Impact of Lend-Lease on Soviet railways

[Politician01]

On the trucks:the problem is that we have no reliable figures for Soviet production.
We have :
the unsourced figures of Politician :200000 for the whole war
from WWIItotal:331000 cars and lorries for the whole war
from Soviet Hammer :motor vehicles production in WWII:331000 a year (trucks and cars)
:in 1945,33 % of the inventory of trucks were from US/UK origin .
from 1.JmA:LL trucks in Russia:
number of domestic trucks
june 1941:272000
january 1942:317000
january 1943:378000
january 1944:387000
january 1945:395000
I have not much faith in the last source,although the author is using as source an article in the journal of Slavic Military Studies by V.I.Vorsin

Western allies delivered 375 000 trucks, 51 000 Jeeps and 35 000 motorcycles to the USSR from December 1941 to June 1945.

Mark Harrison Soviet Planning in Peace and war 1938-1945 page 258

The USSR produced 197 100 trucks in the Years 1942,1943 and 1944

John Ellis World War 2 Databook page 279 table 14

And concerning the locs - in this very forum the number of 2000 was allready brought up and the number of 1200 rejected
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 0&start=30

And Again noone cares how many locomotives the USSR had in June 1941.

How many were captured AND destroyed during the 5to 6 Months from June to December 1941?
How many operative locomotives did the USSR have by late 1941 or early 1942??

[ljadw]

Of course,you do not care how many loc's the SU had in june 1941:the more they had,the less importance the LL loc's had
And,about the figures from Ellis :maybe you don't care , but the SU was at war between 41-45,and not only in 42,43,44
And,how many locomotives the SU received end 1941,or early 1942? 1 ,2, let"s be generous :3 ?

[ljadw]

Good points,I will reply later .

Reply
1) I still doubt that "Beute" would mean the capture of intact loc's only,because,that would mean the same for Russian tanks ;and,the official German sources (BA-MA) are giving for 1941 a Beute of 13405 Russian tanks,if these are only captured intact tanks,one should add a number of (a guess ) 6000 destroyed (by the Germans/Russians) tanks =a total of almost 20000 tanks,what,IMHO,would be to much :in june,the Soviets had some 12000 tanks on the border (on a total of 20000/22000),the others mostly were old,not usable types.
The same German sources are giving for december (=the Germans in defensive and the Soviets attacking with less than 2000 tanks) a Beute of 122 tanks :I would be surprised if the Germans had captured 122 tanks,AND destroyed (a guess) 178 =a total of 300 tanks (=15 % of the Russian tanks)
2)From an other angle,I think that 239 or 1000 loc's (what would be a maximum,IMHO) is not that important:even the loss of 1000 loc's would be a very small number,unless one should be able to prove that the SU only had 3000 operational loc's in 1941(and a stock of 0 loc's) ,and this is very improbable,because in 1935,Germany had more than 21000 operational loc's .
3)After a lot of searching,I have found that in 2007,Russia had 19700 loc's,maybe that would be something usefull(to compare)

[Jon G.]

I don't think you can make inferences from one category of Beute to another - I can appreciate your method, but it will remain speculation.

Generally speaking, trains aren't on the frontline - unlike tanks - and the in fact very low number of train engines reported captured should tell you something in itself: the Germans knew that captured Soviet RR stock would be of little to no use for them, because they intended to re-gauge the entire Soviet rail system anyway, just as they had re-gauged the broad gauged parts of Poland's railroads. IOW, nobody - not even the Eisenbahntruppen - cared much for captured Soviet stock because there was no use for it, and unlike tanks and other military equipment captured, it is not a useful parameter for military success, either.

As I understand it, the Germans handed over captured Soviet RR stock to the Finns, who used a gauge similar to the Soviet type.

[BDV]

I don't think all the "28000" locomotives in Soviet Union control in June 1941 are 'created' equal. One has the pre 1920 types, the 20's and early 30's types (which bore the brunt of industrialization, which was bankrolled through raw material exports), and the "modern types", made mid 30s and later.

A rough estimate is 8,000 in each category (accounting for the Soviet creative accounting).

Now, I'd propose that reliable enough for servicing the front are only the "modern" ones. Now the 1941 campaign with the sudden german advances and having many major ports under siege (Leningrad, Odessa, Sevastopol), the fall of major industrial centers (Kiev, Smolensk, Minsk, Kursk) and major railway hubs (the fall of Vyazma was particularly disastrous), and the german air attacks. Given that 231 locomotives were pressed in german service, and they represent a small fraction of the total lost. So one can easily concoct scenarios where Soviet Union is left with 6-5- or even 4,000 modern reliable locomotives to service the front. And there was no Soviet replacement forthcoming for these.

Now they still had enough to move the industrial and agricultural wares back and forth, and more than plenty (the pre-20 ones) to move the masses of deportees back and forth. Who cares if 10,000 chechens freeze in a train stuck with a broken locomotive somewhere around Omsk? 10,000 traitorous mouths less to feed.

But 2,000 reliable LL locomotives likely were a major part of the frontline rail supply. Of course it was in AngloAmericans' best interest that Soviets had good rail support of the frontline and could move their attack mass in a timely manner.

Without LL RKKA would still be able to move troops and materiel to the front, but definitely not as affective as in OTL. And that's the catch the follow-up has to be very powerful lest germans regroup 50 km back. When one looks where RKKA was in June '43, they obviously needed all efficiency boosters they could get.

[Politician01]

I don't think all the "28000" locomotives in Soviet Union control in June 1941 are 'created' equal. One has the pre 1920 types, the 20's and early 30's types (which bore the brunt of industrialization, which was bankrolled through raw material exports), and the "modern types", made mid 30s and later.

A rough estimate is 8,000 in each category (accounting for the Soviet creative accounting).

Now, I'd propose that reliable enough for servicing the front are only the "modern" ones. Now the 1941 campaign with the sudden german advances and having many major ports under siege (Leningrad, Odessa, Sevastopol), the fall of major industrial centers (Kiev, Smolensk, Minsk, Kursk) and major railway hubs (the fall of Vyazma was particularly disastrous), and the german air attacks. Given that 231 locomotives were pressed in german service, and they represent a small fraction of the total lost. So one can easily concoct scenarios where Soviet Union is left with 6-5- or even 4,000 modern reliable locomotives to service the front. And there was no Soviet replacement forthcoming for these.

Now they still had enough to move the industrial and agricultural wares back and forth, and more than plenty (the pre-20 ones) to move the masses of deportees back and forth. Who cares if 10,000 chechens freeze in a train stuck with a broken locomotive somewhere around Omsk? 10,000 traitorous mouths less to feed.

But 2,000 reliable LL locomotives likely were a major part of the frontline rail supply. Of course it was in AngloAmericans' best interest that Soviets had good rail support of the frontline and could move their attack mass in a timely manner.

Without LL RKKA would still be able to move troops and materiel to the front, but definitely not as affective as in OTL. And that's the catch the follow-up has to be very powerful lest germans regroup 50 km back. When one looks where RKKA was in June '43, they obviously needed all efficiency boosters they could get.

¨

Exactly it is unimportant if the USSR had 28 000 locomotives in June 1941 but how many remained in late 1941 or early 1942.

The Allies wouldnt have delivered 2000 locomotives and 12 000 freigt cars if the Soviets wouldnt have needed any.
As it was the USSR had to produce only 100 locs and 2000 freight cars during the war - had they to build all the locs and freight cars LL delivered this would have come for a price of thousands of tanks and aircraft.

Its the same with the over 400 000 Jeeps and trucks.

200 000 were present at late 1941 and only 200 000 were produced in the next 3 years while LL deliverd 400 000.
had they to build all the trucks and jeeps that LL delivered this would have come for a price of thousands of tanks and aircraft.

And then there were the LL tanks aircraft food, fuel ect and all the German forces destroyed by the West.

[Jon G.]

You would do us all a great favour if you bothered reading other people's posts before making posts of your own, Politician01:

Exactly it is unimportant if the USSR had 28 000 locomotives in June 1941 but how many remained in late 1941 or early 1942.

So far the number of engines lost comes out at 231 according to the Beute des Heeres document I posted upthread. I'm willing to bet that the number of engines lost was higher than that, but how much higher so far remains a guess, unless you know something which the rest of us don't.

Also, as has been pointed out to you upthread, the amount of RR stock lost should be held against the mileage of RR track lost; odds are that the Soviet rolling stock to railroad track ratio was much higher by November 1941 than it was by May 1941.

The Allies wouldnt have delivered 2000 locomotives and 12 000 freigt cars if the Soviets wouldnt have needed any...

They wouldn't, but then Lend-Lease itself created additional transport needs for the Soviets. No lend-lease will mean less stuff for the railroads to carry, bluntly speaking. This has also been pointed out to you upthread.

[Politician01]

The USSR lost a staggering 16 000 locomotives and 400 000 railway cars destroyed or captured.
Thats a little more realistic than the 231 number :roll:

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 0&start=30

One can assume that nearly all these losses occured in 1941-1942

That would be a drop from 28 000 to lets say 13 000 in 1,5 years.
And out of thouse 13 000 that remained many were AFAIK electric locomotives for work in open-cast mines and factories.
So the 2000 LL were a huge help.

As were the 12 000 LL railway cars - after loosing nearly 400 000 in 1,5 years the USSR must have been in desperate need of them.

[ljadw]

As to be expected,another falsification :the source said :a loss of 16000 between 1941-1945,and the figure of 231 is 231 captured loc's in 1941.
You assume (without proofs) that all these losses occured in 1941-1942
The same for the railway cars :the loss is for the whole war

[LWD]

As to be expected,another falsification :the source said :a loss of 16000 between 1941-1945,and the figure of 231 is 231 captured loc's in 1941.
You assume (without proofs) that all these losses occured in 1941-1942
The same for the railway cars :the loss is for the whole war

Indeed but it's a reasonable assumption that the majority occured in 41 and 42. After that the Germans weren't advanceing and would have been less likely to capture or destroy rail road cars and locomotives. The LW was also facing increased opposition and I suspect responding to immediate tactical needs in the latter years as well.

[Jon G.]

The USSR lost a staggering 16 000 locomotives and 400 000 railway cars destroyed or captured.
Thats a little more realistic than the 231 number :roll:

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 0&start=30

It is definitely higher, but without anything else but an unsourced internet post as the basis of that figure, we don't know if it is more realistic. That said, I am sure Soviet locomotive losses up to Nov. 1 1941 were higher than 231 (as I already stated repeatedly), how much higher I would like to see a more authoritative source for, sorry.

One can assume that nearly all these losses occured in 1941-1942

That would be a drop from 28 000 to lets say 13 000 in 1,5 years.

One can assume what one likes; recall that only one figure has to be wrong before your calculation goes awry:

We don't authoritatively know if the Soviets indeed had 28,000 locomotives on strength in 1941. I note in passing that this figure corresponds rather well, perhaps too well, with overall Reichsbahn locomotive stock as of Dec. 31 1942.

Bar an unsourced post on this forum, we don't know if losses were really 16,000. We also don't know how many of those losses occurred in 1941-1942.

Nor do we know how much losses of territory reduced the overall Soviet need for locomotives and other rolling stock by Nov 1941.

The only relatively solid figure brought to the discussion was provided by me; namely that the Germans reported a total of 231 locomotives captured by the Heer as of Nov. 1 1941. The rest is just basic hand-waving.

[LWD]

I found a source for the 16,000 locomitives lost. Unfortunatly it's wiki and no further reference is given so it's problematic. They imply by the way that the losses were in the first two years:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_lo ... rld_War_II

After two years of war with Germany, much of the Soviet rail system was in ruins. At the time, much effort had been put into rebuilding the track; however, the hasty nature of the construction meant that it could not support locomotives with axle-loadings of more than 18 tonnes. What few locomotives (as many as 16,000 were destroyed) that had not been destroyed by bombing were either too weak or too heavy. The factories were did not have the equipment to produce locomotives, so it was decided to order more from America.

A number of things would make me nervous about trusting this without additional data.
This site states:
http://eng.rzd.ru/isvp/public/rzdeng?STRUCTURE_ID=30

The European part was totally destroyed and 40% of carriages and 50% locomotives were lost.

But little else.
There are some titles here that might have more information:
http://www.russian-front.com/frontoviki.htm

[Politician01]

As to be expected,another falsification :the source said :a loss of 16000 between 1941-1945,and the figure of 231 is 231 captured loc's in 1941.
You assume (without proofs) that all these losses occured in 1941-1942
The same for the railway cars :the loss is for the whole war

1. Wow your quite the zealot posting the exact same posts in other forums
http://www.military-quotes.com/forum/gr ... 90346.html
You wanna discredit Lend lease throughout all forums in the Internet??

2. Stop accusing other people of falsifications -and be civil- it was YOU who clamed USSR had 28 000 locomotives but didnt deliver a source untill now.

3. Its common sence to assume that nearly all locomotives and railway cars were lost in 1941-1942 since from late 1942 to the end of the war the only larger territory the Germans captured was a rather small area at kharkov and a really small area at Kursk.

4. See the post of LWD that thwarts your effort to discredit the immense importance of Lend lease and especially Lend Lease locomotives.


The Oxford Companion to World War II 2001

Still, the freight transport volume of the railways was down to 52% of the pre-war level, reaching only 58% in 1943, 68% in 1944, and 76% in 1945—and railways accounted for 83% of all freight transfers and 70% of military freight transfers.

Soviet war production was also supplemented by the Allied Lend-Lease programme. Altogether, during the years 1941 to 1945, 21,621 combat aircraft and 12,439 tanks and self-propelled guns arrived in the USSR, 12,869 and 7,747 respectively coming from the USA, the rest Anglo-Canadian deliveries. Compared to an overall Soviet production during the same period, of 136,364 aircraft and 99,507 tanks or self-propelled guns, Allied supplies seem insignificant. But during the critical year 1942 they provided the margin which allowed the USSR to have adequate aircraft and tank forces. Of acknowledged importance was the delivery of trucks and jeeps. Only these provided the mobility which gave the Red Army the opportunity to turn tactical and operational gains into strategic victories.

http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/USSR.aspx

[Jon G.]

That article seems remarkably uninformed, even by Wiki standards...

I found a source for the 16,000 locomitives lost. Unfortunatly it's wiki and no further reference is given so it's problematic. They imply by the way that the losses were in the first two years:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_lo ... rld_War_II

After two years of war with Germany, much of the Soviet rail system was in ruins. At the time, much effort had been put into rebuilding the track;

Well, WHO would have the opportunity to put much effort into rebuilding 'the track' after two years of war? It seems to me that the author of the wiki article is confusing Soviet reconstruction of recaptured areas' railroads with the Germans' effort to regauge captured Soviet railroads, for how much track would the Soviets have recaptured by summer 1943, and how much track behind the frontlines would have been in ruins at that time? The answer to both questions would be: not all that much.

however, the hasty nature of the construction meant that it could not support locomotives with axle-loadings of more than 18 tonnes.

...which sounds about right for Soviet standards at the time. Soviet railroads have larger loading gauges than do most Western European systems, meaning that Soviet/Russian RR rolling stock has more space, and frequently more wheels, for distributring weight.

'Hasty', I venture, again pertains to the German re-gauging of captured stretches of Soviet railroad, for the Germans did have problems running some of their own heavier engine types on lighter Soviet rails. Conversely, I refuse to believe that the Soviets rebuilt their railroads so that they could not bear the weight of their own locomotives :roll:

What few locomotives (as many as 16,000 were destroyed) that had not been destroyed by bombing were either too weak or too heavy. The factories were did not have the equipment to produce locomotives, so it was decided to order more from America.

Even this is wrong, as the Soviets had built giant locomotive works at Chelyabinsk (quickly converted into building tanks instead), Kuznetzk and Ulan-Ude in the 1930s, all of which are very far indeed from the parts of the USSR which were overrun by the Germans.

[ljadw]

As to be expected,another falsification :the source said :a loss of 16000 between 1941-1945,and the figure of 231 is 231 captured loc's in 1941.
You assume (without proofs) that all these losses occured in 1941-1942
The same for the railway cars :the loss is for the whole war

1. Wow your quite the zealot posting the exact same posts in other forums
http://www.military-quotes.com/forum/gr ... 90346.html
You wanna discredit Lend lease throughout all forums in the Internet??

2. Stop accusing other people of falsifications -and be civil- it was YOU who clamed USSR had 28 000 locomotives but didnt deliver a source untill now.

3. Its common sence to assume that nearly all locomotives and railway cars were lost in 1941-1942 since from late 1942 to the end of the war the only larger territory the Germans captured was a rather small area at kharkov and a really small area at Kursk.

4. See the post of LWD that thwarts your effort to discredit the immense importance of Lend lease and especially Lend Lease locomotives.


The Oxford Companion to World War II 2001

Still, the freight transport volume of the railways was down to 52% of the pre-war level, reaching only 58% in 1943, 68% in 1944, and 76% in 1945—and railways accounted for 83% of all freight transfers and 70% of military freight transfers.

Soviet war production was also supplemented by the Allied Lend-Lease programme. Altogether, during the years 1941 to 1945, 21,621 combat aircraft and 12,439 tanks and self-propelled guns arrived in the USSR, 12,869 and 7,747 respectively coming from the USA, the rest Anglo-Canadian deliveries. Compared to an overall Soviet production during the same period, of 136,364 aircraft and 99,507 tanks or self-propelled guns, Allied supplies seem insignificant. But during the critical year 1942 they provided the margin which allowed the USSR to have adequate aircraft and tank forces. Of acknowledged importance was the delivery of trucks and jeeps. Only these provided the mobility which gave the Red Army the opportunity to turn tactical and operational gains into strategic victories.

http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/USSR.aspx

The usual irrelevant and off topic blahblah:why mention the number of LL tanks and aircraft in a discussion about the number of LL loc's ?
You have claimed that the 2000 LL loc's were essential for the SU ,ignoring /concealing the fact that the SU had between 25000 and 30000 loc's in june 1941,ignoring the fact that we don't know how much loc's the SU lost in 1941-1942,ignoring the fact that the deliveries of the loc's started only later in the war(1943).
The reason is simple :you refuse to admit that the Soviet Army was the equal of the Wehrmacht (something not uncommon with fanboys) and therefore you claim that they only could win because of LL.