Tooze's Wages of Destruction : An Inquiry

Discussions on the economic history of the nations taking part in WW2, from the recovery after the depression until the economy at war.
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Re: Tooze's Wages of Destruction : An Inquiry

Post by pugsville » 11 Aug 2012 01:44

The Wiemar coalitions were fragile, running large deficits was in part avoiding hard decisions, enabling paying large numbers of Government workers for example. Without liberal spending the political stability would have been less so, the effect is hard to judge, but in part the money helped wall paper over some of the cracks in German society, without it there would have been more internal conflict.

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Re: Tooze's Wages of Destruction : An Inquiry

Post by stg 44 » 11 Aug 2012 02:08

Qvist wrote:
If you want a serious analysis I suggest checking out the "Germany and the Second World War" series by the Bundeswehr; its pretty much the official German history of the war. Volume 5 parts 1 and 2 deal with the war economy in Germany. I suggest you read about the 'war of all vs. all' that prevailed in 1939-1941. It took until mid-1940 to actually convert to war priorities because of multiple competing bureaucracies sending out different orders to factories and other projects to appropriate labor and resources.
However, I don't agree with you that DRZW offers a better analysis than Tooze. On the contrary, I think that exactly it's focus on the endless internal squabbles detracts from its ability offer clear analysis. Nothing is easier to source than the existence of bureaucratic infighting, particularly with something as large and complex and involving so many instances as a total war effort carried out by a major power - and if one sticks with these narratives, then you are left with the image of a disorganized jumble. But what does that really explain? The result was not in fact anarchy and randomness. As Tooze clearly shows, there were distinct priorities made which in fact changed and shaped German output very markedly. He deserves credit for doing what Müller and co fails to do, which is to rise above the miasma of bickering by memorandum, and focus on the visible effects. Because that is the relevant basis on which to assess the German war economy - not the extent to which Göring, Thomas and Todt expressed similar views in conferences.

Putting it pointedly, of course. I'm not arguing that one should ignore the bureaucratic documentation, nor that interdepartemental wrangling and overlapping authorities had no negative consequences. but I am convinced Tooze's focus is the appropriate one, and also that DRZW simply fails to provide an adequate analysis of its subject through an exaggerated focus on the decision making process rather than on its results.
I agree that the DRZW does focus quite a bit on the politics of the Nazi bureaucracy, perhaps because it has more documentation that survived, but there were serious problems with production in the first years of the war, specifically in war materials like aircraft, tanks, and trucks.

Looking at specialist books like "Arming the Luftwaffe" by Edward Homze digs into the details of the flaws of the bureaucracy that heavily hindered production, as does Overy's doctoral thesis 'German Aircraft Production 1939-1942', which digs into the flaws during the early years of the war. The recent "Arming the Luftwaffe" by Daniel Uziel (yes very similar title to Homze) covers the last years of the war, with an overview of the problems in the early years of production. There was most certainly very large problems in aircraft manufacturing, mainly the fault of a certain Ernst Udet, which were resolved upon his death. This though doesn't fit into the narrative that Tooze presents, where the lack of raw materials and lack of industrial development are the reason Germany didn't produce more, ignoring the large increases in production despite Germany retaining the same industrial base and raw material resources for its aircraft industry. "Demystifying the armaments miracle' also unpacks this increase, which had to do with rationalizing the resources and switching from handcraft labor to assembly lines with mass production methods. There were also issues like the Me210, which cost Germany about 2000 aircraft from 1939-1942, not to mention contradictory orders that saw absurd situations like one Henschel factory not produce an aircraft from 1940-44, as it was constantly ordered to retool for different aircraft before it had finished retooling from the last order. And as Erhard Milch discovered when auditing engine manufacturing in 1941, the hand work machining methods were wasting as much as 1,500 lbs of aluminum in making a single BMW 801 engine. Of course the military was also interfering in production, constantly demanding short runs of specialist aircraft with nearly 60 different subtypes of Me109. This prevented mass manufacturing, costing around 20% of production before 1943.
From what I gather Panzer production saw somewhat similar problems.

The point is that while Tooze's book is a massive addition to the study of the Third Reich's economy, easily the most comprehensive in English and probably in German too, it still is only part of the story and presents a narrative that ignores factors other than those considered in Tooze's economic model. Certainly Tooze has reframed the debate and improved our knowledge, but he doesn't supersede all that has come before and in fact seem to purposely ignore it when it doesn't fit his thesis.

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Re: Tooze's Wages of Destruction : An Inquiry

Post by paspartoo » 11 Aug 2012 08:23

stg 44 wrote:
This though doesn't fit into the narrative that Tooze presents, where the lack of raw materials and lack of industrial development are the reason Germany didn't produce more, ignoring the large increases in production despite Germany retaining the same industrial base and raw material resources for its aircraft industry.

.
That may have something to do with the Bf-109 being much cheaper than the Ju-88. Just an idea as i'm not a 'historian' like Overy.
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Re: Tooze's Wages of Destruction : An Inquiry

Post by stg 44 » 11 Aug 2012 14:11

paspartoo wrote:
stg 44 wrote:
This though doesn't fit into the narrative that Tooze presents, where the lack of raw materials and lack of industrial development are the reason Germany didn't produce more, ignoring the large increases in production despite Germany retaining the same industrial base and raw material resources for its aircraft industry.

.
That may have something to do with the Bf-109 being much cheaper than the Ju-88. Just an idea as i'm not a 'historian' like Overy.
But there was a major proliferation of types from 1939 on, by the end over 1200 He177 were produced, the majority after 1942, even with massive bombing of German industry, causing vast dispersion, including underground. Yes fighters were favored in 1944, but that doesn't explain the increases of 1942-43 when bombers were still being favored.

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Re: Tooze's Wages of Destruction : An Inquiry

Post by paspartoo » 11 Aug 2012 15:11

stg 44 wrote: But there was a major proliferation of types from 1939 on,
Was there? Throughout the war the main LW aircraft were the Bf-109, Ju-88, He-111, Bf-110, Ju-87 and Ju-52. In each category they have one type with the exception of bombers were they have two.
The only major addition was the FW-190 from 1941.
stg 44 wrote: by the end over 1200 He177 were produced,
Yes that was undeniably a waste of resources since in 1944 they had neither the fuel nor the air superiority to use those planes.
stg 44 wrote: the majority after 1942, even with massive bombing of German industry, causing vast dispersion, including underground. Yes fighters were favored in 1944, but that doesn't explain the increases of 1942-43 when bombers were still being favored.
I don't follow. In 1943 the increase is due to the number of fighters (Bf-109 and FW-190).
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Re: Tooze's Wages of Destruction : An Inquiry

Post by stg 44 » 11 Aug 2012 15:48

paspartoo wrote:
stg 44 wrote: But there was a major proliferation of types from 1939 on,
Was there? Throughout the war the main LW aircraft were the Bf-109, Ju-88, He-111, Bf-110, Ju-87 and Ju-52. In each category they have one type with the exception of bombers were they have two.
The only major addition was the FW-190 from 1941.
There was the Ju152, Ju252, Ju 290, FW200, Me210, Me410, Ju188, Ju288, Ju388, Do217, Do317, Do417, He177, He274, He277, Do335, all of the float planes (he115 for example), all of the trainers, all of the gliders/tugs like the Gotha series and Me323, the various rocket and jet aircraft like the Me163, Arado 234, Me 262, and He 162 (all in 1944).

And this doesn't count all of the various subtypes of each, many of which required separate production lines than the main version like the Ju88C and G nightfighters, though the infighting over the He219 is also a post onto itself. The nightfighter category had several different models and subtypes for each. (Ju88c and g with various subtypes of both, Do217 J and N with subtypes, He219, Bf110, Me210, and Me410 again with subtypes).

The ground attack role also had the Hs129, Hs123, Me410, Ju88, Fw190 ground attack variant, Me109 ground attack variant, Ju87 dive bomber and Ju87G ground attack bomber, and Do217 dive bomber all with subtypes.
Each category of aircraft had ridiculous numbers of models, each with several hundred to several thousand produced. Engines had similar problems too, though less extensive.
paspartoo wrote:
stg 44 wrote: the majority after 1942, even with massive bombing of German industry, causing vast dispersion, including underground. Yes fighters were favored in 1944, but that doesn't explain the increases of 1942-43 when bombers were still being favored.
I don't follow. In 1943 the increase is due to the number of fighters (Bf-109 and FW-190).
That was simply because the focus was on fighters. The increase would have happened regardless if bombers had been selected (the Ju88, Do217, and Me410 were both bombers used as fighters in 1944, both night and day, not to mention the idea to use the He177 as a bomber destroyer!), but it was easier to make fighters, so the increase was larger, but not solely because of the focus on fighters.

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Re: Tooze's Wages of Destruction : An Inquiry

Post by paspartoo » 11 Aug 2012 16:05

stg 44 wrote:
There was the Ju152, Ju252, Ju 290, FW200, Me210, Me410, Ju188, Ju288, Ju388, Do217, Do317, Do417, He177, He274, He277, Do335, all of the float planes (he115 for example), all of the trainers, all of the gliders/tugs like the Gotha series and Me323, the various rocket and jet aircraft like the Me163, Arado 234, Me 262, and He 162 (all in 1944).

And this doesn't count all of the various subtypes of each, many of which required separate production lines than the main version like the Ju88C and G nightfighters, though the infighting over the He219 is also a post onto itself. The nightfighter category had several different models and subtypes for each. (Ju88c and g with various subtypes of both, Do217 J and N with subtypes, He219, Bf110, Me210, and Me410 again with subtypes).

The ground attack role also had the Hs129, Hs123, Me410, Ju88, Fw190 ground attack variant, Me109 ground attack variant, Ju87 dive bomber and Ju87G ground attack bomber, and Do217 dive bomber all with subtypes.
Each category of aircraft had ridiculous numbers of models, each with several hundred to several thousand produced. Engines had similar problems too, though less extensive.
Sure and the Allies also had countless different types. Just for the Brits : May 1941: Blenheim, Wellington, Whitley, Hampden, Stirling, Manchester, Halifax, Spit, Hurricane, Westland Whirlwind and Boulton Paul Defiant plus countless other types in Coastal command plus Lend -Lease types etc etc

The question is what resources were invested in each type. Unlike the Allies the Germans specialised in a few types that were built throughout the war. Of course after a point their types were becoming outdated.
The main types are the ones i mentioned. Specialised roles requires specialised aircraft that were built in small numbers.

stg 44 wrote: That was simply because the focus was on fighters. The increase would have happened regardless if bombers had been selected (the Ju88, Do217, and Me410 were both bombers used as fighters in 1944, both night and day, not to mention the idea to use the He177 as a bomber destroyer!), but it was easier to make fighters, so the increase was larger, but not solely because of the focus on fighters.
I don't know whether that's true or not. Specific types require specific engines and other specialised equipment. Building bombers was roughly 3-4 times more expensive in man-hours.
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Re: Tooze's Wages of Destruction : An Inquiry

Post by stg 44 » 11 Aug 2012 16:39

You have the situation backward, the Germans produced a great variety of different airframes rather than focusing on a few types, while the Allies focused on main types and had a variety of others that did not see mass production.
There was no logical reason to have subtypes of main airframes that could not even be produced without retooling, as was the case with the fighter versions of the Ju88 and Do217. The FW190 fighter-bomber also had this problem.
The British did not do this, they'd let improvements accumulate and introduce them at once in a new Mark instead of retooling and stopping production to introduce one improvement and then have to do the same thing again in another couple of months.

Of the types you mention for the Brits the Hurricane, Manchester, Defiant, Stirling, Whitley, and Wellington were on the way out, while the Whirlwind was never seriously produced, as by 1943 the Brits were focusing on Lancaster, Mosquitos, and Spitfires, with several other specialist types in minor production, while the Lend-Lease doesn't count toward British production, because they were not building those types at home. Since we are talking about the types IN PRODUCTION in Germany and Britain, LL is irrelevant to the discussion.

And the US focused on a smaller number of aircraft type: B17, B24, P38, P40, P51. Sure they had many other variants, but if you compare the numbers of these 5 types with the other minor types, its obvious where the US focused its production. With the Germans its obvious that they tried to produce too many different specialist types constantly instead of focusing on a few main types and let improvements accumulate before phasing them in, rather than stopping production to add one different to an aircraft that took time to retool every couple of months or sometimes even weeks. That was a major change in production that happened after Erhard Milch resumed control over production after Udet's suicide for his failure increase production beyond the pre-war numbers (and in some cases actually reduce production).

Most German bombers required about 2-2.5x the resources of their fighters, as most bombers were two engine types.

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Re: Tooze's Wages of Destruction : An Inquiry

Post by paspartoo » 11 Aug 2012 17:36

stg 44 wrote:You have the situation backward,
:lol: i think that if instead of constructing your theories you took the time to actually write down the statistics regarding German aircraft production and employment and compare with the Allies you would come to a definite conclusion.
I’m too bored to give you an overview but maybe tomorrow I’ll write something.
For the life of me I don’t understand how you can claim that the Allies produced few types while the Germans didn’t.
I guess it’s one of the Overisms people repeat over and over…..
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Re: Tooze's Wages of Destruction : An Inquiry

Post by stg 44 » 11 Aug 2012 19:35

http://books.google.com/books?id=FTE9fM ... 40&f=false

Please read the table at the end of the page and see exactly what you're asking for and an "Overism" that proves my point.
By 1941 the British were producing heavier airframes with about 600k fewer people and producing 8,000 more aircraft per year.

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Re: Tooze's Wages of Destruction : An Inquiry

Post by paspartoo » 12 Aug 2012 08:24

For German production 1939-45 I get for Bf-109, FW-190 and Ju-88:
1).by numbers 70%
2).by weight it’s ~58%.

Just those three types.

The Bf-109 is the only single engine-fighter in 1939-41 and from then on used together with the FW-190. From 1943 it is also the main short range recon plane.

The FW-190 is used from 1941 as a fighter and as a ground attack plane. In fact in ’43-44 it replaces the Stuka in that role.
The Ju-88 is used throughout the war as the main bomber and recon plane. In 1944-45 it replaces the Bf-110 as the main night-fighter.

The same pattern is true for specialized planes. For transport planes 90% is Ju-52. For ground attack it was only the Stuka till 1941. Then the Fw-190 is added plus a small number of Hs 129 tank busters.

The Bf-110 is used as the only twin-engine fighter till 1944 when it is replaced by the Me-410. It is also the main night-fighter in the period 1941-44.

Now for the Allies! Some examples:

Soviet Union: Summer 1941 - SE-Fighters: I-16, I-153, Lagg-3, Yak-1,Mig-3 vs Bf-109
1943 - SE-Fighters: Yak-1, Yak-7, Yak-9, Lagg-3, La-5, I-16, I-153, P-39, Hurricane, P-40 vs Bf-109 and FW-190.

RAF:
May 1940 – SE Fighters: Spit, Hurricane vs Bf-109
Bombers: Blenheim, Wellington, Whitley, Hampden, Battle vs He-111, Do-17 and Ju-88

Sept ’41 : SE Fighters: Spit, Hurricane, Defiant, P-40, Gladiator plus who knows what in the Far East vs Bf-109 and Fw-190.
Bombers: Blenheim, Wellington, Whitley, Hampden, Stirling, Manchester, Halifax, B-17, Maryland, Beaufort, Wellesley and I don’t know what else in the Far East.

Summer ’44 - SE fighters ETO: Spit, Hurricane, P-51, Typhoon, Tempest
Bombers : Stirling, Halifax, Lancaster, Mosquito with Bomber Command plus Boston, Mitchell with 2nd TAF.
If you add other Commands you’ll get even more types.

USAAF:
Med theater 1943 – SE Fighters: P-39, P-40, P-51 vs Bf-109 and FW-190.
Bombers: B-17, B-24, A-20, B-25, B-26 vs Ju-88 (and He-111, Do-217 in other theatres plus less than 100 He-177 and Fw-200)

Summer 1944 aircraft overseas - SE Fighters: P-39, P-40, P-47,P-51 vs Bf-109 and FW-190
Bombers: B-29, B-17, B-24, A-20,A-26,A-36, B-25, B-26

And I haven’t included naval aircraft like the Hellcat, Wildcat or Lend –Lease planes that went straight to the other Allies.

Quite a timewaster this response!
Stop reading Overy friend I’m only interested in your mental health.
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Re: Tooze's Wages of Destruction : An Inquiry

Post by stg 44 » 12 Aug 2012 14:45

What is your source?
Please also provide the percentages of the types of Allied aircraft produced just as you did the German types so we have a proper comparison.

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Re: Tooze's Wages of Destruction : An Inquiry

Post by paspartoo » 12 Aug 2012 15:06

stg 44 wrote: What is your source?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_air ... rld_War_II

Don't worry about wikipedia, i've checked the totals from a book i have ('The life and death of the Luftwaffe') and they are practically the same.
stg 44 wrote:Please also provide the percentages of the types of Allied aircraft produced just as you did the German types so we have a proper comparison.
:lol: go have something cool to drink. I've already wasted enough time with my previous message. If you want more you're free to do your own research.
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Re: Tooze's Wages of Destruction : An Inquiry

Post by stg 44 » 12 Aug 2012 15:57

I got a number close to 60% than 70%, but regardless, that ignores that for all purposes the variants of the main models were not able to be produced on the same production line and in many cases could not use the same parts. The Ju88C and G were rebuilt from the ground up as fighters and were just Ju88's superficially, same thing for the ground attack Fw190 and the major variations in the Me109...the E to K series were virtually different aircraft.

Nevertheless this proves nothing regarding the fact that in 1941 the British were producing 8,000 more aircraft of heavier weight than the Germans with 600,000 fewer workers. There were major inefficiencies in production in German industry that didn't exist in British production that are not reducible to any other factor...something you're blithely ignoring.

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Re: Tooze's Wages of Destruction : An Inquiry

Post by paspartoo » 12 Aug 2012 16:25

stg 44 wrote:I got a number close to 60% than 70%,
It's 72.5% if we look only at combat types (fighter, bomber, recon, ground attack). If you add the He-111 you'll go to 79%.
Transport production is 90% Ju-52.
I'm not sure what more the Germans were supposed to do.
stg 44 wrote: but regardless, that ignores that for all purposes the variants of the main models were not able to be produced on the same production line and in many cases could not use the same parts. The Ju88C and G were rebuilt from the ground up as fighters and were just Ju88's superficially, same thing for the ground attack Fw190 and the major variations in the Me109...the E to K series were virtually different aircraft.
Whatever you say bro and the F-16 blk 50 is different from the F-16 blk 52plus, the T-72A from the T-72B , the Spit I from the Spit V etc .Superior reasoning.

Each country has two options regarding purchases of military equipment,
1). Build something new.
2). Upgrade/modify something already in use.

The Germans went with no2 and they still get shit on? Give me a break…
stg 44 wrote: Nevertheless this proves nothing regarding the fact that in 1941 the British were producing 8,000 more aircraft of heavier weight than the Germans with 600,000 fewer workers. There were major inefficiencies in production in German industry that didn't exist in British production that are not reducible to any other factor...something you're blithely ignoring.
You are comparing different economies with different requirements etc etc . Just think about Lend-Lease.
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