Suggest references on Japanese at-sea refueling?

[glenn239]

There are references I've seen on victual supply ships in the Indian Ocean Raid, but nothing indicating at-sea transfers of food or any other material. The IJN simply did not develop the capacity, AFAIK. Note though that the cranes already on IJN carriers, and the IJN/IJA's training in amphibious landings meant that some form of capacity 'off the shelf' could quickly have been generated if this was thought necessary. Whether something as complex and heavy as a torpedo could be shipped is arguable, but 250kg bombs really shouldn't have been too much trouble to improvise.

[OpanaPointer]

Nothing here, either.

[cstunts]

To Rob Stuart's question, the answer is Yes.

Didn't the Japanese envision the establishment of an "impregnable" defensive perimeter from the IO through the SWP to the home islands? Which in turn rather suggests a static (defensive) posture with bases.
And the seizure and exploitation of strategic resources in SE Asia to maintain the Empire's military strength...

[OpanaPointer]

To Rob Stuart's question, the answer is Yes.

Didn't the Japanese envision the establishment of an "impregnable" defensive perimeter from the IO through the SWP to the home islands? Which in turn rather suggests a static (defensive) posture with bases.
And the seizure and exploitation of strategic resources in SE Asia to maintain the Empire's military strength...

If Europe was a fortress with a roof, The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere's fortress was without walls. Japan put up defenses on outlying islands that weren't so much fortresses as they were delaying tactics. I understand that the plan was to be fully consolidated in the line from Korea to the NEI by the time the Allied reduced the outer defenses. The IJN/IJA didn't understand that the US would bounce back so fast, nor did they "get" that the USN would hound them right into the Inland Sea. It was one of the worst miscalculations in history, IMHO.

[cstunts]

"If Europe was a fortress with a roof, The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere's fortress was without walls. Japan put up defenses on outlying islands that weren't so much fortresses as they were delaying tactics. I understand that the plan was to be fully consolidated in the line from Korea to the NEI by the time the Allied reduced the outer defenses. The IJN/IJA didn't understand that the US would bounce back so fast, nor did they "get" that the USN would hound them right into the Inland Sea. It was one of the worst miscalculations in history, IMHO."

Nothing arguable in this, really. Although S.E. Morison was uncharitable, stating that the strategy of Nihon Kaigun was characterized by "stupidity"...there was more, I feel, of desperation and an intense fatalism. Along with a kind of courage that we hadn't quite come to grips with when the war erupted. The men in the USN & Army who held, or had held, positions of command responsibility with the most proximity to the Japanese--such as Yarnell, Hart, Purnell, among others, including Stilwell, and our earlier historians with actual experience in Japan, such as Gordon Prange--saw this (i.e., Japan's mortal seriousness) a good deal more clearly it seems to me.

I merely meant to suggest (not too strenuously) that I doubt very much the IJN conceived of prolonged operations at such great distances from even their forward bases (such as Staring Bay/Kendari, a very primitive place) as to require significant underway replenishment capabilities. As all who have examined those very interesting pages in the PHA volume will understand, the IJN was operating on a shoestring throughout the first-stage operations as it was...Complaints/concerns regarding the serious implications to their operations of losing even a single stores ship tell us much, for example, along with the criticisms levelled against surface commanders for excessive/profligate expenditures of shells and torpedoes...

Another telling aspect of Japan's flawed strategic execution, IMO, is their quite correct understanding of the crucial importance of advanced air bases, and the plans for seizing & expanding these that they had made before the war (and early in the war) in contrast to what they were actually able to achieve...which were painfully incomplete & under-whelming by comparison with US efforts.

At any rate, the term "fortress" is among the most deceptive that one comes across in PacWar literature...e.g., the Japanese Monograph on Balikpapan speaks of the "Balikpapan Fortress" or, as in this forum, talk of "Fortress Penang"--both of which are absurdly misleading. I do wonder what the Japanese term is that is being translated as "fortress" in these documents...Is it toride? yosai ? or what?

[Akira Takizawa]

The term "fortress" in Japanese is Yosai. Since 19th century, Yosai had been built to defend Japan homeland against enemy fleet. But, they became useless by the appearance of aircraft. Note that Yosai existed only in and around Japan homeland. The fortresses in the Pacific are not Yosai, officially.

Taki

[OpanaPointer]

At the end of the day Japan was trying to do something impossible because they didn't think they had any other choice. They talked themselves into that attitude and it cost the Empire dearly.

[kgbudge]

Following the Boshin Civil War that established modern Japan, the Japanese were able to fight limited wars of relatively short duration. The China Incident was the first real exception; though in some ways a limited war, it dragged on almost to the limit of Japan's endurance.

There are indications the Japanese expected the Pacific War to be another limited and relatively brief conflict. They fully expected the Allies to come to the negotiating table after the first spectacular successes. Those Japanese leaders who knew otherwise, such as Yamamoto, were ignored. Yamamoto's Pearl Harbor strategy was shaped in part by the belief that only a really stunning initial blow had any chance of discouraging the Americans enough to make them negotiate a favorable settlement. Unfortunately, the surprise attack so infuriated Americans that the effect was quite the opposite.

[cstunts]

Domo arigato gozaimasu, Taki-san! Very helpful; I appreciate this information a lot.

What would be the difference between the terms "Yosai" and "Toride"? ADM Yoshida Zengo was known as Saigo no toride ("The last fortress") for his opposition to the IJN's extremists advocating the Tripartite Pact, for example.

Thank-you in advance

[Akira Takizawa]

Toride means fort. It is not a military term, but a literary term. So, it was used as a title of book.

Taki

[robdab]

.
WRT Japanese suply and re-fueling http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/congress/Vol13.pdf has much info starting at page #653.

[PHGamer]

OpanaPointer, thanks for the link to the Congressional Investigation Pearl Harbor attack and pointing to some of the pages regarding Japanese refueling at sea. (vol 13, pages ??? and 660) I was misinformed that the Japanese only did this on the Pearl Harbor raid, but have read other items since that proved this wrong. But this is the first documents that provided details. When in the Navy, I was a phone talker during unreps, so I have experience with this operation.