Schnellboote, the most underrated ships of the surface fleet?

[Von Bock]

Although I know quite a lot about WW II, I’ve never read much about German Schnellboote. (or E-boats in English) I discovered recently that e-boats from the the 6th and 9th flotillas from Cherbourg attacked exercise Tiger on 28 April 1944, causing about 749 American Army and Navy casualties.

This seems to be a very big success to me. A total of 101 merchant ships totalling 214728 tons were sunk by E-boats. Additional claims include 12 destroyers, 11 minesweepers, eight landing ships, six MTBs, one torpedo boat, one minelayer, one submarine, and a number of smaller craft such as fishing boats. They also damaged two cruisers, five destroyers, three landing ships, one repair ship, one naval tug, and numerous other merchant vessels.

Were these boats more successful than any other surface ship of the Kriegsmarine?

[kfbr392]

“There were nine other warships, which, between them, accounted for 142 ships sunk or captured, grossing more than 870.000 tons, in a total of 3.769 days at sea, an average of more than 230 tons of enemy ships sunk or captured per day.

If this operational record is impressive, then in economic terms, the figures are even more so, as this outstanding performance was achieved by little more than 3,000 officers and men, in nine second-hand freighters, armed with third-hand weapons, the total cost of which, both in terms of purchase price and the cost of fitting out, represented barely 1% of the cost of the battleship Bismarck!

They were the Hilfskreuzer, the Auxiliary Cruisers, commerce raiders, which although built as freighters, went to sea and fought as true warships.”

http://www.bismarck-class.dk/bismarck_c ... ction.html

[Von Bock]

“There were nine other warships, which, between them, accounted for 142 ships sunk or captured, grossing more than 870.000 tons, in a total of 3.769 days at sea, an average of more than 230 tons of enemy ships sunk or captured per day.

If this operational record is impressive, then in economic terms, the figures are even more so, as this outstanding performance was achieved by little more than 3,000 officers and men, in nine second-hand freighters, armed with third-hand weapons, the total cost of which, both in terms of purchase price and the cost of fitting out, represented barely 1% of the cost of the battleship Bismarck!

They were the Hilfskreuzer, the Auxiliary Cruisers, commerce raiders, which although built as freighters, went to sea and fought as true warships.”

http://www.bismarck-class.dk/bismarck_c ... ction.html

Very interesting, definitely deserves a bigger place in the history books.

[stolypin]

I likewise knew very little about Schnellboote until I recently read Lawrence Paterson's "Schnellboote: A Complete Operational History."

[Darius333]

Hi,

maybe of interest:

Die Schnellboote der Kriegsmarine im 2. Weltkrieg
https://historisches-marinearchiv.de/pr ... eibung.php

Regards

Darius

[Felix C]

Sinking small coastal convoy ships usually loaded with coal was not significant. The Luftwaffe found this out in 1940 after attacking the small channel convoys. At least USN PTs sank troop laden barges. RN MTBs scarce escorts. All sides occasionally scored a significant sinking. A rarity all around.

As for the auxiliary cruisers, it would be significant to note their victims' cargoes and where bound as that would determine if it were useful to supplying war industries in the UK. They did spread the anti-surface force needed to contain same as long range Axis submarines operations spread the ASW effort. The critical convoys were those heading to the UK with finished munitions or raw material or foodstuffs for workers, oil tankers, troopships.

Reflecting a bit I recall a UK bound fully laden refrigerated ship was captured another sunk and Pinguin seized one entire whaler fleet. Significant sinkings.

[kfbr392]

As for the auxiliary cruisers, it would be significant to note their victims' cargoes and where bound as that would determine if it were useful to supplying war industries in the UK.

Just follow the link I provided upthread to read details about the cargo destroyed by the Hilfskreuzer.

[thaddeus_c]

my view they were an unfinished or unrealized class of vessels, some comparison could be made to the latter war jets they fielded,however unlike the jets they still had the ability to have adapted the S-boats.

the immediate post-war iteration is a "realized" version of the S-boat https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jaguar-cl ... tack_craft

the historical S-boats were used as minelayers but could only carry 6 mines, the above cited boat could manage 2 dozen mines, that is a huge change that would have affected their usefulness.

[kfbr392]

the historical S-boats were used as minelayers but could only carry 6 mines, the above cited boat could manage 2 dozen mines, that is a huge change that would have affected their usefulness.

Greetings Thaddeus,
Schnellboot mining capabilities were increasingly neutralized by British centimetric radar from 1942/43.

From the book „Funkmeß. Die Entwicklung und der Einsatz des RADAR-Verfahrens in Deutschland bis zum Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges“, by Frank Reuter:

Seit Sommer 1941 und von da ab mit zunehmender Wirksamkeit beeinträchtigte der englische Funkmeßeinsatz die Angriffsmöglichkeiten der Schnellbootwaffe im Westraum und zwang zu einschneidenden Änderungen der gesamten Taktik, um die schwachen Stellen und Lücken des gegnerischen Abwehrsystems noch ausnutzen zu können. Eine Parallelität zur U-Boot-Waffe war insofern vorhanden, als auch dem Schnellboot durch die Ortung das operative Überraschungsmoment genommen wurde, das Kampfkraft und damit Erfolg oder Mißerfolg dieser Waffe bestimmte. Doch wie kein anderes Seekriegsmittel war das Schnellboot der Auswirkung des gesamten feindlichen Funkmeßdienstes von Land, Schiff und Flugzeug ausgesetzt, ohne sich, wie das U-Boot, der Ortung entziehen zu können. Es mußte den Kampf tief innerhalb des Ortungsbereiches der englischen Küste suchen, wenn es in offensivem Einsatz überhaupt Erfolge erringen wollte. Mit der Einführung der Funkmeßbeobachtung seit Sommer 1942 war die Gefährdung der Boote durch überraschende Oberfälle gegnerischer Abwehrstreitkräfte für eine Zeitlang herabgesetzt, die Ortung selbst aber wurde nicht verhindert, so daß ein unbemerktes Eindringen in das Operationsgebiet weiterhin unmöglich war. Versuche, die Ortung durch Störung auszuschalten, schlugen fehl, die für den Schnellbooteinsatz von der Luftwaffe übernommenen Funkmeßgeräte entsprachen nur annähernd den Ansprüchen der Front. Waffentechnisch war auf dem Gebiet der Ortung das Schnellboot den gegnerischen Seestreitkräften unterlegen, die damit auch die taktischen Vorteile auf ihrer Seite hatten. Torpedoangriffe führten zuletzt fast nur noch zu Gefechten mit den Sicherungsstreitkräften, kaum noch zur Vernichtung gegnerischen Handelsschiffsraumes. Die Wirkung der Mine war auf Null gesunken, weil der Gegner mit Hilfe der Ortung Minenoperationen als solche erkannte und so verseuchte Gebiete lokalisieren konnte.

Since the summer of 1941, and from then on with increasing effectiveness, the British use of radar impaired the attack possibilities of the S-Boat weapon in the western area and forced drastic changes in the entire tactics in order to be able to exploit the weak points and gaps in the enemy's defense system. A parallel to the U-Boat weapon existed insofar as the S-Boat was also deprived of the operational element of surprise through radar, which determined the combat power and thus the success or failure of this weapon. But like no other means of naval warfare, the S-Boat was exposed to the effects of the entire enemy radar service from shore, ship, and aircraft, without being able to evade detection as the U-Boat could. It had to seek combat deep within the detection range of the British coast if it was to achieve any success at all in offensive operations. With the introduction of [German FuMB passive] radar detectors since the summer of 1942, the danger to the boats from surprise attacks by enemy forces was reduced for a time, but the detection itself was not prevented, so that an unnoticed penetration into the area of operations continued to be impossible. Attempts to disable detection by jamming failed, and the [surplus FuG 202 Liechtenstein B/C] radars received from the Luftwaffe for S-Boat operations didn't come close to meeting the requirements of the front. In terms of weaponry, the S-Boat was inferior to the enemy naval forces in the area of radar, and the latter thus also had the tactical advantage on their side. Torpedo attacks led in the end almost only to battles with escorts, hardly to the destruction of enemy merchant shipping. The effect of the [S-Boat laid] mine had sunk to zero, because the enemy recognized mine operations as such with the help of radar and could thus localize contaminated areas.

[thaddeus_c]

the historical S-boats were used as minelayers but could only carry 6 mines, the above cited boat could manage 2 dozen mines, that is a huge change that would have affected their usefulness.

Greetings Thaddeus,
Schnellboot mining capabilities were increasingly neutralized by British centimetric radar from 1942/43.

From the book „Funkmeß. Die Entwicklung und der Einsatz des RADAR-Verfahrens in Deutschland bis zum Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges“, by Frank Reuter:

Since the summer of 1941, and from then on with increasing effectiveness, the British use of radar impaired the attack possibilities of the S-Boat weapon in the western area and forced drastic changes in the entire tactics in order to be able to exploit the weak points and gaps in the enemy's defense system. A parallel to the U-Boat weapon existed insofar as the S-Boat was also deprived of the operational element of surprise through radar, which determined the combat power and thus the success or failure of this weapon. But like no other means of naval warfare, the S-Boat was exposed to the effects of the entire enemy radar service from shore, ship, and aircraft, without being able to evade detection as the U-Boat could. It had to seek combat deep within the detection range of the British coast if it was to achieve any success at all in offensive operations. With the introduction of [German FuMB passive] radar detectors since the summer of 1942, the danger to the boats from surprise attacks by enemy forces was reduced for a time, but the detection itself was not prevented, so that an unnoticed penetration into the area of operations continued to be impossible. Attempts to disable detection by jamming failed, and the [surplus FuG 202 Liechtenstein B/C] radars received from the Luftwaffe for S-Boat operations didn't come close to meeting the requirements of the front. In terms of weaponry, the S-Boat was inferior to the enemy naval forces in the area of radar, and the latter thus also had the tactical advantage on their side. Torpedo attacks led in the end almost only to battles with escorts, hardly to the destruction of enemy merchant shipping. The effect of the [S-Boat laid] mine had sunk to zero, because the enemy recognized mine operations as such with the help of radar and could thus localize contaminated areas.

in what area was Germany NOT being stymied by 1942-43? that still leaves a window of opportunity earlier in the war albeit the KM would have to view the use of the S-boats differently.

[ShindenKai]

“There were nine other warships, which, between them, accounted for 142 ships sunk or captured, grossing more than 870.000 tons, in a total of 3.769 days at sea, an average of more than 230 tons of enemy ships sunk or captured per day.

If this operational record is impressive, then in economic terms, the figures are even more so, as this outstanding performance was achieved by little more than 3,000 officers and men, in nine second-hand freighters, armed with third-hand weapons, the total cost of which, both in terms of purchase price and the cost of fitting out, represented barely 1% of the cost of the battleship Bismarck!

They were the Hilfskreuzer, the Auxiliary Cruisers, commerce raiders, which although built as freighters, went to sea and fought as true warships.”

http://www.bismarck-class.dk/bismarck_c ... ction.html

German Armed Merchant Cruisers are easily the MOST under-rated warships of WW2. Nothing else comes close to their successes!