German vs. Soviet production in 1942

Discussions on the economic history of the nations taking part in WW2, from the recovery after the depression until the economy at war.
ljadw
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Re: German vs. Soviet production in 1942

Post by ljadw » 01 Sep 2010 20:08

Jon G. wrote:During the rapid industrialization of the USSR in the 1930s, many industries were situated in the Urals, close to big coal reserves. By the late 1930s, many industries had exhausted local coal supplies (the Soviets didn't get the same energy bang for their coal buck as more developed industrialized economies did), but heavy investment in Soviet railroads, particularly from 1938 on, built trunk lines to feed the coal-hungry industries of the Urals with Don basin coal.

Also, Siberian coal fields began to develop in the mid to late 1930s, thus eliminating the need to ship coal all the way to Siberia, and freeing up rail capacity for other uses.

I posted some data here http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 0#p1150240
Russian coal production in 1940:146.8 million ton ,of which the Don basin 85.5 million,
In 1945 :156.2 million ton,of which the Don Basin :36.9 million
The don Basin produced 55.8 % of the Russian coal in 1940,and 25.7 % in 1945
Central Asia,East Siberia and the Far East:7.3 % in 1940,11.2 % in 1945
Karaganda:4.1 % in 1940;17.5 % in 1945
Source :The economic geography of Soviet Oil and Coal and their means of transport in WW II

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Re: German vs. Soviet production in 1942

Post by bf109 emil » 01 Sep 2010 21:43

Carl Schwamberger wrote:Back in 1979 one of my history professors, Flannigan @ Purdue University, remarked on comparing Cezch manfactoring productivity of the 1930s with the 1940s during German managment. Flannigan 's original doctorial study in the 1930s had focused on the economic viability of the Cezch nation. In the 1950s he was able with some Cezch help to compare his data on factory productivity with that during 1939-1945. It was clear that despite the increase in number of laborers and the number of labor hours that productivity had declined significantly during the German occupation. As Flannigan put it the increase in output was not in proportion to the increase in labor expended. I've never found any where he published this & wish I had the time to search his papers archived at the university for this.
perhaps the decline came from the removal of industry on a whole...Entire steel and chemical factories were moved from Czechoslovakia and reassembled in Linz, Austria which incidentally remains a heavily industrialized sector of the country. but only from a wiki source and not able to verifyhttp://www.globalwarmingart.com/wiki/Wi ... hoslovakia

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Re: German vs. Soviet production in 1942

Post by bf109 emil » 01 Sep 2010 22:15

Coal Production
(in millions of tons)


Year/% of total: 1940 % 1945 %
Don Basin 85.5 55.8 36.9 25.7
Moscow Region 9.9 6.5 20.0 15
Kuznets 21.1 13.8 28.9 20.2
Pechora 0.2 0.2 3.3 2.3
Urals 11.7 7.6 25.1 17.5
Karaganda 6.3 4.1 25.1 17.5
Central Asia 1.9 1.3 1.7 1.2
East Siberia 8.5 5.6 7.6 5.2
Far East 0.6 0.4 7.0 4.8
Georgia 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.5
Other 0.4 0.3

source:Source:
Kuzentskii ugolnoi bassein v gody Velikoi Otechestvenoi voiny by I. I. Zelkin, quoted in The Economics of the Second World War by György Ránki

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Re: German vs. Soviet production in 1942

Post by Jon G. » 05 Sep 2010 23:30

JamesL wrote:True, Germany had coal but getting it out of the mines was difficult. The young miners were drafted and production responsbility fell into the hands of older, less physically fit miners. Efficiency fell to about 60% of what it was beforehand.
It dropped even more than that - mining wasn't just left to older miners (who could perhaps substitute experience for strength), but to increasing degress to slave workers of lesser and lesser ability (due to reasons you gave) and on smaller and smaller rations.

Here's a graph showing how per-worker productivity fell:
Image
Then there was the problem of coal distribution. Coal cars and trains were limited. The German railroad system was poorly maintained during the 1930's leading to breakdowns.
It was under-funded, yes. But identified problems were addressed already before the outbreak of war, and at any rate coal traffic was far too important to be allowed to fall behind; the main burden of the overall shortage of coal was borne by occupied Europe.
The Germans stole French railroad equipment. Additionally, much railroad equipment was sent to the east to support the German armies. The vast distances in Russia increased turn around times for the cars and locomotives.
They went even further than that and contracted Belgian and French factories to build railroad rolling stock for them.

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Re: German vs. Soviet production in 1942

Post by Guaporense » 06 Sep 2010 00:34

CJK1990 wrote:Okay so I read the Tooze book and I understand why Germany couldn't fully use Western Europe and other things, but I still don't understand how exactly the Soviet Union managed to so badly outproduce Germany in 1942 even while losing it's Western territories.

I mean, the Soviets couldn't have had many more resources than the Germans did in 1942 yet they produced twice as many aircraft and artillery and even more tanks. And Lend-Lease wasn't a factor until 1943.

What happened?
Germany produced more ammunition and explosives than the USSR in 1942:

Artillery, mortar and rocket production, 1942, thousands:
Germany: 204.690
USSR: 131.300

source: http://www.sturmvogel.orbat.com/SovWarProd.html

Explosives production, 1942, thousands of tons:
Germany: 290.783*
USSR: 125.000**

*http://www.sturmvogel.orbat.com/ussbsappd.html

**(based on Art's post:
art wrote:The most reliable figures I've seen are from I.Vernidub's book - 505 thousands tons of TNT and other individual exposives
, with are for the whole war)

The USSR produced twice as many tanks and 65% more aircraft. However, the quality of these tanks and aircraft was surely inferior. The Luftwaffe had air superiority over the Eastern front in 1942, and the USSR had on paper a greater supply of aircraft. Clearly these airplanes were not cutting edge.

Tanks and artillery pieces were a small proportion of total war production, while ammunition was a larger proportion of total war production than all other ground munitions items.

The strength of the USSR didn't lie in their industrial resources, with were smaller than Germany's, but in their manpower resources. They could lose several times the number of soldiers and still increase the size of the armed forces.

Germany had greater material resources than the USSR, as result their armies were better equipped and had more firepower. This is reflected in the losses:

Losses in the Eastern front in 1942:

Germany: 1.080.950
USSR: 7.369.278

source: Zetterling, Normandy 1944, German Military Organization , Combat Power and Operational Effectiveness.
"In tactics, as in strategy, superiority in numbers is the most common element of victory." - Carl von Clausewitz

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Re: German vs. Soviet production in 1942

Post by Guaporense » 06 Sep 2010 01:18

Soviet vs German production of industrial commodities (for Germany includes the supply of occupied countries, unless otherwise noted):

Black Coal, thousands of tons
USSR: 48.951
Germany: 338.200

Brow Coal (lignite), thousands of tons
USSR: 26.585
Germany: 248.900 (for Greater Germany only)

Coke, thousands of tons
USSR: 6.903
Germany: 64.800

Pig Iron, thousands of tons
USSR: 3.897
Germany: 24.900

Steel, thousands of tons
USSR: 8.070
Germany: 32.100

Aluminium, tons:
USSR: 52.000
Germany: 263.900 (for Greater Germany only)

Sources:
USSR: http://www.sturmvogel.orbat.com/sovprod.html
Germany: http://www.sturmvogel.orbat.com/SteelCoal.html
With exception of lignite and aluminium: http://www.axishistory.com/index.php?id=3631

The USSR managed to extract the most out of their limited materials. Although the final production of munitions was smaller than Germany's, it was still larger in proportion than the production of raw materials. For example, the USSR produced 5 times less aluminium than Germany, but managed to make 5/3 of the aircraft in 1942. How they did it? First, their aluminium supply was expanded by lend-lease deliveries with totaled 328.100 tons of aluminium for the entire war, greater than their production for 6 years (1940-1945).

Total Soviet supply of aluminium during the 1940-1945 period was 591.100 tons, or 98.500 tons per year, compared to 1.888.200 tons for Germany in the 1940-1944 period, or 377.640 per year in average. Both statistics probably include all sources of supply, including production in occupied countries, for Germany. Still, Soviet Aircraft production was 150.000 for the war while German aircraft production for the war was 120.000.

Sources for the aluminium figures:
USSR: http://www.sturmvogel.orbat.com/SovLendLease.html
Germany: http://wwiiarchives.net/servlet/document/149/121/0

Supply of strategic resources for the duration of the war, Germany includes supply for 5 years (1940-1944), while USSR's data is for 6 years (1940-45):

Copper, metric tons:
Germany: 1.531.000 (1)
USSR: 857.600, (domestic production: 470.000, imports: 387.600) (2)

Aluminum, metric tons:
Germany: 1.888.200 (1)
USSR: 591.100, (domestic production: 263.000, imports: 328.100) (2)

Lead, metric tons:
Germany: 1.215.000 (1)
USSR: 406.000 (only includes domestic production) (3)

Zinc, metric tons:
Germany: 2.054.000 (1)
USSR: 384.000 (only includes domestic production) (3)

Nickel, metric tons:
Germany: 46.500 (1)
USSR: 69.000 (3) (they beat the Germans there, hurra!, and it only includes domestic production!)

Tin, metric tons:
Germany: 57.200 (1)
USSR: 17.302 (3) (only includes domestic production)

Machine tools, units:
Germany: 813.880 (4)
USSR: 160.104 (domestic production: 115.400, imports: 44.704 ) (2)

Even the Soviet supply of aircraft fuel was smaller than Germany's, and the USSR had much greater oil resources than Germany. Still, Soviet production totaled only 1.8 million tons, comparable to German annual figures!

Supply of aircraft fuel in 1942, tons:

Germany: 1.472.000 (5)
USSR: 912.000 (2)

During the entire war, only 41% of Soviet fuel supply was produced locally, if the proportion held for 1942, that means that Soviet aircraft fuel production in 1942 was 373.000 tons, or 1/4 of German production for the same year. Although they produced more aircraft, USSR's potential air force strength was much smaller than Germany's thanks to their small fuel production. However, with lend-lease imports they managed to reduce the difference.

Sources:
(1) http://wwiiarchives.net/servlet/document/149/121/0
(2) http://www.sturmvogel.orbat.com/SovLendLease.html
(3) http://www.sturmvogel.orbat.com/sovprod.html
(4) http://wwiiarchives.net/servlet/document/149/234/0
(5) http://wwiiarchives.net/servlet/document/113/122/0
Last edited by Guaporense on 06 Sep 2010 03:03, edited 4 times in total.
"In tactics, as in strategy, superiority in numbers is the most common element of victory." - Carl von Clausewitz

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Re: German vs. Soviet production in 1942

Post by Guaporense » 06 Sep 2010 01:43

The Eastern front is a classic example of a side with inferior material resources winning a war of attrition thanks to their greater manpower supply. With wasn't really much larger:

Size of the labor force, 1942:
Germany: 45.030.000
USSR: 54.700.000

source: The Economics of World War II, page 160 for Germany and 285 for the USSR

And their industrial labor force was smaller:

Size of the industrial labor force, 1942:
Germany: 10.105.000
USSR: 8.700.000

source: The Economics of World War II, page 160 for Germany and 285 for the USSR

And the size of their armed forces wasn't that much larger:

Size of the armed forces, 1942:
Germany: 8.410.000
USSR: 11.340.000

source: The Economics of World War II, page 14

Actually, the smaller industrial production meant that the USSR needed less manpower in their industry, and they could send more manpower into the front. While Germany's multi front war strategic situation implied that they couldn't focus all of their resources in a single front, while the USSR could. This helps to explain why the Wehrmacht was greatly outnumbered in late 1942, when the respective sizes of the armed forces of both countries weren't much different.
"In tactics, as in strategy, superiority in numbers is the most common element of victory." - Carl von Clausewitz

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Re: German vs. Soviet production in 1942

Post by bf109 emil » 06 Sep 2010 07:26

While Germany's multi front war strategic situation implied that they couldn't focus all of their resources in a single front, while the USSR could.
1942?? the second front for Germany consisted of a token force sent to aid the Italian theatre in the Med...hardly a second front!! It wasn't until late in 42 when the second front was already all but lost that Germany ramped up it's efforts in equipment sent to Tunisia in an already loosing cause.
Size of the industrial labor force, 1942:
Germany: 10.105.000
USSR: 8.700.000
German or forced?

# The period from 1938, when the Organisation Todt proper was founded until 1942, when the huge increase in the demand for labour created by the various military and paramilitary projects was met by a series of expansions of the laws on compulsory service, which ultimately obligated all Germans to arbitrarily determined (i.e. effectively unlimited) compulsory labour for the state: Zwangsarbeit.[11] From 1938-40, Over 1.75 million Germans were conscripted into labour service. From 1940-42, Organization Todt began its reliance on Gastarbeitnehmer (guest workers), Militärinternierte (military internees), Zivilarbeiter (civilian workers), Ostarbeiter (Eastern workers) and Hilfswillige ("volunteer") POW workers.
# The period from 1942 until the end of the war, with approximately 1.4 million labourers in the service of the Organisation Todt. Overall, 1% were Germans rejected from military service and 1.5% were concentration camp prisoners; the rest were prisoners of war and compulsory labourers from occupied countries. All were effectively treated as slaves and existed in the complete and arbitrary service of a ruthless totalitarian state. Many did not survive the work or the war.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forced_lab ... rld_War_II

but what is interesting is as Guaprenese points out Germany industry had in almost every category a numerical superiority over the Soviet Union in 1942...Lend Lease to the Soviet Union in 1942 was minimal if hardly scene at the front. The Bulk of munitions, armor, logistics being made, advantages in resources went solely to combat a single front as IIRC 95% of German munitions in 1942 went to the Soviet Union and a scant (5% to North Africa)and yet still Wehrmacht losses in the Soviet union against a weaker and inferior economy where staggering to say the least

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Re: German vs. Soviet production in 1942

Post by ljadw » 06 Sep 2010 09:02

Guaporense wrote:
CJK1990 wrote:Okay so I read the Tooze book and I understand why Germany couldn't fully use Western Europe and other things, but I still don't understand how exactly the Soviet Union managed to so badly outproduce Germany in 1942 even while losing it's Western territories.

I mean, the Soviets couldn't have had many more resources than the Germans did in 1942 yet they produced twice as many aircraft and artillery and even more tanks. And Lend-Lease wasn't a factor until 1943.

What happened?
Germany produced more ammunition and explosives than the USSR in 1942:

Artillery, mortar and rocket production, 1942, thousands:
Germany: 204.690
USSR: 131.300

source: http://www.sturmvogel.orbat.com/SovWarProd.html

Explosives production, 1942, thousands of tons:
Germany: 290.783*
USSR: 125.000**

*http://www.sturmvogel.orbat.com/ussbsappd.html

**(based on Art's post:
art wrote:The most reliable figures I've seen are from I.Vernidub's book - 505 thousands tons of TNT and other individual exposives
, with are for the whole war)

The USSR produced twice as many tanks and 65% more aircraft. However, the quality of these tanks and aircraft was surely inferior. The Luftwaffe had air superiority over the Eastern front in 1942, and the USSR had on paper a greater supply of aircraft. Clearly these airplanes were not cutting edge.

Tanks and artillery pieces were a small proportion of total war production, while ammunition was a larger proportion of total war production than all other ground munitions items.

The strength of the USSR didn't lie in their industrial resources, with were smaller than Germany's, but in their manpower resources. They could lose several times the number of soldiers and still increase the size of the armed forces.

Germany had greater material resources than the USSR, as result their armies were better equipped and had more firepower. This is reflected in the losses:

Losses in the Eastern front in 1942:

Germany: 1.080.950
USSR: 7.369.278

source: Zetterling, Normandy 1944, German Military Organization , Combat Power and Operational Effectiveness.[/quote
"however,the quality of these tanks and aircraft was surely inferior"
Why ?Maybe you could enlighten us and give your reasons for this curious statement ?
"the Soviets couldn't have many more resources than the Germans in 1942"
Why? Maybe you could enlighten us and give your reasons for this curious statement ?

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Re: German vs. Soviet production in 1942

Post by ljadw » 06 Sep 2010 09:09

Guaporense,what do you mean that only 41 % of the Soviet fuel was produced locally ?
Do you mean that 59 % of the Soviet fuel did come from Lend Lease ? :roll: And do you have any proof ?

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Re: German vs. Soviet production in 1942

Post by ljadw » 06 Sep 2010 09:20

Guaporense wrote:The Eastern front is a classic example of a side with inferior material resources winning a war of attrition thanks to their greater manpower supply. With wasn't really much larger:

Size of the labor force, 1942:
Germany: 45.030.000
USSR: 54.700.000

source: The Economics of World War II, page 160 for Germany and 285 for the USSR

And their industrial labor force was smaller:

Size of the industrial labor force, 1942:
Germany: 10.105.000
USSR: 8.700.000

source: The Economics of World War II, page 160 for Germany and 285 for the USSR

And the size of their armed forces wasn't that much larger:

Size of the armed forces, 1942:
Germany: 8.410.000
USSR: 11.340.000

source: The Economics of World War II, page 14

Actually, the smaller industrial production meant that the USSR needed less manpower in their industry, and they could send more manpower into the front. While Germany's multi front war strategic situation implied that they couldn't focus all of their resources in a single front, while the USSR could. This helps to explain why the Wehrmacht was greatly outnumbered in late 1942, when the respective sizes of the armed forces of both countries weren't much different.
Due to the existence of the second front (already in june 1941:the Germans attacked the SU with less aircraft and artillery,than in may 1940),only a third of the Wehrmacht was available for the east,thus the number of 8410000 is not that important .

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Re: German vs. Soviet production in 1942

Post by bf109 emil » 06 Sep 2010 09:30

ljadw wrote:Guaporense,what do you mean that only 41 % of the Soviet fuel was produced locally ?
Do you mean that 59 % of the Soviet fuel did come from Lend Lease ? :roll: And do you have any proof ?
I too would like proof or sources as LL to Soviet Forces in 1942 was minimal if and at best.

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Re: German vs. Soviet production in 1942

Post by Jon G. » 06 Sep 2010 12:18

ljadw wrote:Guaporense,what do you mean that only 41 % of the Soviet fuel was produced locally ?
Do you mean that 59 % of the Soviet fuel did come from Lend Lease ? :roll: And do you have any proof ?
Don't worry, he is just cherry-picking figures to suit his misguided agenda. According to the figures from Jason Long's site, 59% of Soviet avgas was supplied via L-L, and 41% was produced domestically, which seems credible enough to me.

But if you scroll down just a wee bit you'll see that the Soviets were apparently 97.5% self-sufficient in automotive fuel.

As for his other comparisons, they are fully as misleading as we've come to expect from Guaporense: he is comparing German stocks and captures of selected strategic materials with Soviet production & L-L deliveries of the same materials. Which, in practical terms, amounts to comparing your savings with my income, i.e. apples and oranges.

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Re: German vs. Soviet production in 1942

Post by Art » 06 Sep 2010 16:46

Jon G. wrote: Don't worry, he is just cherry-picking figures to suit his misguided agenda. According to the figures from Jason Long's site, 59% of Soviet avgas was supplied via L-L, and 41% was produced domestically
Stirmvogel's figures are taken from this source:
http://www.teatrskazka.com/Raznoe/StatS ... 04.html#t6
in which nothing actually idicates that aviation gasoline number do inclide foreign deliveries. The table is called "Production of fuel". So 59% are under large question mark. The army reported consumption of 4 481,4 thousands ton of aviation fuel from 22 June 1941 to 1 June 1945, of which 2 998,4 thousands tons of high-octane and 1 483,0 thousands taon of low-octane fuel. Import deliveries for the army were 1170,1 thousands tons, of which 450,3 thousands were mixed with 668 thousands tons of Soviet-produed low-octane aviation fuel yeilding 1118,3 thousands of resulting product suitable for combat aircraft. Army stocks of aviation fuel increased from 537,6 thousands tons at the start of the war to 722,8 thousands by the end. In automotive fuel army's consumption was 5750,1 thousands tons, deliveries from domestic industry were 4790,1 thousands of 7712,8 thousands of total production. 12,9 thousands tons were imported for the army from the West. Army stocks decresed from 587,0 thousands to 267,5 thousands tons. Use of Eastern European (mostly Romanian) sources was considerable enough. Total 816,5 thousands tons were delivered for the Soviet Army: 82,8 thousands tons of aviation fuel, 615 - automotive, 98,3 - diesel fuel. All the figures are from a report on army rear serives activities of June 1946. In general leand-lease aviation fuel deliveries was quantitatively and qualitatively important, automotive - negligible.

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Re: German vs. Soviet production in 1942

Post by bf109 emil » 06 Sep 2010 20:42

During the entire war, only 41% of Soviet fuel supply was produced locally, if the proportion held for 1942, that means that Soviet aircraft fuel production in 1942 was 373.000 tons, or 1/4 of German production for the same year.
how can comparing Soviet fuel produced in 1943, 1944, 1945 reflect on stocks available for 1942?

again flawed logic by Guaprenese reflecting upon numbers which show and no significant value as to production, usage and supplies to Soviet forces in 1942 and production capacity of 1941 and 1942 which would reflect on Soviet fuel production and consumption required for campaigns in 1942...
Art wrote'...In general leand-lease aviation fuel deliveries was quantitatively and qualitatively important,
agreed and is the figure for LL aviation fuel sent in/for 1942 and quantities used in 1942 perhaps be found as to show whether Soviet Air forces suffered, where grounded or would have been as a result of which LL fuel alleviated this problem?
Guaprenese wrote and posted earlier'Soviet vs German production of industrial commodities (for Germany includes the supply of occupied countries, unless otherwise noted):
I have no qualm with this, but perhaps guaprenese could have also sourced other then Germany's ability to smelt, obtain, produce various commodities as to Germany's dependence of these material sources , the availability of these resources found within the Greater German reich (essentially Germany itself) and compare how Germany's lack of resources obtained locally from Germany itself reflected upon German industry being forced, deprived and aggressive action personally was needed in order to secure these commodities in order for German industry to produce...simply put the Soviet Union held a huge advantage over Germany in raw materials, and Germany's absence of these required her to buy, conquer or alleviate from occupied countries if and had Germany any hope of establishing a dominance over the Soviet union in materials made...source for a comparison of raw materials between the 2 countries can be scene here...http://www.sturmvogel.orbat.com/resources.html

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