Information on railroad building in wartime

[charwo]

When people talk about logistics in WW2. and how the Germans were very bad at it, my question always is: why didn't they devote more resources to railroad building? The first thing I do in a World War 2 scenario, almost always Civ 2 scenario because I don't know a better strategic game (and don't say Hearts of Iron, because that series is terrible), is to build as many engineer units as I can and build a railway from Tripoli to Tobruk, after taking Malta. Now it is 1,400 kilometers assuming you go through Bengazi, and you should, but the Japanese built a 415-kilometer railway in 15 months under the most hellish conditions possible within the earth's habitable zone, and that included 600 bridges and 8 long span ones. Lybia OTOH is almost all flat and way easier to transport supplies to, even with Malta still in play.

And so too with the invasion of the USSR, the idea of driving the logistics is absurd, and to some degree, it seems like the German High Command didn't quite realize that the Russian rail system was on a different gauge.

So what are the costs and resources involved in building a rail line in this period when effectively money is little object? Cause you know, regime survival. It just doesn't seem very hard to build railroads expect fo the bridges. Finding ANYTHING about wartime railroad construction is difficult.

I'm hoping to get an understanding of what the costs are the limits of track laying so I can understand the possibilities.

[EwenS]

The Italians did begin building a railway east from Tripoli in 1941 but never got very far. As far as I can see most of the materials, with the exception of rock for ballasting the track, would have had to be imported from mainland Italy. Steel rails, wooden sleepers, all the labour (not much of a native population in the desert), and all the rolling stock. Not to mention the additional troops needed to control and administer it all. This would simply have added to the problems of securing enough shipping to support the forces already there. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Italian_Libya_Railways

There is frankly no comparison with the Burma railroad. The Japanese had vast amounts of slave labour immediately to hand, both POW (60,000) and native (estimates up to 200,000 natives) being employed which they were prepared to work to death. Most of the materials, the timber for sleepers and those bridges, came from the jungle they were cutting through. Other materials such as more sleepers and the rails were robbed from other parts of railway systems in Malaya and the Dutch East Indies.

As for taking Malta, that in itself would have been a significant challenge for the Axis, and after Crete not one Hitler had much time for. This study of Italian plans in 1942 might interest you.
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1003811.pdf

As for rail building in the USSR, you have many of the same problems.

I suppose the biggest issue is how to build a railway fast enough to support your advance into the vastness of the Russian Steppe, with all the logistic needs that entails, while still having enough logistic capacity to support the forces you have moving forward.

Again there is no comparison with Burma. In that case the Japanese were building through conquered territory at a time when their front line, that the railway was to support, was stable along the Indian border. Their attempted invasion of India didn’t begin until several months after completion of the Burma railway, which itself only formed a shortcut between Bangkok and Rangoon to save on shipping.

[charwo]

No comparison? I don't see these differences as anything but trivial, in fact, it makes Italy or Germany building in Lybiua easier. Lybia easily has a million people in 1940, which isn't a lot, but corvee labor can be just as effective as working to death slave labor. and with Malta taken out the supply line is much much shorter. It's not like Italy is bereft of forests and woodworkers. You have to take Malta to increase the shipping volume, but tonnage is easy to replace and maintain than oil stocks.

I'm profoundly uninterested in what Axis leadership did do, this is about understanding what they could have done. Hitler was stupid for shelving the airborne ops after Crete. Men are there to die, hat's the price you pay. Only counterfactual assessment makes history useful, all else is worldbuilding.

ANd into Russia, you're thinking in terms of Barbarossa must be won or the Germans will lose. Not if you plan properly. I'm talking about rebuilding the rail system for a long war or elastic defense, backhanding the Red army into a ho. I understand why the rail system was neglected in Russia, everything was a gamble on a short war, and gambling on a short war is the stupidest thing you can do in war.

And as far as Burma goes, it was as conquered as German-occupied Russia, so the comparison is not only there, they are in many ways the same thing: an active front with many collaborators, a brutal occupier, and extreme vulnerability to both weather and irregular warfare

[Carl Schwamberger]

When people talk about logistics in WW2. and how the Germans were very bad at it, my question always is: why didn't they devote more resources to railroad building? ...

The short answer is they did not see it as necessary. Their strategy was to destroy the Red Army in the first 60 to 90 days, thus triggering a collapse of the Soviet government and its support. That had worked against six other nations in three campaigns in the previous year. So, it was expected to work again. The last minute experience in the Balkans and events in Lybia validated this. A highly trained army acting out high tempo operations was clearly proven as a unbeatable tool.

As for the rest of it; I'd recommend researching the numbers of what was available to the Germans for material, equipment, and skilled labor. Corralling X thousands of laborers is useless if you don't have the appropriate engineers and technicians. There was a effort to provide all that out of the Reichs pool and what could be confiscated from the occupied nations. How much more could be taken before crippling the German economy is a open question. Maybe a lot, maybe they were at that limit?

The US and Britain did prepare a solid railway rebuild plan for western Europe. The flaw in the plan was Eisenhowers armies drove the Germans out o France & Belgium 5-6 months faster than expected. Guess they were stupid not foreseeing the feared Wehrmacht would collapse & flee in less than 90 days. Anyway with those preparations the Allied railway units with eager French help completed basic emergency work on the Franco Belgian railways in roughly 5-6 months. That overlapped the start of longer term repair or upgrade work. A comparison of that effort & the kilometers of track put back into wartime service might be made with the kilometers of railway restoration needed in the USSR.

[TheMarcksPlan]

And so too with the invasion of the USSR, the idea of driving the logistics is absurd, and to some degree, it seems like the German High Command didn't quite realize that the Russian rail system was on a different gauge.

This is a very common misconception - that Germans did not adequately prepare/anticipate rail gauge remediation. In fact they re-gauged at >20km/day, fast enough to reach Moscow in a couple months. The problem wasn't the gauge of railways but their quality. The Germans skipped over things like establishing watering stations, adequate sidings for unloading, warming sheds, and signalling infrastructure. German-gauged trains were reaching the front line depots within a week or two of the advancing armies but, because of the skipped-over stuff, not enough trains could use the tracks at once. See https://www.hgwdavie.com/blog/2018/3/9/ ... r-19411945

So what are the costs and resources involved in building a rail line in this period when effectively money is little object? Cause you know, regime survival. It just doesn't seem very hard to build railroads expect fo the bridges. Finding ANYTHING about wartime railroad construction is difficult.

Money matters as a proxy for resources - labor, steel, etc. Efficient pricing of resources breaks down a bit during war but on the whole money is a good measure of the resource tradeoffs countries face during war.

The linked paper discusses the "Otto Program" - a massive German buildup of rail resources in Poland ahead of Barbarossa. This involved 30,000 workers (over a year) and 300,000 tons of steel. In manpower and steel terms that's ~1% of Germany's steel and ~0.1% of its labor force.

The author of the article (H.G.W. Davie) has opined that Barbarossa needed a "Second Otto" behind the advancing forces. IMO a Second Otto resourced as well as the first would have been more than sufficient to support the Ostheer deep into Russia: Otto created capacity for 400 trains/day to the Polish border, the Ostheer would have been richly supplied had 100 trains/day reached the forward depots. The distance for Second Otto is longer but the track density much less than the first. Given the steel and labor needed for First Otto, it's difficult to imagine Second Otto requiring even 1% of Germany's military budget.

IMJ the comparison of Otto with post-June '41 rail investments has important historical implications:

1. The notion that Germany ignored logistics cannot be upheld. Otto was perhaps the biggest rail project undertaken by any country during WW2.

2. Given that the Germans didn't ignore logistics, their failure adequately to supply Barbarossa must have a different explanation. IMJ it lies in the strategic concept of a short war: A large but manageable expenditure on "Second Otto" is unjustified if the SU is assumed to collapse within a few months.

[TheMarcksPlan]

As for the rest of it; I'd recommend researching the numbers of what was available to the Germans for material, equipment, and skilled labor. Corralling X thousands of laborers is useless if you don't have the appropriate engineers and technicians. There was a effort to provide all that out of the Reichs pool and what could be confiscated from the occupied nations. How much more could be taken before crippling the German economy is a open question. Maybe a lot, maybe they were at that limit?

Books like this one provide a lot of the basic answers: https://www.amazon.com/Most-Valuable-As ... 0807825743

As Mierzejewski discusses, Germany did not begin to draw significantly on its domestic and occupied railway personnel for the East until well after Barbarossa began. In 1942-43 they corrected many of these problems and by Kursk the railways were running well despite much greater partisan attacks.

There really can't be any doubt, IMO, that Ostheer could have had better rail support in '41. Just the mid-'42 levels would have been a drastic improvement.

[Carl Schwamberger]

...

Books like this one provide a lot of the basic answers: https://www.amazon.com/Most-Valuable-As ... 0807825743 ...

Read it. Put it back on the shelf unconvinced. Actually the numbers suggest there could have been a lot more done. But, to get there requires a coherent long range plan that considers the situation as it actually was & not in the light of nazi perception in 1939 or earlier.

[TheMarcksPlan]

Actually the numbers suggest there could have been a lot more done. But, to get there requires a coherent long range plan that considers the situation as it actually was & not in the light of nazi perception in 1939 or earlier.

I don't see how pre-'39 perceptions are relevant. Germany executed Otto in '40-'41, long-range plan or no. Had they kept the Otto workforce and kept it moving eastwards with the Ostheer, there's no reason not to believe they could have significantly upgraded Ostheer's '41 rail logistics.

As for the book, which parts do you doubt? You concede that the numbers show more could have been done (more recruitment from France and Belgium as done later, more requisition of rolling stock as done later). Nothing in the book goes beyond analysis of what happened to explicit analysis of what could have happened in an ATL '41.

[charwo]

The linked paper discusses the "Otto Program" - a massive German buildup of rail resources in Poland ahead of Barbarossa. This involved 30,000 workers (over a year) and 300,000 tons of steel. In manpower and steel terms that's ~1% of Germany's steel and ~0.1% of its labor force.

The author of the article (H.G.W. Davie) has opined that Barbarossa needed a "Second Otto" behind the advancing forces. IMO a Second Otto resourced as well as the first would have been more than sufficient to support the Ostheer deep into Russia: Otto created capacity for 400 trains/day to the Polish border, the Ostheer would have been richly supplied had 100 trains/day reached the forward depots. The distance for Second Otto is longer but the track density much less than the first. Given the steel and labor needed for First Otto, it's difficult to imagine Second Otto requiring even 1% of Germany's military budget.

IMJ the comparison of Otto with post-June '41 rail investments has important historical implications:

1. The notion that Germany ignored logistics cannot be upheld. Otto was perhaps the biggest rail project undertaken by any country during WW2.

2. Given that the Germans didn't ignore logistics, their failure adequately to supply Barbarossa must have a different explanation. IMJ it lies in the strategic concept of a short war: A large but manageable expenditure on "Second Otto" is unjustified if the SU is assumed to collapse within a few months.

That's actually a very helpful thing. Your conclusions are mine: never EVER plan for a short war, if you're wrong you're gonna be found with your pants around your ankles and get a rightful kick in the ass.

I know Barbarossa would fail regardless of anything, if it aimed at Russian capitulation in one campaign season. In the Alt history book I'm writing my protagonist, a veteran of the WWI east front and the entire Russian CIvil War periopd thereafter is telling Hitler from the beginning there will be no short war with the Reds, they will fight to the death because they are in his words the Order of the Assassins reborn, and like theuir counterparts, they will have to be burned out of their every stronghold one by one and slaughterd to a man just as the Mongols did to their forebearers.

It makes me wonder if a two stage Barbarossa, where the first goes staight for the Donbass to cripple the Soviet rail system by lack of coal and then moves to nuetralize the Caucus oil fields, THEN annihilate a Red Army that cannot move in sufficent numbers either by road or rail, would play out. I can see Hitler very quickly buying the BS of the other officers, especially as mine will have no part in atrocities (cause Russian partisans are NOT fun, and a liberated peasant is a good insurance policy if the invasion goes tits up).

[charwo]

When people talk about logistics in WW2. and how the Germans were very bad at it, my question always is: why didn't they devote more resources to railroad building? ...

The short answer is they did not see it as necessary. Their strategy was to destroy the Red Army in the first 60 to 90 days, thus triggering a collapse of the Soviet government and its support. That had worked against six other nations in three campaigns in the previous year. So, it was expected to work again. The last minute experience in the Balkans and events in Lybia validated this. A highly trained army acting out high tempo operations was clearly proven as a unbeatable tool.

As for the rest of it; I'd recommend researching the numbers of what was available to the Germans for material, equipment, and skilled labor. Corralling X thousands of laborers is useless if you don't have the appropriate engineers and technicians. There was a effort to provide all that out of the Reichs pool and what could be confiscated from the occupied nations. How much more could be taken before crippling the German economy is a open question. Maybe a lot, maybe they were at that limit?

The US and Britain did prepare a solid railway rebuild plan for western Europe. The flaw in the plan was Eisenhowers armies drove the Germans out o France & Belgium 5-6 months faster than expected. Guess they were stupid not foreseeing the feared Wehrmacht would collapse & flee in less than 90 days. Anyway with those preparations the Allied railway units with eager French help completed basic emergency work on the Franco Belgian railways in roughly 5-6 months. That overlapped the start of longer term repair or upgrade work. A comparison of that effort & the kilometers of track put back into wartime service might be made with the kilometers of railway restoration needed in the USSR.

What makes you think I had criticisms of Allied rail efforts? Especially in France? There was no way of really avoiding supply overstrech in the West or East of 1944, but in this case, the lack of any oil reserves in the enemy homeland was a very VERY good problem to have.

[TheMarcksPlan]

I know Barbarossa would fail regardless of anything, if it aimed at Russian capitulation in one campaign season.

Agreed.

In the Alt history book I'm writing my protagonist, a veteran of the WWI east front and the entire Russian CIvil War periopd thereafter is telling Hitler from the beginning there will be no short war with the Reds, they will fight to the death

Internal OKH assessments from 1939 assessed the SU as lacking offensive capability or intent but capable of defending the country using its enormous space and manpower:

In terms of numbers, the Russian military force is a huge instrument of war. On the whole, the weapons of war are modern. The management principles are clear and specific. The country's rich sources of help and the vastness of the given fighting area are good allies.

But there is a great gap between the material high level of the army and the economic, industrial and administrative level of the whole country, which has its weakening effect on the army's readiness for war.

In addition, the [purge] that began in the summer of 1937 did a great deal of damage to the entire work of the Russian officer corps.

As a consequence, a reduction in the combat value of the total armed forces must be assumed.

For this reason, the news at hand is gaining in importance that the SU has no offensive intentions in the event of a war, but will confine itself to defending the country using the large space available.

The Wehrmacht of the SU is able to do this.

[Google translation of the conclusion, original here: https://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/ru/ ... ect/zoom/5]

This document assessed the panzer and air forces as mostly modern and very numerous. It assessed the Soviet soldier as tough and resilient. All the signs were there for Germany not to take the SU lightly. IMO the problem was with Halder et. al. "working towards the Fueher" and supporting his initial forecast of a short war rather than doing their jobs and presenting hard military analysis such as this study and others that were available to OKH (e.g. the Paulus wargames and Wagner's logistics study).

[Carl Schwamberger]

What makes you think I had criticisms of Allied rail efforts? Especially in France? There was no way of really avoiding supply overstrech in the West or East of 1944, but in this case, the lack of any oil reserves in the enemy homeland was a very VERY good problem to have.

? I did not think that

[charwo]

What makes you think I had criticisms of Allied rail efforts? Especially in France? There was no way of really avoiding supply overstrech in the West or East of 1944, but in this case, the lack of any oil reserves in the enemy homeland was a very VERY good problem to have.

? I did not think that

Oh. Well, sorry been busy with IRL stuff but you said

"The US and Britain did prepare a solid railway rebuild plan for western Europe. The flaw in the plan was Eisenhowers armies drove the Germans out o France & Belgium 5-6 months faster than expected. Guess they were stupid not foreseeing the feared Wehrmacht would collapse & flee in less than 90 days. Anyway with those preparations the Allied railway units with eager French help completed basic emergency work on the Franco Belgian railways in roughly 5-6 months. That overlapped the start of longer term repair or upgrade work. A comparison of that effort & the kilometers of track put back into wartime service might be made with the kilometers of railway restoration needed in the USSR."

What I took from this is you think under my reasoning I would be critical of the Allied oerextention in 1944. But that's not an apples to apples comparison. In 1944, German oil reserves were gone and they lost their last oil supply in Romania and Germany was being sequeezed to death. In 1941, the Russians have for the purposes of one campaign season infinate space, they have vast stores which might not last forever but certainly will esepcially oil and coal. So I'm less than convinced by the Germans thinking everything is going to be all right. Things go wrong in war, some times catastrophically. But then again I tend to beleive nothing goiod in this world can be counted on. Enjoy the good things, never EVER count on them.

BTW, while I've spent a lot of time studying the human element in World War II Germany, but getting hard and fast calculations on costs per military unit and limits on raw materials. Even someone like Tooze his figures on planes are only cost per plane, not the total cost of equiping an air wing, with all it's logistical support, money to train pilots, mechanics, etc.

Is this something where I need to consult with a geniune creditentialed expert?

[Carl Schwamberger]

... What I took from this is you think under my reasoning I would be critical of the Allied oerextention in 1944.

Not at all.

..."The US and Britain did prepare a solid railway rebuild plan for western Europe. The flaw in the plan was Eisenhowers armies drove the Germans out o France & Belgium 5-6 months faster than expected. Guess they were stupid not foreseeing the feared Wehrmacht would collapse & flee in less than 90 days. Anyway with those preparations the Allied railway units with eager French help completed basic emergency work on the Franco Belgian railways in roughly 5-6 months. That overlapped the start of longer term repair or upgrade work. ...

We are in agreement here & on much else. My post tend to be brief & therefore easy to misread.

[Carl Schwamberger]

... BTW, while I've spent a lot of time studying the human element in World War II Germany, but getting hard and fast calculations on costs per military unit and limits on raw materials. Even someone like Tooze his figures on planes are only cost per plane, not the total cost of equiping an air wing, with all it's logistical support, money to train pilots, mechanics, etc. ...

Back in 1979 I took a university course from a old professor named Flanagan. His original PhD subject had been the viability of the Chezchoslovakian economy of the 1940s. Just weeks before he was to complete it Hitler ordered the occupation of Bohemia and separated the Slovakian state from the Czechs. Thus wiping out Flanigans several years of research and analysis. He said his US Army serve in Europe was a personal vendetta. But, to get to the point; In the 1950s Flannigan returned to Czechoslovakia to do a bit more research. In the course of that some local academics discussed how during nazi administration the productivity of factories declined significantly in terms of output per labor hour. This was not part of the class work so Flanagan did not produce data or anything, but I've kept it in mind as a illustration of the complexity of analyzing economic and industrial power production, capacity, potential.