I had two “idiot rules” to deal with. The first being the “Battle of the Bulge” rule where the US would not advance “too far” south of a Japanese unit north of them for fear of creating a “bulge” in their lines. Thus, when US troops reached Yanabaru on Okinawa they abandoned it and pulled back, fearing it would become another Bastogne. I really cannot see a US player doing this. For the rest of us it would be a victory to exploit rather than surrender. Yet the US not only did it but did it once again when, on their way to pursue the retreating Japanese to Medeera (and with tanks to do so) and with the Japanese on foot, the US did stupid once again and called off the attack to allow 6th Division time to eliminate the Japanese sailors to their north at Tomi Susuku. It allowed the Japanese to arrive in the Minatoga area with an organized defense.Carl Schwamberger wrote:
One of the problems of a game designer is to make the decisions each side made seem logical to the player. This is often difficult as the players arrive at the game with some preconceptions which are very different from those the actual commanders brought to the battle. Some designers get around this through "Idiot Rules" that channel the player in specific directions, some try though clever structural design of the game. Others don't try at all.
Evidently it was an important point to US command to do this and my victory conditions require the US to win in 23 turns. Without making it a rule to not “outrun the advance”, the US player would always win in less than 23 turns. Now he doesn’t.
The second “idiot rule” was the US standard procedure of two infantry battalions in an advance followed by a third. No US player will march into the Shuri Line in this formation (Which created the greatest US single day’s losses of the battle for the island.). And the US player will know the Japanese are there either by deducing it from the terrain elevations or simply by looking at the stacks of Japanese playing pieces waiting for him there.
The problem of “visible” Japanese play pieces on the board was solved by allowing the Japanese player to place “bogus” decoy pieces on the board wherever he wanted and with the only way for the American player to determine if they’re actually “bogus” or not in order to remove them being to move a friendly unit into the space and “discover” what’s there.
The problem of an American “blitzkrieg’s” south was solved by limiting the distance the US could move south of a northern Japanese play piece (including bogus).
The problem of forcing the US player into using the standard US advance was solved by limiting stacking to three US infantry battalions. Now he can’t show up with more even though he knows he’s running into the Shuri Line. Stacking rules exist in most wargames. For the Japanese, stacking is limited only one infantry battalion as defensive tunnels only accommodated one battalion.
I could make the “battle of the Bulge” rule optional but don’t know how to change the game’s victory conditions. The US would have to win in fewer turns. But how many fewer turns?
This does not appear to be a problem. 10th Army’s PoV is dictated mainly by their choice of landing beaches and they must land at the historical beaches opposite Yontan and Kadena as not only did they need to capture these airfields but it’s also the only beach big enough to land everything on. So it’s a guarantee the US player’s landing here and in huge numbers. Indeed! If he didn’t land here he’d still be unloading elsewhere 23 turns later when the game ends.I'm wondering at this point what the differences in the players PoV & that of 10th Army staff were. That the 10th Army continued to make frontal attacks on the defense can only be partially attributed to stupidity. If the game steers the player to swiftly to a alternate strategy then perhaps there is defect in its simulation of the commanders PoV.
Once the American player begins landing here it dictates a strategy of moving outwards from the beachhead, north, east, and south. Thus, his strategy becomes exactly the same as 10th Army’s.
Once the American player has cleared off any enemy units (bogus or otherwise) around the landing zone, he will encounter the Shuri Line. In all probability he will attack the entire width of the line with the hope of flanking it by the coastal lowlands of either side. Although not very possible, why not try? Even failure will create attrition in the Japanese Army.
There is an alternative strategy the US did not use. Without the “Battle of the Bulge” rule the US can race down the west coast with the intention of taking Kakazu using an entire division backed up by tanks and corps/Army artillery. All Japanese units to the east would be screened off by a second US division.
I've observed this problem in a number of campaigns & games where the attacker had a amphibious force and the defender considerable coast & no clear idea of the limits of the attackers amphibious capability. Where the defender has a good idea of the limits he will take the risks or quickly adjust. Otherwise he often tries to defend to much and mis deploy his reserve.
Correct. I think the most brilliant part of the US campaign was to maintain the threat of a second landing at Minatoga but not actually landing there. It pinned down Japanese troops here that could have been used against US troops on the Shuri Line or against US landings at Minatoga. These “mis-deployed” troops ended up being used pretty much for nothing.
I haven’t played out a landing at Minatoga but I previously mentioned in my other post that Japan had available A/A guns they had failed to use (three battalions of 20mm A/A guns and six battalions of 75mm A/A guns). Although all three 20mm battalions were added to the Shuri line only one 75mm battalion was. The 20mm was pretty much a waste here as it would not penetrate the Sherman tank’s frontal armor. However, they would penetrate American landing ships and had a 3,000 yard range. In the game I included them as coastal defense weapons against landing craft. Two such battalions at Minatoga would have been presented with a very large number of targets and with perfect visibility. These weapons here plus all six battalions of 75mm Type 88 guns on the Shuri Line could have a considerable impact on US forces. My personal guess is that the 75’s would have forced the US to withdraw all their Sherman’s from the attack on the Shuri Line and in just ten days.
Yahara actually interfered with the attack, believing it would fail, in order to reduce casualties (Although some might say the attack failed because of his interference. There’s no right or wrong way to lose a battle.).The Japanese generals had at this point persuaded themselves the US soldiers would be as weak in the defense as they seemed to be in the attack. The assumed a division size counter attack would shatter the US corps on their front and gain the defense a month or more respite from attacks. Yahara judged it a mistake & says he did not feel the way. He recommended at most some local counter attacks.
But the attack itself was well timed in that the US had withdrawn troops off the line for reorganization with new replacements. And the attack had to be conducted at night or be obliterated by US artillery fire. It was definitely a failure but only Yahara had the wisdom to see it coming. I cannot say, if I were there then, that I would have opposed the attack. In hindsight, yes. In foresight, no. It was the only chance ever presented to create a US setback. After that there were no more. Its failure shortened the Shuri campaign by perhaps a week, maybe two when one considers their losses in artillery pieces.
Although US strategy is pretty much determined by where and when one lands (and the “Bulge” rule) and Japanese by where one choses to defend, ultimately the US will win. It’s just a question of how many turns and at what price. The combination of the Japanese using those A/A guns, using Yahara’s strategy, and the unexpected huge American problem of “combat fatigue” could make this a very deadly game.
