Sorry for insulting you, Mescal, because you are apparently more civil than some other people. I just felt that I had to fire something due to the barrage of insults I receive. But I will not reduce myself to ad hominens anymore.
Guaporense wrote:1944 levels were still at 6/7 of peak 1942 levels of investment
You do understand that a 15% decrease is actually a "cut in investment", don't you ?
I never said that investment increased in 1944 relative to 1942. My argument does not require so.
Guaporense wrote:First, investment was above depreciation rate
What depreciation rate do you use ?
Does it take into account the effects of bombing ?
No. But your point was that Germany was maximizing the present output of armaments versus future output in 1944, by reallocating resources from investment to present production, leading to capital consumption, hence that it was unsound to compare German levels in 1944 versus US levels, which (implicitly) were sustainable levels of output.
The absolutely very high investment levels of 1944 refute your assertion, as the fact that expenditures on armaments were still a small proportion of total government outlays in 1944 also refutes the assertion as well.
Guaporense wrote: it's obvious that Germany's capital stock was the least intensively utilized of all major powers in the war (with the exception of Italy's) German industrial investment was made to keep industry working on a single shift even in 1944
Oh yes, the "single shift".
Seriously, do you have any idea of what would have happened had they increased the numbers of shifts ? Lots of other bottlenecks would have appeared, especially in raw materials.[/quote]
But the basic material sectors of German industry were also working on a single shift, the entire German industry was working on a single shift from the mines to the plants which produced ammunition and guns, except perhaps the blast furnaces, but the blast furnaces in occupied countries was operating at far below capacity. The only real bottleneck was synthetic oil, which wasn't a bottleneck for production of armaments just their utilization.
My point is not that Germany should have increased armament production is that comparing output of individual armament items does not prove that Germany's resources were relatively small, because they represented different proportion of military outlays.
Guaporense wrote:you obviously ignore the vast industrial capacity of occupied territories
Unlike you, who in perfect honesty use the pre-war european GDPs to add them to Germany's to get a "German potential in 1942", but do not forget to delete 37% of the USSR pre-war GDP to take Barbarossa effect into account ?
Exactly. The USSR lost 70 million people due to Barbarossa, hence, we should correct that when comparing warmaking potential, as we should add the GDPs of all European countries under German control, since all their resources were available to the Nazi government as much as inside the pre-war German borders.
You've been told again and again that's at best unsound to simply add the GDPs of occupied countries to the German one.
I know that but no convincing arguments were presented. If you want you can try to convince me, but you cannot impose your (naive) view on the matter, probably based on your ignorance of the nature of governments, upon me.
You don't understand what governments are. Let me teach you:
- A government is just an organization that has the monopoly on the legitimate use of force inside a territory.
- Governments use coercion confiscate resources inside the territory they control to fight wars. All governments did so, including the Allies, or do you think that the US military budget was financed by donations? That all soldiers in the Allied armies weren't conscripted? Of course, like Germany, all the governments involved in WW2 confiscated ("mobilized") the resources inside the territories they control for their armed forces. The Allies, however, were more efficient in doing so, specially the USSR in mobilizing the manpower of their Empire (since half of the Red Army wasn't made of Russians, the Nazi's were unable to incorporate foreigners into their army.)
- In comparing warmaking potential of countries involved in WW2 one should incorporate the resources in the territories the governments control. The Nazis controlled territories much larger than pre-war Germany and it's completely incorrect to ignore it, as historians slaves to political correctness and wishful thinking ("Germany could never win") do.
- It's a clear fact that the Nazis controlled territories whose economic potential was at least as great than the territories controlled by any other government in the world in 1941-44. Or at least, comparable to the economic potential of the territories controlled by the US's government. Hence, it's clear that the Nazi government had, in economic terms, had apparently equal or greater warmaking potential than any other government.
- Empirical evidence also shows that Germany was able to spend 5 times it's pre-war GNP in WW2, compared to 1.9 times for the US and 1.8 times for the USSR. Clearly, that's simply because Germany controlled territories whose economic potential was more than twice it's pre-war GNP. German military outlays were indeed similar in scale to the US's, greater than the sum of those of the British Empire and the Soviet Union (which also include lend-lease).
- Cutting access to raw material imports decreased warmaking potential of continental Europe a little, but not much since there exists such thing as substitute goods. Also, the opportunity of making a, economic union area created by the political unification of continental Europe allowed for possibly greater net-gains of intra-European trade versus losses created by the British blockade. Considering the massive economic size of continental Europe and the already substantial natural resources of Europe there were greater opportunities for trade inside Europe than outside.
- The Allies also had to endure the loss of cutting trading opportunities with continental Europe which also lowered their economic potential. For instance, the US and UK couldn't import the high quality technology of German industrial machine tools nor the high quality optics for fire control provided by the Swiss.
- Just appealing to the British blockade to ignore the massive economic potential the Nazis controlled is a symptom of political correctness and wishful thinking contaminating research. The British blockade also heavily hurt the British economy itself since they couldn't trade anymore with the rest of Europe. Continental Europe was a much larger trade partner of the UK in the 20's and 30's than the rest of the British empire. Which is obvious considering the enormous size of Continental Europe vis. Canada and Australia.
- Finally, according to the World Economic Survey 1942-44, the proportion of French and Benelux industry working for the Wehrmacht in 1943 was between 60% and 67%, in Germany itself it was about 60%.
Guaporense wrote:investment figures, figures for expenditures on armaments, and total government outlays are all inconsistent with this view
You know, I usually take great care and caution when I'm told data do not fit my theory...
but sadly, given your past history of conjuring figures
I never conjured any figures.
and neglect of contradiction
I guess I'm still completely OK with my ideas...
You are free to believe in wrong ideas.
"In tactics, as in strategy, superiority in numbers is the most common element of victory." - Carl von Clausewitz