German vs. Allied war-making potential

[The_Enigma]

Is the performance in war time not the only criterion to speak of a best weapon (if one can speak of a best weapon) ?

No, i would probably the most important factor following reliablity, keeping costs down and ensuring the weapon can do its job is the ability to mass produce them.

For example the Germans (off the top of my head), in a near enough 10 year period built something like 8,000 variants of the MK IV tanks. Constructed around 5-6,000 ( i dont remember which one) of Panthers and around 2,000 Tigers (both variants) during the course of the war. Impressive sounding figures until we look at the likes of the Americans and the Soviets who both were able to produce in excess of 50,000 of their main medium tank of choice. Iirc the British somewhere in the region of 20+ thousand tanks during the war.

That doesnt say anything about the quality of the weapons but to use a silly old phrase quanity has its own quality. So to sum up no i dont feel that a handful of weapons that came late in the war and played little part can be deemed "the best" i.e. the claim made by a poster on the previous page.

[LWD]

I believe that some German tech was better than the Allied counterparts.

I don't think anyone rational can disagree with that if they are being honest

Germany were the masters when it came to Submarines, and if they had had more funding then they would have been able to starve Britain. So in submarines they were superior....

If you except the very late war boats that from what I recal never fired a torpedo in anger then I'm not sure this is completely true. While the German U-boats were very good the US also had some very good subs and used them very effectivly. Indeed US boats were in some ways better suited to the Pacfic and the tropics than at least most of the U-boats. The latter were better suited to the Battle of the Atlantic but that's another matter. As for the Germans being masters of U-boats it's worth noteing that the US submarine campaign was ultimatly successful the German one was not. In part this was due to resources applied but it was also due to the effort the British and US put into ASW. It's far from clear that any reasonoable increase in funding would have allowed the Germans to starve out Britain.

[Guaporense]

If you except the very late war boats that from what I recal never fired a torpedo in anger then I'm not sure this is completely true. While the German U-boats were very good the US also had some very good subs and used them very effectivly. Indeed US boats were in some ways better suited to the Pacfic and the tropics than at least most of the U-boats. The latter were better suited to the Battle of the Atlantic but that's another matter. As for the Germans being masters of U-boats it's worth noteing that the US submarine campaign was ultimatly successful the German one was not. In part this was due to resources applied but it was also due to the effort the British and US put into ASW. It's far from clear that any reasonoable increase in funding would have allowed the Germans to starve out Britain.

German subs sank about 20 million tons of shipping. American subs never sank more than a fraction of that.

The fact is that Japan only made 3-4 million tons of shipping while the US+Britain made nearly 40 million tons, so Germany would have to sunk much more to starve out Britain.

If Germany had 300 U-boats in 1939 they could sank about 10 million tons per year, while Britain had only 16 million tons of shipping, so in less than two years the country would be starved out.

[Graeme Sydney]

German subs sank about 20 million tons of shipping. American subs never sank more than a fraction of that.

I think it's called a 'target rich' environment .

Between '39 and '45 there weren't too many Germany ships of any type on the high seas. A few combat ships tried their luck but were either chased down and sunk or spent their time tucked away in a nice safe German harbour surrounded by a/a. A few merchant ship scurried between Sweden and Germany and a few plied the Baltic but that about it.

Nor were there too many Japanese ships between SE Asia and the Japanese mainland by the end of '44. The reason been that the American subs had sunk them all .

[bf109 emil]

German subs sank about 20 million tons of shipping. American subs never sank more than a fraction of that.

they never had to and on a percentage scale American subs sank a higher percent of IJN shipping then did KM of the Allies

The fact is that Japan only made 3-4 million tons of shipping while the US+Britain made nearly 40 million tons, so Germany would have to sunk much more to starve out Britain.

something Germany should have thought out a little more prior to making war and declaring it upon the USA!

If Germany had 300 U-boats in 1939 they could sank about 10 million tons per year, while Britain had only 16 million tons of shipping, so in less than two years the country would be starved out.

Yes and if Britain had 300 more destroyers a lot more U-boats would have rested on the bottom of the sea

Well, them the best weapon of the war was the K98k

a bolt action rifle?? the M1 Garand was far superior to the K98

[LWD]

German subs sank about 20 million tons of shipping. American subs never sank more than a fraction of that.

they never had to and on a percentage scale American subs sank a higher percent of IJN shipping then did KM of the Allies

US subs also sunk and damaged a signifigant number of warships. While the U-boats also got a few I doubt they had anywhere hear the impact on any of the allied navies that the US subs had on the IJN. Indeed British subs got several major Japanese combatants as well as U-boats over the course of the war.

[Kelvin]

I believe that some German tech was better than the Allied counterparts. Germany were the masters when it came to Submarines, and if they had had more funding then they would have been able to starve Britain. So in submarines they were superior.

In small arms fire, the Germans had the Mauster 98, which many believe was a reliable gun, even if it only held 5 rounds. the Germans did not believe in rapid fire anyway, and were told to fire all 5 rounds, but not to reload fast and fire again like the British were taught to do. The MP-40 was a good gun. It had stoppages a lot and was inaccurate, but then so was the Thompson and Sten guns used by the Americans and British. The Germans had a good machine gun (MG-42) but it became scarce as the war went on.

In planes, the Germans were disadvantaged. The British had the Spitfire at the start of the war, which was superior to the German Messerschmidt at that time. And although the Germans did upgrade that plane so it was superior to a spitfire eventually, the American Thunderbolts, Mustangs and Lightnings were better. It was only because of the skill and courage of the German aircrews in their planes that they survived for so long.

German did build an aircraft carrier and her name is " Graf Zeppelin " The ship launched in Dec 1938 and never completed.





In technological aspect, US M-1 was superior anyway. But German rifles were obsloete but German infantry main firepower was from machine gun. MG was their main weapon in small unit action and rifles only secondary. And German MG 34 and 42 was more superior than any allied MG. The number of MG in German infantry battalion even more than US infantry battalion in 1960's.

I think that the Germans being superior in submarines is irrelevant,because the Allies did not wage a U Boat war against Germany;you could also say that the allies were better in aircraft carriers,but that is wrongthe Germas did not built nor used aircraft carriers .

[Kelvin]

German at least try it and build the aircraft carrier but just incompleted. But the role played by carrier in the European war is less important for Germany and Italy. Italy already had an unsinkable carrier in the Meditterean : Sicily and Sardinia and German airbases existed throughtout Europe. On the other hand, aircraft carrier played an vital role in the Pacific war because the relatively huge size of the Pacific battlefield.

On the other hand, USA like Germany launched submarine warfare against Japan and succeeded in cutting off most of Japan 's supply. Oil from Dutch East Indies which Japan occupied it in 1942, hardly reached Japanese homeland. But the failure of Japan in ASW is her neglect of ASW in prewar period and too focus on sea battles.

Of course, lack of seapower superiority made any hegemony in Europe for Germany and in Asia for Japan unlikely. Just like Stalin talked to British envoy prior to Barbarossa in Moscow : Physical impossibility of German hegemony in Europe because she did not have necessary seapower.

[Guaporense]

Of course, lack of seapower superiority made any hegemony in Europe for Germany and in Asia for Japan unlikely. Just like Stalin talked to British envoy prior to Barbarossa in Moscow : Physical impossibility of German hegemony in Europe because she did not have necessary seapower.

However, Germany made more warships than Britain during the war in terms of tonnage. In 1943 Germany made 320,000 tons of warships and Britain made only 174,000 tons.

With full resources to production of warships Germany could make 500,000 tons per year, in 2-3 years the Kriegsmarine would be a match for the RN. Since at the start of the war Germany had only 270.000 tons of warships and the RN had 1.5 million tons.

[phylo_roadking]

In 1943 Germany made 320,000 tons of warships and Britain made only 174,000 tons.

I think you may have missed a zero or two in there - from Poston's British War Production http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/U ... ion-6.html

Naval programmes and naval output accordingly expanded throughout 1942 and 1943. Indeed 1943 was the year in which the naval shipbuilding effort in the United Kingdom was at its highest. The average amount of naval tonnage under construction throughout the year was over 1.7 million tons, a far higher figure than that reached during the previous war years

The need for aircraft carriers was to be mainly satisfied by auxiliary and, above all, by light fleet carriers. The former—essentially escort vessels—were little more than fast merchantmen converted to carry a small number of aircraft. Their provision therefore depended very largely on the supplies of fast merchantmen, and they were mostly to come from the United States. In so far as they were to be provided from British sources their story is closely interwoven with that of the repair and conversion of merchant ships, and will be mentioned again later. On the other hand, the light fleet carriers were specially designed and fully-equipped aircraft carriers suitable both for escort duty and service with the fleet. They were sometimes described as 'intermediate' in that they were less slow and helpless in combat then the auxiliary carriers but small than the large fleet carriers and therefore enjoyed the advantage of easier and speedier construction. The minimum period they took to build was two years compared with the minimum of three years for a large fleet carrier. They were therefore to form a large and ever-increasing part of naval programmes for the rest of the war and were to be given priority over cruiser, battleships and even over large carriers. Four light fleet carriers were ordered in the spring of 1942, and twelve more by the end of the year. Of these sixteen, ten were actually laid down by January 1943 and were expected to come into service in late 1944 and 1945.

The shipyard capacity for larger ships thus came to be mainly engaged on aircraft carriers. There was however no question now of enlarging it at the expense of smaller ships as had seemed possible at the turn of 1941 and 1942. In the course of 1942 the need for escort and anti-submarine ships of every kind was becoming more and not less urgent than before. In June the enemy attacks on shipping in the Atlantic reached their highest point, and losses of merchant shipping and of escort vessels were exceptionally and alarmingly large. Moreover the expectations of American supplies had to be drastically lowered. Now that the United States were at war and their shipping routes were everywhere under direct attack ,they proceeded to divert to their own use most of the escort ships they were building for Britain. The War Cabinet and the Admiralty were thus compelled to revive and to reinforce the earlier emphasis on Britain's own output of small vessels. Towards the end of the summer of 1942 the Naval Staff estimated the minimum requirements of ocean-going escort vessels at 1,050, but in October of that year only 445 such vessels were available and of these about 100 were old destroyers of 1914–15 vintage. The deficiency was great, and at current rates of production and losses it threatened to be persistent as well as high; it was estimated at 352 by the end of 1944 even if American assignments were honoured in full. Additions therefore had to be made to British production programmes for every type of small vessel capable of escorting merchant ships or of fighting the submarine—minesweepers, sloops, corvettes, frigates, and, above all, destroyers

The building of destroyers was to be continued to the limit of capacity. But even at its maximum the supply of destroyers could make a relatively small contribution to the problem as a whole. Under the wartime 'emergency' programmes there were by the end of 1941 some 118 destroyers in various stages of construction. To these in the course of 1942 there were added forty-two, of which sixteen were larger fleet destroyers of new design and of much increased anti-aircraft firepower. During 1942, seventy-five destroyers were completed and some 107 were still in hand at the beginning of 1943. An additional forty-three were authorised, even though the capacity of the shipyards was so full engaged that there was very little change of their being laid down or being completed before the end of the war

In fact - between the 1st of January and the 31st of December 1943 - Britain's shipyards launched naval vessels totalling 316,112 tons...and that's JUST ships launched; there was another 1.3 million tons in through-production (ships laid down and a-building but not to be completed until 1944/45) in 1943...

And in addition to all THAT - Britain ALSO built (completed) 1.3 MILLION tons of landing craft in 1943 alone, 5,400 of them.

[Guaporense]

I am talking about warships. Britain made 170.000 tons of warships in 1943, while Germany made twice.

This 1.7 million tons includes a loot of stuff.

For comparison the US made 1.07 million tons of warships in 1944, and the US made much more ships than Britain.

[Guaporense]

Thats the numbers of Britain for YA:

Warships, thousands of tons

1941 - 226
1942 - 234
1943 - 174
1944 - 171

Germany made more tonnage of Submarines than UK made of all types of warships.

This 1.7 million tons is 90% made of cargo ships, to replace the losses inflicted by U-Boats.

[phylo_roadking]

Did you actually READ what I posted and check the reference???

In fact - between the 1st of January and the 31st of December 1943 - Britain's shipyards launched naval vessels totalling 316,112 tons...

...and that's JUST complete NAVAL ships sent out of yards in 1943...

Shall I prove it with a SCREEN PRINT? Can you add?



...really too wide for this forum's settings, but you can plainly see that the half yearly totals for COMPLETE ships alone are 124,257 tons and 191,855tons....making 316,112 tons. Nearly TWICE your figure...

And THAT is just for *completed* vessels...

What was more surprising than the delays in 1942 is that in 1943 the rate of completion rose, delays shortened and output improved in spite of the withdrawal of preference. Work in hand rose sharply as the year 1942 drew to its close, and continued to rise in 1943. The increase was most marked in types of ships for which hulls could be prefabricated—L.C.T.s and corvettes. But the general trend of output also reached its highest point during 1943. Tonnage in hand rose from 1,525,000 tons in January to a peak of 1,953,000 tons in December. The tonnage of naval vessels completed rose to 316,000 tons, and the disparity between expectations and fulfilment was now narrower than ever before.

So, now that you have authoritative, sourced figures for British production in 1943 -

2. Claims and Proof

The sixth rule of the forum is: "When quoting from a book or site, please provide info on the source (and a link if it is a website)."

If a poster raises a question about the events, other posters may answer the question with evidence. If a poster stops asking questions and begins to express a point of view, he then becomes an advocate for that viewpoint. When a person becomes an advocate, he has the burden of providing evidence for his point of view. If he has no evidence, or doesn't provide it when asked, it is reasonable for the reader to conclude that his opinion or viewpoint is uninformed and may fairly be discounted or rejected.

Also, undocumented claims undercut the research purposes of this section of the forum. Consequently, it is required that proof be posted along with a claim. The main reason is that proof, evidence, facts, etc. improve the quality of discussions and information.

...isn't it about time you told us where your incorrect figures were sourced? You've avoided doing so so far.

[Mark V]

With full resources to production of warships Germany could make 500,000 tons per year, in 2-3 years the Kriegsmarine would be a match for the RN.

Huh,

I don't think so. It is entirely different matter to mass produce Type VII submarines than finding the yard space, turbine/armour/gearing/heavy naval rifles manufacturing capability for balanced naval construction. Remember that U-boat construction actually suited well to German strenghts. Per ton submarines are much more expensive than surface vessels, suiting better for high quality, low volume production style of German yards. They did make absolutely the best high rpm 4-stroke Diesel engines, for U-boats, E-boats, and other small vessels. Germany was leading country in optical equipment. They held such huge lead in U-boat general design at the end of WW1, that their future enemies were uncapable to surpass them, also Germans did clandestinely design boats for foreign countries, keeping the core knowledge through the lean years.

But that is only for U-boat warfare. For every advantage Germans held in that area, there was half dozen points where they lacked gravely in surface combatant designs.

Also. Britain had Mexican, Venezuelan, US, Iranian, Iraqi, (and till 1942 Burmese and DEI) oil wells - about 80% or so of the world oil production (almost all of the rest being in Soviet Union) available to supply the heavy fuel oil for their navy. Germany had smallish Romanian, and Austrian oil wells - would the Kriegsmarine had rowed their new fleet of battleships to combat ??

Germany was midget in naval construction other than U-boats, and would remain so. If they would had actually got any Z-plan vessels afloat, Brit naval designers (and all designers of any competent navy maintaining country - like US and Japan) would had been in danger of bursted blood vessel by laughter - over the gross mismanagement of ship tonnage in those vessels. Germany had lost their once respectable ability to design and build surface combatants.

Regards

[bf109 emil]

I am talking about warships. Britain made 170.000 tons of warships in 1943, while Germany made twice.

This 1.7 million tons includes a loot of stuff.

For comparison the US made 1.07 million tons of warships in 1944, and the US made much more ships than Britain.

Canada made more then the 1.7 million tons then Germany did...348 10,000 ton cargo ships =3.48 million tons in cargo ships alone during the war as well as

Shipping & Ship Building
After the fall of France in May 1940, it became a priority to enlarge the Allies merchant shipping fleet, to replace ships lost, and to make sure that there were naval escort vessels to guard convoys against German submarines. Britain was highly vulnerable, and North American arms and supplies were a lifeline.

Canada in 1940 had just started to build patrol vessels for the protection of its own coasts, but Britain soon placed orders for 26 ten-thousand-tonne cargo ships and soon after orders for naval escorts and minesweepers. This was just the beginning, as Britain made clear it needed Canada to build as many naval and merchant ships as it possibly could. The practically non-existent Canadian interwar shipbuilding industry - three shipyards employing fewer than 4,000 men - expanded to 90 plants on the East and West Coasts, the Great Lakes and even inland. More than 126,000 men and women were employed.

* Canadian shipyards built 4,047 naval vessels
* Built 300 anti-submarine warships
* 4 Tribal class destroyers
* 410 cargo ships

At its wartime peak in September 1943, the industry was able to deliver the ten-thousand-tonne SS Fort Romaine in a stunning 58 days from the start of construction.

There were 348, ten thousand-ton, merchant ships built in Canada during the war. Large and relatively slow, but reliable and easily adapted to a variety of cargoes, these ships and those who sailed on them ensured the delivery of much of Canada’s war production.

* During 1941, the first of the large 10,000 ton merchant ships were taking an average of 307 days to build (and up to 426 days in one case). One year later, average production time had dropped to 163 days (with one ship being produced in a record 112 days).
* Some 57,000 individuals were employed in merchant shipbuilding and a further 27,000 worked in naval shipbuilding, which included building vessels like destroyers, frigates, corvettes, and minesweepers.