German vs. Allied war-making potential

Discussions on the economic history of the nations taking part in WW2, from the recovery after the depression until the economy at war.
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takata_1940
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Re: German vs. Allied war-making potential

#676

Post by takata_1940 » 12 Apr 2010, 11:13

Hi Domen,
Domen121 wrote:Takata - if it comes to your grapgs - why numbers on the 1st graph are different than those on the 2nd one?
And where did you find figures on Zgkw stocks in IX 1939?
1st Graph is Lkw + Pkw + Zgkw (total vehicles in stock)
2nd Graph is number of Lkw and number of Pkw (not added), and due to its scale, I separated the Zgkw in the third Graph.
All data are from the Ussbs report "The Effects of Strategic Bombing on the German War Economy", except for Sept.39 (Fritz Hahn, Waffen und Geheimwaffen des deutschen Heeres 1933-1945).

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Re: German vs. Allied war-making potential

#677

Post by takata_1940 » 12 Apr 2010, 12:40

Jon G. wrote:
Guaporense wrote:...
Also, in 1944 Germany made 19,000 Panzers, the US made 20,500 tanks and SP guns in the same year, and German tanks were heavier. In terms of ground combat munitions, Germany produced comparable quantities to the US. The US superiority came from Navy and Air-force production.
Why make the comparison for 1944?? That was the year when German tank production peaked (and your figure includes turretless, and therefore less labour-costly STUGs, as The Enigma points out) whereas American tank production was ramping down by that year since it was becoming obvious that the war was won.
There is various datasets for production figures, but tank production should be measured by type of vehicle (Tank, Assault Gun, SP Guns, etc.) and by weight.

Concerning the German tank output for 1944, I've got (Hahn):
Pz Kpfw IV: 3,225 (26t)
Pz Kpfw V: 3,777 (46t)
Pz Kpfw VI: 623 (57t)
Königstiger: 376 (70t)
Total: 8,001
Weight: 319,423 tons.

USA (Sherman only)
M1A4s: 12,925 (32t)
Weight: 413,600 tons.

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Re: German vs. Allied war-making potential

#678

Post by The_Enigma » 12 Apr 2010, 12:55

While it could very much the case the data from wiki is wrong, that is a 3,000 unit difference on the Panzer IV production. Stug production etc make up for the difference (i did assume such large numbers probably did include some SP guns in the first place)?

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Re: German vs. Allied war-making potential

#679

Post by takata_1940 » 12 Apr 2010, 13:44

Hi,
The_Enigma wrote:While it could very much the case the data from wiki is wrong, that is a 3,000 unit difference on the Panzer IV production. Stug production etc make up for the difference (i did assume such large numbers probably did include some SP guns in the first place)?
Well, I was not refering to Wiki.
Ussbs data are slighty different from Hahn's:
http://www.angelfire.com/super/ussbs/tankrep.html

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Re: German vs. Allied war-making potential

#680

Post by The_Enigma » 12 Apr 2010, 14:35

Its ok i understood that you were not referring to it and thanks for the two sources on the subject :)

It would seem nearly 60% of German armour production was in tank destroyer/assault gun/SP arty role would it be a fair assessment to state that the Germans by 1944 had got to the stage were they wanted to pump out items that was quick to built to destroy tanks and were thus moving away from turret vehicles?

OTH going off the initial figure Guaporense provided for total American production and the above figure for Sherman only production; American tank production was at least in the region of 63% (of course light tanks and the few heavies would increase this figure). I dont really know what to make of the vast difference in production attitudes to be honest; doctrine would obviously factor in there somewhere and the want for numerical superority ... but even in an industrial war of mass production and attrition ... it seems a little overkill :lol:

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Re: German vs. Allied war-making potential

#681

Post by RichTO90 » 12 Apr 2010, 15:31

The_Enigma wrote:It would seem nearly 60% of German armour production was in tank destroyer/assault gun/SP arty role would it be a fair assessment to state that the Germans by 1944 had got to the stage were they wanted to pump out items that was quick to built to destroy tanks and were thus moving away from turret vehicles?
No, they built vehicles that were best accomodated by the production facilities and capabilities they had. Pz-38 (t) chassis vehicles were produced because that is what the plant producing them was capable of building absent extensive capital investment in enlargement, retooling, and so on. The idea that turretless vehicles were built because they were "easier" or "less expensive" has never been demonstrated to my satisfaction.
OTH going off the initial figure Guaporense provided for total American production and the above figure for Sherman only production; American tank production was at least in the region of 63% (of course light tanks and the few heavies would increase this figure). I dont really know what to make of the vast difference in production attitudes to be honest; doctrine would obviously factor in there somewhere and the want for numerical superority ... but even in an industrial war of mass production and attrition ... it seems a little overkill :lol:
As usual he cherry picks his year and his data. By December 1942 US industry was capable of building 4,000 medium tanks...in a month. But by December 1943 design changes and production reprioritization meant that production in 1944 would be considerably lower. For one thing, production resources were being reallocated from wartime to peacetime.
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Re: German vs. Allied war-making potential

#682

Post by The_Enigma » 12 Apr 2010, 16:37

RichTO90 wrote:
The_Enigma wrote:It would seem nearly 60% of German armour production was in tank destroyer/assault gun/SP arty role would it be a fair assessment to state that the Germans by 1944 had got to the stage were they wanted to pump out items that was quick to built to destroy tanks and were thus moving away from turret vehicles?
No, they built vehicles that were best accomodated by the production facilities and capabilities they had. Pz-38 (t) chassis vehicles were produced because that is what the plant producing them was capable of building absent extensive capital investment in enlargement, retooling, and so on. The idea that turretless vehicles were built because they were "easier" or "less expensive" has never been demonstrated to my satisfaction.
Only time for a quick reply: Intresting stuff, surely that highlights a major problem with the German war economy then? It sort of reeks of desperation ala the British wanting to carry on production of 2 pounders rather than retool so we had something to use.

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Re: German vs. Allied war-making potential

#683

Post by Piotr Kapuscinski » 12 Apr 2010, 19:26

2nd Graph is number of Lkw and number of Pkw (not added),
Ok, thanks, this explains everything. ;)

I know that the data for IX 1939 is from Hahn - but I can't see the data on Zgkw in his book (which page is it?).

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Re: German vs. Allied war-making potential

#684

Post by takata_1940 » 12 Apr 2010, 21:05

Domen121 wrote:
I know that the data for IX 1939 is from Hahn - but I can't see the data on Zgkw in his book (which page is it?).
In my datasheet #5 :P
Hopefully I made a note: total Wehrmacht produced Zgkw 1t to 18t before 1.9.1939, page 126:
Zgkw 1t: 928 (15,000 RM)
Zgkw 3t: 504 (22,000 RM)
Zgkw 5t: 1,725 (30,000 RM)
Zgkw 8t: 1,506 (36,000 RM)
Zgkw 12t: 165 (46,000 RM)
Zgkw 18t: 131 (60,000 RM)
Total: 4,959 (146,424,000 RM)
It might be off a few dozen vehicles but it gives a good starting basis.
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Re: German vs. Allied war-making potential

#685

Post by Michael Kenny » 15 Apr 2010, 20:03

RichTO90 wrote:The idea that turretless vehicles were built because they were "easier" or "less expensive" has never been demonstrated to my satisfaction.
I would think doing away with a turret saved a lot of complicated machining/fittings on the turret race and thus a Stug III should be less expensive than a PzIII-even if they could have fitted a 75mm in the Pz III turret.
I would also think using the experience gained on the PzIII/IV/38(t) chassis to produce an automotively reliable running gear for a SP would also be 'easier' than putting the same weapon on a Panther, Tiger or newly developed chassis.
Why they decided to switch resources to fixed guns is another matter but it does not take away the 'easier' and 'less expensive' advantages. I think it was just a case of making the best of a bad situation. Using what you had on hand rather than designing something new that was exactly right and mature in 1946!.

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Re: German vs. Allied war-making potential

#686

Post by Oleg Grigoryev » 16 Apr 2010, 07:52

Michael Kenny wrote:
RichTO90 wrote:The idea that turretless vehicles were built because they were "easier" or "less expensive" has never been demonstrated to my satisfaction.
I would think doing away with a turret saved a lot of complicated machining/fittings on the turret race and thus a Stug III should be less expensive than a PzIII-even if they could have fitted a 75mm in the Pz III turret.
I would also think using the experience gained on the PzIII/IV/38(t) chassis to produce an automotively reliable running gear for a SP would also be 'easier' than putting the same weapon on a Panther, Tiger or newly developed chassis.
Why they decided to switch resources to fixed guns is another matter but it does not take away the 'easier' and 'less expensive' advantages. I think it was just a case of making the best of a bad situation. Using what you had on hand rather than designing something new that was exactly right and mature in 1946!.
It seems to me that chassis in their turetless version were generally able to carry heavier armament. To sidestep German machinery for a moment T-34 platform was upgunned to 100 mm - something that could not be fitted reliably in its turret.. T-70 was modified to carry 76 mm, becoming Su-76 big upgrade when compared to original 45 that in effect became rather useless by 1943. On the other hand GAZ could produce anything heavier, so in that regard it was doing the best with what you have.

PS
I wonder if Germans were able to produce turrets and supporting infrastructure (turning mechanisms etc) at the same pace they were producing platforms.

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Re: German vs. Allied war-making potential

#687

Post by Piotr Kapuscinski » 16 Apr 2010, 18:35

In 1939 population of Germany together with Austria and Sudety was 78,5 million. After capturing Czech and subordinating Slovakia, this number reached 90 million. At the same time Poland numbered 35 million. Roughly 40% of that number were minorities (Germans among them), some of which were not very friendly towards Poland.

Extraction of coal in Germany was 12-times bigger than in Poland. Extraction of iron ore in Germany (together with Austria and Czechoslovakia) was 17-times greater than in Poland. In producing pig iron, steel and iron products the III Reich was on the 2nd place in the world and was superior to Poland 14-times in production of steel and iron products and 25-times in production of pig iron. Only extraction of crude oil in Germany was on similarly low level as in Poland - both countries were extracting about 0,5 million tonnes of crude oil per year. But German industry already managed to master production of synthetic gasoline from hard coal, and this production was close to 7 million tonnes per year.

If it comes to financing armed forces of both countries - the III Reich spent around 90,000,000,000 RMs on developing her military machine before September of 1939, while Poland spent only around 6,700,000,000 PLN (or 3,350,000,000 RMs) on developing her military machine before 01.09.1939 - which is 27-times less than the III Reich spent.

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Re: German vs. Allied war-making potential

#688

Post by Guaporense » 16 Apr 2010, 19:00

Jon G. wrote:
Guaporense wrote:...
*Well, Germany indeed produced more artillery ammunition than the US (Ger made over 300 million rounds of ground artillery ammo of over 75mm between 1940 and 1944, the US made 230 in the same period) and I suspect, more heavy guns in 1944 at least.
Have you considered that German artillery, by and large, had much more work on their hands (i.e. much more to shoot at) in the 1940 to 1944 period than US artillery had? US artillery ammunition production from 1940 to 1944 reflects need whereas German artillery ammunition production in the same period reflects necessity.

I don't know how much artillery ammunition the US made in 1943, but it would be interesting to see if not this figure might well surpass German artillery production for the same year.
US artillery ammunition surpassed Germany on the number of heavy rounds in 1942.

This is the data I have:

million of Heavy rounds

--------Germany ----- USA ----- Britain
1942 ---- 57 ----------- 70.9 -------- 25
1943 ---- 93 ------------ 86 --------- 14
1944 --- 108 ----------- 85.6 ------- 12
totals: - 258 ----------- 242.5 ------ 51

To Germany, ammunition made up a larger proportion of war production than either Britain and the US.

Second to the US Wartime Production Achievements, aircraft made up of 23.9% of US munitions production, while ammunition made up 10.6%, or 44% of aircraft production in value. To Germany ammunition made up of 75% of aircraft production by value.

In relation to armaments, in 1944 ammunition may have represented 14-15% of total armament production in the US. While for Germany it was close to 30%.

Historically, the US made 19.7 billion US$ dollars of ammunition, out of 106 billion dollars of armaments. Germany made 35.1 billion RM of ammunition out of 117 billion Rm of armaments. Since an RM was worth about 0.5 dollars, it yields a German ammunition production of 17.5 billion US$.

In terms of tonnage, the US made 3.86 million tons of artillery ammunition, 2 million tons of small arms ammunition, 5.29 million tons of bombs, for a total of 11.15 million tons of ammo "items" (give another 1 million tons for aircraft and navy ammo). Germany made 8.583 million tons of ammunition and 1.28 million tons of aircraft bombs, for a total of 9.86 million tons of ammo "items".
Also, in 1944 Germany made 19,000 Panzers, the US made 20,500 tanks and SP guns in the same year, and German tanks were heavier. In terms of ground combat munitions, Germany produced comparable quantities to the US. The US superiority came from Navy and Air-force production.
Why make the comparison for 1944?? That was the year when German tank production peaked (and your figure includes turretless, and therefore less labour-costly STUGs, as The Enigma points out) whereas American tank production was ramping down by that year since it was becoming obvious that the war was won.
Well, because 1944 was the year of peak munitions production for all great powers (including the US), even thought Germany was heavily bombed and was losing territory, with implied in the collapse of their trade bloc, and hence that their production was below potential. US tank production was being reduced in 1944 for reasons other than "'the war was won", but simply because scarce resources were being allocated to other uses than tank production, since the US had already much more tanks than they could use.

For the US between 1943 and 1944, for example, the production of ground related munitions and warships was reduced, while the production of aircraft increased over 40% by weight. Overall, US munitions production increased 11% between 1943 and 1944.
Bombing only destroyed the building, not the machines, with are made of steel and hence are very resistant to explosions...
That was realized early on. A great many of the Allied bombs dropped on Germany were of the incendiary variety as a result.
If you cannot destroy the machines, kill the laborers. :lol:

Anyway, labor was the most scarce resource for the German war economy. So they acted all right.
...In 1944 explosives production was nearly 500,000 tons, and it reached an annual output of 600,000 tons in June. For comparison, the USSR produced 600,000 tons of explosives during the whole war...
'Whole war' of course being a different timeframe to the Russians than it was to the Germans. Also, while the Soviets 'just' had the Eastern Front to worry about, the Germans had war on their hands elsewhere, too.
Yep. Germany produced 1.5 million tons of explosives during the whole war, while the USSR produced 600,000 tons. But their supply was increased by 300,000 tons of lend-lease explosives. While Germany spent 2/3 of their ammo on the ost front, with would mean about 1,000,000 tons of german explosives to 900,000 tons of soviet explosives.
Last edited by Guaporense on 16 Apr 2010, 20:12, edited 2 times in total.
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Re: German vs. Allied war-making potential

#689

Post by mescal » 16 Apr 2010, 19:13

Guaporense wrote:Germany was heavily bombed and was losing territory, with implied in the collapse of their trade bloc, and hence that their production was below potential.
I fail to understand the meaning of the word "potential" in this sentence.
Potential production is not actually achieved production, no problem with that.

But to compute such a "potential", it's good not to forget real-world constraints, like your allies being invaded.

Anyway, I think that words like "potential production", "war effort" (as opposed to "civilian sector"), "inefficiency" and others of this kind can only lead to pages of pointless arguments as long as they are not defined
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Re: German vs. Allied war-making potential

#690

Post by Guaporense » 16 Apr 2010, 19:22

Domen121 wrote:If it comes to financing armed forces of both countries - the III Reich spent around 90,000,000,000 RMs on developing her military machine before September of 1939, while Poland spent only around 6,700,000,000 PLN (or 3,350,000,000 RMs) on developing her military machine before 01.09.1939 - which is 27-times less than the III Reich spent.
Second to Angus Maddison's GDP estimates, Poland's PPP GDP in 1939 was 23% of Germany's. While Germany PPP gdp in 1943 was 26% of the US's.

Germany was facing worse GDP odds than Poland in september 1939, from december 1941 on, when they were at war with nearly ~2 trillion dollars of gdp and they had a little over 400 billion. Of course, I now think that Maddison GDP estimates have very little usefulness compared to other more precise statistics, like steel production, machine stock, labor force, etc.

And Germany didn't spend 90 billion rm in the military before WW2. They probably spent around 35-50 billion Rm, or about 9 - 15 times more than Poland (most estimates today give total military expenditures as between 34 billion Rm and 48.8 billion RM).
Last edited by Guaporense on 16 Apr 2010, 19:31, edited 1 time in total.
"In tactics, as in strategy, superiority in numbers is the most common element of victory." - Carl von Clausewitz

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