Motivation of Imperial Army Revolt

[GUTB]

All the histories I've read (currently John Toland's The Rising Sun) just say that there were young hothead Army officers. This seems like a very unconvincing motivation. Why were they hotheads and went so far as to organize coups and independent military actions? What was the political / material conditions which lead to the Army to break away from the civilian government to such an extent?

[GUTB]

So, upon further reading it really does seem that -- although not directly stated by the people involved -- the actual motivation is similar to other Axis powers of the time: simply, money. The Army was acting in partnership with the oligarchs (zaibatsu) to make a mint off imperial conquest. Without that understanding is really does seem strange how Japan of the period was so dedicated to the conquest of Chinese territories, would undermine the civilian government (seemingly) and assassinate people not sufficiently pro-conquest. In reality is seems that the majority of the government as well as the Army and Navy were aligned with conquest and those elements not in line with that were the minority and also subject to assassination. So, in reality, there WAS no "revolt" of the Army, the Army and Tojo in particular were just thrown under the bus for the spectacular failure of Japan's attempted land grab and all the main elements of the Japanese power structure were committed to conquest. It was linear progression of real power in Japan with the zaibatsu the primary movers, the "hothead" Army officers were just junior partners in the real power dynamic.

It's INCREDIBLE how much fake information there is about this topic.

[cstunts]

"The Army was acting in partnership with the oligarchs (zaibatsu) to make a mint off imperial conquest."

No. The idea that there was a 'partnership' between the Rikugun & zaibatsu involving Japan's overseas conquests--whether in Korea, Taiwan, China, Manchuria/Manchukuo, or the Nam'po--predicated upon greed & plunder has little or no basis in reality.

"It was linear progression of real power in Japan with the zaibatsu the primary movers, the "hothead" Army officers were just junior partners in the real power dynamic."

Again, not at all. 1932 saw the assassination of Mitsui (zaibatsu) head Dan Takuma...Why would "junior partners" kill their "primary movers" who were allegedly helping them make a "mint"?
Answer: They didn't because they weren't "partners" at all, and there was surely no "mint" being made by the IJA.
The truth is that all of Japan's imperial conquests had been, and were, enormous sinkholes financially--and not just financially. In general, most persons who profited (& they were v. few & far between) were usually civilian criminals who trailed in the wake of the military...a situation we ought to understand very well today.

None of the energetic, idealistic, rightwing young militarists (extremists) of the Twenties & Thirties would have ever tolerated the suggestion that they were after personal financial gain...especially after the disastrous 1931-32 financial scandals that rocked the zaibatsu & led to their public denunciation as traitors to the nation, and the killing of men such as "Baron Dan".
Certainly none of the young officers' revolts were ever based upon money or loot. In fact, what they opposed most violently was precisely this sort of corruption, what Humphreys has called the "...'illicit union of money & power' formed between the parties and the great capitalist plutocrats..."

No, there is a great deal more to the question than anything quite so simple. Although the nuances and complexities of Japan's military & civilian leadership in the Shōwa period are nothing if not exasperating for a Westerner to understand at all, and enough to drive any serious student to hope for such easy answers.

Rather than relying on John Toland--an excellent popularizer but not a true scholar of Japanese history--suggest the following few English language works:


Revolt in Japan: The Young Officers and the February 26, 1936 Incident (1973) Ben-Ami Shillony (best single volume on ni-ni-roku jiken)
Politics & Culture in Wartime Japan (1981) Ben-Ami Shillony
Japan Prepares for Total War (1977) Michael Barnhart
Japan's Total Empire (1998) Louise Young (about Manchuria & Japan's imperialist wartime culture)
Ishiwara Kanji and Japan's Confrontation with the West (1975) Mark Peattie
Agony of Choice (2002) David Lu (on Matsuoka Yosuke)
The Rise of Modern Japan (1995) W. G. Beasley
War Criminal--The Life & Death of Hirota Koki (1977) Saburo Shiroyama
From Mahan To Pearl Harbor (2006) Sadao Asada
The Allied Occupation of Japan (AKA Inside GHQ, 2002) Takemae Eiji
Tojo and Nomonhon, both by Alvin D. Coox
Tanaka Giichi and Japan's China Policy (1980) Wm. Fitch Morton
The Way of the Heavenly Sword: the Japanese Army in the 1920's (1995) Leonard Humphreys (excellent section on the dissident young officers, revolts, and causes thereof...)

HTH

[GUTB]

"The Army was acting in partnership with the oligarchs (zaibatsu) to make a mint off imperial conquest."

No. The idea that there was a 'partnership' between the Rikugun & zaibatsu involving Japan's overseas conquests--whether in Korea, Taiwan, China, Manchuria/Manchukuo, or the Nam'po--predicated upon greed & plunder has little or no basis in reality.

"It was linear progression of real power in Japan with the zaibatsu the primary movers, the "hothead" Army officers were just junior partners in the real power dynamic."

Again, not at all. 1932 saw the assassination of Mitsui (zaibatsu) head Dan Takuma...Why would "junior partners" kill their "primary movers" who were allegedly helping them make a "mint"?
Answer: They didn't because they weren't "partners" at all, and there was surely no "mint" being made by the IJA.
The truth is that all of Japan's imperial conquests had been, and were, enormous sinkholes financially--and not just financially. In general, most persons who profited (& they were v. few & far between) were usually civilian criminals who trailed in the wake of the military...a situation we ought to understand very well today.

None of the energetic, idealistic, rightwing young militarists (extremists) of the Twenties & Thirties would have ever tolerated the suggestion that they were after personal financial gain...especially after the disastrous 1931-32 financial scandals that rocked the zaibatsu & led to their public denunciation as traitors to the nation, and the killing of men such as "Baron Dan".
Certainly none of the young officers' revolts were ever based upon money or loot. In fact, what they opposed most violently was precisely this sort of corruption, what Humphreys has called the "...'illicit union of money & power' formed between the parties and the great capitalist plutocrats..."

No, there is a great deal more to the question than anything quite so simple. Although the nuances and complexities of Japan's military & civilian leadership in the Shōwa period are nothing if not exasperating for a Westerner to understand at all, and enough to drive any serious student to hope for such easy answers.

Rather than relying on John Toland--an excellent popularizer but not a true scholar of Japanese history--suggest the following few English language works:


Revolt in Japan: The Young Officers and the February 26, 1936 Incident (1973) Ben-Ami Shillony (best single volume on ni-ni-roku jiken)
Politics & Culture in Wartime Japan (1981) Ben-Ami Shillony
Japan Prepares for Total War (1977) Michael Barnhart
Japan's Total Empire (1998) Louise Young (about Manchuria & Japan's imperialist wartime culture)
Ishiwara Kanji and Japan's Confrontation with the West (1975) Mark Peattie
Agony of Choice (2002) David Lu (on Matsuoka Yosuke)
The Rise of Modern Japan (1995) W. G. Beasley
War Criminal--The Life & Death of Hirota Koki (1977) Saburo Shiroyama
From Mahan To Pearl Harbor (2006) Sadao Asada
The Allied Occupation of Japan (AKA Inside GHQ, 2002) Takemae Eiji
Tojo and Nomonhon, both by Alvin D. Coox
Tanaka Giichi and Japan's China Policy (1980) Wm. Fitch Morton
The Way of the Heavenly Sword: the Japanese Army in the 1920's (1995) Leonard Humphreys (excellent section on the dissident young officers, revolts, and causes thereof...)

HTH

Complete bull. There was one oligarch who got assassinated (a banker I believe), and the other zaibatsu did bow to social pressure of the time as a result. All this nonsense about the imperial way, Japanese culture, etc, is simply not convincing especially when you consider that the zaibatsu were HEAVILY invested into the wars of conquest and were broken up after the surrender by the American occupation precisely because they were seen as the economic pillar of Japan's war of conquest. The rank and file of Japanese officers, themselves from the peasant class, certainly weren't in the pocket of the oligarchs -- but the generals and leaders who ran these aggressive moves to conquest definitely were. Otherwise, you have to explain why they were hellbent on wars of conquest.

Oh, and the worship of the god-emperor? Total bull. After the surrender a large portion of Japan, including government officials and regular people, thought Hirohito should take responsibility and step down and/or face trial. In reality Hirohito was not terribly against war. So, in reality, he was just a cog in the real power dynamic in Japan. There's so much bull published from the mouths of civilian government people desperate to cover their asses. Do any of those books listed contain real analysis of events that DON'T rely on post-war interviews of people trying cover their asses?

One example of an ass-covering was when the Japanese foreign minister (?) to the US in the interview claimed that war could have been averted but if not for a misunderstanding of a US message demanding the withdrawal from Indochina also including Manchuria. TOTAL bull. If war hinges on that they would have desperately tried to push back on it and asked ti keep Manchuria, at least for a time, etc. The fact was the real power system in Japan wanted their land grab. The people who financed it were the ones who stood to gain, and the nation moved along the real axis of power.