German vs. Soviet production in 1942

Discussions on the economic history of the nations taking part in WW2, from the recovery after the depression until the economy at war.
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LWD
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Re: German vs. Soviet production in 1942

Post by LWD » 07 Oct 2010 12:26

Guaporense wrote: .... But, during the war the situation changed: Germany conquered vast tracks of land, which for example doubled their coal supply, while the USSR suffered the terrible blow of Barbarossa and didn't recover their pre war supply of these industrial raw materials until the post war years. USSR's supply of coal decreased by about half.

Black Coal production:
1940
Germany (Altreich) - 182,600,000 tons
USSR - 139,974,000 tons (76.7% of Germany's production)

These production figures are about the same as in 1938, but I don't have the exact data for the USSR. But as your table shows, in 1938 the USSR had 65.7% of Germany's coal production.

1942
Germany (all occupied territories) - 338,200,000 tons
USSR - 48,951,000 tons (14.5% of Germany's production)
It's not at all clear that these stats confirm your postion. For one thing how much of this production change was due to conquered lands vs increased production from existing fields for Germany? Coal was also one of the minerals in abundance in Germany and surrounding lands. It's not at all clear that the situation with coal was similar to other minerals. Furthermore even if Germany conquered mineral producing areas they weren't necessarily able to make anywhere near full use of them in WWII. Petrolium might be a rather classic counter example to your use of coal.
.... By the 4 quarter of 1942, ....
It is interesting that you keep using 42 as your reference year.

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Re: German vs. Soviet production in 1942

Post by LWD » 07 Oct 2010 12:42

Guaporense wrote:
LWD wrote:
Guaporense wrote: ... Based on the statistics that I have studied I came to the conclusion that the survival of the USSR depended on the direct help of the western allies, mostly the US.
That's nice. Most of us are not so certain.
Yep, the myth that the USSR had some kind of industrial superiority over Germany is deeply entrenched.
Strawman
.... In some areas Japan had more material resources than the US.
In what areas? Certainly they were far worse off in comparison to the US than the USSR was in comparison to Germany.
If the US's industrial production were 10 times Japan's during WW2, Germany's industrial production was 5 times USSR's.
Are these hypothetical numbers or can you document them?
The fact is that Germany controlled most of Western Europe, which was one of the two cores of the world economy. The USSR in 1942-43 was only a poor rump state occuping some peripheric areas of Europe and siberia.

The only country that controlled comparable resources was the US.
Great Britain controled more resources than Germany.
Without the help of the western allies the USSR wouldn't be able to survive a full scale invasion for a indeterminate period.
Obviously true but then Germany couldn't sustain a full scale invasion for an indeterminant period either. The question is who would run out of steam first. As LL and the west made little impact in late 41 and 42 when the Soviets stopped the Germans it's not at all clear that the Germans could outlast the Soviets. Indeed wasn't their whole campaign based on defeating the Soviets in 41?
The Germans never focused their entire warmaking potential agaisnt the USSR.
They came pretty close in 41 and it's not at all clear that focusing more of it would have helped that much. Also note that the huge gains that the Germans made in that year had little to do with relative "warmaking potential".
...
As a example of this is the fact that when they failed to defeat the USSR in 1941,them by early 1942 they increased steel allocations to ammunition production, which were the primary factor in the start of Speer's armaments miracle. So, they could have easily increased production of tanks, guns, ammunition and other army items before 1942, but they didn't. Why? Because they underestimated the USSR.
Your example is flawed as are your conclusions.

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Re: German vs. Soviet production in 1942

Post by RichTO90 » 07 Oct 2010 14:52

LWD wrote:
Guaporense wrote:
LWD wrote:
Guaporense wrote: ... Based on the statistics that I have studied I came to the conclusion that the survival of the USSR depended on the direct help of the western allies, mostly the US.
That's nice. Most of us are not so certain.
Yep, the myth that the USSR had some kind of industrial superiority over Germany is deeply entrenched.
Strawman
Yes, of course it is a strawman - look at who is making the argument after all. However, the real problem in his conclusion is that it should read that "the survival of the USSR depended initially on the indirect help of the western allies, mostly Britain at first and then the direct help of the western allies, mostly the US."

But then the G-man doesn't like to think too hard about the consequences of painting with too wide a brush, since he's such a sloppy painter anyway... :roll: :lol:
Are these hypothetical numbers or can you document them?
Of course he can, how dare you doubt him? :roll: :lol:
The Germans never focused their entire warmaking potential agaisnt the USSR.
They came pretty close in 41 and it's not at all clear that focusing more of it would have helped that much. Also note that the huge gains that the Germans made in that year had little to do with relative "warmaking potential".
Actually damn close to 75% of their ground and air capability through about mid 1942. After that though it started shifting west again, starting with the air. Whether or not the missing 25% would have made the difference in 1941-1942 is the question. On the one hand it seems that the logistical capability was a finite limiter that wouldn't have changed much since the occupation forces in western Europe were esentially static and thus had little capability to add and that allocated to support Afrika Korps were minute. Further, many of those occupation divisions were of limited capability. On the other hand "quantity has a quality all its own" and the additional ground and air support couldn't have hurt. It may have enabled them to prosecute the encirclement battles slightly faster for example leaving the mobile forces capable of just that much more exploitation that became a tipping point.

Or not... :lol:

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Re: German vs. Soviet production in 1942

Post by Guaporense » 07 Oct 2010 20:53

LWD wrote:
Guaporense wrote:
LWD wrote:
Guaporense wrote: ... Based on the statistics that I have studied I came to the conclusion that the survival of the USSR depended on the direct help of the western allies, mostly the US.
That's nice. Most of us are not so certain.
Yep, the myth that the USSR had some kind of industrial superiority over Germany is deeply entrenched.
Strawman
I had the impression that many people think that the USSR and UK had superiority in material resources over Germany. When in fact, Germany had more material resources than both powers combined.
.... In some areas Japan had more material resources than the US.
In what areas? Certainly they were far worse off in comparison to the US than the USSR was in comparison to Germany.
That depends. In some areas the difference between the USSR and Germany was like the average difference between the US and Japan.

In 1942 Germany had 7 times more coal, had 4 times more steel and 5 times more iron. And produced 7 times more machine tools during the war and 3-4 times more aircraft fuel.
If the US's industrial production were 10 times Japan's during WW2, Germany's industrial production was 5 times USSR's.
Are these hypothetical numbers or can you document them?
I based them on the statistics about steel, coal, iron, & other industrial commodities.
The fact is that Germany controlled most of Western Europe, which was one of the two cores of the world economy. The USSR in 1942-43 was only a poor rump state occuping some peripheric areas of Europe and siberia.

The only country that controlled comparable resources was the US.
Great Britain controled more resources than Germany.
The UK controlled more population and more natural resources than Germany. Germany controlled greater human and industrial resources. The only country that controlled more industrial resources was the US.
LWD wrote:
Guaporense wrote: .... But, during the war the situation changed: Germany conquered vast tracks of land, which for example doubled their coal supply, while the USSR suffered the terrible blow of Barbarossa and didn't recover their pre war supply of these industrial raw materials until the post war years. USSR's supply of coal decreased by about half.

Black Coal production:
1940
Germany (Altreich) - 182,600,000 tons
USSR - 139,974,000 tons (76.7% of Germany's production)

These production figures are about the same as in 1938, but I don't have the exact data for the USSR. But as your table shows, in 1938 the USSR had 65.7% of Germany's coal production.

1942
Germany (all occupied territories) - 338,200,000 tons
USSR - 48,951,000 tons (14.5% of Germany's production)
It's not at all clear that these stats confirm your postion. For one thing how much of this production change was due to conquered lands vs increased production from existing fields for Germany?
Pretty much 100% of the change can be explained by conquered territories. Germany's coal production stagnated during the war.
Coal was also one of the minerals in abundance in Germany and surrounding lands. It's not at all clear that the situation with coal was similar to other minerals. Furthermore even if Germany conquered mineral producing areas they weren't necessarily able to make anywhere near full use of them in WWII. Petrolium might be a rather classic counter example to your use of coal.
Germany's oil supply increased from 1940 to 1943, while USSR's oil production was smaller in 1943 than in 1940, though it was still larger than Germany's.

The point is that in 1938 the USSR had nearly as much warmaking potential as Germany, but because of territorial changes by 1942 the picture changed greatly and by that date Germany was in a position of great material superiority over the USSR.
.... By the 4 quarter of 1942, ....
It is interesting that you keep using 42 as your reference year.
The name of of the tread: German vs. Soviet production in 1942.
Last edited by Guaporense on 07 Oct 2010 21:46, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: German vs. Soviet production in 1942

Post by Guaporense » 07 Oct 2010 21:37

LWD wrote:
Guaporense wrote:The Germans never focused their entire warmaking potential agaisnt the USSR.
They came pretty close in 41 and it's not at all clear that focusing more of it would have helped that much. Also note that the huge gains that the Germans made in that year had little to do with relative "warmaking potential".
In 1941 and 1942 the Germans focused 70-80% of their army and most of their airforce on the USSR. But they also didn't focus their resources on the maximization of present production of weapons.

Only in the final years of the war that Germany's production plans were focused on the maximization of the current stream of armament production. By the time that the US and UK were fully engaged.
...
As a example of this is the fact that when they failed to defeat the USSR in 1941,them by early 1942 they increased steel allocations to ammunition production, which were the primary factor in the start of Speer's armaments miracle. So, they could have easily increased production of tanks, guns, ammunition and other army items before 1942, but they didn't. Why? Because they underestimated the USSR.
Your example is flawed as are your conclusions.
My example shows that the production of army munitions, weapons, tanks, etc, was much lower than they could have acheived had they focused their resources on the maximum production of weapons for the invasion of the USSR.

When it was clear that the USSR wasn't going to be defeated in short time (January 1942), steel allocations to the production of army equipment increased and the production of ammunition, guns and tanks multiplied.

Actually, Germany's strategic planners didn't work with the contigency that the opening of the eastern front would mean a total war against a powerfull opponent. They thought that conquering the USSR would have been rather feasible in short time without a full scale mobilization of resources, only with 3/4 of the present military strength (1941 strength) would be enough to conquer the european part of the USSR.

If Germany didn't have to worry about the US and Britain, they could have attacked the USSR initially with 200 divisions instead of 150, they could have allocated millions of tons of steel to the production of army equipment, increasing production several times. They would have been able to mobilize greater number of armored divisions and mantain a much stronger eastern front. The allocation of resources between fronts doesn't take only the present number of divisions and replacements but also the long run strategic plan and the future contingencies that required present preparations, like the atlantic wall.

To illustrate the relative distribution of resources, at the time of the Stalingrad counter attack (1 November 1942), the Germans had 2,400,000 men in the eastern front while the USSR had 6,124,000. (source: Glantz, When Titans Clashed, page 302). However, the Wehrmacht had 8,410,000 men while the USSR's armed forces had 11,430,000 men. (source: Harrison, The Economics of World War Two, Page 14) in 1942.

In 1942 the Germans maintained 28.5% of their armed forces personnel in the eastern front, while the USSR maintained 53.6% of their armed forces personnel in the eastern front. A much smaller proportion of the Wehrmacht was engaged in the Eastern front than the Red Army's. If the Germans were allocating 100% of their resources agaisnt the USSR and fully neglecting the Western powers, they would have 4 million men in the eastern front with 30-40 armored divisions, instead of the historical 2.5 million men and 17-20 armored divisions.

The Germans never focused remotely all their resources agaisnt the USSR at any point during the Russo German war.
"In tactics, as in strategy, superiority in numbers is the most common element of victory." - Carl von Clausewitz

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Re: German vs. Soviet production in 1942

Post by Guaporense » 07 Oct 2010 21:54

To understand that Germany didn't focus on the present production of army armaments for the invasion of the USSR one should look at the graph of armaments production for the army from december 1938 to december 1944, provided by Tooze, Arming the Reich:

http://img801.imageshack.us/f/armaments ... nfort.jpg/

One notes that the two main armament production drives were between september 1939 and june 1940, when the Germans were mobilizing their army to the struggle in the western front. And between january 1942 and july 1944, when the Germans increased armament production for the army due to the mess that they became stuck in.

The mid 1940 armament production peak was only again reached in mid 1942, because from 1940 to 1942 the German high command wasn't planning a mobilization of resources for the army like they did agaisnt France between September 1939 and June 1940. The invasion of the USSR was a true blizkrieg plan, a plan that failed.
"In tactics, as in strategy, superiority in numbers is the most common element of victory." - Carl von Clausewitz

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Re: German vs. Soviet production in 1942

Post by ljadw » 07 Oct 2010 22:16

Guaporense wrote:
LWD wrote:
Guaporense wrote:The Germans never focused their entire warmaking potential agaisnt the USSR.
They came pretty close in 41 and it's not at all clear that focusing more of it would have helped that much. Also note that the huge gains that the Germans made in that year had little to do with relative "warmaking potential".
In 1941 and 1942 the Germans focused 70-80% of their army and most of their airforce on the USSR. But they also didn't focus their resources on the maximization of present production of weapons.

Only in the final years of the war that Germany's production plans were focused on the maximization of the current stream of armament production. By the time that the US and UK were fully engaged.
...
As a example of this is the fact that when they failed to defeat the USSR in 1941,them by early 1942 they increased steel allocations to ammunition production, which were the primary factor in the start of Speer's armaments miracle. So, they could have easily increased production of tanks, guns, ammunition and other army items before 1942, but they didn't. Why? Because they underestimated the USSR.
Your example is flawed as are your conclusions.
My example shows that the production of army munitions, weapons, tanks, etc, was much lower than they could have acheived had they focused their resources on the maximum production of weapons for the invasion of the USSR.

When it was clear that the USSR wasn't going to be defeated in short time (January 1942), steel allocations to the production of army equipment increased and the production of ammunition, guns and tanks multiplied.

Actually, Germany's strategic planners didn't work with the contigency that the opening of the eastern front would mean a total war against a powerfull opponent. They thought that conquering the USSR would have been rather feasible in short time without a full scale mobilization of resources, only with 3/4 of the present military strength (1941 strength) would be enough to conquer the european part of the USSR.

If Germany didn't have to worry about the US and Britain, they could have attacked the USSR initially with 200 divisions instead of 150, they could have allocated millions of tons of steel to the production of army equipment, increasing production several times. They would have been able to mobilize greater number of armored divisions and mantain a much stronger eastern front. The allocation of resources between fronts doesn't take only the present number of divisions and replacements but also the long run strategic plan and the future contingencies that required present preparations, like the atlantic wall.

To illustrate the relative distribution of resources, at the time of the Stalingrad counter attack (1 November 1942), the Germans had 2,400,000 men in the eastern front while the USSR had 6,124,000. (source: Glantz, When Titans Clashed, page 302). However, the Wehrmacht had 8,410,000 men while the USSR's armed forces had 11,430,000 men. (source: Harrison, The Economics of World War Two, Page 14) in 1942.

In 1942 the Germans maintained 28.5% of their armed forces personnel in the eastern front, while the USSR maintained 53.6% of their armed forces personnel in the eastern front. A much smaller proportion of the Wehrmacht was engaged in the Eastern front than the Red Army's. If the Germans were allocating 100% of their resources agaisnt the USSR and fully neglecting the Western powers, they would have 4 million men in the eastern front with 30-40 armored divisions, instead of the historical 2.5 million men and 17-20 armored divisions.

The Germans never focused remotely all their resources agaisnt the USSR at any point during the Russo German war.
while it is obvious that the strength (broadly speaking) of the Ostheer in june 1941,was limited because of the other German commitments,there is no proof that without these commitments,the Ostheer couldrecieve more tanks,......
You are making the ((for an economist serious )fault of assuming that if less UBoats were constructed,if less resources were goingto the surface fleet,more tanks.... could be made .
Factories that were making UBoats could NOT switch to the production of tanks .
For the ammunition of the 5 cm PAK,there was a shortage of 21 %,more steel for that ammunition would not resut in a bigger production :there were (insoluble) shortages of skilled workers,of machine tools,..........
About the 4 million men on the east front:this is a phantasy,besides,how would the Germans supply 1.5 million men extra ?
And,of course,it was impossible for the Germans in june 1941,to have some 15 armored divisions extra .
If we are looking (for june 1941)on what was needed and what was available for the following raw materials,than we see
for coal :shortage :12.5 %
for iron and steel:shortage 50 %
for aluminium:shortage :22.5 %
for oil :shortage :28.7 %
Source :Va Banque :P 48

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Re: German vs. Soviet production in 1942

Post by RichTO90 » 07 Oct 2010 22:54

Guaporense wrote:I had the impression that many people think that the USSR and UK had superiority in material resources over Germany.
Then you would be correct since they did.
When in fact, Germany had more material resources than both powers combined.
No Germany did not.
I based them on the statistics about steel, coal, iron, & other industrial commodities.
Really? Which ones? Where did they come from? How do "industrial commodities" differ from "material resources"?
The UK controlled more population and more natural resources than Germany. Germany controlled greater human and industrial resources. The only country that controlled more industrial resources was the US.
It might help if you bothered to use the same terms and apply the same definitions to them more than once in a row. So the UK had "more natural resources" now? I assume from your sloppy writing that you mean the US was the only country that controlled more "industrial resources" than Germany? So, now we have "industrial commodities", "material resources", and "natural resources"? So some of them are more equal than others depending on which country they are coming from and which way you need to skew the figures? Is that it? :roll:

You are quite possibly the least precise and sloppiest practioner of hard analysis I think I have ever run into.

So, if I follow your "reasoning" your first point is that:

"the USSR and UK had superiority in material resources over Germany"

The second is that:

"Germany had more material resources than both powers combined"

(Neat trick! :roll: )

And the third is that:

"The UK controlled more population and more natural resources than Germany. Germany controlled greater human and industrial resources."

Er, so "population" must not equate to "human"? :roll:

Impeccably reasoned as always...
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Re: German vs. Soviet production in 1942

Post by Jon G. » 07 Oct 2010 23:11

Guaporense wrote:...In 1942 Germany had 7 times more coal, had 4 times more steel and 5 times more iron. And produced 7 times more machine tools during the war and 3-4 times more aircraft fuel...
A different set of figures for Soviet coal production was posted by Art at:

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 3#p1194073

Art also pointed out your avgas gaffe:

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 6#p1504376
...Pretty much 100% of the change can be explained by conquered territories. Germany's coal production stagnated during the war...
The good question being: how did conquered resources integrate into the German war economy? As has been pointed out to you numerous times, eg. French production of 44.1 mill. tons of coal in 1941/1942 does *not* equate the instant addition of 44.1 million tons of coal to the German war economy.
Germany's oil supply increased from 1940 to 1943, while USSR's oil production was smaller in 1943 than in 1940, though it was still larger than Germany's.
Nice comparison. German oil output increased, mainly thanks to the very coal-intensive synthfuel programme, but it remained a fraction of Soviet oil output throughout.

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Re: German vs. Soviet production in 1942

Post by David Thompson » 07 Oct 2010 23:57

Guaporense -- From which post of Jon G. did you get this quote:
So, it is completely invalid point
which you attributed to him? Please refer to it by post number. Here's how you do it:

You can reference an individual post by clicking (or double-clicking) on the little file folder image which appears on the "header" line. It's right by the author's name. In a second or so the url to that specific post will appear, which you can then copy and paste to your post.

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Re: German vs. Soviet production in 1942

Post by RichTO90 » 08 Oct 2010 04:48

Jon G. wrote:A different set of figures for Soviet coal production was posted by Art at:

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 3#p1194073
Interesting. In 1942 seven times 75.5 is 528.5 million tons. According to the League of Nations the entire producton of Europe,less the Soviet Union, in 1937 was 580 million tons. Apparently the rationale is that Germany equals Europe? Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey anyone? Domestic use in the occupied territories? :roll:
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Re: German vs. Soviet production in 1942

Post by LWD » 08 Oct 2010 13:32

Guaporense wrote:
LWD wrote:
Guaporense wrote:
LWD wrote:
Guaporense wrote: ... Based on the statistics that I have studied I came to the conclusion that the survival of the USSR depended on the direct help of the western allies, mostly the US.
That's nice. Most of us are not so certain.
Yep, the myth that the USSR had some kind of industrial superiority over Germany is deeply entrenched.
Hardly a myth at least the way you stated it. And of course not completely relevant to the point above.
Strawman
I had the impression that many people think that the USSR and UK had superiority in material resources over Germany. When in fact, Germany had more material resources than both powers combined.
Which
A) Doesn't explain why you created a strawman.
B) You're wrong as you admit below.
.... In some areas Japan had more material resources than the US.
In what areas? Certainly they were far worse off in comparison to the US than the USSR was in comparison to Germany.
That depends. In some areas the difference between the USSR and Germany was like the average difference between the US and Japan.
a) That doesn't answer the question about which areas Japan was superior to the US.
b) You were giving an overall statment now you are talking about "some areas". The implication is you were wrong and are refusing to admit it directly.
If the US's industrial production were 10 times Japan's during WW2, Germany's industrial production was 5 times USSR's.
Are these hypothetical numbers or can you document them?
I based them on the statistics about steel, coal, iron, & other industrial commodities.
Then you shouldn't have any problem documenting them.
Great Britain controled more resources than Germany.
The UK controlled more population and more natural resources than Germany. Germany controlled greater human and industrial resources. The only country that controlled more industrial resources was the US.
So now you are talking about "industrial resources" and not just resources. Even there it's not clear to me that the British Commonwealth controled less than Germany.
LWD wrote: It's not at all clear that these stats confirm your postion. For one thing how much of this production change was due to conquered lands vs increased production from existing fields for Germany?
Pretty much 100% of the change can be explained by conquered territories. Germany's coal production stagnated during the war.
Can it? Documentation PLS.

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Re: German vs. Soviet production in 1942

Post by LWD » 08 Oct 2010 13:34

Guaporense wrote: My example shows that the production of army munitions, weapons, tanks, etc, was much lower than they could have acheived had they focused their resources on the maximum production of weapons for the invasion of the USSR.
...
Not really.

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Re: German vs. Soviet production in 1942

Post by Guaporense » 10 Oct 2010 15:41

Jon G. wrote:
Guaporense wrote:...In 1942 Germany had 7 times more coal, had 4 times more steel and 5 times more iron. And produced 7 times more machine tools during the war and 3-4 times more aircraft fuel...
A different set of figures for Soviet coal production was posted by Art at:

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 3#p1194073
These figures include black coal and brown coal. If you want comparable figures for Germany you have to sum up their black coal production with brown coal production.

For example, in 1942 the USSR produced:

48,951,000 tons of black coal
26,585,000 tons of brown coal

which adds up to 75 million tons.

Germany and occupied territories produced:

338,200,000 tons of black coal (ca ~260 million tons in germany)
248,900,000 tons of brown coal (also called lignite), only includes production in the Reich

Considering the 10-15 million tons of brown coal produced in the occupied territories, total production comparable to soviet production would be 600 million tons of "coal". Or 8 times soviet production using this methodology.

Note that you almost cut my throat when I added coal and lignite but the USSR's coal numbers always did that.
Art also pointed out your avgas gaffe:

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 6#p1504376
Yes, I was wrong in giving 100% trust over Jason Long's numbers.
...Pretty much 100% of the change can be explained by conquered territories. Germany's coal production stagnated during the war...
The good question being: how did conquered resources integrate into the German war economy? As has been pointed out to you numerous times, eg. French production of 44.1 mill. tons of coal in 1941/1942 does *not* equate the instant addition of 44.1 million tons of coal to the German war economy.
Theoretically it doesn't make a difference if coal was produced at territory A or B at pre war borders if B conquered A. You are free to disagree with me, but you aren't free to simply delete the occupied territories from consideration.
Germany's oil supply increased from 1940 to 1943, while USSR's oil production was smaller in 1943 than in 1940, though it was still larger than Germany's.
Nice comparison. German oil output increased, mainly thanks to the very coal-intensive synthfuel programme, but it remained a fraction of Soviet oil output throughout.
Germany's oil supply was nearly 10 million tons in 1943. Soviet oil production was 17.9 million tons. So, German supply was higher than a fraction of Soviet's supply.

Note that oil's overall importance in WW2 lied in their use as a strategic resource to power up aircraft and motorized divisions, not as the main energy supply of the nation, which was coal. Today oil is much more important as an basic source of energy.
Last edited by Guaporense on 10 Oct 2010 15:53, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: German vs. Soviet production in 1942

Post by Guaporense » 10 Oct 2010 15:51

RichTO90 wrote:
Jon G. wrote:A different set of figures for Soviet coal production was posted by Art at:

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 3#p1194073
Interesting. In 1942 seven times 75.5 is 528.5 million tons. According to the League of Nations the entire producton of Europe,less the Soviet Union, in 1937 was 580 million tons. Apparently the rationale is that Germany equals Europe? Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey anyone? Domestic use in the occupied territories? :roll:
The domestic use of coal in occupied territories has the same significance as the use in Germany and the USSR for basic needs.

The 580 million tons number probably refers to Europe's production of black coal, UK produced 200 million tons, Germany & occupied territories produced 340 million tons, other countries, like Sweden, Spain, Turkey, Italy, produced 40 million tons. The comparable number for the USSR would be 49 million tons, not 75 million (340 million/7 = 49 million).
"In tactics, as in strategy, superiority in numbers is the most common element of victory." - Carl von Clausewitz

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