German vs. Soviet production in 1942

[Guaporense]

Well then, using his data on US ammo consumption we have these figures:

Ammunition consumption

Germany - Eastern front 1944 ---- 2,132,463 tons (12 months)
USA ------- Western front 44-45 -- 1,469,610 tons (11 months) (arty only)

German strength in the Eastern front in 44 averaged about 2.25 million men:

january 44 ---- 2.53 million
febraury 44 --- 2.37 million
march 44 ----- 2.34 million
april 44 ------- 2.25 million
may 44 ------- 2.24 million
june 44 ------- 2.22 million
july 44 -------- 2.20 million

source: Germany and the Second World War volume V/IIB, page 1020.

After Bagration the size of the army collapsed further, so I think an average of 2.25 million is a good guess for 1944. Which means per soldier yearly ammo consumption was 950 kg.

US strength is hard to compare, but that's the data I have:



Theater strength minus airforces was 1.2 million in June 44 and 2.5 million in march 45, on average about 1.85 million, which implies in per capita ammunition consumption of 800 kg per year. Although if we look only at "field forces" the average strength is 1.2 million which would imply in per capita ammunition consumption of 1,300 kg per year.

[Yuri]

Well then, using his data on US ammo consumption we have these figures:

Ammunition consumption

Germany - Eastern front 1944 ---- 2,132,463 tons (12 months)
USA ------- Western front 44-45 -- 1,469,610 tons (11 months) (arty only)

German strength in the Eastern front in 44 averaged about 2.25 million men:

january 44 ---- 2.53 million
febraury 44 --- 2.37 million
march 44 ----- 2.34 million
april 44 ------- 2.25 million
may 44 ------- 2.24 million
june 44 ------- 2.22 million
july 44 -------- 2.20 million

source: Germany and the Second World War volume V/IIB, page 1020.

After Bagration the size of the army collapsed further, so I think an average of 2.25 million is a good guess for 1944. Which means per soldier yearly ammo consumption was 950 kg.

Nonsense. The total consumption of ammunition for the 12 months divided by the average monthly number of staff. The correct way would be: either the average monthly consumption of ammunition divided by the average monthly number of staff; or the total consumption of ammunition for the year divided by the total number of staff received on the front during the year. In addition, the number of staff should include everyone, not just Heer. On the Eastern front, the Heer staff. no more than 60% of the total land forces of the Third Reich, acting on this front. And yet, as stated by Hitler at the meeting on 30 December 1944, half of the shells, taken to the Eastern front, fell into Russian hands. And the picture is quite different.

[Art]

German strength in the Eastern front in 44 averaged about 2.25 million men:

january 44 ---- 2.53 million
febraury 44 --- 2.37 million
march 44 ----- 2.34 million
april 44 ------- 2.25 million
may 44 ------- 2.24 million
june 44 ------- 2.22 million
july 44 -------- 2.20 million

source: Germany and the Second World War volume V/IIB, page 1020.

Actually the numbers after March 1944 are forecasts, which one would expect from a document compiled on 16.04.44.

[Yuri]

German strength in the Eastern front in 44 averaged about 2.25 million men:

january 44 ---- 2.53 million
febraury 44 --- 2.37 million
march 44 ----- 2.34 million
april 44 ------- 2.25 million
may 44 ------- 2.24 million
june 44 ------- 2.22 million
july 44 -------- 2.20 million

source: Germany and the Second World War volume V/IIB, page 1020.

Actually the numbers after March 1944 are forecasts, which one would expect from a document compiled on 16.04.44.

And this is not entirely true.
All figures in this document are calculated. I published the document ten years ago http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 0&start=75.
As you can see, the document is compiled from data as of February 1, 1944. That is, data of February and March not the actual numbers, but estimated. Moreover, from the entire package of documents (documents from the so-called the Keitel's folder) follows - only for 1 December 1943 data is accurate http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 0&start=60.
Thus, data for January 1944, the same design.
At the same time, data for January determined without consideration of the forces which were transferred to the Eastern front for the operation "Fischotter".
This ambitious operation Manstein offered Hitler on 4 January 1944. The essence of the operation was to surround and defeat the forces of the 1st Ukrainian front, to seize Kiev. In other words, Manstein wanted to restore the front on the river Dnieper in the area from Cherkassy to Pripyat. In the operation to use: in the center - 1st and 4th Panzer army; on the right flank - of the 42nd army corps of the 8th army; the left flank - forces of the commander of German troops, security forces and police in Ukraine. At the same time, as ground forces in the band of the 1st Tank army was used by the 10th anti-aircraft division (mot.), and in the band of the 8th Army 17th anti-aircraft division (mot.).
Further, from a document dated 01 December 1943, it follows that the forces of the Wehrmacht are not included: foreign volunteers, internees and POWs in units of the Wehrmacht - 1 320 191; SS troops and police forces on occupied territories - 800 000 (taking into account the forces in Germany); auxiliary formation - 967 000 (including TOD's formation - 800 000).
Thus, to the Guaporense's calculate used document of 15 April 1994 is meaningless.
In fact, this document reflects the factional bickering inside the Wehrmacht for resources. The document is drawn up with the sole purpose - to obtain from Hitler additional troops for OstHeer.
Well, for snack can add that in operation "Fischotter" was used four Hungarian divisions - two on the site of the 4th Panzer army and two in the site of the commander of the German troops , security forces and police in Ukraine (area Rivno-Sarny).

[Art]

Well, actual numbers of German Army personnel in June 1944 are sort of known:



We have more than 2.8 mlns on the Eastern Front (including 20 Geb. AOK, SS and foreign troops) and also about 0.3 mln of Hiwis

[Stiltzkin]

This is only if you include non-combat GHQ units and units directly under command of the of OKH. Mostly irrelevant to his calculation, also it does not refute his point about per capita ammunition availability, since the values for richer nations are always higher. Iststärken are never a good indicator for actual troop strength. Ration strength and actual strengths can still give an inflated number. Verpflegungsstärke includes various non-c. personnel, as well.

Using such estimates above divisional level distorts strengths. The lower you go, the more accurate they become. If you want to make cross country comparisons on Army group level, it is best to use daily strengths.

[Guaporense]

Well, I guess the 4.34 million men figure is comparable to the 3.06 million for the US in April 30 or 2.6 million in November 30: total manpower in the front. In that case per capita ammunition consumption figures are kinda similar: 2.1 million tons over 4.3 million troops is about 480 kg, while 1.4 million tons over 2.6 million troops is about 540 kg.

[EL KAISER]

Soviet vs German production of industrial commodities (for Germany includes the supply of occupied countries, unless otherwise noted):

Black Coal, thousands of tons
USSR: 48.951
Germany: 338.200

Brow Coal (lignite), thousands of tons
USSR: 26.585
Germany: 248.900 (for Greater Germany only)

Coke, thousands of tons
USSR: 6.903
Germany: 64.800

Pig Iron, thousands of tons
USSR: 3.897
Germany: 24.900

Steel, thousands of tons
USSR: 8.070
Germany: 32.100

Aluminium, tons:
USSR: 52.000
Germany: 263.900 (for Greater Germany only)

Sources:
USSR: http://www.sturmvogel.orbat.com/sovprod.html
Germany: http://www.sturmvogel.orbat.com/SteelCoal.html
With exception of lignite and aluminium: http://www.axishistory.com/index.php?id=3631

The USSR managed to extract the most out of their limited materials. Although the final production of munitions was smaller than Germany's, it was still larger in proportion than the production of raw materials. For example, the USSR produced 5 times less aluminium than Germany, but managed to make 5/3 of the aircraft in 1942. How they did it? First, their aluminium supply was expanded by lend-lease deliveries with totaled 328.100 tons of aluminium for the entire war, greater than their production for 6 years (1940-1945).

Total Soviet supply of aluminium during the 1940-1945 period was 591.100 tons, or 98.500 tons per year, compared to 1.888.200 tons for Germany in the 1940-1944 period, or 377.640 per year in average. Both statistics probably include all sources of supply, including production in occupied countries, for Germany. Still, Soviet Aircraft production was 150.000 for the war while German aircraft production for the war was 120.000.

Sources for the aluminium figures:
USSR: http://www.sturmvogel.orbat.com/SovLendLease.html
Germany: http://wwiiarchives.net/servlet/document/149/121/0

Supply of strategic resources for the duration of the war, Germany includes supply for 5 years (1940-1944), while USSR's data is for 6 years (1940-45):

Copper, metric tons:
Germany: 1.531.000 (1)
USSR: 857.600, (domestic production: 470.000, imports: 387.600) (2)

Aluminum, metric tons:
Germany: 1.888.200 (1)
USSR: 591.100, (domestic production: 263.000, imports: 328.100) (2)

Lead, metric tons:
Germany: 1.215.000 (1)
USSR: 406.000 (only includes domestic production) (3)

Zinc, metric tons:
Germany: 2.054.000 (1)
USSR: 384.000 (only includes domestic production) (3)

Nickel, metric tons:
Germany: 46.500 (1)
USSR: 69.000 (3) (they beat the Germans there, hurra!, and it only includes domestic production!)

Tin, metric tons:
Germany: 57.200 (1)
USSR: 17.302 (3) (only includes domestic production)

Machine tools, units:
Germany: 813.880 (4)
USSR: 160.104 (domestic production: 115.400, imports: 44.704 ) (2)

Even the Soviet supply of aircraft fuel was smaller than Germany's, and the USSR had much greater oil resources than Germany. Still, Soviet production totaled only 1.8 million tons, comparable to German annual figures!

Supply of aircraft fuel in 1942, tons:

Germany: 1.472.000 (5)
USSR: 912.000 (2)

During the entire war, only 41% of Soviet fuel supply was produced locally, if the proportion held for 1942, that means that Soviet aircraft fuel production in 1942 was 373.000 tons, or 1/4 of German production for the same year. Although they produced more aircraft, USSR's potential air force strength was much smaller than Germany's thanks to their small fuel production. However, with lend-lease imports they managed to reduce the difference.

Sources:
(1) http://wwiiarchives.net/servlet/document/149/121/0
(2) http://www.sturmvogel.orbat.com/SovLendLease.html
(3) http://www.sturmvogel.orbat.com/sovprod.html
(4) http://wwiiarchives.net/servlet/document/149/234/0
(5) http://wwiiarchives.net/servlet/document/113/122/0

Let me get this straight: You are saying that during the year 1942, the Third Reich had much more resources than the USSR?, and had 60% of its Oil Production? But that would mean that in a economic war against the USSR, Hitler would surely have won! If what you say is true, then the Eastern front setbacks weren't because the Red Army had more resources, but because of solely military defeats (In 1942, i consider the Fuhrer the prime author of mililtary defeats).

Many people claim that Operation Blue was doomed to failure because Germans didn't have as much military resources as the Soviets. But according to you, this claim isn't true... Operation Blue COULD have succeed and leave USSR in a VERY poor shape... perhaps even decide the war in the east.

Also, could you please tell me where your resources come from? Because http://www.sturmvogel.orbat.com/SovLendLease.html doesn't load to me. I get an error message. What is that? Some sort of Military Statistics page? Can you give me the name?

[Stiltzkin]

Let me get this straight: You are saying that during the year 1942, the Third Reich had much more resources than the USSR?, and had 60% of its Oil Production? But that would mean that in a economic war against the USSR, Hitler would surely have won! If what you say is true, then the Eastern front setbacks weren't because the Red Army had more resources, but because of solely military defeats (In 1942, i consider the Fuhrer the prime author of mililtary defeats)

Resources and raw materials are two different things. Just because you are swimming on resources does not mean you can salvage them effectively if your industry is underdeveloped.
Production of certain types of weapons (or the limited field thereof) has little to do with the overall war economy. You also need more labourforce in order to increase production levels independent of capital stock. Yes, the aggregate figures are greater for Germany plus annexed vis the Soviet Union only the combined assets of Allies and Soviets surpass them. The economic backbone of the Allies were the United States, while the Soviets provided the manpower.
On the other hand, the EF setbacks Germany experienced were caused by the Red Armys superior manpower and their ability to replace Divisions at a higher pace than the Wehrmacht could destroy and yes, the USSR was in a terrible situation in the 4th quarter of 1942, overall losing more men relative to the birthrates (or replacement rate of the enemy) to the size of their labourforce or total available "pool". They were stabilized by the WAllies investement and supply, while also introducing massive cuts in the civil sector. The rapid loss of manpower induced by the Axis powers invasion and high rate of attrition meant that victory in a war of attrition would be impossible - "luckily" the Wehrmacht could not keep up such a ratio (beyond their summer offensives of 41/42 and defensive battles of 43 that is) and sustained a gradual decline in manpower relative to the Soviet buildup.

[ljadw]

Soviet vs German production of industrial commodities (for Germany includes the supply of occupied countries, unless otherwise noted):

Black Coal, thousands of tons
USSR: 48.951
Germany: 338.200

Brow Coal (lignite), thousands of tons
USSR: 26.585
Germany: 248.900 (for Greater Germany only)

Coke, thousands of tons
USSR: 6.903
Germany: 64.800

Pig Iron, thousands of tons
USSR: 3.897
Germany: 24.900

Steel, thousands of tons
USSR: 8.070
Germany: 32.100

Aluminium, tons:
USSR: 52.000
Germany: 263.900 (for Greater Germany only)

Sources:
USSR: http://www.sturmvogel.orbat.com/sovprod.html
Germany: http://www.sturmvogel.orbat.com/SteelCoal.html
With exception of lignite and aluminium: http://www.axishistory.com/index.php?id=3631

The USSR managed to extract the most out of their limited materials. Although the final production of munitions was smaller than Germany's, it was still larger in proportion than the production of raw materials. For example, the USSR produced 5 times less aluminium than Germany, but managed to make 5/3 of the aircraft in 1942. How they did it? First, their aluminium supply was expanded by lend-lease deliveries with totaled 328.100 tons of aluminium for the entire war, greater than their production for 6 years (1940-1945).

Total Soviet supply of aluminium during the 1940-1945 period was 591.100 tons, or 98.500 tons per year, compared to 1.888.200 tons for Germany in the 1940-1944 period, or 377.640 per year in average. Both statistics probably include all sources of supply, including production in occupied countries, for Germany. Still, Soviet Aircraft production was 150.000 for the war while German aircraft production for the war was 120.000.

Sources for the aluminium figures:
USSR: http://www.sturmvogel.orbat.com/SovLendLease.html
Germany: http://wwiiarchives.net/servlet/document/149/121/0

Supply of strategic resources for the duration of the war, Germany includes supply for 5 years (1940-1944), while USSR's data is for 6 years (1940-45):

Copper, metric tons:
Germany: 1.531.000 (1)
USSR: 857.600, (domestic production: 470.000, imports: 387.600) (2)

Aluminum, metric tons:
Germany: 1.888.200 (1)
USSR: 591.100, (domestic production: 263.000, imports: 328.100) (2)

Lead, metric tons:
Germany: 1.215.000 (1)
USSR: 406.000 (only includes domestic production) (3)

Zinc, metric tons:
Germany: 2.054.000 (1)
USSR: 384.000 (only includes domestic production) (3)

Nickel, metric tons:
Germany: 46.500 (1)
USSR: 69.000 (3) (they beat the Germans there, hurra!, and it only includes domestic production!)

Tin, metric tons:
Germany: 57.200 (1)
USSR: 17.302 (3) (only includes domestic production)

Machine tools, units:
Germany: 813.880 (4)
USSR: 160.104 (domestic production: 115.400, imports: 44.704 ) (2)

Even the Soviet supply of aircraft fuel was smaller than Germany's, and the USSR had much greater oil resources than Germany. Still, Soviet production totaled only 1.8 million tons, comparable to German annual figures!

Supply of aircraft fuel in 1942, tons:

Germany: 1.472.000 (5)
USSR: 912.000 (2)

During the entire war, only 41% of Soviet fuel supply was produced locally, if the proportion held for 1942, that means that Soviet aircraft fuel production in 1942 was 373.000 tons, or 1/4 of German production for the same year. Although they produced more aircraft, USSR's potential air force strength was much smaller than Germany's thanks to their small fuel production. However, with lend-lease imports they managed to reduce the difference.

Sources:
(1) http://wwiiarchives.net/servlet/document/149/121/0
(2) http://www.sturmvogel.orbat.com/SovLendLease.html
(3) http://www.sturmvogel.orbat.com/sovprod.html
(4) http://wwiiarchives.net/servlet/document/149/234/0
(5) http://wwiiarchives.net/servlet/document/113/122/0

Let me get this straight: You are saying that during the year 1942, the Third Reich had much more resources than the USSR?, and had 60% of its Oil Production? But that would mean that in a economic war against the USSR, Hitler would surely have won! If what you say is true, then the Eastern front setbacks weren't because the Red Army had more resources, but because of solely military defeats (In 1942, i consider the Fuhrer the prime author of mililtary defeats).

Many people claim that Operation Blue was doomed to failure because Germans didn't have as much military resources as the Soviets. But according to you, this claim isn't true... Operation Blue COULD have succeed and leave USSR in a VERY poor shape... perhaps even decide the war in the east.

Also, could you please tell me where your resources come from? Because http://www.sturmvogel.orbat.com/SovLendLease.html doesn't load to me. I get an error message. What is that? Some sort of Military Statistics page? Can you give me the name?

1) The oil production figures are wrong : Soviet oil production in 1942 was 22 million ton (source : Overy ),German production (including import) was 9.6 million (source : Eichholtz)

2) They are also meaningless :

only some 15 % of Soviet oil production/consumption ? was consumed by the military

Before the war the SU produced more oil than it consumed, resulting in big reserves (source : Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg)

We don't know if the SU needed /consumed more or less oil during the war than before the war ,thus : 22 million in 1942 (it was 33 million in 1941) does not indicate a shortage.

We need also consum(tion and needs figures.

3) Point 2 applies also to the other raw materials: that Germany produced more aluminium than the USSR does not indicate a benefit for Germany or a disadvantage for the USSR .