Was Germany's War Effort Badly Run?

[Guaporense]

Well, now I do understand why German munition production levels were so low in 1940 and 1941.

It had nothing to do with a badly run war effort. In fact, the failure to produce tons of munitions occurred for two reasons: The first reason was that in these years a lot of investment was taking place, the industrial capacity to make munitions was being expanded in these years, while munition production was relatively low. The second reason was because Germany's war budget focused less on munitions than the military budgets of other powers. So the fact was that in 1941, Ger had a massive military expending, but this was reflected in a massive army, not in the production of aircraft.

[bf109 emil]

So the fact was that in 1941, Ger had a massive military expending, but this was reflected in a massive army, not in the production of aircraft.

the production of aircraft and the lack numbers was not a result of military spending it was a direct result of Germany not modernizing and going to mass production scale earlier...Germany's aircraft production totals where in direct line with it's poor ability to build quantities of aero-engines, so much so that numerous German bombers had to equipped with older, less powerful Jumo engines, thus fighter planes and those destined to run Daimler-Benz engines could only be made flyable as engine that could be produced

It had nothing to do with a badly run war effort. In fact, the failure to produce tons of munitions occurred for two reasons: The first reason was that in these years a lot of investment was taking place, the industrial capacity to make munitions was being expanded in these years

No Germany had the industrial capacity early to increase production, but because of a badly run war effort, choose to remain production and hours worked during the first 2 yrs of war as similar to those worked during peace time.

[Qvist]

So the fact was that in 1941, Ger had a massive military expending, but this was reflected in a massive army, not in the production of aircraft.

No, aircraft was the largest item in the armaments sector, also in 1941.

the production of aircraft and the lack numbers was not a result of military spending it was a direct result of Germany not modernizing and going to mass production scale earlier...Germany's aircraft production totals where in direct line with it's poor ability to build quantities of aero-engines, so much so that numerous German bombers had to equipped with older, less powerful Jumo engines, thus fighter planes and those destined to run Daimler-Benz engines could only be made flyable as engine that could be produced

Er, no. During 1941, there was a massive reallocation of productive resources towards the aircraft sector, once Rüstungsprogramm B (preparing the army for the Eastern campaign) was finished. In terms of workforce, there was a 40% increase in the air sector between the spring of 1940 and the autumn of 1941. The reason this did not immediately result in increased output figures is simply lead time from raw material to finished output, as well as the fact that refocussing production and reallocating labor takes time - the resulting surge in output followed six to nine months later, in spring 1942.

Anyway, what exactly is meant by "lack of numbers"? Lack relative to what? In 1933, Germany didn't have an aircraft industry at all, nor a single developed military aircraft prototype that could have been put into production. By late 1940, they had built an entirely new major industry that was delivering more than a thousand aircraft per month, and was concerning themselves with effecting a further massive increase in response to the recognised threat inherent in the combined potential of British aircraft production and American deliveries. Production increased by more than a third in 1942 over 1941, then rose to more than twice 1941 levels in 1943 and almost three times more in 1944. It seems to me fairly absurd to speak of a "failure to modernize" when one is speaking about an industry that was developed from point zero over a period of six years prior to the war, and which grew almost continuously during the war itself. The idea of low early war productivity in the aircraft sector has stubbornly lodged itself in the public consciousness as a result of rather dubious claims by Speer, whose productivity statistics were however fairly thoroughly demolished by Tooze.

cheers

[Guaporense]

So the fact was that in 1941, Ger had a massive military expending, but this was reflected in a massive army, not in the production of aircraft.

No, aircraft was the largest item in the armaments sector, also in 1941.

Yes, it was. But total outlays in the aircraft industry were about 4.4 billion RM (2) in 1941. While total military outlays were 71 billion RM (1).

For comparison, in 1944, in the US total military outlays were 87 billion US$ (1) while total aircraft outlays were 16 billion US$ (3). A much higher proportion of total military spending.

Sources:
(1) The Economics of WW2
(2) War and Economy in The Third Reich
(3) Mobilizing US industry for WW2

Sure, Germany was producing a loot of aircraft considering that their industry was only 8 years old. But, they should have awaited more to start the war them, since they had less mature war related industries than the allies, with means that the marginal gains of investing were greater than for the allies. This was reflected in the relative higher increase of munitions production between 1942 and 1944.

[Qvist]

how so, German air industry and the likes of which dates back to WW1.

By 1933 there was nothing left of that industry. Germany was essentially not producing aircraft at all, except for minuscule numbers of small civilian machines.

cheers

[bf109 emil]

how so, German air industry and the likes of which dates back to WW1.

By 1933 there was nothing left of that industry. Germany was essentially not producing aircraft at all, except for minuscule numbers of small civilian machines.

cheers

TY Qvist as i was unaware Daimler-Benz, Messerschmidt, Fokker, etc. all started from scratch in 1933 and had to build factories from scratch or start at square one. I knew Germany was not able to have an airforce under the treaty of Versailles, but even so aircraft which might have been produced early in 1933 (other then training pilots as Germany took so doing within the Soviet Union) would have had little use later in the 30's. Even so I would have to say Germany did a remarkable feat having gone from minuscule size in 33 to being a formidable weapon as used and fought in Spain just 3 yrs. later.

[Qvist]

According to Tooze, in 1932 the German aircraft industry employed 3,200 people and had the capacity to produce no more than a hundred aircraft a year. Ten years later, it emplyed more than 100,000 people and was capable of producing more than 10,000 aircraft annually.

Fokker is (or rather was) a Dutch firm. Of course Daimler-Benz existed but they were not an aircraft company, though like many other large pre-existing industrial concerns they expanded to that sector as the the aircraft industry was developed. Messerschmitt (or rather, Bayrische Flugzeugwerke, as was its actual name) stopped producing aircraft after WW I, going over into furniture and motorcycles instead. They tried to restart aircraft production in 1926, but went bankrupt in 1931. Rearmament provided them with the opportunity to re-ignite.

cheers

[The_Enigma]

I recall reading that Sweden was involved during the inter-war years in helping; any truth to that and if so how much help was made available. Likewise, as already brought up by another poster, in regards to the Soviet Union; or am i mixing up what they actually helped with?

[magicdragon]

Just to add my views on the Tooze book and its relationship to this topic.

My view is that Tooze dismissed the view (which I once held!) that the Germans had spare capacity which could have easily been exploited i.e. more women workers, using the French factories better. Based on their knowledge of the type of war they believed they would be fighting their decisions had a certain rationality!

They could have done things better but the basic flaw was there never enough resources or time to produce a balanced military procurement policy - something had to GO i.e. a much smaller Navy, less building projects !! Tooze never got into this argument and this subject has been been discussed on other threads. The other factor which Tooze discussed in detail was the pre-war currency crises which effectively meant that many projects stopped or where scaled back and its impact on investment plans which in turn had an impact on production capacity in the early war period .

[Jon G.]

Posts about pre-war RAF procurement etc. have been merged to this topic http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 4&t=135768

...this topic is about the German war effort. Stick to it.

[Guaporense]

This paper:

The German War Economy by Nicolas Kaldor,

http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2296114.pdf by Nicolas Kaldor

Makes the point that the German war economy was badly run. I don't think that many people know. At least the guy who wrote the book is an economist, instead of the historian, Tooze.

[Wani]

using the French factories better.

Come on now, sending french workers to Germany while in the same time trying to use the factories for Germany was so rational.
A (quite technical) account of how Volkswagen attempted to develop its productions by taking control of Peugeot is interesting (in French):
http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/pr ... _11_3_1648

[Qvist]

This paper:

The German War Economy by Nicolas Kaldor,

http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2296114.pdf by Nicolas Kaldor

Makes the point that the German war economy was badly run. I don't think that many people know. At least the guy who wrote the book is an economist, instead of the historian, Tooze.

It was written in 1945, on the basis of some of the material from the USSBS, while that was still in progress. If you want to find something that can pontentially challenge Tooze's findings, you'll have to do better than that.

cheers

[Haranin]

Just because something turned out badly doesn't mean it was obviously wrong at the time.
(rubber plant at BUNA).

If you were in Hitler's shoes in 1939 and someone told you that for X investment, you could get most of the rubber you needed artificially a few years down the road, you would jump all over it... economics, idealogy and military realities dictate any chance at addressing a critical material shortage is worth serious consideration.

The point isn't if the Germany economy was badly run, run exactly like the allies or whatever... its that given the constraints the Germans had, they did abotu the best they could have. The infrastructure problems, railroad underinvestment and monetary problems meant there just wasn't much they could do.

If any thing Tooze underlines that Versailles worked, not in preventing another war, but making sure the germans would lose it.

[RichTO90]

This paper:

The German War Economy by Nicolas Kaldor,

http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2296114.pdf by Nicolas Kaldor

Makes the point that the German war economy was badly run. I don't think that many people know. At least the guy who wrote the book is an economist, instead of the historian, Tooze.

It was written in 1945, on the basis of some of the material from the USSBS, while that was still in progress. If you want to find something that can pontentially challenge Tooze's findings, you'll have to do better than that.

cheers

I missed this somehow Qvist.

You realize of course that he's talking about the Adam Tooze who

received his first degree in economics from King’s College Cambridge. Between 1989 and 1991 he studied at the Free University Berlin and took his PhD in economic history from the London School of Economics in 1996. For 13 years he taught in the History Faculty of the University of Cambridge, before joining Yale as Professor of Modern German History in the summer of 2009.

And who:

was appointed to the academic panel charged by the Bundesfinanzministerum (Federal Finance Ministry) with writing the Ministry’s history in the period of the Third Reich. He has responsibility for the volume dealing with public debt.

Tooze has supervised graduate dissertations on many areas of modern German history, British history, the history of the 1970s, Balkan history and East European economic history.

And who:

teaches all areas of modern German History, twentieth century economic history, social theory and the philosophy of history.

At Yale.

Yeah, just a "historian", without any economic credentials, especially when compared to that noted polymath Guaporense.

Does anyone wonder why I keep saying...SURREAL! :roll: