German vs. Allied war-making potential

[ljadw]

That's assuming that he could win the war in 1940-1941,what I am doubting

[bf109 emil]

He takes this ratio, 16% (Germany) vs 48% (USA) as a measure of military efficiency proved by the results achieved in the 1940 & 1941 campaigns.

IMHO 16 % seems low, considering Germany quote The General character of the economic system which the Nazi conspirators and their collaborators among the militarists organized and developed in the years from 1933 to the outbreak of the war in 1939 has been well described in the speeches and writings of Gen. Georg Thomas. During the period in question, General Thomas occupied the position of Chief of the Military Economy staff in the Reich war industry. This position made him a key figure in the Nazi economy, and he became one of the chief organizers of the German rearmament effort.....from documents taken from Nuremberg one has to question why a figure of only 16% of Germany's economy was war material based when their economy from this 33 page document clearly defines Germany's economic position reverting early and in a greater % to rearmament.http://library2.lawschool.cornell.edu/d ... _13_05.pdf

also from page 5/6 of this 46 page text shows Germany's economy was ramped up to the point that she could and would defeat Europe a) The extent of German rearmament was of such
magnitude that it ennbled Germany to crush the whole
military might of the European continent within about
one year. From this very feet it follows that those
who created a Garmen economic machine capable of sustaining
economically such military performance cannot
claim innocence in regard to aggressive intent.
b) By military and economic planners and masterminds
an instrument was being forged capable of cnrrying
out aggressive warfare", and put at the disposal of
Hitler. All those involved in the developmont of this
war machine knew perfectly well that according to Nazi
doctrine and in view of the Fuehrer principle, Hitler
could make use of this instrument, without any checks on
his decisions, for aggressive purposes as well as for
defense. Consequently, while the conspirators might
claim that they themselves did not contemplate nor approve
of aggressive warfare, they must admit that their own
presently claimed lack of aggressive tendencies could not
prevent the use of the finished war machine for aggressive
purposes.
c) The final argument against this line of defense
will have to center in the fact that the finished war
machine was actually used for territorial expansion
through threat of aggressive war (Austria, Czechoslovakia)
as well as for aggressive warfare from 1 September 1939 on.
more here http://library2.lawschool.cornell.edu/d ... _13_06.pdf

[takata_1940]

IMHO 16 % seems low, considering Germany quote [...] from documents taken from Nuremberg one has to question why a figure of only 16% of Germany's economy was war material based when their economy from this 33 page document clearly defines Germany's economic position reverting early and in a greater % to rearmament.
also from page 5/6 of this 46 page text shows Germany's economy was ramped up to the point that she could and would defeat Europe [...]

No no. It is not 16% of Germany's economy.
What Guaporense wrote was about German Military spending:
Out of 71 billion RM spent for 'War' in 1941, only 15% (10.85 billion RM) was 'military outlays' (munitions).
I'm not discussing the figure quoted at this point.

On the other hand, 71 billion RM for 'War' out of a total outlay of 152 billion for Germany is 46.7% Military spendings in 1941. What seems obvious is the modicity of the military outlay --pointed by Guaporense-- against the total spent for 'War'. It is hard to say where the remaining 60 billion RM were spent without a detailed balance of Military spendings.

Other figures for 1941 German Industry in net output by industry group are showing in percent of the total:
- armament: 16%
- basic goods: 25%
- construction goods: 13%
- other invest. goods: 18%
- consumer goods: 28%
[Petzina (1968) p.187]

Which doesn't mean that armament output (16%) was the only one to be retained for war spendings. A table, showing the percentage of the workforce employed in 1941 German Industry on orders for the armed forces, is giving:
- all industries: 54.5%
- raw materials: 63.2%
- manufacturing: 68.8%
- construction: 53.8%
- consumer goods: 27.8%
the total shows an increase of 149 % vs 1939.
[Overy (1994) p.294]

Both table are taken from Harrisson (1998) p.153

S~
Olivier

[Guaporense]

That shows spectacular levels of ignorance of the French campaign in 1940 (BTW the BEF was not destroyed ) and in the NW Europe campaign the Germans lost 1.5 million men within eight months of fighting the Western Allies and Milton Shulman places at least another 1.5. Million men lost in the east.

1- You don't engage in my arguments. I said that manpower and fuel were greater problems to the German war effort than munitions. I didn't say that munitions production was not important, I only said that there were other more important aspects to the outcome of the conflict.

2- Fighting in 1940 in the western front was far more intense than in 1944. In 40 days in 1940, Ger lost 160,000 men killed and wounded. In nearly 180 days of 1944, Ger lost 250,000 men killed and wounded (plus 340,000 missing, with put total casualties in 1944 in the western front to about 600,000). Also, the average Ger soldier in 1940 was much better trained than in 1944. So, I terms of combat, I think that France was inflicting much more damage per day to the wehrmacht in 1940 than the western allies did in 1944.

Arguing about the loss of a few hundred tanks for the loss of the French army shows no thought put into the strategic decissions contemplated and executed by both sides, the weakness of the French politically and soccially, not to mention the issues of morale.

1- The French army was larger than the Anglo-American army in 1944. I think that we could consider then more powerful too.

2- The difference between 1940 and 1944 in France was this: In 1940 we had 3.30 million allied soldiers vs 3.35 million German soldiers. While in 1944 we had 2 million allied soldiers vs 750,000 German soldiers. Manpower explains everything in the European theater, i.e: when the Germans had numerical parity, they win, when the allies outnumber the Germans by 2 to 1, we have stalemate, and when the allies outnumber the Germans 3 to 1, the allies win.

That question founders when you look at the rest of the war...The Germans lost practically everyone of the 2,500 AFV they could muster and send to Normandy, they lost another 600 in the Ardennes battle alone; at least 3,000 AFV in six months? Just how many divisions did the Germans destroy in the west in those six months to compensate for such huge losses?

1- Ger made about 10,000 - 12,000 AFV in the second half of 1944, more than the US. Sure, the US dedicated a smaller proportion of their war production to AFVs, but I think that German AFV production was quite adequate.

2- And in 1944 the budget for AFVs was 2 billion RM, of about 110 billion RM war budget.

3- Many of the lost AFV in 1944 were abandoned in retreats and for lack of fuel.
l

Rambling about how the Americans won via technological power ignores how all sides strived to build better and greater things to give them the edge.

1- I never said that the US won via technological power, I said that technology and munitions played a larger part of their military doctrines than in Germany. That is explained by their greater allocation of war resources to munitions.

2- If I needed to say why the US won, I would say: The US won because they were on the side of the USSR.

3- War on multiple fronts? Well, in the Eastern front Ger lost about 85% of their men. All other fronts were quite insignificant if compared to that single front.

Also, Germany outproduced all other powers in the production of ammunition. While in equipment, both the USSR and the US outproduced Germany. That difference can be explained by the fact that the Germans fired their guns a loot more while the allied tanks and aircraft were blow up a loot more.

That is quite true:

In the 16 months of 1944-1945, the allies lost 50,000 tanks, while Ger lost 13,000. Sources: Krivoshev for USSR afvs, a guy from WW2F for the anglo-american losses and a guy from Dupuy Institute foruns for German losses.

In 1944 Ger made 280 million rounds of ground artillery ammunition, while the USSR made 95 million. While for tanks and SP guns, Ger made 22,000 and the USSR made about 29,000. Sources: http://www.sturmvogel.orbat.com/SovWarProd.html for ammunition and why the allies won for the tanks figures.

Well, I can argue that WW2 truly finished Europe off as the center of the world. In 1938 Europe's GDP was a larger proportion of the global economy than ever after.

A completly different argument than you started with. You said the war crippled the economy of Europe forever - not that it displaced the European market as the "centre of the world"; something i believe you will find the US took over from Germany - who in turn had took the lead from the UK - a couple of decades before iirc.

Well, I think that WW1 and WW2 truly generated a trend of decline in relative importance and development of the European economy. Before WW1 Europe concentrated most of the global economy. Today Europe consists of about 18/61 = ~29% of the global economy (back in 1910 I would guess that Europe had 60% of the global nominal GDP).

The crippled part refers to the fact the Europe is declining in relative importance, in part because of the two world wars.

A moment ago your argument was the Germans didnt need more industrial muscle they just needed more men who were trained to fight tactically better than their oppoents; now you agree they need industrial might to back them?

1- Your argument was: Industrial muscle determines the winner.

2- I pointed out that my previous argument about the damage done on the European economy by the blockade reduced Europe's industrial muscle. And I pointed out that there were more significant problems to the German war effort than lack of munitions. I cut your argument by both sides.

Considering Germany, was by the end of the war, at war with pracitcally the entire world - what market could they draw on?

Well, my point was that lack of access to global markets did have a major negative impact on the outcome of the war.

How about the resilience of the Soviet Union not just their army; their ability to call on more manpower, their ability to call upon more industrial power, their ability to adapt to the situation and inflict crushing defeats upon the German army that caused overall more damage that the German attacks did. The key point - with more manpower and industrial might the other nations were able to absorb the blows the Germans dealt and hit back; something on the whole the Germans could not do.

The USSR didn't have much industrial might. They produced 8.5 million tons of steel in 1943, while Germany produced 31 million. Ger had much more industrial might than either Britain and the USSR, however, they produced less munitions than the sum of both. That happened because their industrial might could not be utilized because raw materials had to be imported and couldn't and because their war budget was less focused on munitions.

What the USSR had that Ger didn't have was manpower might and natural resources.

Considering you said that the loss of an outside market was one of the major reasons for defeat for the Germans; how would having that access - to who do you envision them having access to - combat this resilient army that came back from the brink and defeated the Germans after they had gave it their all and had not destroyed them?

With access to the global markets, Europe's economy would be less hurt by the war. France in particular. With an economy integrated with the world, Europe's could pay more taxes to Ger, and Ger could pay for more soldiers in the front.

[Guaporense]

What Guaporense meant was unrelated to the value of the Reichsmark vs dollar (or whatever), but an analysis of the war spending ratio between "munition" and "non munition" war goods inside German (1941) and US (1943) war economy. He takes this ratio, 16% (Germany) vs 48% (USA) as a measure of military efficiency proved by the results achieved in the 1940 & 1941 campaigns.

Not I don't.

I said the Ger focused less on munitions and more on other aspects of the military machine. And what was more lacking in Ger war effort was not munitions, it was fuel and manpower. So I can even say that German production of munitions should have been smaller than historically, to free resources to other uses.

Without discussing the detailed figure computed for both countries, because one may find that the German total war spending for 1941 was much higher than 71 billion RM, making the 16% ratio even smaller, the real question is to ask if such a figure is relevant with any relative "efficiency" as presented by Guaporense?

Higher than 71 billion RM? I have two figures for 1941: 55 billion RM and 71 billion RM.

. 1941: Germany spent 100 points in her war machine and achieved 16 (or less) in munition output.
. 1943: USA spent 100 points in her war machine and achieved 48 in munition output.
Question: who was the more efficient of both?

That is wrong on every level. Because my figures were about expenditures of munitions! They weren't about the relationship between output of munitions and expenditure on munitions.

Now, Guaporense introduced a new criterium of "war efficiency", stating that, with such a low munition output, Germany destroyed a lot of enemy divisions: 150 in the 1940 Western front and 240 in the 1941 Eastern front; consequently Germany needed no more munitions because she emphasized the élan of her troops rather than high munition output. As the USA put the emphasize on munition output but was unable to achieve such a scale of victories, Germany was much more "war efficient" than the USA.

Of course.

Nontheless, he didn't noticed that both 1940 & 1941 campaigns ended with a complete strategical failure as
neither UK nor USSR were defeated, which implied that Germany was finaly doomed.

Germany was doomed because they fought against 400 million people and were a nation of 80 million, however they succeeded in occupying 200 million people. That would be like the US occupying 750 million people.

As for a comparison of the scale of victories, once it is taken into account the geography factors opposed to the USA for waging a victorious war in Europe and the reality of the 1944 battlefields vs the 1940-1941 period, one will not underate the real scale of the total Allied victory against Germany.

The US troops had to face at most 50 understrength undertrained and undersupplied German divisions with 13 year old boys. That was Pyrrhic victory all the way! Considering that, their battlefield results to their production of munitions tell a history of complete inefficiency in war. For comparison, France had to face 150 full strength, fully trained and decently supplied German divisions.

The allied victory against Germany was paid with the price of 40 million death.

What is total victory about that?

WW1 and WW2 were Pyrrhic victories for the allies.

[LWD]

... 2- Fighting in 1940 in the western front was more intense than in 1944. In 40 days in 1940, Ger lost 160,000 men killed and wounded. In nearly 180 days of 1944, Ger lost 250,000 men killed and wounded (plus 340,000 missing, with put total casualties in 1944 in the western front to about 600,000). Also, the average Ger soldier in 1940 was much better trained than in 1944.

The Germans were also on the offencive in 1940 and the defencive in 44. That makes a fair amount of difference. Then there are the logistics impacts of fighting next to or in your home country vs across the channel or ocean.

1- The French army was larger than the Anglo-American army in 1944. I think that we could consider then more powerful too.

Why?

2- The difference between 1940 and 1944 in France was this: In 1940 we had 3.30 million allied soldiers vs 3.35 million German soldiers. While in 1944 we had 2 million allied soldiers vs 750,000 German soldiers.

That's hardly the only difference or even the most important one.

That question founders when you look at the rest of the war...The Germans lost practically everyone of the 2,500 AFV they could muster and send to Normandy, they lost another 600 in the Ardennes battle alone; at least 3,000 AFV in six months? Just how many divisions did the Germans destroy in the west in those six months to compensate for such huge losses?

1- Ger made about 10,000 - 12,000 AFV in the second half of 1944, more than the US.

1) This is irrelevan to the quote above.
2) What's your point? By late 44 the US was all ready scaling back it's production because it was realized that more wasn't needed.

2- And in 1944 the budget for AFVs was 2 billion RM, of about 110 billion RM war budget.
3- Many of the lost AFV in 1944 were abandoned in retreats and for lack of fuel.

and your point is?

1- I never said that the US won via technological power, I said that technology and munitions played a larger part of their military doctrines than in Germany. That is explained by their greater allocation of war resources to munitions.

Care to expand on this a bit? I'm especially interested in the part where muntions play a lesser part in German doctrine than they do in US doctrine. I defintly like to see any documentation that supports this.

2- If I needed to say why the US won, I would say: The US won because they were on the side of the USSR.

You do like being wrong don't you?

3- War on multiple fronts? Well, in the Eastern front Ger lost about 85% of their men. All other fronts were quite insignificant if compared to that single front.

Documentation PLS.

... In the 16 months of 1944-1945, the allies lost 50,000 tanks, while Ger lost 13,000.

Source PLS.

In 1944 Ger made 280 million rounds of ground artillery ammunition, while the USSR made 95 million. While for tanks and SP guns, Ger made 22,000 and the USSR made about 29,000.

Source PLS.

[LWD]

...
Germany was doomed because they fought against 400 million people and were a nation of 80 million,

Then why were the Finns were able to fight the Soviets to a standstill (ie won)? Maybe the Germans weren't outnumbered enough.

however they succeeded in occupying 200 million people. That would be like the US occupying 750 million people.

??? I could be technical and claim that you don't occupy people you occupy territory. It's worth noteing that the British in India and the Japanese in China probalby occupied territiory with a higher ratio of population to their own than Germany did. Not sure what your point is in all this however.

The US troops had to face at most 50 understrength undertrained and undersupplied German divisions with 13 year old boys.

Your characterization is badly flawed.

That was Pyrrhic victory all the way!

I suggest you don't know what a Pyrrhic victory is.

Considering that, their battlefield results to their production of munitions tell a history of complete inefficiency in war.

If you choose a wierd enough deffintion perhpas. But not for any rational defintion.

For comparison, France had to face 150 full strength, fully trained and decently supplied German divisions.

Not a vary good comparison when you leave out so many important factors.

The allied victory against Germany was paid with the price of 40 million death.

What is total victory about that?

Nazi Germany ceased to exist. That's pretty total.

WW1 and WW2 were Pyrrhic victories for the allies.

As a whole this is fallacious. One can make a case for it being true to some extent for some of the allies. For some however it was anything but.

[Guaporense]

The Germans were also on the offencive in 1940 and the defencive in 44. That makes a fair amount of difference. Then there are the logistics impacts of fighting next to or in your home country vs across the channel or ocean.

So? The fact remains: In 1940 Ger applied 85% of their army in the western front, in 1944, it was less than 25%.

Why?

Because they had over 100 divisions while the americans had 60 divisions in europe by 1945. I think that 100 french divisions are better than 60 american.

That's hardly the only difference or even the most important one.

Numbers are the most important aspect of war. Especially the number of soldiers.

and your point is?

That lack of AFVs was not the biggest problem in the German war effort.

Care to expand on this a bit? I'm especially interested in the part where muntions play a lesser part in German doctrine than they do in US doctrine. I defintly like to see any documentation that supports this.

That is quite obvious? Isn't it?

That munitions figure is quite an clue too, i.e.: the fact that the US allocated a much larger proportion of their military expenditures to the production of munitions.

The americans always thought in technological terms: How many airplanes to win war x. That was quite obvious.

You do like being wrong don't you?

Well, the USSR infliced 89.1% of Geman combat casualties between 07/1940 and 12/1944 while the US inflicted about 4-5% (sources: Das Heer 1933-1945 and extrapolation for the proportion of US casualties in the fronts were US troops fought). The USSR engaged 90% of the German frontline troops between 1941 and june 1944. (Source: Harrison (1988).) While the US engaged at most, 15% at the time of the battle of the bulge. (Source: Glantz, extrapolated from proportion of americans in the western front). I can say that the military contributions of the US to the allies were as significant as the military contributions of Italy to the Axis. The most important contributions of the US were economical, i.e.: Lend-Lease.

[Guaporense]

ohh!... and what happened to this mighty German army when it reached the Channel coast in 1940?
Here, the nazi just realized that they were short of every means necessary to finish off the British because they had neither the amphibious equipment, neither the fleet or U-Boote, neither an adequate airforce in order to wage a war accross 20 km of hostile sea. At this time, they had all the manpower they needed, about 2.000.000 useless troops, and a great abundance of fuel as they nearly doubled all their fuel stock from the captured French oil reserves. So, they could have paid a full year hollidays to most of their armed force (at French/Belgium/Holland/Poland expenses), sat on top of their milion tons of raw materials and armament captured from the defeated power, in order to watch their aiforce being wasted in the British sky.

The failure to defeat Britain was caused by the failure to predict the victory over France.

If they knew how and when France would be defeated and the strategic position of Germany in June 1940, they would have allocated more resources to the production of munitions necessary for an successful invasion of Britain, they needed adequate landing craft and a few thousand more bombers, to destroy the RN.

And, by the way, the Battle of Britain was completely wasteful and irrelevant to the outcome of ww2.

In fact, they produced less materiel than they needed when it was critical for them to have more (in 1940-1942) and they still had the ressource to use it at this time, in manpower and fuel. It was just impossible to develop quickly enough what was lacking (amphibious means, strategical aircraft, long range fighters) or to produce much more than what was planned at the time (naval ships, U-boote, tanks, trucks, etc.).

So, how do you explain the low expenditure on munitions? They were expending everything that they could? Well, that means that Ger had a very small industry in proportion to the domestic economy.

The reason why Germany had so few tanks in 1940 wasn't because she didn't need more of them, but because she couldn't produce everything she needed at the same time at this stage of the war.

Tank production consisted of 2% of munition production in 1941. And munition production was 15% of total military outlays. Tank production was an insignificant part of german war effort until 1943.

[Guaporense]

This is kind silly again to compare what it is not comparable. What you are saying is that the German soldiers were better paid than US troops (I'd like to see how it is computed)

No, I am only saying that Germany spent more money on non munition items, while the US spent more money on munitions.

The reason why global comparisons on expenditures between US and Germany are meaningless is because the prime factor behind each country war strategy was the Geography!

Sure, it was an important factor. That's why the US could only maintain 60 divisions in Europe in 1944, while a much smaller country like France could maintain over 100.

But, the US had a long war strategy, were they accumulated massive stocks of munitions to use in attrition warfare. While Ger had a strategy for producing munitions only when they were needed in the present. For example, they didn't produce munitions necessary to invade Britain before conquering France because they failed to predict their need before. They started pumping tanks in large quantities in 1943 because they lost many tanks in 1942. They started pumping 3,000 fighters per month in 1944, because they lost many fighters in 1943. Ger had a completely retarded munition production strategy.

The USA had to wage war in Europe at 3,500 miles from its East coast and in the Pacific at 6,000 miles from its West coast! It is not difficult to understand that sea powers cannot wage war overseas like a continental power which is like a spider in the middle of its web. Keeping all the world's oceans safe for tens of thousands of vital merchant ships, protected by thousands of naval vessels relying on hundreds of sea bases accross the globe, to be feed and fully manned, will certainly need some extra money in comparison to the infantry/armor strength deployed on the battlefield. Even the airforce cannot fight without all the shipping behind, and the millions of men mobilized to keep it running.

That explains why the USSR was vital for victory: The US simply didn't have the resources to maintain an army of 500 divisions on Europe like the USSR had.

British 6th Army in Egypt barely reached 6 full combat divisions but its LOC extended accross 13,000 miles around Africa to Britain (3 months run) and kept certainly more than 1,5 milion men busy to supply it.

Impressive.

A supply ship in the Pacific could make no more than 3 trips a year as an average. So what? this was costly but USA-Britain could do it until they had a sufficient power able to be projected in Europe, which they did, accross the same chanel that the Germans were unable to cross in 1940... because Germany did not have the means to produce the necessary equipment, whatever good pay and elan the German troops had.

If they had 2-3 years they could. They didn't have the time to produce the equipment, or the foresight to produce then in the 30's.

[Michael Kenny]

The US simply didn't have the resources to maintain an army of 500 divisions on Europe like the USSR had.

The US initialy aimed for a 90 Division Army so 500 (or even 100) was never an issue. You should add in the manpower in the USAAF, Marines and Navy to get the full picture. The totals may suprise you.

[The_Enigma]

Thanks LWD

German divisions with 13 year old boys

Now this one has me, at which point did the Western Allied armies encounter 13 year old landser on a regular basis? (and for the love of god do not provide the answer as the 12thSS )

Well, the USSR infliced 89.1% of Geman combat casualties between 07/1940 and 12/1944 while the US inflicted about 4-5% (sources: Das Heer 1933-1945 and extrapolation for the proportion of US casualties in the fronts were US troops fought).

I take it a few extra German divisions were shifted from the Western Front to the Eastern Front between your posts then?
Am curious, how does the Soviet Union manage to kill German soldiers 13 months before the war begins?

The USSR engaged 90% of the German frontline troops between 1941 and june 1944. (Source: Harrison (1988).) While the US engaged at most, 15% at the time of the battle of the bulge. (Source: Glantz, extrapolated from proportion of americans in the western front).

This would be the point where the Anglo-Canadians, with Polish, French, Dutch and Belgian troops were strolling towards Berlin rather bored due to the lack of fighting?

To actually be very serious, and stop being sarcastic (to note the above is mostly sarcasim), how many troops did the Germans pull off the frontline - or turn around from being sent from reserve/training centres in Germany - in the east to send to the west/Italy around December 1944?

If they knew how and when France would be defeated and the strategic position of Germany in June 1940, they would have allocated more resources to the production of munitions necessary for an successful invasion of Britain, they needed adequate landing craft and a few thousand more bombers, to destroy the RN.

Isnt there a little issue of Hitler never wanting to invade the UK in the first place? Was the possability even there for landing craft to be produced at the expense of the surface fleet and U-boat fleet? What surface fleet were they planning on using to keep the Royal Navy at bay? Was there capacity to run up aircraft production to your apparent levels? Would these be redesigned bombers, with better defenses and ability to launch raids agaisnt the main fleet situated up north with payloads of bombs or torps that could threaten the main fleet? Thats allot of questions and what-ifs than a simple they should have just rammed up production...

And, by the way, the Battle of Britain was completely wasteful and irrelevant to the outcome of ww2.

Did it not leave Germany on a two front war and suck its main Ally into war in Africa; ensuring that hundreds of thousands of German troops could not be deployed to the East - later on meaning further troops would have to be deployed in the likes of the Balkans to keep the people under control and await the never coming Allied landings (much like Norway) and overall just drain much needed German resources that could have been used better elsewhere. Did it not mean that the Western Allies were able to proscute the war and launch more and more air raids agaisnt occupied Europe diverting much needed fighter and bomber attention, launch Husky and Overlord etc Did it not cause the Luftwaffe many machines and pilots better used elsewhere? It would seem rather relevent and am pretty sure there are a number of historians that back the UK still being in the war as an important factor.

[RichTO90]

Oh goody, this should be fun, I haven’t seen this argument crop up in a while…

1- You don't engage in my arguments. I said that manpower and fuel were greater problems to the German war effort than munitions. I didn't say that munitions production was not important, I only said that there were other more important aspects to the outcome of the conflict.

2- Fighting in 1940 in the western front was far more intense than in 1944. In 40 days in 1940, Ger lost 160,000 men killed and wounded. In nearly 180 days of 1944, Ger lost 250,000 men killed and wounded (plus 340,000 missing, with put total casualties in 1944 in the western front to about 600,000). Also, the average Ger soldier in 1940 was much better trained than in 1944. So, I terms of combat, I think that France was inflicting much more damage per day to the wehrmacht in 1940 than the western allies did in 1944.

Heer casualties in the French Campaigns (Organizationsabteilung d. Gen,Stb. d. OKH. 6 Feb 45, NARA T78, R414, F3226-3227) were reported as 27,650 KIA, 115,299 WIA, 13,607 MIA for a total of 156,556. Over 42 days that is 3,727.5 per day for the Heer, Waffen SS, and Luftwaffe in Erdkämpf. Luftwaffe losses were significant, but not excessive (for the first war year they were just 6,480 KIA, 1 UNK, 1,196 MIA, and 793 PW, with 1,549 discharged due to wounds). KM losses were negligible in the campaign.

In Normandy to 31 August 1944 Wehrmacht ground forces losses (Heer, Waffen SS, and Luftwaffe in Erdkämpf were at least 288,695. Over 87 days that is 3,318.3 per day. However, it can be shown that at least another 36,751 Wehrmacht casualties were incurred (the difference between reported MIA and Allied reported PW). For the period to 31 October, where the data is more complete, the casualties were 483,742, or 3,268.5.

So a “reduction” in intensity of roughly 11-12.3 percent in exchange for doubling or nearly tripling the length that intensity was incurred? Hmmm?

Or, to look at it another way, the French Army, as gallant as it was, was forced to surrender after 42 days. The U.S. Army continued for a few days longer than that.

1- The French army was larger than the Anglo-American army in 1944. I think that we could consider then more powerful too.

No, the French Armed Forces were somewhat weaker than the US Army, 6.1-million to 6.916-million, but the US Armed Forces included another 2.7-million in the Navy and Marines.

2- The difference between 1940 and 1944 in France was this: In 1940 we had 3.30 million allied soldiers vs 3.35 million German soldiers. While in 1944 we had 2 million allied soldiers vs 750,000 German soldiers. Manpower explains everything in the European theater, i.e: when the Germans had numerical parity, they win, when the allies outnumber the Germans by 2 to 1, we have stalemate, and when the allies outnumber the Germans 3 to 1, the allies win.

Yes, numbers count, but it helps if they are accurate. Ob. West totaled about 1.375 to 1.6-million Wehrmacht troops of different flavors on 1 June 1944.

1- Ger made about 10,000 - 12,000 AFV in the second half of 1944, more than the US. Sure, the US dedicated a smaller proportion of their war production to AFVs, but I think that German AFV production was quite adequate.

What are you smoking? Speer’s Schnellberichte indicates otherwise, but I’m too tired to trot out the figures right now. But I do have the U.S. ones:

Tanks – 9,952
TD – 1,762
Special AFV – 682
AC – 2,158
SP Artillery – 749
SP AAA – 169
Full-Tracked Carriers – 7,335
Total – 22,807

BTW, no half-tracks are included in the figure because the program had been completed in March 1944, after 39,436 had been completed…

2- And in 1944 the budget for AFVs was 2 billion RM, of about 110 billion RM war budget.

Um, so? The U.S. War Department expended $2,094,867,000 on AFV procurement in 1944 delivered from a total procurement expenditure of $36,850,000,000…then there was Department of the Navy procurement and the Maritime Commission procurement…all those ship sand things.

3- Many of the lost AFV in 1944 were abandoned in retreats and for lack of fuel.

There go those damn Allies cheating again. You are of the “if they don’t shoot holes in them they aren’t really lost” school of military history then?

1- I never said that the US won via technological power, I said that technology and munitions played a larger part of their military doctrines than in Germany. That is explained by their greater allocation of war resources to munitions.

Ah, so the Germans depended on stones and sharpened sticks then?

What “greater allocation of resources”? The Germans mobilized to a greater degree than any other country, but that is not quite the same thing. The Americans allocated the resources necessary to win the war and there greater over resource capability allowed them a few luxuries…such as the Manhattan Project.

Horses for courses and all that.

2- If I needed to say why the US won, I would say: The US won because they were on the side of the USSR.

The reverse of that statement is just as true…and just as deserving of a

3- War on multiple fronts? Well, in the Eastern front Ger lost about 85% of their men. All other fronts were quite insignificant if compared to that single front.

Crap. I have some lovely data somewhere to dispute that, but can’t find it right now – too tired. This should be fun though. Back in a few days.

In the 16 months of 1944-1945, the allies lost 50,000 tanks, while Ger lost 13,000. Sources: Krivoshev for USSR afvs, a guy from WW2F for the anglo-american losses and a guy from Dupuy Institute foruns for German losses.

BTW, I’m the guy from the Dupuy Institute forum…

[ljadw]

I think there is some 'exageration ' in the allied tank losses for 1944 -1945 :from panzer archiv by Jan-Hendrik (verluststatistik) :Soviet tank losses :1944 :169OO ,1945 : 8700 ,that should mean 23400 lost tanks for the US and Britain ?

[The_Enigma]

In the 16 months of 1944-1945, the allies lost 50,000 tanks, while Ger lost 13,000. Sources: Krivoshev for USSR afvs, a guy from WW2F for the anglo-american losses and a guy from Dupuy Institute foruns for German losses.

BTW, I’m the guy from the Dupuy Institute forum…

And do you support such statement?

Full-Tracked Carriers – 7,335

Out of interest what type of carriers would these be, arty tractors and the likes?