The hand waving is, indeed, being kept to a minimum, at least from me. I always cite my sources.AllenM wrote: ↑08 Dec 2019 00:28I see that the hand waving is being kept to a minimum here. The British Target Force or T-Force had a number of predetermined targets as it entered formerly German held countries and into Germany itself. This included "Japanese intelligence targets." (T-Force by Sean Longden, pg. 47). "For these early operations it was highlighted that Japanese intelligence targets were of 'vital importance.' All follow-up investigations were to be handled by staff appointed by SHAEF. It was also stated that all Japanese persons were to be detained, with officers being told to test anyone with a request to say 'Hullo' as it was noted that the Japanese are physically incapable of of pronouncing the letter 'I' and will therefore say "Hurro". The footnote given cites National Archives WO171/3865.
Did the Germans do any work related to atomic fusion? It appears some work was done.
Kernfusion und Kernwaffenentwicklung: Fusionsforschung in Deutschland bis 1945 von Rolf-Günter Hauk
Interesting tidbit there regarding the British T-Force. I had no idea they might be going after Japanese attache officers, spies, and other personnel in Nazi Germany as it crumbled. I know that at least one prominent Japanese official, Imperial Japanese Navy Commander Yoshiro Fujimura, escaped to Switzerland as the Allies closed in on Berlin. There is at least one MAGIC intercept of a Japanese radio signal sent from neutral Stockholm, Sweden, in which a Japanese attache officer or officers claims that some kind of German nuclear weapons were used against the Russians on the Eastern Front in 1943. Did the Brits also get wind of this, and is that why they sent the T-Force looking for Japanese nationals in Germany during the last days of the Third Reich? Given that the British were regularly reading top secret German radio traffic with ULTRA, why would they attach such importance to hunting down the relative handful of Japanese who were still in Germany in the spring of 1945? What did they think the Japanese might know that the British were not already aware of through ULTRA?
Yes, German atomic R&D during WWII was most often pursuing concepts, experiments, and prototypes which we would term "thermonuclear weapons" in the present day. This tendency to favor fusion was evident in the postwar work of both Ronald Richter in Argentina and Friedwardt Winterberg, late of the University of Nevada-Reno and formerly the PhD student of Werner Heisenberg.
https://www.quora.com/How-close-did-Naz ... iam-Pellas
Perhaps the biggest benefit of the German approach was the significantly smaller size of most of their bombs or warheads. (A notable exception being the Rugen Island event in October, 1944---though I have reason to believe that the weapon tested at that time and place utilized a very different technology.) Along with this, particularly if they went with an immediate ancestor of Winterberg's "Third Way / Mini-Nuke" ideas, was the fact that such weapons would need dramatically smaller amounts of fissile material and possibly none at all (meaning that even U-238 can in theory be detonated with this method). The explosive yield of this type of bomb would be very small as such things go, but they would nevertheless be a kind of thermonuclear explosive device. Winterberg was brought to the US as part of Operation Paperclip in 1955---I didn't know until just now that that effort continued post-WWII. The possibility that Nazi Germany was pursuing weaponry related to Winterberg's concepts is one reason I don't discount the various stories and eyewitness accounts of test detonations of Nazi nukes---nor the possibility that the transfer of this technology to Japan might have enabled them to build a similar weapon at war's end.
Along these lines is a statement given to Wilcox by Tony Toluba, a former CIA analyst and expert on North Korea. This was in 2005, when the "Six Party Talks" designed to rein in North Korea's nuclear weapons were underway. Toluba told Wilcox he had a document in his possession which stated that 3,000 German troops had been sent to Korea (the Hungnam-Chongjin area) in late 1944. Given how hard-pressed and short of troops Nazi Germany was by that point in the war, this was quite an extraordinary transfer of personnel. Unfortunately Toluba did not provide a copy of the document to Wilcox while he was doing the research and writing for the Third Edition of Japan's Secret War. But that's what he claimed. (It's on page 232.) If true, this is one of the strongest indicators that has yet come to light of cross-pollination between the nuclear weapons programs of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan.
That said, the majority of the fragmentary documentation which has emerged to this point seems to indicate with a fair amount of consistency that the main thrust of Japanese nuclear weapon R&D was---irony of ironies---very much along the same lines as the basic but powerful atomic fission bombs being pursued in the US in the Manhattan Project. In other words, Japan was hit by very much the same kind of weapon she was attempting to build and use against the United States.