Roberto]

Roberto wrote:

So one of the two colleagues must be wrong.

I'm looking forward to Mr. Mills' demonstration that it's Graml.

I do not think that I have to demonstrate anything.

I drew the attention of readers to a chapter in a book (yes, it is by Joachim Hoffmann - the name had escaped my memory due to early-onset Alzheimers) which detailed information collected by German investigators showing Soviet plans for a westward advance at some time. That was in response to Roberto's claim, based on a statement by Graml, that the German investigators had not found any WRITTEN material indicating a Soviet plan of attack.

If the material given in Hoffmann's chapter is correct, then it casts doubt on Graml's statement, although it does not entirely negate it. There could be disagreement as to what exactly constitutes material indicating a plan of attack; perhaps Graml would not accept anything less than a fully detailed plan of attack with maps and dates, signed by Stalin.

But in drawing readers' attention to the chapter in "Zwei Wege" by Hoffmann, I did not say that Graml's claim is false. I leave to readers of this forum to consult the book (there is an English translation called "From Peace to War: Germany, Soviet Russia and the World 1939-1941" and make up their own minds.

It is Roberto who is casting aspersions on Hoffmann. His phraseology clearly indicates an attempt to dismiss the material in the chapter I referred to on the basis that it is by Hoffmann, therefore by definition untrustworthy.

Furthermore, it is blatantly obvious that Roberto has not even read the book; he is relying purely on a review in "Spiegel".

I suggest that Roberto read the book, in particular the chapter by Hoffmann, and then demonstrate on this forum why the material in that chapter should be disregarded.

It is for Roberto to demonstrate that Hoffmann is wrong.

In his post of Tue Oct 22, 2002 1:42 am on this thread,

In the book "Zwei Wege nach Moskau" there is a whole chapter on Soviet military planning before the German attack. It contains a number of examples from material collected by German investigators after the attack, including captured documents and the results of the interrogation of captured Soviet personnel. The conclusion of the chapter was that the material collected supported the view that there was some Soviet planning for a westward attack.

If I get time, I will look up the book at the library again, and give more details of the chapter referred to.

It seems that Michael Mills has since changed his mind, for he is now running away from the issue and feebly trying to pass the ball onto myself.

As I see it, if someone holds a theory that counters the established historical record, the burden of providing evidence and arguments in support of such theory is upon that person.

And if someone on a discussion forum endorses such theory, it is upon that person to make a presentation of the evidence and arguments that the proponent of said theory has provided.

When he has done so - and only then - he may ask his opponent to demonstrate that and why the evidence and arguments presented do not support the theory in question.

Mills' approach is that it is his opponent who must do both, i.e. i) look up the evidence and arguments in support of the theory endorsed by Mills himself and ii) demonstrate that such evidence is not conclusive and such arguments are not convincing.

In other words, he's asking his opponent to do both the work that is incumbent upon Mills himself and his own work, to de-construct a case that Mills hasn't even yet made.

That's a very comfortable position, of course, but it is also one that absolutely sucks.

It also suggests a lack of confidence in the theory endorsed and its evidentiary and argumentative support.

[michael mills]

On 22 October, I wrote:

Roberto wrote:

Quote:
Could Mr. Michaels or any of his fans tell us, for instance, why the German troops, although they captured the staffs of whole Soviet armies and army groups during the great encirclement battles in 1941, did not come upon a single element of evidence hinting at a Soviet attack in the making?

In the book "Zwei Wege nach Moskau" there is a whole chapter on Soviet military planning before the German attack. It contains a number of examples from material collected by German investigators after the attack, including captured documents and the results of the interrogation of captured Soviet personnel. The conclusion of the chapter was that the material collected supported the view that there was some Soviet planning for a westward attack.

If I get time, I will look up the book at the library again, and give more details of the chapter referred to.

Of course, I would not place absolute reliance on the statements made by captured Soviet personnel under German interrogation. They may well have told their interrogators what they wanted to hear, in the same way as captured German personnel told their Allied interrogators what the latter wanted to hear. However, the testimony cannot be dismissed absolutely.

Let us look again at what Roberto originally wrote. He claimed that " not a single element of evidence" was found by German troops. That is a fairly categorical statement; Roberto is saying that no evidence whatever was found.

In response, I drew the attention of readers to book containing a chapter by the respected German historian, Joachim Hoffmann, a member of the Military Research Office, which detailed evidence of Soviet planning for a westward advance collected by German investigators.

The existence of that book refutes Roberto's sweeping claim that "not a single element of evidence" was found. The book shows that many elements of evidence were found. How conclusive that evidence was is another matter; I leave it to readers to consult the book and decide for themselves. In my original post I did write that the evidence collected by the German investigators, in particular the statements of captured Soviet personnel, should not be relied on absolutely; that cautious approach is what distinguishes an unbiassed scholar such as I am from a professional propagandist like Roberto.

As I originally wrote, when I get time I will consult the book again, and may post for the information of readers some examples of the "elements of evidence" found by German investigators and quoted by Hoffmann.

Given the existence of the book referred to, it is for Roberto to prove his claim that not a single element of evidence was found. The source he quotes, Graml, does not make such a sweeping statement; Graml says that the Germans did not capture a single document indicating plans by Stalin for a preventive war.

For the information of readers, Hoffmann does not posit that the Red Army was on the point of attacking westward in June 1941. His thesis is that, when the original Soviet planning was upset by the German victory over France in June 1941, the Soviet Government adopted a strategic plan to build up its forces for an inevitable conflict with German; the aim of that build-up was on the one hand to be able to counter any German attack, and on the other to be able to advance westward into German-occupied Europe when the time was ripe.

Hoffmann believes that Soviet planning was geared to a westward advance in 1942, and that it consisted of two phases; first an advance into Rumania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, to cut off Germany's supply of oil and other resources, and subsequently an advance due west through Poland into a weakened Germany. His thesis is that this strategic plan, originally scheduled for 1942, was activated in 1944, once the Red Army had pushed the German forces out of Soviet territory and reached the line occupied in 1941 (except for the Baltic States).

If the Soviet plan was for a westward advance in 1942, that might well explain why Red Army units on the ground had not been issued with detailed orders, eg objectives, dates of attack etc, which could be captured by the Germans in 1941. How far in advance of the target date for Barbarossa were German forces on the ground issued with their detailed orders for the attack? In the book I referred to, Hoffmann shows that interrogation of captured Soviet personnel indicated that they were well aware of the Soviet strategic plan, including an eventual westward advance.

[Roberto]

Let us look again at what Roberto originally wrote. He claimed that " not a single element of evidence" was found by German troops. That is a fairly categorical statement; Roberto is saying that no evidence whatever was found.

Not so far off, if the following statement by my source, German historian Hermann Graml, is correct (see my post of Tue Oct 22, 2002 1:53 pm):

Bei genauerem Zusehen stellt sich nämlich heraus, daß “Suworow” keine plausiblen Argumente und erst recht keine dokumentarischen Beweise für seine Thesen vorzulegen vermag. In den Kesselschlachten des Jahres 1941 haben ja die deutschen Truppen, obwohl ihnen die Stäbe von Armeen und Heeresgruppen in die Hände fielen, nicht ein einziges Schriftstück erbeutet, das auf Stalinsche Präventivkriegspläne gedeutet hätte, und dieser Mangel ist bis heute gegeben.

My translation:

A closer look reveals that “Suvorov” cannot provide plausible arguments let alone documentary evidence in support of his theses. This is not surprising given that in the encirclement battles of 1941 the German troops, although the staffs of armies and army groups fell into their hands, did not capture a single document that would indicate plans by Stalin for a preventive war, and such are lacking to this day.

Graml only speaks of documentary evidence, for sure, but that doesn't necessarily invalidate my admittedly wide interpretation of his statement given that documentary evidence, in the form of orders of battle, plans for attack, maps and similar documents, is arguably the only evidence that can be considered conclusive in this respect.

When Mills objected that his source Hoffmann had found such and/or other evidence, I asked him to show us what that evidence was and thereby to demonstrate that Graml was wrong.

I’m still waiting for that demonstration.

In response, I drew the attention of readers to book containing a chapter by the respected German historian, Joachim Hoffmann, a member of the Military Research Office, which detailed evidence of Soviet planning for a westward advance collected by German investigators.

The existence of that book refutes Roberto's sweeping claim that "not a single element of evidence" was found. The book shows that many elements of evidence were found.

Or so Mills would like to believe.

The article Mills is referring to was written by a one of the proponents of the apologetic thesis that Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union anticipated a Soviet attack in preparation, a fellow whose unsubstantiated and dishonest criticism of Christian Streit’s Keine Kameraden: Die Wehrmacht und die sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen 1941-1945 and statements such as those quoted hereafter, taken by his colleague Wigbert Benz from page 61 of Hoffmann’s 1995 book Stalin’s Vernichtungskrieg, do not exactly warrant the assumption of an objective approach.

Hitler (ist) nur knapp einem mit Hochdruck vorbereiteten Angriff Stalins zuvorgekommen. Der 22.Juni 1941 war so ziemlich der letzte Termin, um überhaupt noch einen ‚Präventivkrieg’ führen zu können.

[…]

Nicht am 22.Juni 1941 wurde Stalin von einem Schock getroffen, sondern (...als) klar wurde, dass die Deutschen im Kampf eben doch die Besseren waren.[…]

My translation:

Hitler only narrowly anticipated an attack that Stalin was preparing with high pressure. 22 June 1941 was about the last date on which such a ‚preventive war’ could still be waged at all.

[…]

Not on 22 June 1941 was Stalin his by a shock, but (…when) it became clear that the Germans were, after all, the better fighters.[…]

The last sentence sounds like “master race” vs. “sub-humans”…aliengray

It is therefore reasonable to assume that the mere existence of Hoffmann’s article in the book Zwei Wege nach Moskau means nothing and that we must look at what evidence exactly he has dug up.

How conclusive that evidence was is another matter; I leave it to readers to consult the book and decide for themselves. In my original post I did write that the evidence collected by the German investigators, in particular the statements of captured Soviet personnel, should not be relied on absolutely;

Rather feeble hair-splitting such as I would expect from the likes of Mr. Mills.

Evidence must be conclusive, otherwise it has no value as evidence.

My statement that not a single piece of evidence was found may thus be construed as meaning that nothing at all was found or that what was found was not conclusive.

that cautious approach is what distinguishes an unbiassed scholar such as I am from a professional propagandist like Roberto

Mills again seems to be indulging in his rather feeble sense of humor, or then there are reasons to doubt his sanity.

His calling an interested amateur like myself a “professional”, in any case, reveals a high degree of paranoia.

His calling me a “propagandist”, on the other hand, is the ultimate in intellectual dishonesty, considering that it is Mills who has repeatedly been caught on this forum propagating distortions of sources and of his opponents’ statements in support of his apologetic agenda.

The most that Mills could accuse me of would be i) a too wide interpretation of Graml’s statements and ii) ignorance of a contrary assessment by Hoffmann (although I don’t think, given the reputation of either, that I have missed a lot by not being familiar with Hoffmann’s assessment).

But then, accusing their opponents of their own fallacies is one of the hallmarks of propagandist charlatans like Mills, isn’t it?

As I originally wrote, when I get time I will consult the book again, and may post for the information of readers some examples of the "elements of evidence" found by German investigators and quoted by Hoffmann.

Why is it “may” now, Mr. Mills?

It used to be “will” (time provided, of course):

If I get time, I will look up the book at the library again, and give more details of the chapter referred to.

Given the existence of the book referred to, it is for Roberto to prove his claim that not a single element of evidence was found. The source he quotes, Graml, does not make such a sweeping statement; Graml says that the Germans did not capture a single document indicating plans by Stalin for a preventive war.

Indeed I may have gone too far in my interpretation of Graml’s statement, even though, as I explained, I would consider only documentary evidence to be conclusive in this respect.

But as Mills is maintaining that such evidence exists or that evidence not documentary is nevertheless conclusive enough, it would only be fair if, instead of asking me to prove a negative, he showed us the evidence that his source Hoffman found or claims to have found, as he originally announced he would.

For the information of readers, Hoffmann does not posit that the Red Army was on the point of attacking westward in June 1941.

How does that fit with Hoffmann’s above quoted statement from his book Stalin's Vernichtungskrieg ?

Has he modified his assessment in the meantime, and is Benz dishonestly ignoring this ?

His thesis is that, when the original Soviet planning was upset by the German victory over France in June 1941, the Soviet Government adopted a strategic plan to build up its forces for an inevitable conflict with German; the aim of that build-up was on the one hand to be able to counter any German attack, and on the other to be able to advance westward into German-occupied Europe when the time was ripe.

Hoffmann believes that Soviet planning was geared to a westward advance in 1942, and that it consisted of two phases; first an advance into Rumania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, to cut off Germany's supply of oil and other resources, and subsequently an advance due west through Poland into a weakened Germany. His thesis is that this strategic plan, originally scheduled for 1942, was activated in 1944, once the Red Army had pushed the German forces out of Soviet territory and reached the line occupied in 1941 (except for the Baltic States).

If the Soviet plan was for a westward advance in 1942, that might well explain why Red Army units on the ground had not been issued with detailed orders, eg objectives, dates of attack etc, which could be captured by the Germans in 1941.

If that is Hoffmann's assessment, then Michael Mills’ statement:

Roberto wrote:

Could Mr. Michaels or any of his fans tell us, for instance, why the German troops, although they captured the staffs of whole Soviet armies and army groups during the great encirclement battles in 1941, did not come upon a single element of evidence hinting at a Soviet attack in the making?

In the book "Zwei Wege nach Moskau" there is a whole chapter on Soviet military planning before the German attack. It contains a number of examples from material collected by German investigators after the attack, including captured documents and the results of the interrogation of captured Soviet personnel. The conclusion of the chapter was that the material collected supported the view that there was some Soviet planning for a westward attack.

(emphases added)

was more than a little misleading, for in conjunction with my own statement referred to and in the context of the discussion if was bound to convey to the unwary reader the impression that Mills’ source found evidence to a Soviet attack scheduled to take place in 1941, at about the same time as the German attack.

Which in turn means that my statement about the absence of evidence to a Soviet attack scheduled to take place in 1941 has a very good chance of being correct.

How far in advance of the target date for Barbarossa were German forces on the ground issued with their detailed orders for the attack? In the book I referred to, Hoffmann shows that interrogation of captured Soviet personnel indicated that they were well aware of the Soviet strategic plan, including an eventual westward advance.

If so, Hoffman has told us nothing new, for a strategic plan “including an eventual westward advance” was in line with the Soviet military doctrine of forward defense, carrying the fight onto enemy territory as soon as possible in the event of war breaking out.

It can thus not be considered evidence of an intended or even imminent unprovoked aggression by the Soviet side.

[michael mills]

Roberto wrote:

If that is Hoffmann's assessment, then Michael Mills' statement:

michael mills wrote:
Roberto wrote:
Quote:
Could Mr. Michaels or any of his fans tell us, for instance, why the German troops, although they captured the staffs of whole Soviet armies and army groups during the great encirclement battles in 1941, did not come upon a single element of evidence hinting at a Soviet attack in the making?


In the book "Zwei Wege nach Moskau" there is a whole chapter on Soviet military planning before the German attack. It contains a number of examples from material collected by German investigators after the attack, including captured documents and the results of the interrogation of captured Soviet personnel. The conclusion of the chapter was that the material collected supported the view that there was some Soviet planning for a westward attack.


(emphases added)

was more than a little misleading, for in conjunction with my own statement referred to and in the context of the discussion if was bound to convey to the unwary reader the impression that Mills' source found evidence to a Soviet attack scheduled to take place in 1941, at about the same time as the German attack.

Which in turn means that my statement about the absence of evidence to a Soviet attack scheduled to take place in 1941 has a very good chance of being correct.

Roberto is here indulging in his normal practice of distorting what someone has posted, and then making a show of refuting the distorted version.

In this case, he has even distorted what he himself wrote!

Roberto did not write that no evidence was found of preparations for a Soviet attack in 1941; he did not nominate a date at all. He simply referred to failure to find evidence for a Soviet attack "in the making"; that could be interpreted to mean an absence of evidence for any Soviet attack at any time.

When Roberto uses the words "my statement about the absence of evidence to a Soviet attack scheduled to take place in 1941", he is simply falsifying his actual statement, which did not specify a date and subtly implied that there was no Soviet preparation for a westward attack at all.

My own comment on Roberto's original statement did not mention a date either, ie I did not say that there was any proof of a Soviet intention to attack in 1941. I informed readers that Hoffmann's conclusion, expressed in the book referred to, was that the material collected by the German investigators supported the view that there was some Soviet planning for a westward attack. That statement by me was very moderate and cautious; it left it open to readers of this forum to consult the chapter by Hoffmann and decide for themselves whether his conclusion was justified on the basis of the material quoted by him.

Roberto accuses me of insanity. I do not think he is insane; merely wilfully dishonest, and spoiling for a fight.

[michael mills]

Further to my previous post, I have not read Hoffmann's "Stalins Vernichtungskrieg", and therefore cannot comment on what Hoffmann may or may not have written in it.

I have read the chapter by Hoffmann in "Zwei Wege", and also his contributions to the history of the German-Soviet war by the Military Research Bureau, and both struck me as well-reasoned and moderate.

I doubt that Roberto has read that book either (or anything at all by Hoffmann for that matter), but that has not stopped him from making a judgement based on what may be a tendentious quotation by Wigbert Benz, a historian hostile to Hoffmann.

Again, that shows the difference between me and Roberto.

[Roberto]

Roberto wrote:

If that is Hoffmann's assessment, then Michael Mills' statement:

michael mills wrote:
Roberto wrote:
Quote:
Could Mr. Michaels or any of his fans tell us, for instance, why the German troops, although they captured the staffs of whole Soviet armies and army groups during the great encirclement battles in 1941, did not come upon a single element of evidence hinting at a Soviet attack in the making?


In the book "Zwei Wege nach Moskau" there is a whole chapter on Soviet military planning before the German attack. It contains a number of examples from material collected by German investigators after the attack, including captured documents and the results of the interrogation of captured Soviet personnel. The conclusion of the chapter was that the material collected supported the view that there was some Soviet planning for a westward attack.


(emphases added)

was more than a little misleading, for in conjunction with my own statement referred to and in the context of the discussion if was bound to convey to the unwary reader the impression that Mills' source found evidence to a Soviet attack scheduled to take place in 1941, at about the same time as the German attack.

Which in turn means that my statement about the absence of evidence to a Soviet attack scheduled to take place in 1941 has a very good chance of being correct.

Roberto is here indulging in his normal practice of distorting what someone has posted, and then making a show of refuting the distorted version.

In this case, he has even distorted what he himself wrote!

Roberto did not write that no evidence was found of preparations for a Soviet attack in 1941; he did not nominate a date at all. He simply referred to failure to find evidence for a Soviet attack "in the making"; that could be interpreted to mean an absence of evidence for any Soviet attack at any time.

When Roberto uses the words "my statement about the absence of evidence to a Soviet attack scheduled to take place in 1941", he is simply falsifying his actual statement, which did not specify a date and subtly implied that there was no Soviet preparation for a westward attack at all.

My own comment on Roberto's original statement did not mention a date either, ie I did not say that there was any proof of a Soviet intention to attack in 1941. I informed readers that Hoffmann's conclusion, expressed in the book referred to, was that the material collected by the German investigators supported the view that there was some Soviet planning for a westward attack. That statement by me was very moderate and cautious; it left it open to readers of this forum to consult the chapter by Hoffmann and decide for themselves whether his conclusion was justified on the basis of the material quoted by him.

Roberto accuses me of insanity. I do not think he is insane; merely wilfully dishonest, and spoiling for a fight.

I’m beginning to feel honestly sorry for poor Mills.

Here is an interesting review of the German-Soviet conflict.

http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v20/v20n6p59_Michaels.html

Looks like the old Suvorovian cream cheese.

Far-fetched speculations based on nothing other than Soviet troop movements and rhetorical propaganda statements, which all by themselves may mean a lot or nothing at all.

No documentary or other evidence that there was a Soviet intention to embark on an all-out war of aggression and conquest, or that what British historian Richard Overy called "a desperate gambit to obstruct German mobilization against the Soviet Union" - the plan for a pre-emptive attack produced by Zhukov and Timoshenko on 15 May 1941 - ever received a "go ahead" from Stalin.

No documentary or other evidence that poor Adolf was in any way concerned with an imminent Soviet attack or even the threat of a potential future attack, let alone that such considerations in any way influenced his decision.

Instead the usual compilation of half-truths and downright lies, decorated with inevitable and telling crap such as "Jews were very much involved in murderous assignments during the war".

I don't see what can be interesting about such a "review", which notably includes only the view of such historians who can be presented as supporting the author's view. What about Graml, Ueberschär, Hillgruber, Wette, Müller, Benz, Overy and others who consider the theories of Suvorov et al to be untenable?

Could Mr. Michaels or any of his fans tell us, for instance, why the German troops, although they captured the staffs of whole Soviet armies and army groups during the great encirclement battles in 1941, did not come upon a single element of evidence hinting at a Soviet attack in the making?

The last paragraph of the above post was the one that Mills commented on, and it should be obvious that it referred to an article in the “Journal of Historical Review” where, unless I completely misunderstood it, the contention is propagated that Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union anticipated an all-out Soviet attack that was to take place in 1941.

That my statement was made in this context and with this meaning also becomes apparent from the source I referred to:

Bei genauerem Zusehen stellt sich nämlich heraus, daß “Suworow” keine plausiblen Argumente und erst recht keine dokumentarischen Beweise für seine Thesen vorzulegen vermag. In den Kesselschlachten des Jahres 1941 haben ja die deutschen Truppen, obwohl ihnen die Stäbe von Armeen und Heeresgruppen in die Hände fielen, nicht ein einziges Schriftstück erbeutet, das auf Stalinsche Präventivkriegspläne gedeutet hätte, und dieser Mangel ist bis heute gegeben.

My translation:

A closer look reveals that “Suvorov” cannot provide plausible arguments let alone documentary evidence in support of his theses. This is not surprising given that in the encirclement battles of 1941 the German troops, although the staffs of armies and army groups fell into their hands, did not capture a single document that would indicate plans by Stalin for a preventive war, and such are lacking to this day.

which clearly addresses the contentions of “Suvorov” that a Soviet attack was in the making at the time Hitler staged his own attack, i.e. in mid-1941.

Of course Mills knows this very well, as he knows how easily I can demonstrate the fallacy of his contentions.

Which means that the persistent accusations of intellectual dishonesty he levels against me, which achieve nothing other than demonstrating his own, could also lead one to question Mills’ intelligence.

[Roberto]

Further to my previous post, I have not read Hoffmann's "Stalins Vernichtungskrieg", and therefore cannot comment on what Hoffmann may or may not have written in it.

I have read the chapter by Hoffmann in "Zwei Wege", and also his contributions to the history of the German-Soviet war by the Military Research Bureau, and both struck me as well-reasoned and moderate.

I doubt that Roberto has read that book either (or anything at all by Hoffmann for that matter), but that has not stopped him from making a judgement based on what may be a tendentious quotation by Wigbert Benz, a historian hostile to Hoffmann.

Again, that shows the difference between me and Roberto.

The difference seems to lie in the fact that Mills considers it reasonable to claim that a professional colleague of Hoffmann’s might be not only so dishonest, but also so unbelievably stupid as to submit a misquotation of Hoffmann’s writings that can most easily be revealed as such.

As Michael Mills doesn’t seem to be alien to such a mixture of dishonesty and stupidity himself, however, it’s understandable that he might project such tendencies of his own onto others.

[Xserx]

What you think about this document?
This document was created in the single copy. Intended to Molotov and to Stalin. It was prepared general Zhukov (Head the General Staff) and marshal Timoshenko (Minister of defence). The executor: general-major Vasilevsky. This plan not was signed by anybody, but was signed other plans and maps, enclosed to this document.

The plan of strategic expansion of Red Army (March 41)
In connection with spent for Red Army in 1941 large organizational actions I report on your consideration the specified plan of strategic expansion of armed Forces of Soviet Union in the West and in the East.

I. OUR PROBABLE OPPONENTS
The usual political conditions in Europe forces to pay exclusive attention to defense of our western borders. Possible armed conflict can be limited only to our western borders, but the probability of attack is not excluded and on the part of Japan our Far East borders. Armed attack of Germany to the USSR can involve Finland, Romania in the military conflict to us, Hungary and other allies of Germany. Thus it is necessary for Soviet Union to be ready to struggle on two fronts: in the west - against Germany maintained by Italy, Hungary. Romania and Finland, and in the east - against Japan, as open opponent or the opponent borrowing a position of an armed neutrality. Always able to proceed in open collision.

II. ARMED FORCES of PROBABLE OPPONENTS
West
Germany.
Now Germany has developed 225 infantry, 20 tank and 15 motorized divisions, and all up to 260 divisions, 20 000 field guns of all calibres, 10 000 tanks, up to 15 000 planes, from them 9000-9500 fighting. From the specified quantity of divisions - 76 divisions, from them up to 6 tank and 7 motorized in insisted time are concentrated on our borders and up to 35 divisions - in Romania and Bulgaria. Under condition of the ending of war with England it is presumably possible to count, that from available 260 divisions by Germany will be left not less than 35 divisions in the occupied countries and up to 25 divisions in depth of the country. Thus, up to 200 divisions, from them up to 165 infantry, 20 tank and 15 motorized, will be directed against our borders.
Finland can expose against Soviet Union up to 18 infantry divisions.
Romania now has up to 45 infantry divisions and 700 warplanes, from them it is possible to expect, that against Soviet Union will be used not less than 30 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions, up to 2700 field guns of all calibres, 400 tanks and 600 planes.
Hungary can expose against the USSR up to 20 infantry divisions, 2 motor-brigades, 850 instruments, 350 tanks and 500 warplanes.
East
Japan for war can expose against the USSR up to 60 infantry divisions, 1200 tanks and platform soles, 850 heavy guns and 3000 planes, from them up to 30 infantry divisions, and the most part of tanks and can be concentrated artillery to borders USSR during 25 - 30 days. Except for the Japanese armies, it is necessary to take into account an opportunity of use against the USSR of armies Mangou-Go in structure of 27 mixed brigades, 1 cavalry divisions, 6 cavalry brigades. So, at war on two fronts the USSR should be considered with an opportunity of a concentration on his(its) borders about 293 infantry divisions, 12000 tanks, 21 000 field guns of average and heavy calibres, 15 000 planes.

III. PROBABLE OPERATING PLANS of the OPPONENT
The documentary data on operating plans of probable opponents both over the West, and over the East the Joint Staff has no. The most probable assumptions of strategic expansion of possible(probable) opponents can be:
In the West.
Germany most likely will develop the main forces in a southeast from Sedlets up to Hungary so that impact on Berdichev, Kiev to grasp Ukraine. This impact, apparently, will be accompanied by auxiliary impact in the north from East Prussia on Dvinsk and Riga or concentric impacts from side Suvalki and Brest on Volkovysk, Baranovichi. At statement of Finland on the side of Germany support of its army by the German divisions (8-10) for attack of Leningrad from northwest is not excluded.
In the south it is possible to expect simultaneous transition with the German army in approach in the common direction on Jmerinka the Romanian army maintained by the German divisions. At the stated presumable variant of actions of Germany it is possible to expect following expansion and a grouping of its(her) forces:
- to the north from the bottom current r. West Bug up to Baltic sea - 30-40 infantry divisions, 3-5 tank divisions, 2-4 motor-divisions, up to 3570 instruments and up to 2000 tanks;
- to the south from r. West Bug up to border with Hungary - up to 110 infantry divisions, 14 tank, 10 motorized, up to 11 500 instruments, 7500 tanks and the most part of the aircraft. The opportunity is not excluded, that Germans will concentrate the main forces in East Prussia and on the Warsaw direction so that through Lithuanian to put and develop the main impact in a direction to Riga or on Kovno, Dvinsk. It is simultaneously necessary to expect auxiliary concentric impacts from side Lomzha and Brest with subsequent their development in a direction Baranovichi, Minsk. Development of operation to Riga in this case, probably, will be combined 1) with landing landings to coast of Baltic sea in area Libavy with the purpose of actions in flank and rear to our armies operating on the bottom Neman and 2) with capture of Moonzund archipelag and landing to territories Estonian with the purpose of approach to Leningrad. At this variant of actions of Germany it is necessary to expect, that Germans will allocate for actions in the north up to 130 divisions, the most part of the artillery, tanks and aircraft, having left for action in the south of 30-40 infantry divisions., a part of tanks and aircraft. Provisional term of expansion of the German armies on our western borders - 10-15- day from the beginning of a concentration.
On our border with Romania, with the main grouping - up to 18 infantery divisions - in area Botoshany, Suceava it is possible to expect the termination of expansion of 30 Romanian infantry divisions on 15-20 days.
Concerning the Finnish army to us following its grouping plan is more probable:
1) at the front from gulf of Finland up to Savonlinna - not less than 6 infantry divisions maintained by 5-6 divisions of Germans;
2) for covering a direction to Kuopio, Ioensu - at the front Oncamo, Ilomantsy, Nurmes- up to 30 infantry divisions;
3) for covering Uleaborg of a direction at the front Cuhmoniemi, Suomussalmi - up to 2 infantry divisions;
4) in area Merijarvi - 2-3 infantry divisions; 5) in area Petsamo - 1-2 infantry divisions. Final expansion of the Finnish army should be expected on 20-25 days.
The probability of a concentration of great strengths of the Finnish army on the Vyborg-Leningrad direction, maintained here German divisions, predetermines an opportunity of active actions of the opponent on this direction. The most probable actions of marine sea fleets of opponents will be:
German fleet -
à) blockade in Baltic sea; b) maintenance and landing of landings in area Libava and capture of Moonzund archipelago; c) aspiration to break to gulf of Finland and to force out our fleet to the east; d) in Northern sea development by Germans of cruiser operations and actions of submarines on blockade of our ports in Murmansk and in Arkhangelsk is possible. The Italian fleet will aspire to transfer the basic actions to Black sea.
In the East.
Most likely, the Japanese command by the nearest purpose of the actions overland and naval forces will put mastering by our Far east in this connection the following grouping of the Japanese forces in the first month of war is supposed:
- on the Seaside direction - 14-15 infantry divisions:
- on Sungary direction - up to 3 infantry divisions; - on the Sakhalin direction - up to 3 infantry divisions;
- against Sakhalin and in a mouth of the river Amur - up to 2 infantry divisions;
- against Transbaikalia and Mongolia - 8-9 infantry divisions which main grouping will be on Hailar plateau.
The others 30 Japanese divisions and small means of strengthening can be brought up to Northern Manchuria by the end of the second month from the beginning of a concentration. Also it is necessary to take into account actions against our east coast and ports of a strong marine sea fleet of the opponent.
IV. BASES of OUR STRATEGIC EXPANSION
If necessary strategic expansion of armed Forces of Soviet Union on two fronts basic our forces should be developed in the West. Other our borders should be covered with the minimal forces, namely:
à) on protection of Northern coast there are one 88# Infantry division, spare parts and border guard;
b) on protection of coast of Black sea from Odessa up to Kerch except for the Black Sea fleet there are 156# Infantry division, spare parts, coastal defense and border guard;
c) on protection of coast of Black sea from Kerch up to Sukhumi - 157# Infantry division and border guard;
d) Transcaucasia is provided 6 infantry divisions (from them 4 mountain), 2 ( two) cavalry, 11 ïîëêîâ aircraft;
e) borders in Central Asia are provided with two mountain - infantery divisions and three êàâàëåðèéñêèìè. In total on northern and southern borders of the USSR from field armies it is left 11 infantry divisions (from them 7 mountain) and 5 cavalry divisions.
For actions in the East against Japan it is necessary to appoint: 29 infantry divisions (from them 6 motorized) in view of three of Siberia; 7 tank divisions; 1 cavalry division; 1 motorized brigad; 4 Mongolia's cavalry divisions ; 1 Mongolia's motorized brigad; 2-3 brigades an airlanding; 54 shelf of aircraft.
In total it is left on northern, southern and east borders of the USSR: 40 infantry divisions, from them 6 motorized; 7 tank divisions; 9 cavalry divisions; 1 motorized brigad; 80 ïîëêîâ aircraft, from them 11 on air defence of Moscow.

Russian text:http://armor.kiev.ua/army/hist/stratplan-3-41.shtml

P.S.: I'm translate this document in automatic translator, and I'm sorry for quality. Place names can be wrong translate.
P.P.S.:Infantry divisions in original documents named "shooting division".

[Roberto]

What you think about this document?

Nothing special. An assessment of the military situation followed by a suggestion as to what measures to take in the face of that situation.

What do you think about it?

[michael mills]

Xserx wrote:

What you think about this document?

The most interesting thing about it is that Zhukov and Timoshenko thought that the main German thrust would come in the south, to seize Ukraine, with an auxiliary thrust from East Prussia toward Riga.

That conclusion was quite reasonable, since the objective of a German attack would be to gain control of the resources of Ukraine and the Caucasus on which it was dependent, and which it currently had to buy from the Soviet Union in return for scarce manufactured goods, especially arms.

The Soviet Union concentrated its main force in the south, where it protected Ukraine, and was also poised for an advance into Romania and Bulgaria, cutting Germany off from its only other sources of supply.

However, the main German thrust came in the north, which allowed it to achieve a breakthrough, and subsequently wheel right to conquer Ukraine.

The document shows that Zhukov and Timoshenko did weigh the possibility that the main German attack might come in the north, from East Prussia in the direction of Riga, but they obviously decided against that possibility.