German vs. Allied war-making potential

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Re: German vs. Allied technology

Post by Michael Kenny » 13 Dec 2009 21:19

ljadw wrote: About the German losses in 1944 in the west :I have the following figures for 6 june to 31 january 1945 (army and Waffen SS only )
KIA 66321
WIA 221548
MIA 411978
total:699833
Note the large MIA numbers. This means the Germans did not know if these men were dead or POW's. A good number were in fact dead and thus the totals were ALWAYS on the low side.

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Re: German vs. Allied technology

Post by ljadw » 13 Dec 2009 22:56

it always applies for a retreating army:
German losses in the east(june,july and august 1944):KIA 72OOO WIA 325000 MIA 503000
Losses of the BEF:KIA 42O6 WIA 16815 MIA 48159

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Re: German vs. Allied technology

Post by Michael Kenny » 13 Dec 2009 23:08

ljadw wrote:it always applies for a retreating army:
German losses in the east(june,july and august 1944):KIA 72OOO WIA 325000 MIA 503000
Losses of the BEF:KIA 42O6 WIA 16815 MIA 48159

True but you never hear it being claimed the BEF lost 'only' 4206 dead in 1940. I have heard it claimed many a time that Germany lost circa 24,000 dead in Normandy.

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Re: German vs. Allied technology

Post by takata_1940 » 14 Dec 2009 09:46

Hi,
There is so many things to answer about Guaporense's theories that it will take several posts.
Guaporense wrote: Well, an US division had 14,300 men. A German division had 16,700 men. I guess that a French division had ~15,000 men. Divisions have fairly standard size.
For your information, the French 1940 'North-East' (standard) infantry division had a TOE strength of 16,537 men (497 officers, 1,722 NCOs, 14,318 ORs). So, one may say the German and French infantry divisions were build on the same model before the war.

- Problems with numbers and statistics.
a) Talking only about divisional manpower, it is fairly useless to take any standard division's TOE for comparisons during subsequent war operations when the available strength may vary widely from one unit to another. In June 1940, none of the French divisions that had been commited would be close to half its TOE strength; some were only reduced 'cadre' reinforced by depots troops. The Russian and German divisions in 1944 could range from a full 1944 division to a bunch of several hundreds men. Moreover, TOE strength varied seriously in USSR and Germany during the whole war. This sort of comparison would be mostly usefull during peacetime and divisions in wartime are mostly rated by intelligence following their real firepower rather than their supposed TOE. As a matter of fact, the 82 allied divisions or so in the 1944 western front were worth the double or triple the same number of Russians and Germans ones. Now, the margin of error in any computation is so large that no serious analysis can be made on this TOE basis.

b) Talking only about national Army manpower is doing the same mistake. In any comparison, you first need to verify if your data are computed using the same method.

For example, a table showing the French mobilized manpower use at March 1st, 1940:

1. Army Métropole: 2,420,000 (North East: 2,230,000 - Alps: 190,000)
. French : 2,330,000
. North African: 70,000
. Colonials: 20,000

2. Army North Africa: 202,000
. French : 80,000
. North African: 100,000
. Colonials: 22,000

3. Army Levant: 61,000
. French : 35,000
. North African: 23,000
. Colonials: 3,000

Total Army: 2,683,000 (Métropole, AFN & Levant only)
Total Navy: 182,000
Total Air Force: 150,000
Total Interior Army: 2,330,000
. Replacements: 380,000 (available)
. Territory service: 657,000 (security, training)
. Industry: 710,000
. Agriculture: 250,000
. North Africa: 188,000 (security, training)
. Miscalleous: 145,000 (Leave, hospital, etc.)
Total Armed Forces: 5,300,000 (Army: Métropole, AFN & Levant only)
. French: 4,895,000
. North African: 340,000
. Colonials: 65,000

So, the total field Army of 2,683,000 men should be amputed of the part facing Italy or delployed in AFN & Levant. This will left 2,230,000 men in the North East front (including Britain-Norway expedition troops). In May, the German field Army reached about 3,300,0000 men but should be also amputed of the part left to guard Poland and other places. As a detailed table of military manpower is showing, 1 men computed value is vastly different from another men value. Only a limited part of the total manpower may be used for combat at any time. If overall figures are usefull to a certain extent in showing the global effort and resources committed, they are saying nothing about the real war potential without any qualitative factor (age, education, military training, health, etc.).
Guaporense wrote:Clausewitz said that it is practically impossible for an army to defeat another army 2 times larger.
Come on. Then, Clausewitz is certainly wrong as the German Army was not 2 times larger than the French one, without even adding any of the other Allies. Clausewitz is to be interpreted in its time and technology which wasn't about Industrialised warfare waged by whole nations.

Nonetheless, If one XIXe century maxim was proved true in 1940, it was Napoléon's one: "La force d'une armée, comme la quantité de mouvement en mécanique, s'évalue par la masse multipliée par la vitesse." [The strength of an army, like the amount of momentum in mechanics, is estimated by mass times the velocity"] This stand still right in WWII warfare were the mass is the firepower times the speed of action.

This is why it is again fairly useless to make any comparison between a French 1940 division and a US 1944 division (or any other of this period) on the simple basis of manpower and losses inflicted/sustained. The battlefield technology changed so dramatically after the successful early German campaigns that this early advantage was lost on every front. All they were able to do was to win some time before their complete defeat.

This bring us to the losses computed:
How do you know how many losses were really sustained by the French during the 1940 campaign? If there is still something very hard to get, it is a correct estimation of the combat losses (almost any country, anywhere, anytime). In France, they are just finishing to compute the real losses of the first world war; nobody knows exactly how many combat losses were sustained during the 1940 campaign. Estimations are ranging from one (60,000 or less) to two (120,000 or more), only for the KIAs. The WIAs are the most difficult to correctly compute (one WIA dying later of its wounds would be counted twice in the total losses; some were lightly wounded more than once and not evacuated, etc.). As for the MIAs, are they dead, wounded and/or prisonner? if one is WIA, recorded as MIA but POW, then dying in captivity, in what category would he be counted? Certainly more than once also.

There is one document in French archives (SHDT 7N23) called: "État récapitulatif établi rétroactivement le 10 juillet 1942"
for the september 1939 to july 1940 total armed force French losses are 1,599,449 men: 52,329 KIAs, 352,314 WIAs, 1,194,806 POWs & MIAs. But, the medical service recorded only 123,000 WIA evacuated during the May-June campaign. Statistically, this number imply about 40,000-60,000 dead, plus about 10% (12,300) dying of their wounds later (which should be counted WIA and not KIA).
So I don't know what kind of usefull analysis are you going to make using so improbable data as the 'losses' sustained by the Armies during such and such campaign.

I'll be back later about Economical statistics.
S~
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Re: German vs. Allied technology

Post by Kelvin » 14 Dec 2009 11:52

Hi, Ljadw, In May 1940, there were 91 French division in the West :

Seven motorized infantry divisions : 1,3,5,9,12,15 and 25 infantry divisions

Ten active infantry divisions : 10,11,13,14,19,21,23,36,42 and 43 infantry division

Seventeen A class infantry division ( reserve division age up to 32) : 2,4,6,7,8,16,18,20,22,24,26,32,35,41,44,45,47 infantry division

Nineteen B class infantry division ( reserve division age average 36) : 51,52,53,54,55,56,57,58,60,61,62,63,64,65,66,67,68,70 and 71 infantry divisions ( 64, 65 and 66 were Alpine division and deployed in Italian front)

Five Alpine division : 27,28,29,30,31 Alpine divisions ( Two active and three A class)

North African infantry divisions : 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,82,87 and Morcoccan divisions

Colonial infantry division : 1,2,3,4,5,6, and 7 colonial divisions

Fortress division : 101102,103,104 and 105 Fortress division with MG battalion from Indo China and Malgaches.

Also five cavlary divisions, 3 DCR and 3 DLM

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Re: German vs. Allied technology

Post by takata_1940 » 14 Dec 2009 12:04

Hi,
Few comments:
EKB wrote:
takata_1940 wrote:the French initial contract was for 500 aircraft plus 33% parts (making 167 more in dollar as spare-parts), not a 667 total as it is mentioned by you. This was not a 'British' contract.

The British took over the contract in 1940, long before the aircraft were built. They also made amendments before and after the Lightning I was flight-tested in England, so this for all intents and purposes was a British deal.
You might have to check closer the lengthy production cycles for aircraft and aero-engines at this time. The first of the batch wasn't a prototype just made for 'testing'. It was the first out of the batch to be delivered. All others in the production line were actually completed at the same time. The Lockeed contract specified that the engines, which were ordered to G.M. on another contract, were to be made available at the assembly line at least 6 months before each aircraft completion date. The date was set on October 1940 for the first 10 aircraft. Then engines had to be delivered to the plant before April 1940. The first batch of 100 P-38, equiped with Allison V1710-C15 engine were to be delivered before March 1941; the next 100 with Allison V1710-F3R before May 1941:
Oct.40: 10
Nov.40: 15
Dec.40: 20
Jan.41: 25
Feb.41: 30
Mar.41: 50
Apr.41: 50
May.41: 80
Jun.41: 100
Jul.41: 120
Aug.41: 140
So, obviously, all this was something already running by the time France was defeated. And those data are not from memory as I still have the document [SHDA Thouvenot Z11609] This table is dated March 19, 1940 but is showing the planed U.S. importations from January 1940 to December 1941. It is annexed to Thouvenot's report 1051/A on 15.08.1942. The total quantity scheduled is for 800 P-38, including 500 French and was compiled from the telegrams of Colonel Jacquet from the French Purchasing Commission. On the other hand, the contracts and engagements signed with Lockeed (May 4th 1940) are showing only 667 aircraft for an amount of $51,760,000 on which the British and French Commission had paid 10% each in advance. The second contract 'open' with G.M. (May 25, 1940) was for 5,000 Allison C-15, E4, F3R engines. 815 other Allison C15 were in order for 265 P-40 and 550 Arsenal VG33.
EKB wrote:Going from memory is not appropriate here.
There might have been some truth to your beliefs in 1938 but the first export model Lightning was built three years later, by which time the U.S. trade relationship with the U.K. had changed drastically. In any case turbos had been around for a long time; Auguste Rateau developed them for French bi-plane fighters during World War I. There is no truth to the rumor that turbochargers were deleted because it was 'a secret' when the first British Lightning was built in 1941.
How long do you think that it takes to build a plant for aircraft or engine production?
Because it is exactly what happened. They had to build the plants before assembling the aircraft with engines and accessories. In 1938, there was no capacity in the USA to build those contracts. The French and British paid for developping it and this was planned long before a single production aircraft ever fly. A production cycle is about 9 months and a lot more if it is the first batch of production (which it was). So, there is no way that those aircraft were build from scratch in 1941 when the contract specified a first delivery in October 1940.

S~
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Re: German vs. Allied technology

Post by thom » 14 Dec 2009 15:03

Takata_1940 you wrote:
There is one document in French archives (SHDT 7N23) called: "État récapitulatif établi rétroactivement le 10 juillet 1942"
for the september 1939 to july 1940 total armed force French losses are 1,599,449 men: 52,329 KIAs, 352,314 WIAs, 1,194,806 POWs & MIAs.
Is there any more detailed information given in that document, such as losses per month, theater of war, etc.? There seem to be very few reliable statistics existing on French casualties in WW2.

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Re: German vs. Allied technology

Post by LWD » 14 Dec 2009 16:22

Guaporense wrote:
LWD wrote:
Guaporense wrote:1- France had more tradition of war
That's what I thought you meant but you still haven't supported it.
ever heard about ww1, napoleon, etc?
Sure I have. However that hardly supports your postion.
That may be what you are attempting to do but you are being spectacularly unsuccessful at it.
Do you know books that made any explicit comparison of French to US soldiers of WW2?
Your the proponent of the superiority of the French army it's up to you to make a case for it. So far you haven't all we have is an opinion.
Were they? It's not at all clear that's true and again you are neglecting the difference from being on the offensive vs beign on the defensive. Ie you are making unwarranted assumptions and basing opinions on them then calling both facts.
1- Second to statistical studies, German soldiers suffered less casualties than US soldiers in the defensive and in the offensive.
What statistical studies? How comparable were the situations? So far you've given us nothing other than opinion.
2- What assumptions? I used the data on allied combat casualties on normandy plus data on german combat casualties on france, disconted from other operations and compared to the ratio of ger/french combat casualties in 1940. I reached the conclusion that US and British troops were as inferior to German soldiers in 1944 as French troops were in 1940, and since German soldiers in 1944 were inferior to German soldiers in 1940, then I reached the conclusion that French soldiers in 1940 didn't suck that much. So, if I have 130 French divisions on one hand and 60 US divisions on the other, well, I think that I can chose the 130 French divisions over the 60 US divisions.
The assumption that those situations are even comprable.

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Re: German vs. Allied technology

Post by ljadw » 14 Dec 2009 16:53

I should like to see some proofs that the German soldiers in 1944 were inferior to those in 1940;of the 157 divisions in 194O,only 77 were classified as 'einsatzfahig '(ready for offensive and defensive operations ). Of the 4.5 million men of the Wehrmacht in 194O,only 2million were fully trained,800000 were untrained and there were 1.2 million veterans of WW I,the rest belonged to construction units . (source :the Blitzkrieg legend )

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Re: German vs. Allied technology

Post by Guaporense » 14 Dec 2009 17:33

ljadw wrote:I should like to see some proofs that the German soldiers in 1944 were inferior to those in 1940;of the 157 divisions in 194O,only 77 were classified as 'einsatzfahig '(ready for offensive and defensive operations ). Of the 4.5 million men of the Wehrmacht in 194O,only 2million were fully trained,800000 were untrained and there were 1.2 million veterans of WW I,the rest belonged to construction units . (source :the Blitzkrieg legend )
I read the claim that German soldiers in the 1944-1945 were inferior to the 1939-1942 soldiers in many books.

If you want hard data, second to Van Creveld (1982) based on data on 50 US vs German engagements (in 1944), about 1.55 US soldiers were killed and wounded and missing for every German soldier killed and wounded and missing. This included attacks and defenses, in the case were one side was fortified, there was a corrective bonus of 60% (for example, if US attacked a fortified German position and lost 320 men for 100 Germans, then, German score would be 2 to 1, on average German score was 1.55 to one in these 50 engagements). The average score for the British was a little better, 1.52 against 1.55 for the Americans. There were cases of elite German divisions in fortified positions with traded their men 6 to 1 with the Americans (yielding scores of about 4 to 1).

At France in 1940, the ratio of allied to German casualties was 2.4 to 1 (360,000 French and allied vs 150,000 German killed and wounded). And the Germans weren't in fortified positions when attacking. So score differential was about 2.4 to 1, quite worse than in 1944.

So we can conclude that in relation to the allies the Germans became worse during the war in relative terms. How can we say that this change in relative performance was generated by the allies getting better or the Germans getting worse? Well, the Germans got much, much, much more experience in ground warfare than the allies during the course of the war fighting the USSR. So I conclude that German soldiers were worse in 1944 than in 1939-1942.
"In tactics, as in strategy, superiority in numbers is the most common element of victory." - Carl von Clausewitz

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Re: German vs. Allied technology

Post by LWD » 14 Dec 2009 18:18

Guaporense wrote: ...If you want hard data, second to Van Creveld (1982) based on data on 50 US vs German engagements (in 1944), about 1.55 US soldiers were killed and wounded and missing for every German soldier killed and wounded and missing. This included attacks and defenses,
but in what ratio?
in the case were one side was fortified, there was a corrective bonus of 60% (for example, if US attacked a fortified German position and lost 320 men for 100 Germans, then, German score would be 2 to 1, on average German score was 1.55 to one in these 50 engagements).
??? So this 60% correction was just pulled out of the air? What constitures being "fortified"?
...At France in 1940, the ratio of allied to German casualties was 2.4 to 1 (360,000 French and allied vs 150,000 German killed and wounded). ....
And you keep doing this saying "casualties" or losses then excluding captures and sometimes other catagories.

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Re: German vs. Allied technology

Post by Guaporense » 14 Dec 2009 18:44

LWD wrote:
That may be what you are attempting to do but you are being spectacularly unsuccessful at it.
Do you know books that made any explicit comparison of French to US soldiers of WW2?
Your the proponent of the superiority of the French army it's up to you to make a case for it. So far you haven't all we have is an opinion.
You should note that your claim is stronger than mine. You say that US army was men per men, over two times as better than the French army. Second to Dupuy studies even the Wehrmacht (but it was in 1944) was only 20-30% better than the allied soldiers, men per men.

Even assuming that the US was much superior to the French, saying that an US infantry division could handle 2 French divisions in the defensive is ridiculous, the Almighty Wehrmacht could only handle at most 1.5 Russians to 1 German in the offensive.

Let's assume that the US army was much better than the French, i.e.: that it was 40-50% better, roughly the difference between the German army and the French in 1940. Then, since in January 1945 there were 2.9 million US personnel in Europe, of with 1,484,330 were in the frontlines. While in 1940 there were 6.1 million French personnel in Europe, of with 3 million were in the frontlines. So, the 1.48 million US soldiers would be worth 2.07-2.22 million French soldiers.

The fact is that in 1940 the 3 million French soldiers were against 80% of Germany's divisions and the German army had 4.35 million men in May 1940, or about 3.4 million men. While in January 1945, the 1.5 million US soldiers were fighting 15.1% of Germany's divisions (since 73 divisions out of 338 were in the western front in January 1945, and the US forces comprised 70% of allied forces in the front at the time, they were fighting 51 German divisions), second to Glantz in January 1945 the German army had 4 million men, with gives 600,000 German soldiers vs 1.5 million US soldiers. Numerical superiority of 2.5 to 1.

For comparison, in the Eastern front the German army had 2.3 million men fighting 6.5 million Soviets, a numerical superiority of 2.8 to 1.

Note that if in December 1944, the USSR ceased hostilities with Germany, then Ger would be more than able to win in the war (on the ground). Since they had 4 million men and the allies had 2.2 million, with are equivalent to 1.75 million German soldiers second to Dupuy statistical studies. But the allies would need to use the atom bomb to make the country surrender.
Were they? It's not at all clear that's true and again you are neglecting the difference from being on the offensive vs beign on the defensive. Ie you are making unwarranted assumptions and basing opinions on them then calling both facts.
1- Second to statistical studies, German soldiers suffered less casualties than US soldiers in the defensive and in the offensive.
What statistical studies? How comparable were the situations? So far you've given us nothing other than opinion.
Trevor Dupuy's studies. He found out that in attack, the late war German army inflicted 1.49 casualties per men lost vs allied soldiers, while in defense they inflicted 2.27 casualties per man lost.

This is similar to the case of France in 1940.
"In tactics, as in strategy, superiority in numbers is the most common element of victory." - Carl von Clausewitz

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Re: German vs. Allied technology

Post by Guaporense » 14 Dec 2009 18:48

LWD wrote: ??? So this 60% correction was just pulled out of the air? What constitures being "fortified"?
Ask Dupuy about that. I think he has good reasons to use there "corrections".
And you keep doing this saying "casualties" or losses then excluding captures and sometimes other catagories.
Yes, you should not include captured when comparing army performance.
"In tactics, as in strategy, superiority in numbers is the most common element of victory." - Carl von Clausewitz

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Re: German vs. Allied technology

Post by RichTO90 » 14 Dec 2009 19:23

Guaporense wrote: What argument?
Er, the one you are making…that the U.S. engaged solely in a Materialschlacht against the poor gallant Germans, who were really defeated by the ignorant but sturdy Soviet peasants. That one, the one I’ve replied to in various forms here, at Feldgrau, soc-history world war ii, TankNet, and others over the last ten years or so. The one where I keep running into posters that like to reset the goalposts as they go along to fit their “facts”…that are usually as amorphous as their argument. That one.
However, you should note that in 1944 most casualties were prisoners, while in 1940, most casualties were "combat casualties" (killed and wounded). I was taking these casualties in account to say that the Western front in 1940 was more intense than in 1944.
Yes, I see that not only are you an aficionado of the “if you don’t poke holes in a tank it isn’t lost” school of thought you are also of the “MIA aren’t really casualties because they haven’t had holes poked in them enough to make them fall down” ilk.

Please refer me to the German, American, Commonwealth, or Soviet doctrinal documents that explain that distinction.
Sure, 1944 western front was much heavier to the German army than the 1940 Western front, since it wielded 4 times more casualties and most casualties in 1944 were permanent while in 1940 were wounded. However, my point is that the intensity of combat in 1940 was greater than in 1944.
You do realize that argument is both circular and nonsensical don’t you?
However, of these 6.9 million men, only 2 million were front line troops, and only 2/3 of these front line troops were deployed in Europe, the US had 90 divisions. France had about 130 divisions or something like that.
Yep, if you can’t address the facts or explain why the data point you argued is not incorrect…simply move the goalposts. Now it isn’t strength of the armed forces or strength of the armies, its strength of the armies “deployed” to the region you select. Cool.

Except that we have peak strength figures for the Metropolitan French Army mobilized of 2.42-million plus 150,000 Air Force versus ETOUSA peak figures of 2,639,377 US Army forces on the continent May 1945 (Supreme Command, Appendix E). Note that figure does not include forces assigned to MTOUSA that could arguably be claimed to be “on the continent” as well.

I suppose now you want to go back and compare the French total armed forces strength mobilized to just the US Army commitment to Northwest Europe.
However, these ~1.5 million men included personnel other than front line troops. Since they had 70 divisions in 1944, with were mainly understrength, while in 1940 they had 140 divisions, with were full strength, I think that the 750,000 number reflects in 11,000 frontline men per division.
Yep, move the goalpost again…now its “front line troops”…never mind there is no definition attached as to what constitutes “front line troops”…or is it now a divisional strength?
Well, I though that the US made only 20,000 AFVs in 1944.
Well, you were wrong…and were also wrong about the German production claims you made, which you carefully skirted.
I read that the US spent 42 billion dollars in all types of munitions in 1944. Is that correct?
No, it is not. First, what constitutes “all types of munitions”? Is that ordnance and ammunition production only? Does that exclude then shipbuilding and aircraft construction? Does it include the Manhattan Project?
Well, since 2.1 billion is 5% of 42 billion and ~2.5% of 85 billion (total military outlays of the US), and tanks consisted in 7% of Ger's munition production in 1944. Since ger's war expenditure was 110 billion in 1944, 2 billion is about 1.8% of that, then in 1944 we can conclude that tanks consumed a smaller part of Ger's resources than US's.
No again, total defense expenditure (what is a “military outlay”?) of the US in 1944 was $90.9-billion, of which War Department expenditures totaled $49.2-billion, including procurement expenditure of $36.9-billion.

I would be curious as to where you are drawing your figures from for German expenditures and what they actually constitute?
If they had the manpower and fuel, they wouldn't have lost these AFVs. With manpower to thick the front lines and prevent retreats and fuel to make the tanks move when they retreat, I think that these losses would not have happened. So, the fact is that armour casualties would have been smaller in 1944 had Ger have fuel and manpower. Hence, the need to produce more armour was derived from lack of manpower and fuel. With means that lack of manpower and fuel were bigger elements of ger's defeat in ww2 than munitions.
Yep, you’re of the “if they don’t shoot holes in them they aren’t really lost” school of military history.

And if pigs had wings they could fly.

BTW, I “think” that the majority of those “ger tanks” were lost because they were out of fuel because the Germans were retreating, having had their defenses in France irreparably ruptured by the Allied assault. And that was occasioned by them having committed about 1,959 Panzer, StuG, and JgPz to 27 July while having lost as write offs 486 and having about 900 out of action for short and long-term repair due to damage and breakdowns.
Germany did not mobilize to a greater degree than any other country. The USSR "outmobilized" then all. But yes, Ger did "outmobilize" the US. However this "outmobilization" was not reflected in munitions production because Ger spent a smaller proportion of the resources mobilized for war in munitions. In fact, the US had a GNP of 190 billion US$ in 1943 and spent 38 billion in munitions, about 20% of the GNP. Ger spent 11 billion RM in munitions in 1941, out of a GNP of 140 billion RM, about 8% of Ger's GNP.
Sorry, but no, the Soviet Union mobilized to an equal degree as Germany, by 1942, but Germany matched the Soviet Union in 1943 and probably exceeded them in 1944.

You seem to be very selectively using Harrison and Tooze.
The USSR inflicted 20 times the casualties that the US inflicted on Ger.[
You have evidence of that I’m sure…
I think that it can be argued that the western fronts concentrated more munitions per man than the eastern front. So a single casualty in the western front was more costly than in the eastern front. So we can go from the 85% to 80% in terms of total proportion of damage to Ger.
So now the goalpost is “cost per casualty”?

Sorry, out of time…later. This is going to be fun.
:lol:

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Re: German vs. Allied technology

Post by RichTO90 » 14 Dec 2009 19:25

Guaporense wrote:Ask Dupuy about that. I think he has good reasons to use there "corrections".
Hard to do, he's been dead since 1995. :? :lol:
Yes, you should not include captured when comparing army performance.
Why? Trevor did...or are you adjusting the definitions to suit your argument? :wink:

Sorry, I really gotta go...later.

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