Japanese surrender

[Imad]

Hello

This man makes a case for the Soviet entry into the war being the actual reason for Japan's surrender in 1945 rather than the atomic bombings. What, in your opinion, are the fallacies in his argument? Thanks in advance.

https://youtu.be/r9H6o83NUf4

[Eugen Pinak]

The main fallacy is that there was THE ONE AND ONLY reason for Japan's surrender in 1945. Both A-Bombs and Soviet attack were the final of the weeeeeeeeeeeeeeeery long list of nails in the coffin of Japan's imperial ambitions.

[ShindenKai]

This article sums it up very well.

https://www.historynet.com/japans-fatal ... -war-ii-2/

Japan was completely unprepared for WW2, their logistics were almost nonexistent in comparison to that of the USA. Its truly astounding that they thought they could beat the USA.

[Eugen Pinak]

This article sums it up very well.

https://www.historynet.com/japans-fatal ... -war-ii-2/

Japan was completely unprepared for WW2, their logistics were almost nonexistent in comparison to that of the USA. Its truly astounding that they thought they could beat the USA.

Actually that's very bad example of historical research, hardly suited as an example of Japanese faults.
Even the basic facts are ignored, or worse - distorted - to paint Japanese Army and Navy Air Forces in a bad light.

The most outrageous one is this tale:
"The Japanese failed to construct ferry sites and auxiliary airfields between Rabaul and Guadalcanal, 675 miles away, when they had the time. Lack of shipping to carry men and equipment for that task was the main problem, but their near total disregard of an aircraft’s combat radius was also at fault. For example, 18 Aichi D3A1 dive bombers were ditched into the sea in the first two days of the campaign when they ran out of gas."
In fact, IJNAF needn't to construct any auxiliary airfields between Rabaul and Guadalcanal, because RANGE of its planes was enough to get there without problems. COMBAT RADIUS become problem only for D3A and only after US troops landed on Guadalcanal. Of course, IJN command was perfectly aware of this problem - but could do nothing about it. As alternative was to let US forces to land without interruption. IJN high command did their best to rescue D3A crews by providing them "ditching area" near Japanese forces on Bougainville. And if some planes won't be able to reach this area, IJN "Akitsushima" was sent half-way to Guadalcanal to save water-landed D3A crews (and other crews as well).
This is well known story of Japanese resourcefulness. And to turn it into the tale of Japanese stupidity and disregard of the basic aircraft characteristic means author of the article is only interested in finding bad sides of Japanese air forces and not in the thorough research of this topic

And of course - absolutely no "whataboutism". As a result the reader is set to believe, that the problems of operating air forces on the enormous, non-developed theaters of operations were unique to Japanese - Allies had no problem operating there. Which is obviously not true.

[fontessa]

In fact, IJNAF needn't to construct any auxiliary airfields between Rabaul and Guadalcanal, because RANGE of its planes was enough to get there without problems.

It seems saying about Zero’s large range. It was true that the Zero had a maximum cruising range of 3,000km. With 1/3 of its fuel used for the outward trip, the next 1/3 for aerial combat, and the rest for the return trip and reserves, the calculation says that the escort mission to Guadalcanal was possible. But this required a lot of hardships for the Zero pilots. I've read the memoirs of one Zero pilot. According to it, the condition for flying Zero with the lowest fuel consumption was "250km speed at 4,000m altitude". In other words, the pilots were able to reach Guadalcanal after four hours in the thin, cold air with their right hand on the control stick, left hand on the throttle lever, and both feet on the foot pedals. After a nerve-wracking aerial battle of 20 minutes or so, while keeping eye on fuel consumption there, he again had to endure four hours of penance to return to Rabaul. He says "If we keep doing this, any masters will be exhausted. Then he'll be shot down. HQ just stay in the safety of Rabaul and why didn't advance 2,000 km." In my humble opinion, wasn't Solomon called the "Graveyard of pilots"? Eventually, an additional airfield was created in the fall of 1942 at Buin, halfway between Rabaul and Guadalcanal. Of course, poor construction capacity was the reason why it was so late. And Zero units advanced there. Also, the Model 32, which has a short cruising range and was unpopular, could be used.

fontessa

[ShindenKai]

This article sums it up very well.

https://www.historynet.com/japans-fatal ... -war-ii-2/

Japan was completely unprepared for WW2, their logistics were almost nonexistent in comparison to that of the USA. Its truly astounding that they thought they could beat the USA.

Actually that's very bad example of historical research, hardly suited as an example of Japanese faults.
Even the basic facts are ignored, or worse - distorted - to paint Japanese Army and Navy Air Forces in a bad light.

The most outrageous one is this tale:
"The Japanese failed to construct ferry sites and auxiliary airfields between Rabaul and Guadalcanal, 675 miles away, when they had the time. Lack of shipping to carry men and equipment for that task was the main problem, but their near total disregard of an aircraft’s combat radius was also at fault. For example, 18 Aichi D3A1 dive bombers were ditched into the sea in the first two days of the campaign when they ran out of gas."
In fact, IJNAF needn't to construct any auxiliary airfields between Rabaul and Guadalcanal, because RANGE of its planes was enough to get there without problems. COMBAT RADIUS become problem only for D3A and only after US troops landed on Guadalcanal. Of course, IJN command was perfectly aware of this problem - but could do nothing about it. As alternative was to let US forces to land without interruption. IJN high command did their best to rescue D3A crews by providing them "ditching area" near Japanese forces on Bougainville. And if some planes won't be able to reach this area, IJN "Akitsushima" was sent half-way to Guadalcanal to save water-landed D3A crews (and other crews as well).
This is well known story of Japanese resourcefulness. And to turn it into the tale of Japanese stupidity and disregard of the basic aircraft characteristic means author of the article is only interested in finding bad sides of Japanese air forces and not in the thorough research of this topic

And of course - absolutely no "whataboutism". As a result the reader is set to believe, that the problems of operating air forces on the enormous, non-developed theaters of operations were unique to Japanese - Allies had no problem operating there. Which is obviously not true.

You do realize that in the REAL world there are things like mechanical failures and battle damage that would cancel out ANY range advantage RIGHT?? Being forced to ditch your aircraft IS A LOSS, NOT a win, even if the crews are rescued, which is never guaranteed even in the best conditions. I've read multiple personal accounts by Japanese soldiers/pilots and they've all talked about the poor living conditions/amenities on island bases. The brutal manual labor to clear jungles for airfields, etc, etc. Have you not seen any Allied videos showing them clearing jungle/earth for an airfield and laying down MARSTON MAT?! The US could have an airfield finished within 72hrs. The fact is the Japanese never developed anything similar (I don't think any of the Axis powers did). As far I've been able to tell they never had construction battalions that were ever even close to being as well prepared and equipped as US CB's. Marston Mat was many times simply laid over the vegetation, which actually worked better because the damp and rotting vegetation greatly reduced the dust, which kills engines.

There are various Allied reports that talk about finding abandoned Japanese aircraft with very little damage/no real problems other than lack of maintenance. Thats a TRAINING, supply/LOGISTICAL failure (no parts = NO FLY). I have no doubt that they had great mechanics but you need TEAMS of mechanics for EACH aircraft and if they get killed (airfield attacked) or SICK, not uncommon in the least in the PTO they can't come close to fixing ALL the aircraft. You literally need many more multiples of ground crew per aircraft to keep your air forces flying. Ground crews are and always have been the unsung heroes in aerial combat, without them the aircraft become quite useless VERY quickly. -Its why warbirds are still the playthings of only the very rich today.

There's a video on YT of a Japanese Ace talking about how it was NOT uncommon for Zero pilots to fall asleep in their cockpits! He said you could always tell if they'd fallen asleep because they'd go into a slow climb, roll-over into a dive and disappear-crashing into the sea! -Though sometimes they'd wake-up and slowly rejoin the formation. He lamented the fact that they could only watch it happen because they didn't have decent enough radios to call out to the pilots to wake them up! That is an absurd way to lose experienced pilots/crews but it happened.

If the Japanese had simply used their subs more effectively they would've greatly affected US logistics, the Japanese subs had the best torpedoes of the war but they hardly used them! IIRC, they only sank 180-something Allied ships. That's BAD. You can't win if don't even try to stem the tide of the enemies supplies.

The article never says the PTO wasn't a difficult environment for ALL involved there, the FACT is the USA handled it better. The bottom line is He who has the best logistical support of his men & equipment wins.

Almost forgot: Let's not forget the multi-caliber fiasco (AKA logistical nightmare) of just arming Japanese aircraft:
MGs-
7.7mm
7.92mm
12.7mm
13mm
13.2mm
14mm (Experimental, but time/resources still wasted on it!)

Cannons-
20mm (6 different versions of the Type 99 20mm with 2 different cartridge sizes! AKA different tooling settings SLOWS manufacturing!)
30m
37mm
40mm (Limited production, used only in Ki-44)
57mm
75mm (Ki-109 only 22 completed but manufacturing time/materials/engineering wasted on a project that ended up being completely ineffective)

Can't forget that the IJNAF & IJAAF didn't even use the same guns! MORE complication for logistics.

The Japanese should've standardized and minimized calibers & guns used on everything.

US aircraft-
.30cal
.50cal
20mm (very limited usage)
37mm (for P-39's, early war)

Notice a trend yet?? The US figured out what worked and ran with it.

[Eugen Pinak]

In fact, IJNAF needn't to construct any auxiliary airfields between Rabaul and Guadalcanal, because RANGE of its planes was enough to get there without problems.

It seems saying about Zero’s large range.

No. I'm saying about authors' claims, apparently made with the desire to show Japanese in the negative light.
If everything went as Japanese planned, both Rabaul and Guadalcanal air bases would've become just another intermediate airfield for the Japanese aircraft going to Caledonia, Fiji, Samoa. And for such flights the range was pretty OK. You haven't read stories about IJN pilots' hardships operating at long range from Kavieng, Truk, Saipan, right? - That's because those air bases were used as intermediate airfields. So there weren't any problems with the range for the Japanese.
For the pilots operating from Rabaul problems begun only after US captured Guadalcanal and Rabaul turned into front-line air base for operation over Guadalcanal, which it wasn't intended for. But when the problem occurred, IJN command quickly established two new seaplane bases and begun to build new land air base for the operations over Guadalcanal.
So accusations of the author of the article that Japanese weren't clever enough to build more airfields between Rabaul and Guadalcanal before 7 August 1942 confirm only one thing - it's very easy to be smart afterwards, forearmed with all the historical knowledge of the decades of research.

[Eugen Pinak]

Being forced to ditch your aircraft IS A LOSS, NOT a win, even if the crews are rescued, which is never guaranteed even in the best conditions.

Yes-yes - and US lost Battle of Midway because some of its aircraft had to ditch

I've read multiple personal accounts by Japanese soldiers/pilots and they've all talked about the poor living conditions/amenities on island bases.

Yes-yes - and all US bases in the Pacific had excellent living condition, first class food and facilities For example on Guadalcanal pilots never lived in the huts, sometimes spend night in the foxholes and flew between bouts of malaria and other diseases, right?

Have you not seen any Allied videos showing them clearing jungle/earth for an airfield and laying down MARSTON MAT?! The US could have an airfield finished within 72hrs.

I've seen videos/photos of US Pacific airfields having no mats. But I don't make any deep conclusions from it.
BTW, what airfield was built in the Pacific by US from zero in 72 hours?

There are various Allied reports that talk about finding abandoned Japanese aircraft with very little damage/no real problems other than lack of maintenance. Thats a TRAINING, supply/LOGISTICAL failure (no parts = NO FLY).

Yes-yes - everybody knows Japanese simply teleported aircraft spare parts to any place in the Pacific they wanted

There's a video on YT of a Japanese Ace talking about how it was NOT uncommon for Zero pilots to fall asleep in their cockpits!

Yes-yes - and all US pilots flew only if they were in the excellent physical condition
Flying tired, sleep deprived, ill? - Certainly not! Do not believe those US veterans!

If the Japanese had simply used their subs more effectively they would've greatly affected US logistics, the Japanese subs had the best torpedoes of the war but they hardly used them! IIRC, they only sank 180-something Allied ships. That's BAD. You can't win if don't even try to stem the tide of the enemies supplies.

Yes-yes - everybody knows Japanese submarines were part of the Japanese air forces

The article never says the PTO wasn't a difficult environment for ALL involved there, the FACT is the USA handled it better. The bottom line is He who has the best logistical support of his men & equipment wins.

The article says about "Fatally flawed" Japanese air forces. It provides multiple examples of Japanese faults while saying nothing about Allies' problems. So the reader without some knowledge of air war in the Pacific can make only one conclusion from it - only Japanese had problems during the air war on the Pacific.

Almost forgot: Let's not forget the multi-caliber fiasco (AKA logistical nightmare) of just arming Japanese aircraft:

Yes-yes - horrible "nightmare" Japanese failed to notice

[ShindenKai]

1) War machines & crews lost only because they weren't able to return to base (RTB) is a logistical failure. Too many logistical failures = future battles lost without fighting. The Japanese most of all couldn't afford to replace lost war machines & crews like the US could. Midway demonstrated the USN's better air crew rescue system. You can't rescue fighter pilots that CAN'T radio in distress calls as they ditch their aircraft.

2) Neither I nor the article ever stated that "the US always had 1st class food & amenities" YOU did.
Yes, US soldiers & air crews have talked about going into battle sick and tired. That's common throughout the ENTIRE history of warfare, have you actually ever done any reading??

The fact is it was less of an ongoing issue with US forces in the PTO.

3) Yes, its crystal clear from YOUR lack of understanding of the importance of logistics that Marston Mat would be an insignificant advantage, to YOU.

https://samenews.org/the-history-of-air ... ng-design/
https://www.airandspaceforces.com/article/0489marston/
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/air-spac ... 180951234/

"Sooner or later it is “General Mud” who commands too many battle situations. Mud does not oc­cur in nature when rain only wets the earth; but given intensive use by heavy airplanes and a week of rain, the best turf airfield will degenerate into a crazy-quilt of badly rutted mud. Marston mat performed well on soft ground, overcoming most of the problems.

Similarly, Marston mat controlled dust. The airplane is an incorrigible dust maker, and on a busy airfield dust can be an operational night­mare. Dust ingested by engines shortens the time between over­hauls—never mind the general wear and tear on an airplane and its inte­rior parts.

In dusty North Africa, airplane engines had only half the life between overhauls compared with those operated from the well-pre­pared airfields of England. More frequent overhauls require more spare parts, more manpower, and more facilities to serve the work. In North Africa, the total increase in logistics requirements often be­came horrendous. Meanwhile, air­craft availability suffered.

Dust also creates operational and tactical hazards. After two or three airplanes take off from an arid, dirt runway, visibility is reduced to zero. Since airplanes take off into the wind, the dust they generate blows back among the planes wait­ing to take off. With each takeoff the dust becomes thicker. Precious min­utes are lost before the next plane can get into the air.

In the worst conditions, it could take half an hour to get a squadron off the ground, an operation that normally took five minutes. Tank trucks sprayed water over the run­way to hold down dust, but this cre­ated only a thin patina that evapo­rated quickly. The pressure of air­plane tires broke the thin crust, and prop blasts blew away what re­mained.

Each hole in a piece of Marston mat provided a small reservoir for runway watering, retaining its moisture for fifteen minutes or more. It was soon discovered that if you covered the runway area with local flora—leaves, small branches, palm fronds, or, if it could be found, hay—and laid the mat on top, you greatly reduced the dust problem. Even after these materials dried out, they maintained barriers be­tween the mat and the dust, retain­ing hygroscopic qualities that made runway watering more effective.

After experience was gained, it was not unusual to have an area cleared and graded, the mat down, and airplanes operating within sev­enty-two hours. Creating an ele­vated subgrade was desirable and often necessary before laying the mat, although it added a few days to the job. The mat ordinarily was laid lengthwise, across the runway. Lay­ing started from the middle and worked toward the sides and both ends. By 1943, a technique had been developed for laying mat from both ends and from the middle simulta­neously, and everything usually came out right. A misalignment was corrected by having bulldozers drag the runway section into place. Any hundred yards of locked Marston mat always had some stretch in it."

"Inevitably, Marston mat became damaged by use, but it was not dis­carded. Field engineers developed machinery for its rehabilitation. The diesel-powered unit weighed fourteen tons and reprocessed 250 mats per hour. The mats were straightened, cleaned, given a chemical bath, repainted, and made good as new.

This small industrial plant could be broken down for air transport among units in the field. Six C-47s were needed to move it. This airlift may seem excessive, but a C-47’s cargo space was only 22.5 feet long within a tube ninety-two inches wide enclosing a usable 1,200 cubic feet. A C-47’s maximum payload was 4,900 pounds. In 1944, a unit operating out of Australia airlifted its remanufacturing plant through­out the South Pacific, rehabilitating some fifty million square feet of run­way mat."

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W-NhwqZA_gQ

^That video clearly shows US aircraft landing with EASE on COMPLETELY FLOODED runways, which the neither the Japanese nor Germans could do. Is it making sense yet??

4) Yes, due to your lack of understanding of logistics, YOU would think that food, medical supplies, parts and men are transported magically without any sort of logical supply chain.

5) AGAIN, US soldiers & air crews have talked about going into battle sick and tired. That's common throughout the ENTIRE history of warfare, have you actually ever done any reading??

The fact is it was less of an ongoing issue with US forces in the PTO.
The US merchant fleet wasn't being devastated by Japanese subs, like they could've and should've been.

6) US Subs sank 201 Japanese warships AND 1,113 merchant vessels!

https://www.history.navy.mil/research/l ... -wwii.html

Did you know that merchant vessels are the logistical force NEEDED to supply ALL the large bulky things like: food, medical supplies, tractors/construction equipment, and men , etc, etc to the front lines?! This must be earth-shattering news for you.

Japanese submarine commanders were ORDERED not to sink the US's merchant vessels! Thats tactical seppuku!
Japanese subs had the most successful torpedoes of WW2, yet they hardly did anything with them. Sinking a total of only 180-ish ships is NOTHING. One of the most colossal failures of ANY side during WW2! If only they had been sinking US merchant shipping at every opportunity the war in the PTO would've looked drastically different.

7) If I were you, I'd focus on your reading comprehension. Did you somehow fail to notice that the article was focused strictly on Japanese wartime issues? By your "logic" a book about Japanese Aces should also cover US Aces.


8) AGAIN, it's quite clear you don't have a clue about the real world issues of supply & demand. Do you get out much?
Every single separate gun previously mentioned would need its own production line, tools and tooling. Having such a myriad of choices compounds manufacturing and logistical issues. Apparently, the IJA/IJN didn't understand that they were making it harder on themselves because they never simplified their gun and caliber selection. The 7.7 & 7.92mm MG's were basically useless and they knew that VERY earlier in the war. Why waste time & resources on something so ineffectual? Let's not forget that most of their flexibly mounted MGs were DRUM-fed! Even most of the flexibly mounted 20mm cannons were DRUM-fed! Heavy, awkward drums that are emptied in a few seconds...what a great idea :roll:

The defensive firepower on US aircraft kicked-ass because not only was each gun .50cal that could reach out and destroy enemy aircraft at 800yrds but every single gun was BELT-FED. Don't need to STOP firing to: remove empty drum, load full drum and charge the weapon... REPEAT, REPEAT. -Let's not forget that the 20mms had a heavy recoil spring that had to be overcome to cock the weapon again, try doing ALL that while potentially wounded AND in a maneuvering aircraft, experiencing G-loads...GOOD LUCK! :roll:

[AriX]

The main fallacy is that there was THE ONE AND ONLY reason for Japan's surrender in 1945. Both A-Bombs and Soviet attack were the final of the weeeeeeeeeeeeeeeery long list of nails in the coffin of Japan's imperial ambitions.

I totally agree with this statement.

[OpanaPointer]

The Soviet commander in the Far East was ready to fling a Hail Mary at Hokkaido, but Stalin canx'd it the day before it was to sail. The Soviets were a threat to the occupied territories on the continent, but not so much to the Home Islands.