A Comparison of American and German economies in WW2

[mescal]

And with regard to the cuts in investments : I do not have overall figures, but some indicators are useful.

No it did not.

Read:
http://economics.yale.edu/sites/default ... 060329.pdf

Industrial investment in 1944 was very large, nearly as large as the peak and still way above pre-war levels.

Your link is interesting.
However, its content does not support you conclusion.

The numeric values of the level of investment in 1944 are actually systematically lower than those for 1939.

Here is a table summing the 1944 values vs both 1939 values and peak-year values, computed from the nine tables in the paper you linked :

investGer44.jpg

I would say that this tend to support my position (that extra production of war material was made from 1943 at the cost of a decrease of investment).

[Guaporense]

Considering the overall expenditures on industrial investment compared to total government expenditures and on armmaments the difference is almost insignificant:

Estimated industrial investment is around 6 billion RM
Total expenditures on armaments are estimated at around 25-26 billion RM
Total government expenditures were 150 billion RM

The difference between total industrial investment in the peak year and in 1944 is insignificant next to the totality of resources mobilized for the war and the overall scale of investment still was very large if you compare to the capital stock of the aircraft industry and the fact Germany's industrial capital stock was underutilized if compared to other countries: industry was generally on a single shift, in the allied countries industries worked on two or three shifts.

The main problem of the 80,000 aircraft plan was lack of labor, the aircraft industry had only 850,000 workers in mid 1944, to produce 80,000 aircraft it would need perhaps 1.25 million (considering output in mid 1944 reached 4,000-3,600 units, increasing by 3/4 wouldn't require a proportional increase in labor input most of these would be single engine fighters). Though compared to the aggregate size of the German labor force (39 million, discounting the unpaid family helpers) and the fact that Germany could import workers from occupied territories (as they did) importing 500,000 foreigners would be easy given they had 200 million people in occupied territories. And the total cost of 80,000 aircraft would be around 16 billion RM, considering they would be mostly single engine fighters, or 11% of total German government outlays.

Your claim that producing 80,000 aircraft was beyond the resources the German government controlled, even though it controlled most of Europe, don't appear convincing overall just because industrial investment was around 5/6 of the peak level in 1944, a difference equivalent to 1%.

So I don't see how your claim makes much sense. Unless you think a 1 billion RM reduction in industrial investment was due to a massive resource reallocation to present level armament production while total government expenditures in 1944 were 150 billion RM! My point is that the change in industrial investment was of negligible size compared to total resource mobilization for the war. That also resource expenditures on aircraft weren't that large for the Nazis (which also helps to explain why aircraft production increased so much between 1940 and 1944: given total cost of aircraft was low, increasing output was almost trivial).

[Guaporense]

And with regard to the cuts in investments : I do not have overall figures, but some indicators are useful.
Notably and on different levels :
* factory floor surface shrank in 1944,

(and the fact that it was contradicted "by production plans" is almost as ridiculous as said production "plans").

In 1943-1944 fiscal year, the German government spent 149.4 billion RM I don't know exactly how much were military outlays but I guess around 90%, in the US it was 93%.


Aircraft expenditures in 1944, for the 40,000 units delivered, spare parts and associated equipment for the airforce, was 10.5 billion RM (using 1943 prices). So 100,000 aircraft, spare parts and associated equipment would be ca. 25 billion RM, 17% of government expenditure.

1)It is questionable to use guesses in a discussion about economics

It's not a blind guess. It's an estimate based on comparative statistics: in the US around 90-95% of government outlays were military expenditures, in 1940-43 95% of German government outlays were military outlays: it's perfectly reasonable, in fact, probably an underestimation, to say that 90% of German government outlays were military outlays. It's not like in 1943-44 Germany was spending 20 billion RM on social security, right?

Also, don't try to pose as an authority on economics. You appear to have absolutely no knowledge of the field at all. I have been studying economics seriously for a long time now, from my perspective your statements show that you are completely clueless.

There is no proof that ,if 40000 units = 10.5 billion RM,that 100000 units = 25 billion RM.

Probably less than that. Considering the economies of scale involved.

Anyway, you did not understand my point: that given the size of government outlays, increasing aircraft production beyond historical levels, was not something that was actually very difficult as other countries were allocating a much larger proportion of their resources to do the same.

You have the custom to use guesses,estimations,extrapolations,interpretations to build a house of cards to prove your right,this result in the justified suspicion by a lot of posters that you are using such things(guesses,interpretations,estimations,extrapolations)because you know that the facts are putting you in the wrong .

What are you saying? I don't understand how can I be wrong based on your post. It appears that you don't understand my argument.

I am refuting a popular notion: that Germany had very small resources and because these very small resources they did not produce much armaments if compared to the allies. However, this notion is obviously wrong if you look at a map of the territories under German occupation since the Battle of France, or simply looking at government outlays. Also, Germany produced a lot of specific types of armament for their specific (ground warfare focused) needs: ammunition for the army, whose output was comparable to the total for the US and the USSR combined.

Compare manpower allocation, mid 1944:

Germany
Field army size ---------------------- 4,400,000
Labor force in aircraft industry --- 850,000

US
Field army size ---------------------- 2,400,000
Labor force in aircraft industry --- 2,150,000

Germany focused their resources on the army, the US focused a larger fraction of their resources on airforce and on the navy (Americans always have an aircraft fetish, even though WW2 showed aircraft couldn't actually be decisive alone, firepower of aircraft was too low to inflict substantial level of casualties). They were lucky though that the USSR won the war for them so that they could play with their flying toys while the blood of tens of millions was being spilled in the East.

It's that HARD to understand? It's HARD to understand that Germany controlled MOST OF EUROPE. Europe as a whole (including the European parts of the USSR) had more than twice of the GDP of the US in the 1930's. It's hard to understand that the Nazi government had under their means control of a lot of potential economic resources relative to the rest of the world, specially in 1940? It's hard to understand that a 1 billion RM decrease in industrial investment doesn't mean vast resources were being reallocated from future increase in armament production to present armament production, even though total government outlays were 150 times larger than 1 billion RM, that this doesn't mean a specific production plan for specific class of armaments could still be feasible?

Things are obvious, right before your eyes, and you don't see it. You even believe that Siberia had greater economic potential than continental Europe (because that were respectively the industrial bases of USSR and Germany in the war).

[ljadw]

The last sentence would not be received positively at a university ,because : it is WRONG .
The industrial base of the SU during the war was NOT Siberia ,but European Russia,the majority of which was not occupied by the Germans ,neither was continental Europe the industrial base of Germany for its war against the SU.

I find it not hard,but impossible to understand that someone with a certificate of economics can use as argument that before the war the GDP of Europe was more than twice that of the US,because,this is totally irrelevant :we are discussing not the economic potential of Europe before the war,but the economic potential of Europe during the war,and both were as different as a zebra and a lion .

May I also advise you not to let your hatred and malice against the US give the possibility to dominate your posts,otherwise,posters would ,rightfully,conclude that your aim is not to discuss objectively what happend 75 years ago,but to attack continuously the US : thus,childish remarks about flying toys have no place here .

Last points : if I am not wrong,your claim of the US field force strength of 2.4 million has been proved several times to be wrong and false .

: I accept your claim that you have ben studying economics for a long time,but,as most posters here, my conviction is that seriously is not the appropriate word to describe your studies .Besides,people who are blowing their own trompet can be suspected rightfully to do this to divert the attention from the fact that their claims are only front.

[Guaporense]

You are posting just nonsense, pure nonsense. I have no hatred for the US, never had and I don't understand why people would think that, in fact I have been living in the US for some time right now. And that field army size number is from Van Creveld's Fighting Power, a highly respected work, also corroborated by other sources, such as this:



US army size in continental Europe in the end of the war was 1.6 million, in 61 divisions which would imply in total US field army size of 2.4 million. Divisional slice was bigger in the beginning of the invasion in June-August but those were above average slices, because of great number of attachments. RIch's claim that the average US divisional slice was 40,000 appear to include more categories of manpower than this number. Overall, Heer manpower slice was 26,000 including the reserve army.

If US field army was larger than 2.4 million, then the degree in which the German army was outnumbered in the Western front would be much higher than conventionally estimated 2-2.5 to 1.

If you want to convince me that Germany did not control many resources, you could try posting more price data that would allow to construct a PPP estimate of mark/dollar in 1944 for us to make a comparison of government outlays in real terms, which would suggest a lower mark value and hence a lower real value for German government outlays.

In terms of formal study I have undergraduate degree, a Masters and I am working on research in a PHD in economics at a top research center right now. I am very well regarded among my colleagues and I am as serious as I can be.

The price data I have is for 1935 (US) and 1937 (Germany) from 2 scientific papers, which allowed me to construct a crude PPP estimate of 2.7 1937 RM = 1 1935 dollar, considering inflation in Germany from 1937 to 1944 was much smaller than inflation in the US from 1935 to 1944 (which was about 60%, compared to around 10% for Germany), we would have a PPP exchange rate of about 1.9 RM = 1 dollar in 1944, cost of production data for aircraft, machine tools and other, less rigorous data, seems to support that exchange rate. Considering that government outlays of 150 billion RM would be equivalent to about 80 billion dollars. Which implies that total resources under control of the German government were of comparable magnitude of the US's government at the same period in time. This is corroborated by the fact that estimated pre-war GDPs of the territories under control of both governments were of similar magnitude, as well as data on coal production, the basic energy input of early to mid 20th century industrial economies, were of similar magnitude, as well by figures of expenditures based on official exchange rates (which appear to have been overvalued against the dollar by about 10% in the late 30's, slightly more against the pound). Even the degree in which the German army was outnumbered/outgunned in the western front appears to be perfectly consistent.

Overall, all evidence leads me to conclude that the conventional assumption that Germany's resources were modest is incorrect. Germany and their continental European allies controlled about one third of the world's industrial production though it was also at war with almost all the other two thirds.

[ljadw]

Which would imply : nice :an other of Guaporense's guesses .

Intelligent readers will meanwhile (better:immediately) have discerned an other of his primitive subterfuges :the Heer manpower slice was 26000 including the reserve army

Of course,as usual this is surpassed by his use of price data to prove his right .

An other pearl: "which allowed me to construct a crude PPP estimate of ...."(the rest being the usual meaningless blahblah .)

So we know him :the number one in the construction of crude ( ) estimates .

[RichTO90]

Intelligent readers will meanwhile (better:immediately) have discerned an other of his primitive subterfuges :the Heer manpower slice was 26000 including the reserve army

I think everyone is well aware that guaporense's argument depends on gaming the numbers. For example, according to him apparently the American Army only existed from May 1944 to April 1945, and only in Northwest Europe. Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, and Bell I. Wiley, The Army Ground Forces, The Organization of Ground Combat Troops, table, p. 161, line 51 clearly states the breakdown of Army strength as of 30 June 1944. Furthermore, the figures are for enlisted personnel only, so also in fact are an UNDER-COUNT. So, in terms of enlisted men ONLY there were:

1,097,000 in divisions = 12,325.8 enlisted men per division
713,000 in non divisional combat support units (less AAA) = 8,011.2 enlisted men per division
342,000 in non-divisional AAA units = 3,842.7 enlisted men per division
436,000 in AGF service support units = 4,898.9 enlisted men per division
888,000 in ASF service support units = 9,977.5 enlisted men per division
3,476,000 enlisted ground troops = 39,056.2 enlisted men per division

In addition, there were:

2,029,000 in AAF
1,395,000 in overhead, replacements, non-available, and et cetera (excluding AAF; effectively the U.S. Army's "Ersatzheer")

Total enlisted was:

6,916,000

Add about 9.6% for officers and warrant officers not counted in the enlisted totals, so roughly 663,936, of which 333,401 were USAAF. Thus, ground forces, including officers, overhead, replacements, non-available, and et cetera were 3,476,000+1,395,000+332,535=5,203,535. In terms of "field forces" we may estimate the total as 3,715,390 for a divisional slice of 41,746.

Cheers!

[RichTO90]

Germany produced a lot of specific types of armament for their specific (ground warfare focused) needs: ammunition for the army, whose output was comparable to the total for the US and the USSR combined.

For those of you having difficulty following what guaporense's "conclusions" such as this are based on, may I remind you...

Total ammunition production/supply of calibers over 75 mm:

(1) Germany (1940-1944) --------- 312 million rounds (production)
(2) United States (1940-1945) ---- 211.8 million rounds (deliveries to the army) [note the correction to 356.795719 million of course ignored by guapo]
(3) Soviet Union (1940-1944) ----- 168.4 million rounds (prewar stock+ war production)

So what he is saying above is that 312 million is "comparable to the total of" 525.2 million.

Is it any wonder that Nassim Nicholas Taleb has commented that "An economist is a mixture of 1) a businessman without common sense, 2) a physicist without brains, and 3) a speculator without balls."?

[RichTO90]

Add about 9.6% for officers and warrant officers not counted in the enlisted totals, so roughly 663,936, of which 333,401 were USAAF. Thus, ground forces, including officers, overhead, replacements, non-available, and et cetera were 3,476,000+1,395,000+332,535=5,203,535. In terms of "field forces" we may estimate the total as 3,715,390 for a divisional slice of 41,746.

Cheers!

BTW, if anyone is interested, its also possible to provide similar, much more accurate figures, for 15 November 1943 and 8 May 1945, all of which demonstrate the lack of rigor in guaporense's "assumptions".

Is it time to note what happens when you "assume" too much?

[ljadw]

There is also the following ; the OP is : A comparison of American and German economies in WWII, not :a comparison of the American economy to :the German economy + the economies of the German allies + the economies of the European neutral countries + the economies of the occupied European countries .

If one want to compare the latter,a minimum of intellectual honesty would require to compare them with :the economy of the US + the economies of the allies of the US + the economies of the neutrals .

But,of course,dreaming of intellectual honesty is only wishful-thinking .

[Guaporense]

And with regard to the cuts in investments : I do not have overall figures, but some indicators are useful.

No it did not.

Read:
http://economics.yale.edu/sites/default ... 060329.pdf

Industrial investment in 1944 was very large, nearly as large as the peak and still way above pre-war levels.

Your link is interesting.
However, its content does not support you conclusion.

Yes it does. Extremely clearly, I will show to you step by step because your limited cognitive capability prevents you from understanding my point.

The numeric values of the level of investment in 1944 are actually systematically lower than those for 1939.

Pre war means before the war, the last year before the war was 1938, not 1939.

These were the pre war numbers, industrial investment in millions RM:

1935 - 1,714
1936 - 2,493
1937 - 3,337
1938 - 4,679

The paper's estimated numbers for industrial investment in the last 3 years of the war:

1942 - [6,881-7,882]
1943 - 6,344
1944 - [5,417-6,730]

Where 1942 and 1944 are intervals between the lower and upper limit estimated by the paper. Obviously, 1944 figures are way higher than 1930's figures, even factoring in inflation. 1944 levels were still at 6/7 of peak 1942 levels of investment and much higher than needed to prevent depreciation of the industrial capital stock. Given a capital stock of 70 billion RM, to prevent depreciation would require investments around 3-4 billion RM, given the usual rates of depreciation of 5% per year.

I would say that this tend to support my position (that extra production of war material was made from 1943 at the cost of a decrease of investment).

Your claim was much more radical than that.

You claimed that Germany consumed their capital stock in 1944 in order to provide a unsustainable volume of war production. First, investment was above depreciation rate, not below as you argued, second, it's obvious that Germany's capital stock was the least intensively utilized of all major powers in the war (with the exception of Italy's) German industrial investment was made to keep industry working on a single shift even in 1944 as the ratio of workers to machine tools was kept constant at 2.4 during the whole war (while the ratio in the UK was 5.6), third, you obviously ignore the vast industrial capacity of occupied territories, which was used to an even lesser degree than Germany's. Fourth, investment figures, figures for expenditures on armaments, and total government outlays are all inconsistent with this view: German expenditures on armaments in 1944 were a relatively small proportion of total government expenditures, much smaller than the Allied countries. Increasing armament production several times would be perfectly feasible given the size of government outlays and installed industrial capacity.

You said:

And with regard to the cuts in investments : I do not have overall figures, but some indicators are useful.
Notably and on different levels :
* factory floor surface shrank in 1944,

Not at all, investment figures for 1944 are completely inconsistent with this claim. You also claimed that resources that would go into investment were allocated to armament production.

In 1942, government expenditures were the following:
Total -------------------- 102.36 billion RM
of which armaments ---- ca. 15 billion RM
industrial investment --- ca. 7.3 billion RM

In 1944, government expenditures were the following:
Total -------------------- 149.39 billion RM
of which armaments ---- ca. 26 billion RM
industrial investment --- ca. 6.1 billion RM

The 1.2 billion decrease in expenditures in industrial investment doesn't explain the >10 billion increase in armament expenditures nor the nearly 50 billion increase in overall government expenditures, as you claim to do, since you claimed Germany was consuming their industrial capital stock in 1944 to produce an unsustainable amount of armaments. It's obvious from the figures above that the quantity of armaments was small relative to total resources consumed by the government and from data on the utilization of capital stock such as employment per machine, that the industrial capital stock was still being worked in a single shift in 1944 as it was according to a census made in 1942.

I am using ca. figures for armament expenditures because they come from No Room For Miracles and are the averages of two distinct set of estimations for armament expenditures: the USSBS's estimate and Wagenfuhr estimate. Total government outlays come from Germany and the Second World War volume 5, they do not include outlays in servicing the debt but only the non-financial outlays.

Clearly, industrial invesment overall represented a very small fraction of resources Germany mobilized for WW2, which also imply that Tooze's thesis, that resources were focused no increasing the industrial capital stock instead of being allocated for armament production, is obviously plain wrong: both categories were not particularly "competing" for resources during the war.

[ljadw]

Are the USSBS's estimates not founded on the Wagenführ estimates ?

[mescal]

Yes it does. Extremely clearly, I will show to you step by step because your limited cognitive capability prevents you from understanding my point.

Lol

1944 levels were still at 6/7 of peak 1942 levels of investment

You do understand that a 15% decrease is actually a "cut in investment", don't you ?

First, investment was above depreciation rate

What depreciation rate do you use ?
Does it take into account the effects of bombing ?

it's obvious that Germany's capital stock was the least intensively utilized of all major powers in the war (with the exception of Italy's) German industrial investment was made to keep industry working on a single shift even in 1944

Oh yes, the "single shift".
Seriously, do you have any idea of what would have happened had they increased the numbers of shifts ? Lots of other bottlenecks would have appeared, especially in raw materials.

you obviously ignore the vast industrial capacity of occupied territories

Unlike you, who in perfect honesty use the pre-war european GDPs to add them to Germany's to get a "German potential in 1942", but do not forget to delete 37% of the USSR pre-war GDP to take Barbarossa effect into account ?
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 5#p1927926
You've been told again and again that's at best unsound to simply add the GDPs of occupied countries to the German one.

investment figures, figures for expenditures on armaments, and total government outlays are all inconsistent with this view

You know, I usually take great care and caution when I'm told data do not fit my theory...
but sadly, given your past history of conjuring figures and neglect of contradiction, I guess I'm still completely OK with my ideas...

[RichTO90]

You know, I usually take great care and caution when I'm told data do not fit my theory...

That doesn't appear to be a care taken by "economists" or "economics students"...at least this supposed one.

but sadly, given your past history of conjuring figures and neglect of contradiction, I guess I'm still completely OK with my ideas...

Don't forget the deliberate distortion of figures, the making up of figures, and the ignoring of figures that have better fidelity and greater context.

[Guaporense]

Sorry for insulting you, Mescal, because you are apparently more civil than some other people. I just felt that I had to fire something due to the barrage of insults I receive. But I will not reduce myself to ad hominens anymore.

1944 levels were still at 6/7 of peak 1942 levels of investment

You do understand that a 15% decrease is actually a "cut in investment", don't you ?

I never said that investment increased in 1944 relative to 1942. My argument does not require so.

First, investment was above depreciation rate

What depreciation rate do you use ?

5%

Does it take into account the effects of bombing ?

No. But your point was that Germany was maximizing the present output of armaments versus future output in 1944, by reallocating resources from investment to present production, leading to capital consumption, hence that it was unsound to compare German levels in 1944 versus US levels, which (implicitly) were sustainable levels of output.

The absolutely very high investment levels of 1944 refute your assertion, as the fact that expenditures on armaments were still a small proportion of total government outlays in 1944 also refutes the assertion as well.

it's obvious that Germany's capital stock was the least intensively utilized of all major powers in the war (with the exception of Italy's) German industrial investment was made to keep industry working on a single shift even in 1944

Oh yes, the "single shift".
Seriously, do you have any idea of what would have happened had they increased the numbers of shifts ? Lots of other bottlenecks would have appeared, especially in raw materials.[/quote]

But the basic material sectors of German industry were also working on a single shift, the entire German industry was working on a single shift from the mines to the plants which produced ammunition and guns, except perhaps the blast furnaces, but the blast furnaces in occupied countries was operating at far below capacity. The only real bottleneck was synthetic oil, which wasn't a bottleneck for production of armaments just their utilization.

My point is not that Germany should have increased armament production is that comparing output of individual armament items does not prove that Germany's resources were relatively small, because they represented different proportion of military outlays.

you obviously ignore the vast industrial capacity of occupied territories

Unlike you, who in perfect honesty use the pre-war european GDPs to add them to Germany's to get a "German potential in 1942", but do not forget to delete 37% of the USSR pre-war GDP to take Barbarossa effect into account ?

Exactly. The USSR lost 70 million people due to Barbarossa, hence, we should correct that when comparing warmaking potential, as we should add the GDPs of all European countries under German control, since all their resources were available to the Nazi government as much as inside the pre-war German borders.

You've been told again and again that's at best unsound to simply add the GDPs of occupied countries to the German one.

I know that but no convincing arguments were presented. If you want you can try to convince me, but you cannot impose your (naive) view on the matter, probably based on your ignorance of the nature of governments, upon me.

You don't understand what governments are. Let me teach you:

- A government is just an organization that has the monopoly on the legitimate use of force inside a territory.

- Governments use coercion confiscate resources inside the territory they control to fight wars. All governments did so, including the Allies, or do you think that the US military budget was financed by donations? That all soldiers in the Allied armies weren't conscripted? Of course, like Germany, all the governments involved in WW2 confiscated ("mobilized") the resources inside the territories they control for their armed forces. The Allies, however, were more efficient in doing so, specially the USSR in mobilizing the manpower of their Empire (since half of the Red Army wasn't made of Russians, the Nazi's were unable to incorporate foreigners into their army.)

- In comparing warmaking potential of countries involved in WW2 one should incorporate the resources in the territories the governments control. The Nazis controlled territories much larger than pre-war Germany and it's completely incorrect to ignore it, as historians slaves to political correctness and wishful thinking ("Germany could never win") do.

- It's a clear fact that the Nazis controlled territories whose economic potential was at least as great than the territories controlled by any other government in the world in 1941-44. Or at least, comparable to the economic potential of the territories controlled by the US's government. Hence, it's clear that the Nazi government had, in economic terms, had apparently equal or greater warmaking potential than any other government.

- Empirical evidence also shows that Germany was able to spend 5 times it's pre-war GNP in WW2, compared to 1.9 times for the US and 1.8 times for the USSR. Clearly, that's simply because Germany controlled territories whose economic potential was more than twice it's pre-war GNP. German military outlays were indeed similar in scale to the US's, greater than the sum of those of the British Empire and the Soviet Union (which also include lend-lease).

- Cutting access to raw material imports decreased warmaking potential of continental Europe a little, but not much since there exists such thing as substitute goods. Also, the opportunity of making a, economic union area created by the political unification of continental Europe allowed for possibly greater net-gains of intra-European trade versus losses created by the British blockade. Considering the massive economic size of continental Europe and the already substantial natural resources of Europe there were greater opportunities for trade inside Europe than outside.

- The Allies also had to endure the loss of cutting trading opportunities with continental Europe which also lowered their economic potential. For instance, the US and UK couldn't import the high quality technology of German industrial machine tools nor the high quality optics for fire control provided by the Swiss.

- Just appealing to the British blockade to ignore the massive economic potential the Nazis controlled is a symptom of political correctness and wishful thinking contaminating research. The British blockade also heavily hurt the British economy itself since they couldn't trade anymore with the rest of Europe. Continental Europe was a much larger trade partner of the UK in the 20's and 30's than the rest of the British empire. Which is obvious considering the enormous size of Continental Europe vis. Canada and Australia.

- Finally, according to the World Economic Survey 1942-44, the proportion of French and Benelux industry working for the Wehrmacht in 1943 was between 60% and 67%, in Germany itself it was about 60%.

investment figures, figures for expenditures on armaments, and total government outlays are all inconsistent with this view

You know, I usually take great care and caution when I'm told data do not fit my theory...
but sadly, given your past history of conjuring figures

I never conjured any figures.

and neglect of contradiction

When?

I guess I'm still completely OK with my ideas...

You are free to believe in wrong ideas.