DKM BB Operatons 39/40 vs 41

[g.flotron]

In the first year of the war, Raeder and the Admiralty Staff were ighly critical of Marschall’s handling of the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau; first when they attacked the Northern Patrol and then during the Norwegian campaign, because in both cases they weren’t used more aggressively.
Then comes Operation Berlin and Operation Rhine, and the operational orders from Raeder et al are to avoid risk.
While obviously the latter were for commerce warfare, what I’ve never understood, is what changed?
Always seemed odd to me because in the former operations, France with Dunkerque and Strasbourg, and the soon to be completed Richelieu and Jean Bart, and the older Lorraine, Bretagne, and Provence, was still in the war, while Italy with her 6 battleships was not.
By 1941, the net result to Germany is a 13 ship swing; 7 less enemies, 6 more allies.
With Italy’s entry, England has to keep at least 1 or 2 heavy ships at Gibraltar, and at least 3 at Alexandria, which when you factor in refits, maintenance and expected battle damage, puts a great strain on the Royal Navy.
I understand Fleet in Being, ,mercantile warfare, etc, but why not the same concerns and approach the first 18 months.
Operation Juno: Attack Harstad, even though heavy BR warships may be present.
Operation Berlin: Run away from the Ramilies.
What was the reason for such a dramatic departure?
Thoughts?

[Kingfish]

I'm not so sure it was a change in strategy. Rather, it may have been a realization of the risks involved with operations in the open Atlantic against a Royal Navy that even with the commitments in the Med was far superior to the Kreigsmarine. The loss of the Graf Spee no doubt had an effect on their thinking.

[g.flotron]

Very good points.
Again, it is not so much I don't understand, or disagree with the change in strategy in so much that it is such a 180 that I've always wondered what had the most impact on effecting.