Er, yes, of course, after all the Germans made a larger investment in producing machine tools during the 1930s in comparison to the U.S. So QED.Guaporense wrote:My point is that Germany had a much larger stock of machine tools in proportion to the size of the economy than the US because the proportion of the sector of machine tool using industries in Germany was similarly larger than the US's in terms proportion of total employment as well. Hence, the proportion of GNP generated in this sector was larger in Germany in the late 1930's compared to the US.
So then to restate it with your "clarification", what you meant was:Germany compared to UK and US. US and UK were similar in that employment in metal working industries rose dramatically and much faster than Germany's.
"So when war started German machine tool stock was much more intensively used during the war as Germany shifted their workforce to machine tool using industries due to Germany's focus of their resources on production of aircraft and ships."
Unfortunately that isn't a "comparison" with anything. The statement makes as much sense if you substitute "United States" or "United Kingdom" for "Germany". In fact, it makes more sense.
Dear God... Would you care to restate that so it makes some form of sense? Whose "aircraft and ships in 1943"? Germany's? The United State's? Argentina's? Is "25 billion dollars" "50 billion RM"? How, if you then state that 3 RM = 1 1939 dollar? Did the RM to US$ exchange in 1942 become more favorable to Germany? Why? Where are the data you are slinging about from?Aircraft and ships in 1943 was apparently 25 billion dollars, or 50 billion RM, compared to 10 billion RM for Germany, aircraft alone was 25 billion RM for the US in 1943, 32 billion in 1944, compared to 8 billion RM for Germany in 1943 and 10 billion in 1944, 57/18, around 3 times more. Though for ammunition the figures are much closer, at 22 billion RM for the US in 1943-44, same as for Germany.
Using the 1939 3 RM = 1 1939 dollar and the Friedman and Schwartz (1963) price index converting 1945 dollars to 1939 dollars.
In any case, why are you babbling on about comparative monetary expenditures when I asked you about what industrial OUTPUT advantage was derived from the U.S. having an INPUT of 4-million workers in an industry compared to 0.9-million German workers - NOT what the monetary INPUT was. Try, please try to focus on developing an actual logical and coherent argument.
So then obviously the German policy of rapine WRT industrial resources, machinery, and the like had nothing to do with it? The German Occupation wasn't interested in integrating Norwegian, Danish, Dutch, Belgian, and French industry and economy into the Grossraum. Hungary, Bulgaria, Italy, and Romania were not occupied territories, they were sovereign states. The German's did a terrible job of integrating the manpower and industrial capacity of the occupied territories and their allies...and were unable to solve the key issue of liquid fuels. Nor were many of those states as well industrialized as either Germany or the U.S.What I find puzzling is the fact that Germany controlled a comparable economic potential as the US after defeating France (see that little table above) and despite taxing occupied territories as heavily as Germany itself they produced way less aircraft (naval vessels is easily explained by difference in military objectives). I explained that fact using two arguments:
1. The territories under German occupation suffered economic collapse, while the US as a whole grew, continental Europe GDP declined, by 1943, western continental Europe's GDP was ca. 60% of the US's, when it was nearly the same size in 1939.
2. Germany spend a smaller proportion of their resources on aircraft by virtue of different doctrines regarding airpower: US believe in airpower as a strategic weapon while German military used aircraft as support for ground forces. In 1943, German expenditures on aircraft were 8% of total military expenditures, compared to 16% in the US.