German vs. Allied war-making potential

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Kingfish
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Re: German vs. Allied technology

Post by Kingfish » 11 Dec 2009 12:32

Guaporense wrote:
LWD wrote: Because they had over 100 divisions while the americans had 60 divisions in europe by 1945. I think that 100 french divisions are better than 60 american.
The differences are night and day.

A significant portion of the French forces was tied to static positions along the Maginot line. Of the rest, the majority was essentially a marching army built around WW1 equipment and tactics. Their primary mission was defensive in nature; to defend France and the low countries from German aggression. It certainly wasn't tailored for a drive on Berlin.

In contrast the Anglo-American army in Normandy enjoyed full mobilization under a protective umbrella of complete air superiority. It wasn't just built to take the war to the enemy, it was built to take the war to the enemy's heartland.

The bottom line is a straight comparison of only soldiers in uniforms does not give an accurate picture of the strength and weaknesses of the two armies. The French army's mission in 1940 was to prevent defeat. The Anglo-American army's mission 1944 was to defeat the enemy. History shows which one failed and which succeeded.

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Re: German vs. Allied technology

Post by LWD » 11 Dec 2009 13:27

Guaporense wrote:
LWD wrote: The Germans were also on the offencive in 1940 and the defencive in 44. That makes a fair amount of difference. Then there are the logistics impacts of fighting next to or in your home country vs across the channel or ocean.
So? The fact remains: In 1940 Ger applied 85% of their army in the western front, in 1944, it was less than 25%.
And your point is? Especially as it relates to this topic?
Why?
Because they had over 100 divisions while the americans had 60 divisions in europe by 1945. I think that 100 french divisions are better than 60 american.
Why? Especially if you are looking at French 1940 divisions vs US 1945 Divisions. Then of course there's the question of divisions are even a good relative measure of strength.
Numbers are the most important aspect of war. Especially the number of soldiers.
You really think so? Most if not all good military leaders would disagree with you and history is full of incidents proving them correct.
That lack of AFVs was not the biggest problem in the German war effort.
I doubt there are many that would disagree with that.
Care to expand on this a bit? I'm especially interested in the part where muntions play a lesser part in German doctrine than they do in US doctrine. I defintly like to see any documentation that supports this.
That is quite obvious? Isn't it?
Not at all.
That munitions figure is quite an clue too, i.e.: the fact that the US allocated a much larger proportion of their military expenditures to the production of munitions.
Irrelevant.
The americans always thought in technological terms: How many airplanes to win war x. That was quite obvious.
As far as I can tell opinion backed by nothing.
Well, the USSR infliced 89.1% of Geman combat casualties between 07/1940 and 12/1944 while the US inflicted about 4-5% (sources: Das Heer 1933-1945 and extrapolation for the proportion of US casualties in the fronts were US troops fought).
That's a hardly an acceptable way of stating a reference or source. I suggest you read the guidliens. Whose extrapolation by the way? In any case the Heer was not the only German force engaged in combat. So a source dedicated to it is unlikly to contain all combat casualties.
The USSR engaged 90% of the German frontline troops between 1941 and june 1944. (Source: Harrison (1988).) While the US engaged at most, 15% at the time of the battle of the bulge. (Source: Glantz, extrapolated from proportion of americans in the western front). I can say that the military contributions of the US to the allies were as significant as the military contributions of Italy to the Axis. The most important contributions of the US were economical, i.e.: Lend-Lease.
Your conclusion is very debateable. Consider the fact that 8th airforce essentially made all of Germany the front line. You are also ignoring the war in the Pacific.

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Re: German vs. Allied technology

Post by LWD » 11 Dec 2009 13:35

Guaporense wrote: ...
The failure to defeat Britain was caused by the failure to predict the victory over France. :lol:
Hardly. The German military simply wasn't designed to defeat Britain.
If they knew how and when France would be defeated and the strategic position of Germany in June 1940, they would have allocated more resources to the production of munitions necessary for an successful invasion of Britain, they needed adequate landing craft and a few thousand more bombers, to destroy the RN.
Had they allocated more resources to landing craft and bombers they might not have had the force to defeat France. Even if they had such allocations would have effected British allocations and they were so far behind in this race they weren't going to catch up especially under the financial constraints in place. I note that you don't mention fighters at all but the RAF fighter arm won the BOB and that alone precluded a German invasion of Britain. Landing craft by the way were probably less important than sea lift and naval vessels.
And, by the way, the Battle of Britain was completely wasteful and irrelevant to the outcome of ww2.
Irrelevant hardly.
In fact, they produced less materiel than they needed when it was critical for them to have more (in 1940-1942) and they still had the ressource to use it at this time, in manpower and fuel. It was just impossible to develop quickly enough what was lacking (amphibious means, strategical aircraft, long range fighters) or to produce much more than what was planned at the time (naval ships, U-boote, tanks, trucks, etc.).
But did they really have the resources? I really suggest you read Wages of Destruction. The German economy in the prewar period was pretty well tapped out.

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Re: German vs. Allied technology

Post by ljadw » 11 Dec 2009 15:14

Guaporense,'that guy on the DIF ' is Rich Anderson,a well known researcher of The Dupuy Institute;The Dupuy Institute is considered as one of the best in the world;sadly enough,you have to pay to register,on the other hand it is understandable that they want to prevent ignorant amateurs (like me ) and trouble makers (I hope not like me )to join their forum
One more thing :Rich Anderson has forgotten more on those matters,than you and I will ever known ;if I were Rich Anderson, I should not be very happy to be called 'that guy' .

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Re: German vs. Allied technology

Post by RichTO90 » 11 Dec 2009 15:27

The_Enigma wrote:And do you support such statement?
Hey, don't get me started on you again! :P I said it was a late night and I had run out of steam so didn't have the energy to finish. I don't "support" anything, I'd rather simply try to present the best facts possible and reasonable interpretation; then let them stand as they will.
Out of interest what type of carriers would these be, arty tractors and the likes?
No, artillery tractors were not considered "AFV". Combat vehicle production by U.S. Army Ordnance in the second half of 1944 M29 and M29C tracked cargo carriers and T16 and T16E2 (Bren carriers) produced for Lend-Lease. The U.S. Army categorized them as "combat vehicles" as opposed to "automotive vehicles" and since Guaporense's "AFV" (a British categoriztion not usually utilized by U.S. Army Ordnance of the day) apparently was pretty open-ended I thought why not?

German production in the second half of 1944 was remarkable, Panzer and StuG production matched US tank production, but then that was because US production was rapidly ramping down as contracts were curtailed as the war was obviously ending. At peak output US tank manufacturing alone in December 1942 was 4,772, ten times German production in that month of 446. Which is why I mentioned selective date usage. German production second half of 1944 (I'm missing PSW figures for some reason BTW) were:

Tanks - 4,037
"TD" StuG and JgPz - 5,960
SP Arty - 176
SPW - 4,665
Total 14,832

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Re: German vs. Allied technology

Post by RichTO90 » 11 Dec 2009 15:30

ljadw wrote:Guaporense,'that guy on the DIF ' is Rich Anderson,a well known researcher of The Dupuy Institute;The Dupuy Institute is considered as one of the best in the world;sadly enough,you have to pay to register,on the other hand it is understandable that they want to prevent ignorant amateurs (like me ) and trouble makers (I hope not like me )to join their forum
One more thing :Rich Anderson has forgotten more on those matters,than you and I will ever known ;if I were Rich Anderson, I should not be very happy to be called 'that guy' .
Actually "that guy" is better than "hey you"... :lol:

BTW, you don't need to pay to register at the TDI fforum, but it has been fairly quiet for a year or more now. And I don't work for TDI anymore either, although I do have access to most of the data still along with that I collected myself.

Cheers!

Rich

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Re: German vs. Allied technology

Post by The_Enigma » 11 Dec 2009 20:09

RichTO90 wrote:
The_Enigma wrote:And do you support such statement?
Hey, don't get me started on you again! :P I said it was a late night and I had run out of steam so didn't have the energy to finish. I don't "support" anything, I'd rather simply try to present the best facts possible and reasonable interpretation; then let them stand as they will.
:lol: Wasnt went that way :P
RichTO90 wrote:
Out of interest what type of carriers would these be, arty tractors and the likes?
No, artillery tractors were not considered "AFV". Combat vehicle production by U.S. Army Ordnance in the second half of 1944 M29 and M29C tracked cargo carriers and T16 and T16E2 (Bren carriers) produced for Lend-Lease. The U.S. Army categorized them as "combat vehicles" as opposed to "automotive vehicles" and since Guaporense's "AFV" (a British categoriztion not usually utilized by U.S. Army Ordnance of the day) apparently was pretty open-ended I thought why not?
That was the only thing i could think of this morning that could be full tracked that wasnt a tank or SP gun :D I totally forgot that the Yanks built hell loads of Bren carriers. Cheers :)

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Re: German vs. Allied technology

Post by Guaporense » 12 Dec 2009 21:10

LWD wrote:
Guaporense wrote:
LWD wrote: The Germans were also on the offencive in 1940 and the defencive in 44. That makes a fair amount of difference. Then there are the logistics impacts of fighting next to or in your home country vs across the channel or ocean.
So? The fact remains: In 1940 Ger applied 85% of their army in the western front, in 1944, it was less than 25%.
And your point is? Especially as it relates to this topic?
That in 1940 in the western front, Ger suffered more combat casualties per day than in 1944 because in 1940, they had more soldiers. In 1940 they lost 160,000 soldiers in 40 days, or 4,000 per day, while in 1944, they lost 250,000 soldiers in 200 days, about 1,250 per day. But in 1940 they had 3.3 million soldiers, while in 1944, they had 1 million. So the losses were in proportion to the numbers.
Why?
Because they had over 100 divisions while the americans had 60 divisions in europe by 1945. I think that 100 french divisions are better than 60 american.
Why? Especially if you are looking at French 1940 divisions vs US 1945 Divisions. Then of course there's the question of divisions are even a good relative measure of strength.
1- France had more tradition of war.

2- France had about 2 times more soldiers.

I think that these 2 facts combined imply that France's army in 1940 was more powerful relative to the US ground forces in Europe in 1945.
Numbers are the most important aspect of war. Especially the number of soldiers.
You really think so? Most if not all good military leaders would disagree with you and history is full of incidents proving them correct.
Clausewitz said that number are very important too:http://74.125.93.132/search?q=cache:pDm ... =firefox-a.

Also, my position is that number of men that the allies had was the most important part in the outcome of WW2. Much more important than the technology, with the Germans had the edge over most adversaries they fought (the poles, french and soviets).
That lack of AFVs was not the biggest problem in the German war effort.
I doubt there are many that would disagree with that.
Right them.
Care to expand on this a bit? I'm especially interested in the part where muntions play a lesser part in German doctrine than they do in US doctrine. I defintly like to see any documentation that supports this.
That is quite obvious? Isn't it?
Not at all.
Well, I based this statement on my readings. The Americans were more focused on aircraft, the definitive technological weapon of war, than other players of WW2 (well, the British too had the aircraft fetish). But that had a geographical factor too.

And also, the USSR too allocated a larger proportion of their war resources to the production of munitions than the Germans.
That munitions figure is quite an clue too, i.e.: the fact that the US allocated a much larger proportion of their military expenditures to the production of munitions.
Irrelevant.
Why? If one faction allocates 15% of their resources to munitions while another allocates 48% to the same end, I think that the first values munitions less than the second. Even considering the fact that the US had to made thousands of ships just to carry their army to Europe.
Your conclusion is very debateable. Consider the fact that 8th airforce essentially made all of Germany the front line. You are also ignoring the war in the Pacific.
Well, American planes were the smaller group of allied planes in Europe. In June 1944 there were 11,800 American aircraft, 13,200 British aircraft and 14,700 Soviet aircraft in the European theater. Source: http://www.angelfire.com/ct/ww2europe/stats.html.

Well, if you assume that the 85% of American resources were directed against Germany while 10-15% of Germany's resources and 4-5% of the casualties were put against that 85%, I think that we can consider the Pacific war as 50 times less relevant as the war in Europe.
"In tactics, as in strategy, superiority in numbers is the most common element of victory." - Carl von Clausewitz

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Re: German vs. Allied technology

Post by ljadw » 12 Dec 2009 22:06

Guaporense wrote:
LWD wrote:
Guaporense wrote:
LWD wrote: The Germans were also on the offencive in 1940 and the defencive in 44. That makes a fair amount of difference. Then there are the logistics impacts of fighting next to or in your home country vs across the channel or ocean.
So? The fact remains: In 1940 Ger applied 85% of their army in the western front, in 1944, it was less than 25%.
And your point is? Especially as it relates to this topic?
That in 1940 in the western front, Ger suffered more combat casualties per day than in 1944 because in 1940, they had more soldiers. In 1940 they lost 160,000 soldiers in 40 days, or 4,000 per day, while in 1944, they lost 250,000 soldiers in 200 days, about 1,250 per day. But in 1940 they had 3.3 million soldiers, while in 1944, they had 1 million. So the losses were in proportion to the numbers.
Why?
Because they had over 100 divisions while the americans had 60 divisions in europe by 1945. I think that 100 french divisions are better than 60 american.
Why? Especially if you are looking at French 1940 divisions vs US 1945 Divisions. Then of course there's the question of divisions are even a good relative measure of strength.
1- France had more tradition of war.

2- France had about 2 times more soldiers.

I think that these 2 facts combined imply that France's army in 1940 was more powerful relative to the US ground forces in Europe in 1945.
Numbers are the most important aspect of war. Especially the number of soldiers.
You really think so? Most if not all good military leaders would disagree with you and history is full of incidents proving them correct.
Clausewitz said that number are very important too:http://74.125.93.132/search?q=cache:pDm ... =firefox-a.

Also, my position is that number of men that the allies had was the most important part in the outcome of WW2. Much more important than the technology, with the Germans had the edge over most adversaries they fought (the poles, french and soviets).
That lack of AFVs was not the biggest problem in the German war effort.
I doubt there are many that would disagree with that.
Right them.
Care to expand on this a bit? I'm especially interested in the part where muntions play a lesser part in German doctrine than they do in US doctrine. I defintly like to see any documentation that supports this.
That is quite obvious? Isn't it?
Not at all.
Well, I based this statement on my readings. The Americans were more focused on aircraft, the definitive technological weapon of war, than other players of WW2 (well, the British too had the aircraft fetish). But that had a geographical factor too.

And also, the USSR too allocated a larger proportion of their war resources to the production of munitions than the Germans.
That munitions figure is quite an clue too, i.e.: the fact that the US allocated a much larger proportion of their military expenditures to the production of munitions.
Irrelevant.
Why? If one faction allocates 15% of their resources to munitions while another allocates 48% to the same end, I think that the first values munitions less than the second. Even considering the fact that the US had to made thousands of ships just to carry their army to Europe.
Your conclusion is very debateable. Consider the fact that 8th airforce essentially made all of Germany the front line. You are also ignoring the war in the Pacific.
Well, American planes were the smaller group of allied planes in Europe. In June 1944 there were 11,800 American aircraft, 13,200 British aircraft and 14,700 Soviet aircraft in the European theater. Source: http://www.angelfire.com/ct/ww2europe/stats.html.

Well, if you assume that the 85% of American resources were directed against Germany while 10-15% of Germany's resources and 4-5% of the casualties were put against that 85%, I think that we can consider the Pacific war as 50 times less relevant as the war in Europe.
About the 10-15 % of Germany' resources engaged against the US and the UK :
Luftwaffe strength in the East on 31 december 1943 :1683 aircraft
Luftwaffe strength in the west on 31 december 1943:251O aircraft
not counting in 1944 14000 8.8 and 2000 1O.5 AA guns
I doubt that the Germans had 3.3 million men in the West in 1940 (they had only 2.7 million in the East in june 1941):93 divisions started the offensive ,there was a reserve of 42,of which 24 were engaged :117 divisions can not make 3.3 million(there were in the east in june 1941 some 120 divisions with 2.7 million )
about the Air forces :to quote only the number of aircraft is giving a wrong picture :most Russian aircraft were fighters and light bombers for tactical aims,with less firepower

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Re: German vs. Allied technology

Post by LWD » 12 Dec 2009 22:13

Guaporense wrote: ...
That in 1940 in the western front, Ger suffered more combat casualties per day than in 1944 because in 1940, they had more soldiers. In 1940 they lost 160,000 soldiers in 40 days, or 4,000 per day, while in 1944, they lost 250,000 soldiers in 200 days, about 1,250 per day. But in 1940 they had 3.3 million soldiers, while in 1944, they had 1 million. So the losses were in proportion to the numbers.
Not sure at all how that is relevant to this topic.
Because they had over 100 divisions while the americans had 60 divisions in europe by 1945. I think that 100 french divisions are better than 60 american.
Why? Especially if you are looking at French 1940 divisions vs US 1945 Divisions. Then of course there's the question of divisions are even a good relative measure of strength.
1- France had more tradition of war.
How do you define "tradition of war" why is that relevant? They also clearly had a flawed armored doctrine and an artillery doctrine that was no where near as good as that of the us.
2- France had about 2 times more soldiers.
Did they really? How big was a French division? How does it compare to a US division especially as committed to combat?
I think that these 2 facts combined imply that France's army in 1940 was more powerful relative to the US ground forces in Europe in 1945.
That is a huge leap of faith. And in the direction of fantasy. A US division from 1945 would have had little or no trouble handling a French 1940 division if the conditions were anywhere hear even. In a confrontation between 2 French 1940 divisions and a US division from 1945 unless the French had overwhelming advantage of terrain (something like the Maginot line) I'd still bet on the US division and be willing to give odds. The US divisions of that time had huge advantages of doctrine, technology, and experience over the 1940 French ones.
Numbers are the most important aspect of war. Especially the number of soldiers.
You really think so? Most if not all good military leaders would disagree with you and history is full of incidents proving them correct.
Clausewitz said that number are very important too:
There's a difference between being important and being the "most important".
Care to expand on this a bit? I'm especially interested in the part where muntions play a lesser part in German doctrine than they do in US doctrine. I defintly like to see any documentation that supports this.
That is quite obvious? Isn't it?
Not at all.
Well, I based this statement on my readings. The Americans were more focused on aircraft, the definitive technological weapon of war, than other players of WW2 (well, the British too had the aircraft fetish). But that had a geographical factor too.
How does a focus on aircraft translate into the "muntions play a lesser part in German doctrine"?
And also, the USSR too allocated a larger proportion of their war resources to the production of munitions than the Germans.
How does that relate to your point about munitions and doctrine?
That munitions figure is quite an clue too, i.e.: the fact that the US allocated a much larger proportion of their military expenditures to the production of munitions.
Irrelevant.
Why? If one faction allocates 15% of their resources to munitions while another allocates 48% to the same end, I think that the first values munitions less than the second. Even considering the fact that the US had to made thousands of ships just to carry their army to Europe.
Without looking at all the relevant facts no I think you are jumping to a conclusion that is far from well supported.
Your conclusion is very debateable. Consider the fact that 8th airforce essentially made all of Germany the front line. You are also ignoring the war in the Pacific.
Well, American planes were the smaller group of allied planes in Europe. In June 1944 there were 11,800 American aircraft, 13,200 British aircraft and 14,700 Soviet aircraft in the European theater.
Well I should have said that the RAF and 8th AF made the whole of Germany the front lines. The Soviet aircaft were mostly short ranged planes used on or near the front lines. Likewise a far small percentage of the RAF aircraft were being used in operations vs Germany than the US.
Well, if you assume that the 85% of American resources were directed against Germany while 10-15% of Germany's resources and 4-5% of the casualties were put against that 85%, I think that we can consider the Pacific war as 50 times less relevant as the war in Europe.
That's some really twisted logic. I'm also not at all sure exactly what your numbers represent or where you got them.

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Re: German vs. Allied technology

Post by phylo_roadking » 12 Dec 2009 22:24

1- France had more tradition of war
Than who exactly...Germany? Prussia???
A US division from 1945 would have had little or no trouble handling a French 1940 division if the conditions were anywhere hear even. In a confrontation between 2 French 1940 divisions and a US division from 1945 unless the French had overwhelming advantage of terrain (something like the Maginot line) I'd still bet on the US division and be willing to give odds. The US divisions of that time had huge advantages of doctrine, technology, and experience over the 1940 French ones.
Actually - we DO have a real example of this! Vichy's armies in North Africa - which were in effect frozen in amber with no devevlopment since 1940 - encountered the Americans, and not always peacefully...and IIRC Patton's armoured recce forces were able to shoot holes - literally! :lol: - in French armour...and THAT was U.S. capability vs. French in an 1942/43 versus 1940 comparison.

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Re: German vs. Allied technology

Post by Guaporense » 12 Dec 2009 22:47

RichTO90 wrote:Oh goody, this should be fun, I haven’t seen this argument crop up in a while…
What argument?
Heer casualties in the French Campaigns (Organizationsabteilung d. Gen,Stb. d. OKH. 6 Feb 45, NARA T78, R414, F3226-3227) were reported as 27,650 KIA, 115,299 WIA, 13,607 MIA for a total of 156,556. Over 42 days that is 3,727.5 per day for the Heer, Waffen SS, and Luftwaffe in Erdkämpf. Luftwaffe losses were significant, but not excessive (for the first war year they were just 6,480 KIA, 1 UNK, 1,196 MIA, and 793 PW, with 1,549 discharged due to wounds). KM losses were negligible in the campaign. In Normandy to 31 August 1944 Wehrmacht ground forces losses (Heer, Waffen SS, and Luftwaffe in Erdkämpf were at least 288,695. Over 87 days that is 3,318.3 per day. However, it can be shown that at least another 36,751 Wehrmacht casualties were incurred (the difference between reported MIA and Allied reported PW). For the period to 31 October, where the data is more complete, the casualties were 483,742, or 3,268.5.
However, you should note that in 1944 most casualties were prisoners, while in 1940, most casualties were "combat casualties" (killed and wounded). I was taking these casualties in account to say that the Western front in 1940 was more intense than in 1944.
So a “reduction” in intensity of roughly 11-12.3 percent in exchange for doubling or nearly tripling the length that intensity was incurred? Hmmm?
Sure, 1944 western front was much heavier to the German army than the 1940 Western front, since it wielded 4 times more casualties and most casualties in 1944 were permanent while in 1940 were wounded. However, my point is that the intensity of combat in 1940 was greater than in 1944.
1- The French army was larger than the Anglo-American army in 1944. I think that we could consider then more powerful too.
No, the French Armed Forces were somewhat weaker than the US Army, 6.1-million to 6.916-million, but the US Armed Forces included another 2.7-million in the Navy and Marines.
However, of these 6.9 million men, only 2 million were front line troops, and only 2/3 of these front line troops were deployed in Europe, the US had 90 divisions. France had about 130 divisions or something like that.
2- The difference between 1940 and 1944 in France was this: In 1940 we had 3.30 million allied soldiers vs 3.35 million German soldiers. While in 1944 we had 2 million allied soldiers vs 750,000 German soldiers. Manpower explains everything in the European theater, i.e: when the Germans had numerical parity, they win, when the allies outnumber the Germans by 2 to 1, we have stalemate, and when the allies outnumber the Germans 3 to 1, the allies win.
Yes, numbers count, but it helps if they are accurate. Ob. West totaled about 1.375 to 1.6-million Wehrmacht troops of different flavors on 1 June 1944.
However, these ~1.5 million men included personnel other than front line troops. Since they had 70 divisions in 1944, with were mainly understrength, while in 1940 they had 140 divisions, with were full strength, I think that the 750,000 number reflects in 11,000 frontline men per division.
What are you smoking? Speer’s Schnellberichte indicates otherwise, but I’m too tired to trot out the figures right now. But I do have the U.S. ones:

Tanks – 9,952
TD – 1,762
Special AFV – 682
AC – 2,158
SP Artillery – 749
SP AAA – 169
Full-Tracked Carriers – 7,335
Total – 22,807

BTW, no half-tracks are included in the figure because the program had been completed in March 1944, after 39,436 had been completed…
Well, I though that the US made only 20,000 AFVs in 1944.
2- And in 1944 the budget for AFVs was 2 billion RM, of about 110 billion RM war budget.
Um, so? The U.S. War Department expended $2,094,867,000 on AFV procurement in 1944 delivered from a total procurement expenditure of $36,850,000,000…then there was Department of the Navy procurement and the Maritime Commission procurement…all those ship sand things.
I read that the US spent 42 billion dollars in all types of munitions in 1944. Is that correct?

Well, since 2.1 billion is 5% of 42 billion and ~2.5% of 85 billion (total military outlays of the US), and tanks consisted in 7% of Ger's munition production in 1944. Since ger's war expenditure was 110 billion in 1944, 2 billion is about 1.8% of that, then in 1944 we can conclude that tanks consumed a smaller part of Ger's resources than US's.
3- Many of the lost AFV in 1944 were abandoned in retreats and for lack of fuel.
There go those damn Allies cheating again. You are of the “if they don’t shoot holes in them they aren’t really lost” school of military history then?
If they had the manpower and fuel, they wouldn't have lost these AFVs. With manpower to thick the front lines and prevent retreats and fuel to make the tanks move when they retreat, I think that these losses would not have happened. So, the fact is that armour casualties would have been smaller in 1944 had Ger have fuel and manpower. Hence, the need to produce more armour was derived from lack of manpower and fuel. With means that lack of manpower and fuel were bigger elements of ger's defeat in ww2 than munitions.
1- I never said that the US won via technological power, I said that technology and munitions played a larger part of their military doctrines than in Germany. That is explained by their greater allocation of war resources to munitions.
Ah, so the Germans depended on stones and sharpened sticks then?

What “greater allocation of resources”? The Germans mobilized to a greater degree than any other country, but that is not quite the same thing. The Americans allocated the resources necessary to win the war and there greater over resource capability allowed them a few luxuries…such as the Manhattan Project.

Horses for courses and all that.
Germany did not mobilize to a greater degree than any other country. The USSR "outmobilized" then all. But yes, Ger did "outmobilize" the US. However this "outmobilization" was not reflected in munitions production because Ger spent a smaller proportion of the resources mobilized for war in munitions. In fact, the US had a GNP of 190 billion US$ in 1943 and spent 38 billion in munitions, about 20% of the GNP. Ger spent 11 billion RM in munitions in 1941, out of a GNP of 140 billion RM, about 8% of Ger's GNP.
2- If I needed to say why the US won, I would say: The US won because they were on the side of the USSR. :lol:
The reverse of that statement is just as true…and just as deserving of a :lol:
The USSR inflicted 20 times the casualties that the US inflicted on Ger.
3- War on multiple fronts? Well, in the Eastern front Ger lost about 85% of their men. All other fronts were quite insignificant if compared to that single front.
Crap. I have some lovely data somewhere to dispute that, but can’t find it right now – too tired. This should be fun though. Back in a few days.
I think that it can be argued that the western fronts concentrated more munitions per man than the eastern front. So a single casualty in the western front was more costly than in the eastern front. So we can go from the 85% to 80% in terms of total proportion of damage to Ger.
Last edited by Guaporense on 12 Dec 2009 23:25, edited 2 times in total.
"In tactics, as in strategy, superiority in numbers is the most common element of victory." - Carl von Clausewitz

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The_Enigma
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Re: German vs. Allied technology

Post by The_Enigma » 12 Dec 2009 22:52

Likewise a far small percentage of the RAF aircraft were being used in operations vs Germany than the US.
I would just like to know then what the RAF was actually doing during the war then? What percentage of air forces, excluding training elements, were not engaged in combat operations agaisnt German targets; i.e. fighter-sweeps, bombing/escort mission, patroling the Atlantic and hunting subs etc

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Guaporense
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Re: German vs. Allied technology

Post by Guaporense » 12 Dec 2009 22:54

phylo_roadking wrote:
1- France had more tradition of war
Than who exactly...Germany? Prussia???
Than the US.
A US division from 1945 would have had little or no trouble handling a French 1940 division if the conditions were anywhere hear even. In a confrontation between 2 French 1940 divisions and a US division from 1945 unless the French had overwhelming advantage of terrain (something like the Maginot line) I'd still bet on the US division and be willing to give odds. The US divisions of that time had huge advantages of doctrine, technology, and experience over the 1940 French ones.
Actually - we DO have a real example of this! Vichy's armies in North Africa - which were in effect frozen in amber with no devevlopment since 1940 - encountered the Americans, and not always peacefully...and IIRC Patton's armoured recce forces were able to shoot holes - literally! :lol: - in French armour...and THAT was U.S. capability vs. French in an 1942/43 versus 1940 comparison.
However, German divisions in 1944 were better equipped than their equivalents in 1940. I am comparing relative strength, i.e.: removing the effects of technology in the equation.

Well, I you want numbers you can say that fighting the French in 1940 yielded a exchange rate of 2.5 French kia+wia per German. While in 1944 the proportion was roughly the same in Normandy, and the German soldiers of 1944 were inferior to the soldiers of 1940.
"In tactics, as in strategy, superiority in numbers is the most common element of victory." - Carl von Clausewitz

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LWD
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Re: German vs. Allied technology

Post by LWD » 12 Dec 2009 22:57

The_Enigma wrote:
Likewise a far small percentage of the RAF aircraft were being used in operations vs Germany than the US.
I would just like to know then what the RAF was actually doing during the war then? What percentage of air forces, excluding training elements, were not engaged in combat operations agaisnt German targets; i.e. fighter-sweeps, bombing/escort mission, patroling the Atlantic and hunting subs etc
My point was that Germany itself became essentially the front line. The majority of the planes over Germany in 1944 were US planes. While there may have been more British planes in Europe than US planes many were dedicated to things other than the bomber campaign vs Germany. IE the things you mentioned as well as defence of Britain itself.

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