Japanese combat against Viet Minh prior to surrender?

[UncleBourbon]

I've been curious for a while now if there was any combat between Imperial Japanese Army and Viet Minh forces. Specifically during WWII; I'm aware of the Southern Expeditionary Army Group that was employed by the French and British to combat the Viet Minh in the South after unconditional surrender, but it isn't exactly what I'm looking for as the Southern Expeditionary Army Group was under French and British command at this point.

I'm aware the OSS supported Ho Chi Minh against Japan during the war, but Viet Minh resistance in the form of combat is either incredibly vague or not mentioned at all.

While I haven't read the full book, the closest I've found so far was one shoot-out on August 28, 1945 in Tay Ninh at the provincial people's committee building during the August Revolution in David Marr's Vietnam 1945. I'm aware the August Revolution took place during and after Japanese surrender, however I consider it an exception as the Japanese still practically held control of Indochina at that point, since it was prior to Allied occupation.

Near all search attempts for information on the matter are misconstrued as being for the instances of Imperial Japanese soldiers joining the Viet Minh after the war, so any related information would be appreciated.

[lazycat1984]

I wrote on this years ago for a grad seminar. I long since lost the deets and sources, but the Japanese were not happy to work for the French who they saw as despicable. They had sympathies for the locals. But they were largely also anti-communist. But at this stage, the VietMinh was more a national independence army as opposed to a column of the Third International. There was a dust up over an armory somewhere that the VietMinh wanted to plunder. But the Japanese routinely abused the French and iirc, the British and French were eager to send the Japanese home to Japan as soon as they could do.

[UncleBourbon]

I wrote on this years ago for a grad seminar. I long since lost the deets and sources, but the Japanese were not happy to work for the French who they saw as despicable. They had sympathies for the locals. But they were largely also anti-communist. But at this stage, the VietMinh was more a national independence army as opposed to a column of the Third International. There was a dust up over an armory somewhere that the VietMinh wanted to plunder. But the Japanese routinely abused the French and iirc, the British and French were eager to send the Japanese home to Japan as soon as they could do.

That's really interesting! It's a shame you lost it, as that's something I'd really be interested in reading. The armory dust up in particular sounds of interest, and if you recall anything on it I'd really appreciate hearing on it!

The Japanese sympathizing with the locals definitely checks out with their behavior in other European colonies like the Dutch East Indies and Singapore, which is another reason why I was surprised to see the Viet Minh being funded/armed against them.
Interestingly the Japanese were also employed by the British against Indonesian Revolutionaries after surrender in the Dutch East Indies, same as Indochina/Vietnam.

Vietnam's relevance later in the century and the fact there was combat prior to local Japanese surrender is what fascinates me with the Indochina situation more, however.

[Sheldrake]

In 2008 I met a WW2 veteran at an Anglo Japanese reconciliation event organised by the Japanese Embassy in London. He commanded the convoy that collected the ammunition and weapons to rearm the French in Vietnam. He mentioned that half of the escort were Japanese and half Gurkha and that they engaged the Viet Minhn who tried to ambush them. He did not mention any reticence by Japanese soldiers.

I am sure it must have been a bit weird, but I don't think the Japanese commanders had any say.

[EwenS]

I have this in the library but it’s been a while since I read it. It covers more than Vietnam, but it will shed some light on the actions there after Aug 1945 until the French resumed total control and the British finally withdrew at the end of March 1946.
https://www.amazon.co.uk/Mountbattens-S ... 0957630557

[Carl Schwamberger]

The Japanese sympathizing with the locals definitely checks out with their behavior in other European colonies like the Dutch East Indies and Singapore, which is another reason why I was surprised to see the Viet Minh being funded/armed against them.

Second & third hand information strongly suggests the Viet Minh & the Japanese had been fighting at least from the late 1944, if not earlier. Previous the Viet Minh had focused on building a political structure, and a embryonic military organization. This may have included assassination of unpopular local administrators, sabotage, & theft of weapons from the Japanese or residual French colonial military posts. There is at least one first hand witness I've run across.

Rene Defourneaux wrote a book 'The Winking Fox' about his career in the US Army, which included service in the OSS during WWII. He stated how in mid 1945 his OSS detachment was diverted from its mission in China to penetrate into French Indo China, and make contact with any resistance in the Red River region, or adjacent provinces. Their mission brief & background information left him thinking there had been no previous contact with the Viet Minh or any other group in FIC. A additional officer was attached to the team, who had the political background and authority to initiate communication with whoever they found. After a week or two of travel & discrete inquiry with the Vietnamese they were able to initiate a conversation with the top Viet Minh leaders. Defourneaux was convinced this was the first actual contact between US representatives and the Viet Minh. What the Brits or French might have accomplished in contact/support I don't know.

There was a dust up over an armory somewhere that the VietMinh wanted to plunder.

Defourneaux described how after the surrender he witnessed a gunfight between Viet Minh & Japanese in Hanoi, or one of its suburbs. The VM had been demanding they occupy a building or group of buildings and the Japanese had refused. Aside from the OSS team and some French liaison officers there was no one else to intervene quickly. Eventually the VM were persuaded to back off and the Japanese to pack up and depart the neighborhood.

Defourneaux was born in France & immigrated to the US in 1942. Fleeing conscription into German controlled work when he turned 18. He enlisted in the US Army in 1942, was eventually assigned to Army intelligence & commissioned as a officer in 1944. That same year he was incorporated into Jedburgh team and parachuted into France in August 1944. After the Jedburgh mission was complete he was transferred to China for OSS operations there. He served in US Army intelligence until the 1960s & retired as a Maj.

[Loïc]

Very limited resistance and fightings militarily-speaking, it doesn't seem that the underquiped Viêt-Minh at this moment was able to do a guerrilla warfare with real "combats" against the Japanese other than to serve its propaganda and for the United States observers and services in the area

according to Bernard Fall
the only known armed attack of some importance is that of 500 Viêt-Minh against 40 Japanese gendarmes [only 15 for others sources] at the altitude station of Tam Đảo the 17th july 1945 where the Japanese lost 8 men

not resentful, 2500 Japanese joined the Viêt-Minh as foreign volunteers or training cadres

[Carl Schwamberger]

... not resentful, 2500 Japanese joined the Viêt-Minh as foreign volunteers or training cadres.

I wonder what their background was? Those with Communist sympathies. The Communists were driven underground in 1930s Japan, but still existed. Perhaps they were Koreans?

[Loïc]

rather lost soldiers and deserters, as it existed throughout History in this kind of troubled periods, asian solidarity against the "whites" and others explanations

It would be quite wrong to believe that the ordinary Japanese soldiers who went to the side of the Viet-Minh (or the Indonesian separatists) all did so for "pro-Asian" or "anti-Western" motives. These counted, we will see, but very often they left because they were simply afraid of being arrested by the Allies, tried as war criminals and executed. This was especially the case in southern Indochina, where the rapid reoccupation by Anglo-Indian troops followed by General Leclerc's divisions left little time to think about it.

the reasons explaining most of the desertions are, ultimately, ordinary. Among the non-commissioned officers, in particular, many Japanese soldiers and civilians preferred to stay in Indochina, where economic opportunities were considerably better than in Japan, economically and militarily devastated by war. Among them, many will prefer to trade their weapons and change their names to open small businesses, public transport services and import-export houses both in the Viet-Minh zone and in Saigon or Haiphong, under French control

Some even chose to restart their previous agricultural trades by converting themselves to farmers in Vietnam. Many of these defectors were married to Vietnamese women. Many of the Kempetai or military intelligence officers spoke Vietnamese and / or Chinese, and had extensive cultural and economic knowledge of the country. Several of them stayed there to earn money.

The repatriation of the Japanese initially supposed to take place over five years, some have decided to try their luck in Indochina rather than wait in an internment camp for their repatriation to Japan. Others, genuinely destitute, were seduced by promises of preferential treatment in the DRVN army, which in many cases came true, at least initially. There was also "mass choice," a psychological situation in which an officer could remove his men through the bonds of friendship and loyalty forged in previous battles. If one studies very closely the list of the 400 Japanese names absent at the embarkation at Haiphong in March-April 1946, one will notice that 98 men belonged to the 82nd Infantry Regiment, that is to say about 25% of the total; 70 belonged to the 34th BGI, or 17.5% of the total; and 40 belonged to the 83rd Infantry Regiment, or 10%
It is hard to believe that these simple soldiers all left for "pro-Viet-Minh" motives. They were probably afraid of being arrested and convicted by the Allies

It should also be noted that the incorporation of several Japanese into the ranks of the Viet-Minh was sometimes done against their will: they were simply captured and forced to work as technicians and advisers for the Viet-Minh

(...)

In addition, some Japanese officers deserted to continue the battle against the "whites" and for the "Asians". In this regard, let us remember that among the deserters, some officers had been trained in the most secret ultra-nationalist and pan-Asian military schools. This is the case with officers trained in the Nakano School. The Japanese who passed through this elite school, says a military study, "came under the influence of a Pan-Asian mystic and were initiated into the largest and most secret projects of Japanese expansion policy and received instruction. special technique for the geopolitical area in which they were going to take charge ”. The Allies believed that these men probably had received special protection from Marshal Terauchi's staff, which enabled them to escape Allied search. According to documents seized by them at the end of the war, it is possible that some Japanese officers crossed over to the Viet-Minh on an express order from the Japanese High Command in mid-August.

Moreover, although severely tested in Burma, the Japanese Expeditionary Force has never been defeated in the true sense of the word, neither on the Indochinese peninsula nor in Indonesia. Some of these officers must have swallowed very bitterly the idea of ​​capitulating to the Europeans without a fight. Disgusted by their unexpected debacle and the emperor's repudiation, many simply disappeared never to return to a country that no longer wanted to listen to them. This seems to be the case with the 55th Division in particular

Alliés tardifs : les apports techniques des déserteurs japonais au Viet-Minh durant les premières années de la guerre franco-vietnamienne
https://www.cairn.info/revue-guerres-mo ... age-81.htm

[UncleBourbon]

Excellent information, Loïc! Thanks for the contribution.

These are accounts I have thus far now.

[lazycat1984]

This is a fascinating corner of WW2 and asian history. Apparantly IJAAF pilots were flying obsolete Ki43 fighters in support of Indonesian independence forces when the Dutch tried to come back. Many Japanese soldiers also joined the Chinese communists as well.

[SBConnor]

Here are two more sources:

Peter M . Dunn, The First Vietnam War
Stein Tonnesson, The Vietamese Revolution of 1945

The British officer mentioned earlier in the posts who commanded the joint Japanese-Gurkha relief column in Saigon was the late Major Philip Malins. I corresponded with Maj Malins while researching my thesis (which became a book, 'Mountbatten's Samurai', that someone has kindly mentioned above). Malins wrote a 20-page account of the relief column for Peter Dunn, who used some of it (but not much) in his 'First Vietnam War'. (He wouldn't let me have a copy as it was done 'solely' for Dunn. Pity.) The 'master work', however, is Tonnesson's (it has a superb bibliography).

American-French cooperation in FIC ceased after the murder of OSS officer, Lt Col Dewey in Sept '45. Not surprising really. Too much to go into here.

I hope my book is of use. (There's an ebook edition now that I've made availalble to libraries.) The Japanese army was into a number of 'sideshows' in FIC in late '45. Not least ripping off the currency reserves. Plane loads of Mitsubishi bombers stuffed with 500 piastre notes were documented leaving Saigon. It was the only tender that was recognised, so the Japanese just kept printing. They were still in administrative control! This cash funded guerilla battalions, bought food (for interned Japanese forces in northern FIC under Chinese control), and bribed just about everybody. The French were furious but could do nothing. The same thing happened in the Netherlands East Indies. Japanese printed 'Gulden' were in use till 1948 or so.

In contrast to the situation in the Netherlands East Indies the Japanese were repatriated very quickly, I think all had left by the end of January 1946. There were armed Japanese in the NEI till July 1946. (My late kendo instructor was in 20th IJA. He told me some great stories about guarding Standard Oil's refineries in Sumatra!) For a lighter take on the post-war colonial chaos and the role of the Japanese, you could do worse than Rory Marron's 'Black Sun, Red Moon' and 'Merdeka Rising.