Tooze's Wages of Destruction : An Inquiry

[KDF33]

It's not. If I was writing a scholarly paper I'd have to include it for completeness' sake, but non-combat aircraft output was so marginal that it doesn't change the big picture as presented here.

Regards,

KDF

[ljadw]

It depends on what one is calling marginal :

1940:combat aircraft :7103 (fighters,bombers,stuka/schlacht)
non combat output:3723

1941: combat 8082 ;non combat:3694

1942: combat : 11752 ;non combat : 3804


Source : Eagle in Flames (E.R. Hooton) :appendix 19

[stg 44]

Okay, I found the section and somewhat misstated the argument from memory (pg 177 in "Goering" if anyone is interested); mobilization plans in 1938 expected 21,000 combat aircraft within the first 12 months of mobilization, to be achieved by doubling shifts on productions lines...but this was under the assumption that war would come in 1942 once the combat types expected for war were fully introduced into production for several years. Of course the war came early so that was an major issues; yet even in 1944 the number of people, amount of raw materials, and factory floor space (measured in square meters) was the same as it was in 1940, yet output was much higher. Part of the problem was general inefficiency due to cost plus contracting (meaning there was no incentive to save on production methods), part of it was the major bomber type, encompassing 50% of all aviation resources, the Ju 88, wasn't properly introduced into production lines sans mechanical issues until 1940, and experience producing aircraft type played a role too (as did the Me210 fiasco). There was mismanagement in the broader sense in the allocation of labor, which wasn't sorted out until 1940. There were of course administrative issues, as until 1942 Udet was not effectively leading the production effort in aviation, which resulted in his suicide in December of 1941 and Milch's assumption of power again, which corresponded to the rise in aircraft numbers, though the Jägernotprogramm wasn't introduced until 1943 and little new resources in terms of labor or raw materials were added to aviation production.

There was a slew of issues going on, from mobilization plans not being complete in 1939, industry not being completely ready, misallocations of labor, bureaucratic chaos, the new introduction of types like the Ju88 that weren't fully mechanically reliable yet and industry wasn't experienced with its production, the failures of multiple major weapons programs (me210, he177, ju288), and of course corruption. @KDF33: you're right about the production plans once the war started and I was wrong about output figures, but there was other things going on at that point besides industry meeting goals and the RLM just setting low numbers.

[paspartoo]

Okay, I found the section and somewhat misstated the argument from memory (pg 177 in "Goering" if anyone is interested); mobilization plans in 1938 expected 21,000 combat aircraft within the first 12 months of mobilization, to be achieved by doubling shifts on productions lines...but this was under the assumption that war would come in 1942 once the combat types expected for war were fully introduced into production for several years. Of course the war came early so that was an major issues; yet even in 1944 the number of people, amount of raw materials, and factory floor space (measured in square meters) was the same as it was in 1940, yet output was much higher. Part of the problem was general inefficiency due to cost plus contracting (meaning there was no incentive to save on production methods), part of it was the major bomber type, encompassing 50% of all aviation resources, the Ju 88, wasn't properly introduced into production lines sans mechanical issues until 1940, and experience producing aircraft type played a role too (as did the Me210 fiasco). There was mismanagement in the broader sense in the allocation of labor, which wasn't sorted out until 1940. There were of course administrative issues, as until 1942 Udet was not effectively leading the production effort in aviation, which resulted in his suicide in December of 1941 and Milch's assumption of power again, which corresponded to the rise in aircraft numbers, though the Jägernotprogramm wasn't introduced until 1943 and little new resources in terms of labor or raw materials were added to aviation production.

There was a slew of issues going on, from mobilization plans not being complete in 1939, industry not being completely ready, misallocations of labor, bureaucratic chaos, the new introduction of types like the Ju88 that weren't fully mechanically reliable yet and industry wasn't experienced with its production, the failures of multiple major weapons programs (me210, he177, ju288), and of course corruption. @KDF33: you're right about the production plans once the war started and I was wrong about output figures, but there was other things going on at that point besides industry meeting goals and the RLM just setting low numbers.

no matter how many times it is pointed out to you that you are wrong you still wind up the tape and press play.
I have to say I admire your persistence!

For those who want to read more: http://www.econ.yale.edu/growth_pdf/cdp905.pdf
http://chris-intel-corner.blogspot.gr/2 ... onomy.html

[pugsville]

their was a drop in the number of man hours to produce a me109 from 6,000 to around 2,000 IIRC from 1940 to 1943/44 this was expected and a well known engineering / manufacturing process thing. same for the allies.when producing the same aircraft over a number years a rapid drop in man hours is expected. also the germans radically changed the mix of aircraft produced in 1944 the vast bulk were the simple single engine fighters that were much easier to make.

comparing raw aircraft production figures for 1940/1944 is not that helpful.

[KDF33]

@KDF33: you're right about the production plans once the war started and I was wrong about output figures, but there was other things going on at that point besides industry meeting goals and the RLM just setting low numbers.

Well, if this wasn't the main issue, then why:

a) Is there no gap between production programs and actual output?

b) Did output decrease from it's early 1941 peak? If inefficiency limited production, why were most plants producing at a comparatively high level in early 1941? Did they suddenly become inefficient?

Take, say, Weser's Tempelhof plant. It delivered 70 Ju 87s in January 1941 and a further 67 in February. It churned out a mere 25 in October, and 2 in November.

Or take Erla's Leipzig plant. It's Bf 109 deliveries rapidly rose from 14 in January 1941 to 21 in February, 61 in March and 100 in April. It never reached that output again before 1943, save for a single month in 1942.

Or take Heinkel's Oranienburg plant. It's Ju 88 output reached 55 in March, then dropped to 25 one month later and to 35 in May. It never delivered more than 33 Ju 88s for the rest of the year.

How do we account for this sudden drop in production? It's not an isolated phenomenon - it's seen across the board in 1941. It either implies a catastrophic collapse in productivity or deliberate cutbacks. Given our access to the RLM production programs, the second case seems a lot more plausible. Given the known limitations to Luftwaffe expansion - fuel and trained pilots, mostly - it also appears sensible.

Regards,

KDF

[stg 44]

@KDF33: you're right about the production plans once the war started and I was wrong about output figures, but there was other things going on at that point besides industry meeting goals and the RLM just setting low numbers.

Well, if this wasn't the main issue, then why:

a) Is there no gap between production programs and actual output?

b) Did output decrease from it's early 1941 peak? If inefficiency limited production, why were most plants producing at a comparatively high level in early 1941? Did they suddenly become inefficient?

Take, say, Weser's Tempelhof plant. It delivered 70 Ju 87s in January 1941 and a further 67 in February. It churned out a mere 25 in October, and 2 in November.

Or take Erla's Leipzig plant. It's Bf 109 deliveries rapidly rose from 14 in January 1941 to 21 in February, 61 in March and 100 in April. It never reached that output again before 1943, save for a single month in 1942.

Or take Heinkel's Oranienburg plant. It's Ju 88 output reached 55 in March, then dropped to 25 one month later and to 35 in May. It never delivered more than 33 Ju 88s for the rest of the year.

How do we account for this sudden drop in production? It's not an isolated phenomenon - it's seen across the board in 1941. It either implies a catastrophic collapse in productivity or deliberate cutbacks. Given our access to the RLM production programs, the second case seems a lot more plausible. Given the known limitations to Luftwaffe expansion - fuel and trained pilots, mostly - it also appears sensible.

Regards,

KDF

Looking through Overy's "The Battle of Britain" he mentions that the delivery plans were revised downward to match production output, due to the factories not producing enough to meet pre-war plans. Pre-war plans were discarded after the war started and in September 1939 and later in November 1939 Plans 15 and 16 were created, which heavily reduced expected output. A new production plan was generated in July 1940 which revised numbers even lower. Overy states that this was to match the low output of factories, as they consistently were missing production goals, something Goering was constantly berating industry over. In 1940 industry missed fighter production goals by about 600 aircraft (~1800 instead of ~2400 planned).

As to the drop in 1941 of aircraft production, that was due to orders to shift resources away from the Luftwaffe to get the army ready for Barbarossa and to replace ordnance expended in previous campaigns. By then the Battle of Britain was over and the Blitz was changed to a much lower tempo in January 1941 due to weather constraints, which lasted until the end of February. By then the focus was on getting ready for Barbarossa, not an air campaign.

[KDF33]

As to the drop in 1941 of aircraft production, that was due to orders to shift resources away from the Luftwaffe to get the army ready for Barbarossa and to replace ordnance expended in previous campaigns. By then the Battle of Britain was over and the Blitz was changed to a much lower tempo in January 1941 due to weather constraints, which lasted until the end of February. By then the focus was on getting ready for Barbarossa, not an air campaign.

Well, there was a substantial air component to Barbarossa. As for ordnance, orders were actually cut between 1940 and 1941. Field artillery ammunition output in fact drops by more than 50% between these two years.

In any event, the above seems to concur with my assessment that the low initial production had more to do with deliberate choice than failure to produce, save perhaps for the first months of the war in 1940.

Regards,

KDF

[stg 44]

Really it was only in early 1941 that resources were shifted to the army, but even then the number of laborers in the aviation industry rose, as per Overy in "The Air War" and industry and been hoarding raw materials in this period so could have increased deliveries if they had wanted to. Milch discovered major supplies of aluminum and the like during a 1942 audit of industry stocks, which was largely the result of Udet issuing 4 tons of aluminum per aircraft frame regardless of its size.

[AlfonsoHaynes]

I found a few notes from Richard Overy's How the Allies won the war that I would like to present in this thread, as well as in other articles.

As you said stg 44, German machine tools were more general purpose, to take up multiple tasks, whereas the machine tools in the United States and Britain were structured in a division of labor mode of production. Although such a decision by German generals would hinder higher levels of production, it was very resistant to any changes in weapons of choice, modifications, and such. So production was, arguably, concentrated on few weapons system. In short, they sacrificed quantity but gained quality. You're saying, though, that the maintenance of weapons was more difficult since there was less parts for them? Like what parts were difficult to acquire for the Panther or Tiger? German tools tended to last longer than American ones, once machine tools in the US had arrived their replacements were paid for. So while the Germans started off with more machine tools, this was vastly overcome by the rate of American mobilization and their purchasing standard.

In the Soviet Union, labor conditions were very unfavorable to the people as a whole. Overy on p. 187 states that all holidays and leave for workers were cancelled. Generally there was 12-16 hours of work and three hours compulsory overtime. All economic activities were governed by military law. Rationing was even worse. On the same page he gives, for miners and metalworkers, 2 pounds of bread per day along with 5 pounds of meat, a pound of sugar and a pound of fat per month. Food producers only got half a pound of bread and a potato or two each day (p. 188)

Another thing I would like to expand on, is the method of food production and such. Most inputs for the farmers were oxen to plow, since the army took the horses and tractors necessary to increase output. Was erosion or greenhouse gasing common? How much arable land was used in the Soviet Union compared to Nazi Germany? Did the supply of oxen in the Soviet Union fluctuate, and could solar kits help fuel the war effort?

Overy praises the United States' ability to produce, he gives the examples of Liberty ships. They were built in parts, away from the slipway, and then assembled there by modern welding methods. (p. 194) A mile from the shore, vast assembly sheds and storehouses were built. Don't you think there was considerable labor needed on the storehouses, also that they had limited carrying capacity?

The one definitive factory in Overy's account is Opel, but it was a foreign affiliate of General Motors. Not until 1942 were plans for mobilizing the company taking place. What took so long? He references his Göring book on pages 99 and 161 but I don't have those at the moment. There was also Wolfsburg, only twenty percent of it was utilized. (Why the Allies won p. 202)

Also the workflow of craft work was inherently inefficient, as it utilized benchwork, rather than workflow production

The advantage in benchwork is that it requires little machine tools, but Germany had more stock of it compared to the US until 1944. Was the benchwork technique ever abandoned at one point? Small businesses were employed maybe, because it was less corrupt and decentralized.

Surely, Britain as you said had less subcontractors and larger factories, it's strange to me how the British economies would have no problem since, due to having less subcontractors, there wouldn't be a higher profit rate that would encourage greed.

The article you gave me on page 4 conditions that European machine tools were “typified perhaps by the so-called engine lathe”.

On page 5 he gives the following figures for machine tool stocks:

Table 1. USSBS comparison of machine tool stocks
US STOCK
GERMAN STOCK
US ANNUAL ADDITIONS
GERMAN ANNUAL ADDITIONS
Jan-1940 942,000 1,177,600
Jan-1941 1,053,500 1,305,800 111,500 128,200
Jan-1942 1,246,500 1,437,800 193,000 132,000
Jan-1943 1,529,386 1,554,900 282,886 117,100
Jan-1944 1,770,935 1,656,800 241,549 101,900
Jan-1945 1,882,841 1,737,100 111,906 80,300
Source: USSBS Report 55, p. 3.



He mentions Stephen Broadberry's productivity race, which I found on Google Books here http://books.google.com/books?id=EfKyy2 ... ce&f=false .

Page 7: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/dae/repec/cam ... pe0342.pdf

German machinery and techniques have become popular all around the world.. You have mentioned effective and practical ways which are highly acceptable in our society.

[Guaporense]

How in Zeus’s name could the Germans have built a ‘strategic’ (I guess the meaning is 4-engine bomber) airforce in the 1930’s? They started to build up the aero industry from almost scratch and it took the Anglo-Americans till the period 1943-44 to get their own strategic forces fully operational. Germany with fewer resources is going to achieve more in half the time….
Why not build 100 nuclear bombs in the same timeframe, it is more realistic.

Well, the cost of building 4 engine bombers wasn't that high compared to aggregate German military expenditures. J-88 production costs fell from 360,000 RM to 260,000 RM from 1940 to 1943, the J-88 was 60% of the (empty) weight of a B-17, which means the cost of production of a similar aircraft to the B-17 would be around 600,000 RM to 440,000 RM, slightly higher than the cost of a Tiger tank. Building a modest number like 5,000 (equivalent to UK's output in 1944), would cost ca. 3 billion RM, using 1940 J-88 production costs per ton, 3.5 billion RM with spares. For comparison, German military expenditures were > 200 billion RM in 1942-43 and yearly sales of the entire metal working industry were 50 billion RM in 1943.

Main problem would be finding the chemicals to produce enough bombs, bombs required more explosives than ground ammunition, producing substantial quantities of bombs would place severe burdens on the restricted supply of chemicals. Overall, though, Germany dropped on the Soviet Union a not much smaller tonnage of bombs as the Anglo-Americans dropped on Germany. For example, the Luftwaffe flew 350,000 sorties on the USSR in 1944 and in earlier years Luftwaffe activity there was at least as intense (considering aggregate aircraft fuel supply was greater in 1942-3), so from 1941-44, it would total ca. 1.2 million sorties, if bomber sorties were 2/5 of these, that would be 0.5 million bomber sorties, the Ju-88 carried 1.4 tons, the He 111, carried 2 tons, if on average these sorties dropped 1.5 tons of bombs, it would total 750,000 metric tons of bombs dropped on the Eastern Front, or 3/4 of total German bomb production during the 41-44 period (similar proportion of consumption with the fact ground ammunition consumption in the eastern front was 5.8 million metric tons in 1941-44, out of total output from 41-44 of 7.8). For comparison, the western allies dropped 1.26 million metric tons of bombs over Germany and 0.16 million tons over Japan.

[ljadw]

Other main problems would be finding and training the crews, would be producing the needed fuel,would be finding and training mechanics,.....

[ljadw]

Besides :why would the Germans need all those 4-engine bombers ?

[Guaporense]

I think overall strategic bombing was a waste of resources, a waste that the allies could afford. Germany, spending money on strategic bombers means less resources for the eastern front, meaning they lose the war faster.

[ljadw]

Could you give a proof for what you think ?