Military Potential - A Rule of Thumb

[magicdragon]

In the book "Absolute War" by Chris Bellamy the author cites that German intelligence assessed that two divisions could be made up per million people of the total population. This equation was also I think used in "Wages of Destruction"? Quite clearly this did not apply for the USSR who raised far more formations than Germans believed they could.

However, would the two divisions created per million people of the total population still apply as a rough measure of military potential in most other circumstances. Or is there another measure you could use?

[South]

Good morning Magic Dragon,

Somewhere here or nearby I've posted some thoughts and references on this.

Re: "...still apply..."in most other circumstances?";

No, in the 1930s and 1940s, the nation-state's industrial base was used for fielding militaries based on electrical machines, chemicals and steel. Now ("still apply...?") the industrial base is robotics, bioengineering and telecommunications enhancements.

Note how, for example, the land-based sea skimming cruise missile, with a small crew, can neutralize a naval vessel. Compare the cost ratio and personnel ratio. In American English slang this is "More bang for the buck" (nickname for US Dollar).

Look at the crew size and costs to field a surface to air missile ("SAM") that can engage and neutralize geometrically more expensive aircraft.

The book you referenced "Absolute War" got my attention because at a different site, I just introduced into a discussion the post World War One book "Total War" by German General Erich von Ludendorff (pure evil, but the Frau was worse).

Military potential in most other circumstances has experienced a "cultural change". Some militaries do not need an elaborate and costly medical organization with field hospitals, etc. Wilth land-based missile development, naval vessels must hesitate to approach within range of shore, thus we can envision the expensive (and labor-intensive) aircraft carrier to fade away. Robotics - clearly shown by the example of drones - changes the complexion of the air battle. I take note that Israel's IAF, for over a quarter of a century, has a primary mission to deliver ordnance to ground targets. Air to air combat is fading away.

The measure I use is a nation-state's economic base (in contradistinction to an = industrial = base). This encompases, for example, a large high-education level and support system for this education, a scientific R&D base that handles "pure" research besides applied research. This scientific base incorporates the engineering field (Some make distinctions). High-quality governmental organizations are the future. One example of this is governmental export sales organizations of military products that,inter alia, reduces unit costs.

Let me close by mentioning a term that is replacing older terms such as "firepower". It is "knowledge superiority".

Now, for reasons unknown to me, I am in the mood for some German pastries and coffee.


Warm regards,

Bob

[xristar]

In the book "Absolute War" by Chris Bellamy the author cites that German intelligence assessed that two divisions could be made up per million people of the total population. This equation was also I think used in "Wages of Destruction"? Quite clearly this did not apply for the USSR who raised far more formations than Germans believed they could.

However, would the two divisions created per million people of the total population still apply as a rough measure of military potential in most other circumstances. Or is there another measure you could use?

1)Not all "divisions" are equal. Soviet divisions were very different from say British divisions in many ways.

2)As a rule of thumb, states excericising full conscription could/would mobilise up to about 10% of their total population, without suffering too much economically and in terms of personnel quality. Depending on each Army's divisional slice, that's about 2.5 to 5 divisions per million inhabitants. In real conditions, most states didn't reach their 10% threshold immediately upon mobilisation, but kept substantial numbers as reserves (ie having 5% in active service, and calling up the rest 5+% as replacements if need arises). The 2-divisions-per-million is kinda simplistic, but more or less accurate.

3)The number of formations raised depends greatly on the ability to equip them, as much as it does to man them. It takes a decision how much weight an army will put on equipment quality over quantity. For example Poland, a not very rich state, put to the field an army too small for her population (950,000 men out of 35 million population), but with relatively good equipment. By comparisson the Yugoslav mobilisation was proportionally much bigger than the Polish (1,200,000 men out of 16 million population), but also given that the Yugoslav economy was not any better than the Polish, it had distinctly inferior equipment.

[magicdragon]

South/xristar

Thanks for the reply.

It is a very good point about the relative size of divisions - which could in part account for the German's miscalcuation on the potential of the USSR.

The other issue would be seapower - the very large fleets maintained by Britain, USA and Japan (to lesser extent Italy and France) must have had a significant impact on their potential to put divisions in the field?

[Carl Schwamberger]

The other issue would be seapower - the very large fleets maintained by Britain, USA and Japan (to lesser extent Italy and France) must have had a significant impact on their potential to put divisions in the field?

Absolutely. The US made immense trades during its mobilization between naval, air, and ground forces.

"1)Not all "divisions" are equal. Soviet divisions were very different from say British divisions in many ways."

One difference was the Red Army reduced it support overhead somewhat by eliminating the corps HQ for the infantry formations. A Red Army army HQ directly administered/supported 6 - 9 divisions while a German or US Army corps HQ contained 2 - 3 divisions.

Another variable would be the number of civilians in the support services. The US & British armys the invaded Europe had very few persons not in uniform for transportation & engineering services. The German army that defended France started out dependant on many civilian laborers. After the Allied armies had been in France six months they were increasingly making use of civilian labor.