Japanese casualties in Pacific theatre

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Imad
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Japanese casualties in Pacific theatre

#1

Post by Imad » 22 Nov 2004, 01:05

I have always wondered why, in the latter stages of the Pacific War, Japanese casualties were always so much higher than those of their opponents. The discrepancy is sometimes horrific, as for example, in the Kohim/Imphal campaign, Okinawa, and Luzon. My personal feelings are that the tactical inflexiblility of the Japanese in both attack and defence, the suicidal Banzai charges, the lack of heavy weaponry, and Allied mastery of the air were important factors. If any person with more knowledge on the subject than myself could correct any of my above analyses or add a few more I would be most obliged
Sincerely, Imad

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Andy H
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#2

Post by Andy H » 22 Nov 2004, 02:38

One reason would be that the Allied forces became more adept in fighting the Japanese and neutralizing (to an extent) the geography/topography of the battleground. Also war fighting experience would help.

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richardrli
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#3

Post by richardrli » 22 Nov 2004, 11:29

The Japanese never really put an emphasis into firepower.

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Gen_Del_Pilar
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#4

Post by Gen_Del_Pilar » 23 Nov 2004, 10:44

Was just about to start a thread on a related topic, but this one will do nicely.

I too noticed that Japanese casualties were higher than U.S. ones on the ground. Yes, certainly firepower was a factor. But then... a common feature in the island-hopping seems to be that the Japanese garrisons were outnumbered 2 or 3 to 1. For example, at Iwo Jima I think the Japanese numbered 21,000 (of which 20,000 KIA and 1,000 POW) and the Americans 70,000 (of which 6,800 KIA and 21,000 WIA).

So, there are 3 comparisons here:

1) Strength of the opposing sides: Japan was outnumbered 3.33 to 1
2) Total Killed: 2.94 Japanese to 1 American
3) Total Casualties: 1 Japanese to 1.32 American

So, it seems Japan actually did pretty well under the circumstances. They were outnumbered by more than 3 to 1, yet the kill ratio difference was less than this, and, in fact, the Americans suffered more casualties than the Japanese! Plus, the casualty figures are skewed by the fact that the Americans prevailed - if the attack had failed, then a lot of the US WIA would have been KIA/POW, while a huge amount of Japanese casualties would be WIA as opposed to KIA.

In conclusion, the Japanese probably would have performed even better with a parity in numbers, e.g. if they were defending their homeland in Operation Olympic. Thoughts?

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#5

Post by Goldfish » 23 Nov 2004, 11:38

Some other factors were logistics, diet, physical conditioning, search and rescue, and quality of medical services. Few Americans starved to death in the Pacific, but thousands of Japanese did and thousands more died of treatable diseases. Japanese pilots and sailors were often lost at sea or in the jungle due to poor search and rescue as well. Allied wounded often survived if they reached a hospital (which they often did) within a few hours. The Japanese, when resupplying units, emphasized ammunition over medical supplies and food. Also, Japanese planning, especially at Imphal but also at Guadalcanal, counted on capturing large stocks of Allied supplies ("Churchill rations" the Japanese called them) to sustain their offensives. When these supplies were not captured, the Japanese often met with disasterous casualties through starvation and disease.
Lastly, the Japanese emphasis on toughness and suicidal courage led many to kill themselves before there was a need to do so or led them to launch hopeless charges.

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Peter H
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#6

Post by Peter H » 23 Nov 2004, 14:12

American firepower had its benefits though.

From the history of the First Marine Division.
To kill each of the ten thousand Japanese soldiers on Peleliu it took:

1,331 rounds of .30 caliber
152 rounds of .45 caliber
69 rounds of .50 caliber
9 rounds 60mm mortar
5 rounds of 81mm mortar
1 rifle grenade
10 hand grenades
6 rounds 75mm howitzer
5 rounds 105mm howitzer
1 round 155mm howitzer
0.5 round 155mm gun
And this on the Philippines Campaign 1944/45:
The number of soldiers used by the Americans and Australians in land operations was never very high--the largest force they ever deployed was the 200,000 men under General MacArthur,sent to tackle 350,000 Japanese holding the Philippines...when Japan surrended in August 1945,the battle for the remaining islands of the Philippines,which was still going on,had caused 192,000 Japanese dead but a mere 9,700 wounded--possibly the highest ratio of killed in any major campaign since the 16th Century.American deaths were very low,the ratio being one to every twenty-four Japanese...emphasis was placed on the immense superiority in firepower enjoyed by the Americans,whose policy was to drench everything with explosive or flame rather than waste a single life.
Land Warfare,Kenneth Macksey,1973.

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#7

Post by JamesL » 26 Nov 2004, 18:11

I'll have to throw in my 2 pence for naval gunfire.

My father's ship bombarded Iwo Jima. Making 15 knot runs and shooting from the west, the heavy cruiser BOSTON put several hundred 8 inch high explosive and armor piercing shells in and around the south airfield. Following the BOSTON at 1000 yd was her sister ship, the CANBERRA, doing the same thing. Firing began at 16,750 yd and the ships gradually moved inward until they were less than 9,000 yd from the beach.

Later the 5"/38 AA guns were used in an indirect fire mode, destroying Japanese aircraft on the field. Over 1,000 rounds were fired by BOSTON and a similar number by CANBERRA.

There were also several battleships involved with the bombardment of Iwo Jima.

This bombardment kept the Japanese air forces from doing anything to hinder the invasion fleet and Marines aboard the landing craft. It killed many Japanese soldiers before they even set foot outside their bunkers.

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Peter H
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#8

Post by Peter H » 27 Nov 2004, 04:38

Any truth in the view that a lot of Navy ordanance,rockets and shells were being saved for the upcoming Okinawa landing and hence the Iwo Jima bombardment was under-supplied?

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#9

Post by Gen_Del_Pilar » 27 Nov 2004, 06:28

Interesting point about naval bombardment. Apparently they had to cut the bombardment to a "mere" 3 days at Iwo Jima. And I think that indeed had to do with preparations for Okinawa.

Don't know how long the Okinawa bombardment took but I find it strange how the Japanese did considerably better in Iwo Jima, where apparently every square inch of ground was within range of naval guns. In Okinawa, where this wasn't the case, the KIA rate was more than 6 Japanese to 1 American, and overall casualties more than 2 Japanese to 1 American (not even counting the enormous civilian losses) - significantly worse from a Japanese perspective than at Iwo Jima.

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#10

Post by Goldfish » 27 Nov 2004, 09:56

The higher survival rate at Iwo Jima was probably due to two factors: First, the Japanese had heavily fortified almost the entire island-some tunnel complexes were multiple stories and this meant that the Japanese could stay deep underground during bombardments. Second, Iwo's loose volcanic soil absorbed most of the impact of the shells, protecting them from penetrating fire. Many Japanese survived in the tunnels until the end of the war and would emerge occasionally to pick off unsuspecting Americans. Okinawa was fortified, but not to the same degree. There were many areas of Okinawa where the Japanese would have to move in the open to resupply or reinforce or to mass for counterattacks and naval fire would hit them hard.

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#11

Post by richardrli » 27 Nov 2004, 11:18

Just on the question of naval gunfire, were there incidents where masses of Japanese preparing to attack or defend a certain area were entirely wiped out by the ships offshore?

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#12

Post by Goldfish » 27 Nov 2004, 12:54

I don't think there were any cases where they were entirely wiped out, but certainly there were cases where units were severely damaged.

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#13

Post by Larso » 27 Nov 2004, 14:10

I'll probably get this wrong but during one of the earliest island invasions, that of Betio (?) naval gunfire was inadequately elavated and shells 'skimmed' off the island's surface and went out to sea on the other side. Anyway the lesson was learned (among many) and naval gunfire was much more effective in latter support roles.

The Australian's had similar 'kill' ratios in 1945. I'll look them up and post them tomorrow. One point made in 'The Australians in Nine Wars' by Peter Firkins, was that the number of Japanese who surrended also was very high compared to the earlier battles.

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#14

Post by Peter H » 27 Nov 2004, 14:32

After Betio(Tarawa) a replica island of Japanese bunkers and defences was set up off Hawaii for USN target practice and techniques.

Something on Pacific war losses from the UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY(Pacific War):

http://www.anesi.com/ussbs01.htm#doiojgf
DESTRUCTION OR ISOLATION OF JAPANESE GROUND FORCES
The Japanese built up their army ground forces from a strength of approximately 1,700,000 at the outbreak of war, to a peak strength of approximately 5,000,000. Japanese army medical records indicate that the aggregate number deployed in the Solomons, New Guinea, Marshalls, Gilberts, Carolines, Marianas, Philippines, Okinawa, Iwo Jima, and the Aleutians was approximately 668,000, of whom 316,000 were killed in action; some 220,000 were deployed in Burma, of whom 40,000 were killed; and 1,100,000 were deployed in China, of whom 103,000 were killed. Most of the remainder were in Manchuria, Korea, or the home islands, and did not actively participate in the decisive campaigns of the war.

The strategy of our advance and the limitations imposed on Japanese overwater transportation became such that the Japanese could concentrate only a small portion of their available Army ground forces strength at any of the critical island positions which we determined to capture. Japanese soldiers were unique in their willingness to face death and endure hardships. At every point where our Army or Marine forces engaged the Japanese on the ground after 1942, we enjoyed full air superiority. In every instance, except Ormoc in the Leyte campaign, we had eliminated Japanese ability to reinforce the critical area with either men or supplies. At Ormoc the Japanese were able to land 30,000 troops, but these reinforcements arrived piecemeal over too long a period of time to be effective and many of the transports were sunk prior to unloading heavy equipment. In every instance where the Japanese had prepared defenses in a landing area these had been softened up by aerial bombardment and usually by naval shelling as well. It often proved impossible, however, to destroy more than a small percentage of the defending Japanese soldiers in preliminary softening up operations of even the greatest intensity. The Japanese were dug in, in tunnels, trenches and caves which were hard to find and often impossible to destroy, either by bombing or by naval shelling. Most of their fixed artillery positions were eliminated, but even some of these survived. The weight of fire on the immediate invasion beaches was generally such that the Japanese retired a short distance inland, but once we advanced beyond the beaches, it became necessary to destroy the remaining Japanese in costly close-range fighting. It was demonstrated, however, that Japanese resistance was effectively weakened and our casualties lighter when the appropriate weapons were employed with sufficient weight and accuracy in both preliminary softening up operations and subsequent close support.

A Japanese estimate indicates that in the southern regions, approximately 25 percent of their combat deaths resulted from aerial bombardment, 58 percent from small arms fire, 15 percent from artillery, and the remaining 2 percent from other causes.

In those places where it was essential to eliminate Japanese ground resistance in close-range fighting, great precision had to be developed in air-support operations in order to be certain not to hit our own troops, and to assure hits on the small targets which the critical Japanese positions presented. This required highly specialized training and the closest coordination between the ground and air forces through an intricate system of ground and air observers and unified control by ground-ship-air radio communication. In the Pacific war this system was continuously improved by the Navy and Marines in connection with succeeding amphibious operations against strongly defended positions and reached a high degree of effectiveness. In the Philippines campaign, the Army air forces employed comparable techniques, and General Yamashita has testified to his feeling of complete helplessness when confronted with this type of opposition.

In the Southwest Pacific, it often proved possible to effect landings at lightly held positions, and thus bypass large bodies of enemy ground forces. In the Central Pacific, many of the islands the Japanese expected us to attack were bypassed, and the garrisons left to wither and die. Survey examination of the bypassed islands in the Pacific and interrogation of the Japanese survivors confirmed their intolerable situation. Their planes and ground installations were destroyed by air attack. Cut off from any supplies or reinforcements, except occasionally by submarine, their food ran out. On certain of the islands, Japanese actually ate Japanese. It appears, however, that our air attacks on these bypassed positions were often continued longer and in greater weight than was reasonably required or profitable.

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#15

Post by JamesL » 27 Nov 2004, 20:42

Well, according to her war diary, the BOSTON expended all her 8" shells on Iwo Jima - 126 rounds the first day and 144 the second day. She then reverted to 5" AA guns. Although part of the Okinawa fleet the BOSTON had no bombardment ammunition available so, prior to the invasion of Okinawa, it was dispatched and ordered to Pearl Harbor. At Ulithi BOSTON transferred much of her 5" AA ammo to the WEST VIRGINIA and NEW JERSEY. The BIG J also got a motor whale boat as part of the deal.

So there might be something to the thought that heavy shells were in short supply.

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