Was Germany's War Effort Badly Run?

[prr]

if Germany had defeated the USSR, it would not have needed most of the synthetic oil plants. Hitler was surprised by the British and French declarations of war. The official plan assumed that war was only likely in 1943-44 (the naval Z-plan for example). The synthetic oil programme made sense on that assumption. I suspect that nobody changed the plans even when they no longer made sense.

There was an earlier thread on German versus USSR steel production http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 6&t=119848 that might suggest that the limitation on, for example, tank production was not lack of raw materials. However, Lend Lease might have allowed the USSR to concentrate more on weapons, so it is not absolutely clear.

[/quote]

Bookmarked the steel thread. Looks good so far.

Not sure if I'm understanding your oil comments in the proper context. As far as synthetic oil is concerned, you would have had them shut down the project after they attacked Russia, because if they won, they wouldn't have needed synthetic oil? I understand the logic of that (telling Germany to put all its energy into a fight that will solve its energy problems), even though I think its wise to make a plan b when it comes to energy supply in wartime. But did this drain too much of their resources? I mean, they already had the technology before war broke out, so wasn't this simply a matter of paying a bit more for oil (b/c it was synthetic and more expensive) than they otherwise would have? Its not like this was a major cause of under-production in the early 40s was it?

[Mostlyharmless]

I gather that the construction of the synthetic oil plants might use significant resources.http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airc ... becker.htm includes "Production goals were altered again in the summer of 1938 when Göring set up a new program whose completion was to coincide with the completion of rearmament in 1942-43, in keeping with the plans revealed by Hitler in his November 1937 conference. Greater armaments required larger amounts of fuel, and the so-called Revised Economic Production Plan of 1938 reflected the new needs. Göring called for the production in 1942-43 of almost 88 million barrels of various types of fuels and lubricants. But it was not long before it was realized that a program of such dimensions would require construction steel quantities that simply were not available in an already straitened economy. After several further revisions, the final one of January 1939 called for a production in 1943 of 68 million barrels."

After reflection on the Volkswagen factory usefulness in air warfare, I did remember an example of a flying beetle ending a war http://classics.mit.edu/Aristophanes/peace.html.

[Attrition]

Had the Germans captured Caucasian oil, they would still have had to move it to Germany. This would not be posssible in the short term because of the destruction of Russian railways during the invasion. I recall that Tooze quoted people like Thomas writing that the exports of commodities by the USSR before Barbarossa were at the maximum that the USSR's transport system could handle. Extracting a lot of oil from the Caucasus would have required a lot of investment in infrastructure which would have taken time that Germany didn't have.

I thought the war ended because of that subversive minx Lysistrata?

[Tim Smith]

I think Tooze is giving the German leadership too much credit for far sightedness as he is such an obvious fan of Speer .

It's understandable how people become 'fans' of Albert Speer.

Compared to Hermann Göring, Speer was absolutely fantastic at organising the German war economy!
Of course, that's like saying that von Paulus was a better army commander than Heinrich Himmler.....

[Belrick]

I think one only needs to compare the production figures from Germany in 1944 to that of 39-40 to realise just how badly the Nazis ballsed up there military economy.
The nazis were trying to fight wars cheaply and to stick to there lebensraum and racial ideals and it cost them the war.

A fully mobilized Germany with the intention of demolishing USSR instead of conquering the people and land would have easily won in the east and presented an impenetrable barrier to the allies in the west.

Thank god that they didn't!

[LWD]

...
A fully mobilized Germany with the intention of demolishing USSR instead of conquering the people and land would have easily won in the east and presented an impenetrable barrier to the allies in the west.

Thank god that they didn't!

It's not clear they could have. Indeed a big part of the problem was building the military up too soon at the expense of infrastructure and foreign relations.

[Qvist]

OK. What do folks here think about this question? Were German factories unnecessarily run at a much slower pace than could have been?

Well, if you've read Tooze, why do you need this discussed? He shows conclusively that they weren't.

It's not clear they could have. Indeed a big part of the problem was building the military up too soon at the expense of infrastructure and foreign relations.

If anything characterised the German war economy, from 1933 to the end, it was inevstment in infrastructure on a truly gargantuan scale.

I think one only needs to compare the production figures from Germany in 1944 to that of 39-40 to realise just how badly the Nazis ballsed up there military economy. The nazis were trying to fight wars cheaply and to stick to there lebensraum and racial ideals and it cost them the war.

Sorry, but these are both old myths that are completely wrong. This has been covered at length in many previous discussions.

cheers

[Belrick]

Sorry but i strongly disagree. Everything I have ever written is quite clear on just how much Russia was hated by her own supposed people. Going in as genuine liberators and freeing Ukrainians, belorussians, georgians et al would of added greatly to the axis cause while reducing Russian significantly. How many other states would of then shown unrest in attempting to also breakaway?

I think people don't realise just how close Germany came to defeating USSR. The manpower shortages in 1945 Russia faced was chronic.

[Belrick]

Question:

Tooze says that in 1939 that factories (250,000+ of them)in 1939 produced 8,000 aircraft, 15 submarines, 370 tanks and support a fielded a 1.3 million strong army (beans bullets etc) and was infact running at 100% military production.

Were also the same factories in 1944 that produced 40,000 aircraft, 288 submarines, 19,000 tanks and support a fielded a 9.5 million strong army?

Or am I missing your guys points?

Second question, what is your guys definition of bankrupt? A physical limitation that prevents individuals and nations from producing like a broken arm to a gymnast or a virtual condition where a creditor is requesting his money back by any means possible?

Man Japan in 1942 should really have forced USA bankrupt eh?

[Tim Smith]

Question:
Tooze says that in 1939 that factories (250,000+ of them)in 1939 produced 8,000 aircraft, 15 submarines, 370 tanks and support a fielded a 1.3 million strong army (beans bullets etc) and was infact running at 100% military production.

That was 100% production - in a peacetime-level economy. Which is what Germany's economy was in 1939.

[Qvist]

Code: Select all

Tooze says that in 1939 that factories (250,000+ of them)in 1939 produced 8,000 aircraft, 15 submarines, 370 tanks and support a fielded a 1.3 million strong army (beans bullets etc) and was infact running at 100% military production.

Were also the same factories in 1944 that produced 40,000 aircraft, 288 submarines, 19,000 tanks and support a fielded a 9.5 million strong army?

Or am I missing your guys points?

You are missing lots of points.

1. As Tim points out, the 1939 figures reflect a largely peacetime economy. Even in the Third Reich, there was a significant difference
2. They were not "the same factories". The German armaments-industrial base was much larger in 1944 than in 1939
3. Aircraft, submarines and tanks are not the measure of war production. They are just three commodities within it. And they all of them made up a considerably greater relative share of German armanents production in 1944 than they did in 1939.
4. Of course German output was much larger in 1944 than in 1939, as it bloody well should be after five years of war and resource mobilisation. The same is the case for every other major combatant. If it wasn't, THEN you could really talk about "badly run war effort".

cheers

[Qvist]

Sorry but i strongly disagree. Everything I have ever written is quite clear on just how much Russia was hated by her own supposed people. Going in as genuine liberators and freeing Ukrainians, belorussians, georgians et al would of added greatly to the axis cause while reducing Russian significantly. How many other states would of then shown unrest in attempting to also breakaway?

You strongly disagree with what? AFAICS, nobody has commented on this point at all since you last posted.

cheers

[FireFoxy]

Sorry but i strongly disagree. Everything I have ever written is quite clear on just how much Russia was hated by her own supposed people. Going in as genuine liberators and freeing Ukrainians, belorussians, georgians et al would of added greatly to the axis cause while reducing Russian significantly. How many other states would of then shown unrest in attempting to also breakaway?

I think people don't realise just how close Germany came to defeating USSR. The manpower shortages in 1945 Russia faced was chronic.

Even the Allies did not like or trust Russia.Allies only use Russia to defeat Germany.
Plus Germany only run in to a brick wall course of the russian winter that enventually turn the tide for the Russian, therefore turn the tide for the Allies.

[Mostlyharmless]

2. They were not "the same factories". The German armaments-industrial base was much larger in 1944 than in 1939

4. Of course German output was much larger in 1944 than in 1939, as it bloody well should be after five years of war and resource mobilisation. The same is the case for every other major combatant. If it wasn't, THEN you could really talk about "badly run war effort".

All very true. However, WW2 was decided between June 1941 and November 1942. Thus there is a sense in which Germany's economy was badly run because it did not produce anything like its maximum possible output over that period. Note that Britain, Japan, Russia and the USA reached their peak of production quicker and that German was suffering from bombing (forcing dispersion of production) and had started to lose access to some raw materials from 1943. The increased output for 1943-44 included increased production from factories existing in 1940 as well as output from new factories as far as I can see from sources such as the USSBS reports on tanks and vehicles http://www.angelfire.com/super/ussbs/tankrep.html and http://www.angelfire.com/super/ussbs/motvehrep.html#G2.

[Qvist]

Thus there is a sense in which Germany's economy was badly run because it did not produce anything like its maximum possible output over that period. Note that Britain, Japan, Russia and the USA reached their peak of production quicker and that German was suffering from bombing (forcing dispersion of production) and had started to lose access to some raw materials from 1943. The increased output for 1943-44 included increased production from factories existing in 1940 as well as output from new factories as far as I can see from sources such as the USSBS reports on tanks and vehicles http://www.angelfire.com/super/ussbs/tankrep.html and http://www.angelfire.com/super/ussbs/motvehrep.html#G2.

Well, the problem you have there is that you seem to think that you can compare German tank production in 1941-42 and 1944 and conclude that since the latter is higher, capacity wasn't being used to the full in 1941-42. This is of course not possible. The basic reason more tanks were being produced in 1944 was that more resources and a greater share of the overall resources were devoted to it than in 1941-42, at the expense of other armaments items. You can't use a single item as a measure of overall economic performance, and certainly not one of such comparatively little significance as tanks (whose share of German armaments output never exceeded 7%). The big items in the production effort was always aircraft and ammunition, and even things like artillery and naval construction more or less dwarfed armoured vehicles in scale.

There is as far as I know nothing to suggest that there was idle and unused capacity in 1941-42, but the structure of the productive effort was very different than in 1943-44. This was a period of vast investment in plant and infrastructure, and of reallocation to aircraft production. This again underlay the surge in output figures for many items in 1943-44. As far as tanks is concerned, the output did not only benefit from a generally increased productive capacity and the completion of several large new plants, but also of an increased priority for tanks through the Adolf Hitler Panzer Programme as a result of which productive capacity previously used for other (military) purposes were ridirected to tank production. Certainly they could conceivably have done this earlier, but how would it have made German war production intrinsically better run if they had produced more tanks and less ammunition or trucks? For that matter, they could probably have doubled or tripled tank production in 1944, if they had chosen to divert the nececssary resources away from other sectors in the aramaments industry, but would this have meant German industry was more efficient?

cheers