German Railways in the East

Discussions on the economic history of the nations taking part in WW2, from the recovery after the depression until the economy at war.
User avatar
Der Alte Fritz
Member
Posts: 1865
Joined: 13 Dec 2007 21:43
Location: Kent United Kingdom

Re: German Railways in the East

Post by Der Alte Fritz » 03 Jan 2014 09:08

There are quite a number of railway lines built in the years before 1914 by the Russians that raised their ability to mobilise quickly on the German border in the Tsarist province of Poland.The question is in 1941, were these already standard gauge? What condition were they in?

Yes more is on its way, details of the Otto Programme, the three Ostbau programmes, etc. but it is slow posting things.

The capacity of railways has little to do with the number of railway lines. It is governed by the amount and type of signalling and the other track materials such as points and sidings. Consider a basic block system. A 10km railway line is divided into 5 blocks. For a train to proceed down the line, it has to travel from block to block going through 5 sets of signals (or in the old days a signal box giving the driver a big metal bar - to indicate he had right of way) and there is a delay at each block to check that the train still has right of way. A train coming in the other direction will have to wait in a siding at a block signal until the other train has cleared the block - 1 block one train. A fast train wanting to over take, will have to wait in the block behind, until the block in front has been cleared by the slow train pulling into the siding and then the fast train will have to traverse TWO blocks before the slow train can proceed. The maximum number of trains on our 10km line at any one time is the number of blocks or 5 each way. The number of trains per day is the number of blocks and the speed of the line.

So if you want to double the capacity of the track, you have to halve the distance of a block down to 1km in this case and double the number of signals, sidings, points, signal boxes, etc. The minimum distance of a block is stopping distance of a train for the maximum speed of the line plus a bit. But blocks are often considerably larger to allow for trains to complete long runs before stopping and starting again. Double tracked lines work on the same principal only with an 'up' line and a 'down' line and blocks being used for fast trains to over take slow trains, or to control the entry into platforms, etc. Remember that a capacity of 72 trains a day each way means a train passing a particular spot on a railway line every 5 minutes during daylight hours. You can read about the various types of signalling at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_ab ... signalling
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Railway_signalling

It is difficult to comment on the Ostbahn timetable without actually seeing an example - can you post it? Remember these German capacity figures relate to the number of trains per day and each way. So the 24 trains a day means 48 trains on that line.

GregSingh
Member
Posts: 2495
Joined: 21 Jun 2012 01:11
Location: Melbourne, Australia

Re: German Railways in the East

Post by GregSingh » 05 Jan 2014 00:14

Timetables for passenger trains for Germany and several European countries (no Soviet Union unfortunately, but Baltic States and some international long-distance trains to Leningrad and Moskva are listed) just before outbreak of hostilities in September 1939 can be accessed here: http://www.deutsches-kursbuch.de/
It also has several timetables for Germany and occupied territories for 1941-1945.
I’m reading a book about anti-gravity. It’s impossible to put down.

User avatar
Der Alte Fritz
Member
Posts: 1865
Joined: 13 Dec 2007 21:43
Location: Kent United Kingdom

Re: German Railways in the East

Post by Der Alte Fritz » 05 Jan 2014 08:34

Excellent material, thank you for posting.
If we are looking for original source material then the first three reels of this would be great to see: http://www.ushmm.org/online/archival-gu ... 3002M.html

User avatar
Der Alte Fritz
Member
Posts: 1865
Joined: 13 Dec 2007 21:43
Location: Kent United Kingdom

Re: German Railways in the East

Post by Der Alte Fritz » 05 Jan 2014 09:37

This is what Hans Pottgiesser has to say about the Ostbahn in "Die Reichsbahn in Ostfeldzug" Kurt Vowinkel Verlag 1960
I. THE EASTERN RAILWAY
The first, great performance that was requested and fulfilled by the German railways in the Second World War, was the parade of the 86 non-motorized divisions, which were run in late August 1939, the eastern and western border. The period beginning in September campaign against Poland was fast and was completed in a few weeks. During the fighting, moving up the operation of the railway did not play a decisive role behind the front for replenishment. But despite the rapid advance of the German troops, the destruction of the railway lines in the conquered territory were very considerable and has had an unprecedented extent in recent wars.

Of the receding Poland , the tracks were mainly near the border with remarkable thoroughness and much refinement in large scale torn or blown up , expanded and worn switch points ( note 1 ) , buildings burned and destroyed bridges. Further east came to widespread damage that had been caused by the German Air Force. Some stations were littered with bomb craters and the remains of burned vehicles. 11 Bug , Vistula and San bridges were blown up. 8,000 destroyed and 25,000 damaged railway cars have been counted . Railway pioneers immediately began to prepare the railway facilities again . Troops took with the help of local railwaymen makeshift short legs again. Yet in September 1939, followed the soldiers from the neighbouring districts of the Reichsbahn divisions civilian railway personnel in so-called columns ( 600-800 Manpower ) was summarized . For these columns have then soon - if only temporarily - developed based on the proven organizational form of the native operating offices, which were led by two directorates in Lodz and Krakow.
16
In what condition the stations were found by the incoming railway workers , shows an excerpt from the report of a reconnaissance column leader from 23.09.1939 :
On 23.09.1939 takeover of the operating column Siedlce . Station Siedlce found in an indescribable state. Burning coal beds , all buildings destroyed and looted, only one track continuous section if need be , destroyed on 41 sites by heavy bomb strikes 17 points and the tracks. Station fully driven by trains of all kinds including unexploded ammunition trains, derailed numerous locomotives and cars and overturned, completely burned more coal trains , three cattle trains , demolished with semi-decomposed animal carcasses in the station safety systems and destroys unusable , railway station and distance telephone , water stations and coal cranes unusable. Allows procurement of food for followers very difficult only from the field kitchens of the ever-changing troops. Accommodation initially in Polish C-Wagons, then a larger block of flats . Constant exposure to snipers in Siedlce railway station and place. Column armed with captured guns.
17
It soon became apparent that the railway pioneer regiments and the few already prepared to peacetime military railroad building crews were not sufficient to eliminate the destruction at least on the main lines shortly. There were therefore additionally used construction battalions of the Reich Labor Service, and numerous construction trains of the Deutsche Reichsbahn and German and Polish construction companies. The reconstruction was promoted with all the energy and made ​​rapid progress. After starting up a makeshift Vistula bridge of Dirschau was on 18 October 1939, the continuous rapid rail system are recorded on the route Berlin-Konigsberg again. At the same time continuous connections from Königsberg to Warsaw and from Warsaw were opened to Oppeln. By the winter of 1939/40, almost the entire Polish rail network was operational. The armies were the Bug and San traced back to the railroad and the big cities are again supplied with food and coal. Even in winter 124 000 German settlers were transported 24 000 horses and 13 000 cars from the Russian border by rail from. In the spring of 1940, the reconstruction work were down to the final recovery of some large bridges practically completed. The total expense for the removal of all damage is estimated at around 120 million zlotys.

On 26 October 1939 the German military administration in Poland was stopped and ordered a Governor-General for the Polish rump area. Between this and the Reich Minister of Transport came on 9 November 1939 an agreement concluded, remain after the railroads owned by the General Government (GG) and should be managed and operated under the name "Ostbahn". The directorates in Lodz and Krakow went to the Directorate General of Eastern Railway on (Gedob) in Krakow, the four operating directorates governors in Krakow, Lublin, Radom and Warsaw were placed under the seats of the district.This geographical correspondence of the Organization of Ostbahn with the administration of GG was very advantageous for practical cooperation. Opposite the Reichsbahn the Gedob took a special place with its own form of organization, legislation, financial management and other privileges, their conservation has repeatedly defended the vigorous assistance of the Governor General against the RVM. The differences of opinion that existed between the Reich Government and the Governor-General, particularly with regard to the treatment of the Poles themselves, as well as chief of the transportation of the Wehrmacht wore for the first time during preparations for the campaign against Russia and later to an even greater extent on the ratio Gedob one hand, and RVM on the other hand . Especially one made repeatedly from this side of Gedob, perhaps with some justification the claim that they too favored and by their Polish friendly attitude and consideration for the interests of the country at a disadvantage domestic traffic and the journeys of the local population the Wehrmacht traffic. In contrast, the Ostbahn has stressed that it has always regarded it as a natural obligation, as far as possible to put themselves at times heaviest burden of the war their apparatus in the service of the General Government, and more likely to accept operational difficulties, as the internal traffic was restricted  with "cheap Signal Blocks" !. Finally, the RVM has prevailed and introduced in the summer of 1943 in Poland the full Reichsbahn organization with the three directorates Krakow, Lviv and Warsaw.

The Ostbahn took over in 1939 a route network of about 5000 km, which after the beginning of the Russian campaign increased by the routes in Galicia to 7151 km in 1941. It has made ​​its genesis no uniform structure, but consisted essentially of three parts, namely:
1 the earlier Austrian routes with some density in the south with somewhat steep inclines, narrow arches and short station tracks,
2 the few, long-range, strategic lines mainly in the former Russian territory in the north,
3 the during and after the First World War created especially north-south connections between the two networks.
Because of its geographical location due, fell to the Ostbahn in the first period of its existence the following special duties:
4 Inland Transport for agriculture, for the rebuilt or extended in space industry Warsaw, Radom, Debica and for the oil deposits Jaslo and Drohobicz as well as for business trips of the population.
5 Exchange and transit traffic through the Carpathians stretch after Slovakia, Hungary and Romania.
6 Traffic with Russia.
The latter gained after completion of the German-Russian economic agreement in the spring of 1940, considerable importance by the importation of grain, timber and oil over the three in the Ostbahn lying transitions. To cover these goods from the Russian broad gauge wagons on Western European vehicles the Ostbahn put on new powerful surrounding railway stations in Malaszewica (Brest) and Zurawica (-PrzemysI). Here, up to 3,000 tons of oil and 3,600 tonnes of other goods were handled daily. From summer 1940 until June 1941 went 1 million tons, ds 2/3 of the entire German-Russian exchange of goods on the lines of the Ostbahn. After the invasion of Russia, the traffic multiplied in the west-east direction and primarily served the interests of the Wehrmacht: the supply of the southern front and a substantial portion of the middle section.
19
The working conditions of the operating engine department of the Ostbahn were initially difficult, as a large proportion of the locomotives and cars destroyed, damaged or drained to the east into Russian territory. In the locomotive 62 different, frequently obsolete classes were found, the passenger car park was not present day. The reconstruction of the 9 repair works carried out but quickly and generously, so that from 1941 all the work done in our own factories of Ostbahn, yes even car repairs for the kingdom could be executed. 1940/41, were the first to be voluntarily conveyed in the the homeland RA W (Reich Labour Organisation) about 1,000 skilled Polish workshop workers.

In the area of personnel policy, the Ostbahn was direction-giving for all subsequent railway directorates on the eastern theater of war. She had soon been found after it was founded, inter alia, the following principles, which it has pursued and defended tenaciously to the end of the German occupation:
1 That in the course of the war increasingly rare German Reichsbahn staff is extremely economical to use only where it make the backup of the operating guide for the Imperial Defence as well as the secrecy of the war required.
2 Local staff is everywhere to use under German management with transfer of full responsibility , where it can be justified without danger to the warfare of any according to its performance and its motivation .
3 By all means must be obtained and retained the full confidence of local staff through a straight personnel policy , by strictly fair treatment , through ceaseless concern for the material well-being and a spiritual care, through fair recognition of achievement and promotion of the advancement in the professions, education a well-educated , upstanding young , by by protection from encroachment by outsiders and against arbitrary and not least
Not eradicating all their high task forces grown . ( after Gerteis : 5 years in the Ostbahn , Bielefeld 1949) .
20
The organization of the external service was constructed. There were larger, independent departments with German service chiefs and a small staff of German personnel and also Leitdienststellen, where a number of, mostly only with local personnel staffed and led by this railway stations, termination, etc., were assumed. This system was especially applied to the secondary lines. In repair and maintenance service 5 bureaus were monitored with indigenous overseers by a German Bm-head. In the repair works of the German monitoring staff was around 2 of the staff. Here Poles and Ukrainians were not only used for craft work, as well as foremen and engineers. The number of employees at the German staff has greatly changed in the different stages of the organization Osthahn and under the influence of military events, as the following summary shows:

User avatar
Der Alte Fritz
Member
Posts: 1865
Joined: 13 Dec 2007 21:43
Location: Kent United Kingdom

Re: German Railways in the East

Post by Der Alte Fritz » 10 Jan 2014 10:50

A a further example of pre-war attitudes towards the Soviet Railways, Hunter quotes A. Piotrowski of the Eastern European Institute at Vilna in Poland who believed that the Soviet railways would collapse in the event of a war. This was based on the huge increase in traffic since 1930 without a corresponding growth in the rolling stock fleet, which led him to believe that the system was already precarious in peacetime and that the additional burden of war could not be met from internal reserves.

Similarly Rees "Stalinism and Soviet Rail Transort 1928-1941" (1995) quotes British diplomatic cables from 1935 commenting on the start of the Purge on the railway with the attack on the "Limiters" showed
"
It will, I submit be clear, that from an economic point of view alone, drastic steps are overdue, but when one considers the military aspect, the perusal of these accounts of gross neglect and inefficiency leads one to doubt whether it would be possible at the present for the USSR to mobilise the Red Army or conduct a campaign on even a modest scale, more especially in the Far East
The problem for outside observers was that the years of the first 2 Five Year Plans showed huge changes in the Soviet railways, often uneven and marred by the Purges and had to be seen through the lens of a very limited set of statistics, many of which were not believed anyway. In the years from 1928 (the end of the NEP and the start of the first Five Year Plan) and 1940, freight traffic grew from 152 milliard ton km to 415 milliard ton km, passenger traffic from 46 milliard passenger km to 98 milliard passenger km yet locomotive fleet only grew from 19,200 in 1932 to 23,600 in 1937 (as older Tsarist locomotives were retired from service and replaced by more powerful ones the number produced was considerably higher).
The crisis on the railways was in 1934 and recovery in 1935/6 due to an increase in investment ordered by Stalin against the advice of Molotov and others, followed swiftly by the purge of railway technical and managerial staff in 1937 and the steadying of railway performance in 1938/9 by another increase in investment. Soviet railways were over extended by 1940 but they had evolved to make maximum use of their limited resources and their labour force had grown steadily over the period (from 900 thousand in 1930 to 1,300 thousand in 1939) with strong efforts made at the working level to improve the technical training of the staff with a Stakonovte type movement and investment in training schools.

User avatar
Der Alte Fritz
Member
Posts: 1865
Joined: 13 Dec 2007 21:43
Location: Kent United Kingdom

Re: German Railways in the East

Post by Der Alte Fritz » 10 Jan 2014 10:58

Soviet account of state of railways in Occupied Poland (Western Ukraine and Belorussian) taken from Transport in the Great Patriotic War - Kovalev

Quote:
They came liberation campaign of the Red Army, which began September 17, 1939 As a result of his Western Belarus and Western Ukraine were rescued from Nazi oppression.*A dream come true western Belarusians and Ukrainians of reunification with Belarus and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.Military transportation during the liberation of Western Belarus and Western Ukraine were carried out in a number of military districts.
Quote:
As a result of the liberation campaign of the Red Army threshold at which to focus the fascist hordes to attack the Soviet Union, moved west to 300-350 km.*But the more important factor was perceived by some people simply, in particular without a thorough analysis of transport problems.*Meanwhile, the transport network is liberated territories of Western Belarus and Western Ukraine had its own peculiarities that must be taken into account.
Traffic routes in Western Ukraine and Western Belarus in 1939 were almost destroyed.*The railway network there was a relatively thick: it was created mainly at a time when these areas were part of the Russian Empire (and only a small part of Western Ukraine - the Austro-Hungarian Empire).*According to the cross-border provision of these areas the railway network was designed with the strategic appointment.*However, over the years between the two world wars, according to the general attitudes of the authorities*[24]*bourgeois Poland, see Western Ukraine and Western Belarus as Polish colony, railways these areas derelict.*They have been altered to Western European gauge (1435 mm), with some of the lines was made ​​the second main road, and the rails were used in the construction and reconstruction of roads in Poland itself.*New lines have been built a little bit, and all of them were built in preparation for war with the Soviet Union.*On most of the rail network in Western Ukraine and Western Belarus traffic volume in 1939 was at about 1913 Density of traffic almost everywhere was 1.5-2 million tkm / km or less, and only on the line Lviv - Przemysl exceed 5 million tkm / km.*{61}
Quote:
The length of railways in Western Ukraine and Western Belarus was 6.7 thousand km (including 4.9 thousand km of single track and 1.8 thousand km of double-track lines).*The roads were narrow gauge, and locomotive and car fleet heterogeneous.*Thus, the locomotive fleet of 120 steam locomotive 5264 series fleet of passenger cars - 129 types of freight car fleet - 60 types.*Rails and rolling stock were characterized not only large multi-type, but worn.*Almost 80% of locomotives, mostly foreign-built, were older than 15 years.*The average age of passenger cars was 28 years, cargo - 23 years.*Due to the large excess of the rolling stock (in stock was more than 25% of locomotives and almost 20% of freight wagons), cheap labor and the absence of mechanical means to repair the park in no hurry, repair base was poorly developed.
Quote:
In general, a fairly large in these areas density rail network capacity and carrying capacity of was low.*Calculations showed that the ability of trains to supply the new boundaries were reduced by more than 2 times.*Enemy could bring to the new western border of the USSR, as will be shown below, at least 2 times more trains than we do.
Quote:
The General Staff, especially since it was headed by Zhukov insisted on an dual gauge rolling stock to connect Western Belarus and Western Ukraine to broad gauge track, their technical reconstruction with bringing traffic, freight and unloading capabilities to a level which was achieved on the railways in the old borders.*The calculations showed that it would take about 10 billion rubles.*(Prices of those years).
Quote:
Decision on Altering and technical reconstruction of roads was taken only at the end of 1940, to which the Soviet government allocated large funds.*To the west were transferred part of the Special Corps of railway troops in the border districts, in addition to existing there individual railway regiments formed eight new railway brigades*{65}*, the People's Commissariat of Defense, the Far East and other parts of the country imported a large number of rails, sleepers and other materials .*By the spring of 1941, conditions were created for the work on the reconstruction of railways.
Quote:
By the time of the development of traffic schedule for the summer of 1941 in the strategically important Kowel railway malfunctioned, the main factors were performed poorly.*In particular, the train speed was lower than planned*{66}*.*The presence of Western European gauge on three sections of road congestion and create unnecessary congestion nodes.*
Quote:
True, Kovel road entered the Soviet network shortly before the war.*Besides technical equipment of roads adjacent to the western border of the old country, was not up to scratch.

Quote:
the situation in the border area in the transport relations were not in our favor.*Weak capacity of the railway to the west of the old borders of the USSR was the bottleneck of the transport pipeline.*So, in the east on the six railway lines with nine different tracks to the train Rokad Ovruch - Korosten - Shepetovka - Kamenetz-Podolsk could bring 259 trains a day (and the same to send back).*But to the west of this belt, the railway passes only*five railway direction with six tracks, which was passed only 108 pairs of trains.*Within Western Ukraine total capacity existing there six to eight railway lines of gauge is 168 pairs per day.*Railways in the Baltics, as noted, were low-capacity, stations in areas near the border of East Prussia were not ready for the mass unloading troops.
When the Germans came to cross this area they initially aimed for 25 trains a day each way for each Army Group ie. 75 trains a day, by around September.

So it seems pretty clear from the Soviet accounts that Soviet Poland had just finished converting gauge but had not had much in the way of track improvement or building of new lines, stations, etc before the German invasion of June 1941. Since Soviet Poland has 6,700km of railways of which 1,800 km is double tracked and 4,900 km single tracked the cost of reconstruction of 10,000 million rubles at 1940 prices and a construction time of two years is in line with the Five Year Plan figures of 3,370 million rubles for 1936 investment. This was clearly a large project.

User avatar
Der Alte Fritz
Member
Posts: 1865
Joined: 13 Dec 2007 21:43
Location: Kent United Kingdom

Re: German Railways in the East

Post by Der Alte Fritz » 13 Jan 2014 16:18

As a further part of my efforts to identify TRUNK lines in Western Russia, there is the US Air Force study "Fundamentals of a method of evaluating rail net capacities" published by Rand Corporation which contains these interesting maps which show the rail net in 1955.

Railway lines in Western Russia (no indication of double or single tracks shown)
Western Russia Train Lines 1955.jpg
Trunk Lines in the Western part of Russia
Western Russia Trunk Lines 1955.jpg
You can clearly see in the latter map, the main Brest - Minsk- Smolensk - Moscow line, the Brest - Kovel - Kiev - Rostov line in the Ukraine with the branch off from Kiev to Kharkov and the Lvov - Odessa line in the bottom left hand corner. Pretty similar to the 1941 layout. The map does not extend far enough east to show the 3 Moscow - Donbass coal lines but it does show the Donbass - Leningrad switch line around Moscow.
Attached Thumbnails
You do not have the required permissions to view the files attached to this post.

User avatar
Der Alte Fritz
Member
Posts: 1865
Joined: 13 Dec 2007 21:43
Location: Kent United Kingdom

Re: German Railways in the East

Post by Der Alte Fritz » 17 Jan 2014 10:25

Another aspect to consider about the Soviet network is that it is laid out in a similar way to the French system, like a spiders web with radiating arms out from a centre point in this case with Moscow/Paris at its centre. This makes cross country travel difficult, in the case of European Russia, north south travel is particularly difficult as there is only one trunk line that does not run through Moscow and that is the Leningrad - Donbass Coal line which bypasses Moscow to the west and the only other north south route are the normal train lines that run between Brest and Kovel west of the Pripet Marshes.

The Crimea Paradox
In 1942, Manstein's 11.Armee captured the Crimea and was ordered by Hitler to move to the Leningrad front. This is normal, we constantly hear about the LSSAH rushing from crisis to crisis by train up and down the front. But given the above statement, how did this happen? In Mansteins case, the solution was to ship the Armee back to Poland up the Kiev - Brest and Odessa - Lemburg trunk lines and then back into Russia via the line from Warsaw to Leningrad.

The Soviets tended not to make movements of units across the front line, the only exception that I can find is the movement of the forces from the Crimea in 1944 up to Belorussia and this is recorded in the railway histories of the GPW as a major event. In most cases the Soviets would not move units such as the Tank Armies in the Ukraine in 1944 up to Belorussia but would tend to form new units or simply bring up to strength units that were already in the area that were burnt out from previous fighting. So rather than move the whole unit, they are moving reinforcements and new equipment, so reducing the load on the railway.

So how much effort had to be made by the GVD Osten to move Panzer units around the country. We have this example given by Raus in "Military Improvisations"
An interesting incident occurred in November 1942 when 6th Panzer Division was moved to the area south of Stalingrad after its rehabilitation in Brittany. The division was loaded on seventy-eight trains of approximately fifty cars each. Each train was organized for combat in accordance with the above�mentioned procedure. Numerous raids and surprise attacks occurred during the trip through the marshy forests. Only a few trains got through the Pripyat region without incident. Most of the attacks were directed against the trains hauling tanks and artillery, and fierce fighting broke out in each instance. One artillery battalion commander and several men were killed and a number of officers and men wounded. The trains were greatly delayed and many of them had to be rerouted. During the ten-day trip they were mixed up and arrived at their destination in improper order and long overdue. A special problem was created by the fact that the trains loaded with artillery and tanks arrived last because twenty such trains were attacked by partisans, some of them repeatedly.
So GVD Osten has around 4,000 locomotives on 1.1.1943 and the two Districts along the route: RVD Kiev 1,016 and RVD Dnjepro 875 locos.

So 6.Pd needs 2% of the total locomotive stock and 8% and 9% respectively of the individual RVDs. Not excessive especially spread over 10 days but significant especially if you are trying to move several divisions at once, like II SS Pz Korps. It would disrupt normal traffic and since 50% of the traffic was military, there is not much economic traffic that can be shunted off the railway before you start impacting on military traffic such as leave trains as well. Add to this the lack of capacity for north south traffic and you can start to see that limitations are staring to come into play. Something that the Soviets tried to avoid but the Germans seemed to need .

User avatar
Der Alte Fritz
Member
Posts: 1865
Joined: 13 Dec 2007 21:43
Location: Kent United Kingdom

Re: German Railways in the East

Post by Der Alte Fritz » 18 Jan 2014 23:43

Walter Scott Dun gives this 1938 estimate of the Soviet Rail System for mobilisation:

The source references refer to Mahinne "Le Rouge Armee" 1938 http://books.google.co.uk/books/about/L ... edir_esc=y
Screenshot 2014-01-18 22.34.33.png
Screenshot 2014-01-18 22.35.14.png
You do not have the required permissions to view the files attached to this post.

Exlurker
Member
Posts: 34
Joined: 30 Jun 2006 09:14
Location: Edmonton, Canada

Re: German Railways in the East

Post by Exlurker » 24 Jan 2014 03:45

Just had to chime in here to support the research you are providing here on this thread.
My understanding of the situation within Reichsbahn Ost is limited to the works of Mierzejewski and the sources you have provided (Soviet ones) have had an effect, as to furthering on my understanding of this matter.

Please continue to extrapolate on this topic, it's fascinating to us "logistic geeks"

Thanks, Ron

GregSingh
Member
Posts: 2495
Joined: 21 Jun 2012 01:11
Location: Melbourne, Australia

Re: German Railways in the East

Post by GregSingh » 24 Jan 2014 08:48

This table appears in Dr.G.Garbe article published in Berlin in 1942.
It confirms some numbers already posted before. But here it is in one place.
You do not have the required permissions to view the files attached to this post.
I’m reading a book about anti-gravity. It’s impossible to put down.

GregSingh
Member
Posts: 2495
Joined: 21 Jun 2012 01:11
Location: Melbourne, Australia

Re: German Railways in the East

Post by GregSingh » 24 Jan 2014 10:02

Nice map showing railroads connecting Soviet industrial regions.
You do not have the required permissions to view the files attached to this post.
I’m reading a book about anti-gravity. It’s impossible to put down.

User avatar
Der Alte Fritz
Member
Posts: 1865
Joined: 13 Dec 2007 21:43
Location: Kent United Kingdom

Re: German Railways in the East

Post by Der Alte Fritz » 24 Jan 2014 11:47

Exlurker wrote:Just had to chime in here to support the research you are providing here on this thread.
My understanding of the situation within Reichsbahn Ost is limited to the works of Mierzejewski and the sources you have provided (Soviet ones) have had an effect, as to furthering on my understanding of this matter.

Please continue to extrapolate on this topic, it's fascinating to us "logistic geeks"

Thanks, Ron
Ron
I am sorry it is a bit slow but it is dependant on me translating both German and Russian texts on this. The next subject is the Ostbau and I should have it completed by the weekend.

User avatar
Der Alte Fritz
Member
Posts: 1865
Joined: 13 Dec 2007 21:43
Location: Kent United Kingdom

Re: German Railways in the East

Post by Der Alte Fritz » 24 Jan 2014 12:10

Greg
This table appears in Dr.G.Garbe article published in Berlin in 1942.
It confirms some numbers already posted before. But here it is in one place.
Great information, any chance I could see a copy or get a link to these two items?
This is really important information in that it shows that the Germans have in 1942 a good idea about the expansion of the Soviet railway. You can clearly see in the table column 6 the steady growth between 1928 and 1933 (93 to 169) and then the rapid growth 1934 - 1938 (205 - 370) which then flattens out up to 1940.

The map is really interesting as well as it shows the Trunk Network of the USSR only with some additional lines (the lines through Gomel and the ones up to Stalingrad are not trunk lines. This is more what the Germans thought the Soviet network looked like rather than what is was. If you follow me.

The real question is 'was this information based on captured documents, etc or was it from pre-war information'? If the latter it would show that the Germans did have a decent knowledge of the railways before the invasion. Or it might be that they only gained this information after the invasion. My current information is that the German opinion was that the Soviet railway network was seriously overstressed and so did not have the capacity (long term) that the Soviets claimed nor able to stand the stresses of war. This lowered their expectations of what could be achieved in Russia.

User avatar
Der Alte Fritz
Member
Posts: 1865
Joined: 13 Dec 2007 21:43
Location: Kent United Kingdom

Re: German Railways in the East

Post by Der Alte Fritz » 24 Jan 2014 12:13

The only Dr Garbe that I know of is the designer of locomotives but he died in 1932:
http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Garbe_(Ingenieur)

Return to “Economy”