A Comparison of American and German economies in WW2

[pugsville]

But for example what was the cost/man hours comparison for trucks? Something the US standardised and the Germans didn't? can any sort of estimate be made for how much more productive a standardised German truck model?

[LWD]

Your numbers seem a bit off. For instance you state:

...
Air force

Fighters -------------------------- 28,926 --------------- 38,873

On the other hand http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Sta ... rld_War_II lists the US producing a total of over 99,000 fighters over 47,000 of which went to the USAAF.
and http://www.afhra.af.mil/shared/media/do ... 08-042.pdf
lists over 100,000 fighters produced by the US.

...
Bombers ------------------------- 6,468 ----------------- 35,003

Similarly the wiki page mentions over 96,000 bombers for the US and the airforce statistical document lists over 98,000.

Navy

--------------------------------- Germany ------- USA
Naval vessels ----------------- 234 ------------- 379
------ displacement ---------- 280,500 -------- 1,047,000

Note: I only included major naval vessels. I.e. submarines, destroyers, carriers, battleships, cruisers, etc. Much of US ship production consisted of merchant ships. In fact, most of American ship production, in terms of value, consisted of merchant ships to replace the losses to the U-boats.
...

http://www.combinedfleet.com/economic.htm
lists the US as having produced 1249 or not counting escorts 751

[LWD]

...
Let's compare productivity in the munitions industries:

For instance, productivity in munitions was not that lower than in the US. If fact, it may have been higher, at least in some sectors. Germany produced U-Boats with a greater worker productivity than the US produced submarines.

Did they? How did you determine this? I.e. sources please.

From the respective costs of German and American submarines. A German type VII U-Boat cost in 1943, when production reached 25 submarines per month, 2 million RM. That's 2,500 RM per ton. An American submarine cost 3 million dollars, of 2,000 dollars per ton. Considering that the RM was certainly worth less than 0.8 cents of dollar (it was 50 cents of a dollar if it is indexed by inflation to pre-war exchange rates). And much lower production costs usually imply in higher levels of labor productivity.

Where did you get your costs? What's included in them? For instance if you talk about tanks there are quite a few different "costs" associate with say a M4 in 1943. There's the cost to produce, the cost the government paid for it, and the costs they charged to external customers. If you are comparing between countries there's the amount of governement furnished equipment included or not included in those costs (GFE often includes armament and radios for instance and may include engines). Furthermore there was a surcharge applied to many US tanks, planes, and I suspect ships that covered the cost of buidling and/or expanding the facility where they were built. Then there are questions about whether spares are included and if so how many and the impact of the design and materials on the costs. For instance US warships (not sure about subs) used armor quality steel througout the vessels for internal bulkheads and decks.

... Medium German bombers to heavy American bombers. I am comparing the labor costs involved in airframe construction and final assembly. I.e. the labor costs of the factories that make the aircraft. Junkers made a Ju-88 medium bomber for 7,000 labor hours in 1943, while Boeing made a heavy bomber less than twice of Ju-88's size had to invest 18,600 labor hours in 1944.

Also, since heavy bombers are larger they tend to be easier to build in terms of labor hours per ton, which means that German labor productivity is relatively even higher than these numbers indicate.

I'd like to see a source for that as well. For instance I strongly suspect that a B-29 was not at all "easier to build in terms of labor hours per ton". Looking a fighters I'm almost certain that the P-38 was more difficult to build in such terms than any of the single engine fighters.

So, German productivity in making bombers was in fact much higher than in the US during the war.

You have yet to substanitate this.

What do you want?

Perhaps an apples to apples comparison?

Let's see you are comparing an aircraft that was introduced in 1937 with one that was introduced in 1942. So you are comparing the last half of the Me-109 production with the early and mid produciton of the P-51.

Large scale Me-109 production didn't start that early. The war broke out in late 1939, so that's only 2 years in advance.

When large scale production started is not all that relevant. Early production often works out a log of bugs and the Me-109 clearly had several more years to do so. Note that large scale production didn't really start until 43 either.

Furthermore you are ignoring the differences between the two. For instance the P-51 weights in at over 3 times the Me-109.

No. It was 1.5 times the weight. And had a weaker engine.

Let's see looking at the wiki pages:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Amer ... 51_Mustang
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Messerschmitt_Bf_109
P-51D empty weight 7,635 lbs and 1,720hp
bF-109G empty weight 5,893 lbs and 1,455 hp
So it looks like I got confused by the flip floping of units and you are correct the P-51 only weights ~1.5 times what the Me-109 does. However the engine is clearly not weaker indeed on Kurfurst site it mentions that they were not suppose to run it at that power rating.

Cost:
Me-109: 43,900 RM (in 1943)
P-51: 51,000 dollars (in 1945, two years later!)

Again what's included. The P-51 cost mentioned above is almost sure to include a prorated value for buidling the plant and equiping it with tools. It may also include some spares.

Also, the Me-109 had a stronger engine and fulfilled the same role as the P-51.

That is simply not the case. The numbers above show that the Me-109 did not have a "stronger engine" nor did they fulfil the same role.

One simply cannot say that 3 P-51 = 1 Me-109, unless this one is a retard.

Indeed. The P-51's role was that of a long range escort where the Me-109 was essentially useless. So 1 P-51 was worth an infinte numer of Me-109's if you need a long range escort.

[Guaporense]

Using the US prices we can get an idea of the relative values of these munitions, in 1944 dollars.

Prices (for 1944 when I have the source):

Ammunition:

105 mm shell - 32 dollars (http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 9#p1303259), usually a 105 mm shell had 14.2 kg, implying in a price of 2.25 dollars per kg of projectile produced.

Tanks:

A M4A1(75)VVSS Sherman cost 47,725 dollars and weigthed 30,300 kg. Giving a price per ton of $1,575.

Aircraft:

Single engine fighters:
P-40: 44,892
P-47: 85,578
P-51: 51,572
average: 60,681

Twin engine fighters:
P-38: 97,147

Tactical bombers:
A-20: 100,800
B-25: 142,194
B-26: 192,427
average: 145,140

Strategic bombers:
B-17: 204,370
B-24: 215,516
average: 209,943

from: http://www.usaaf.net/digest/t82.htm

Navy:
$2,765,000 for a Gato class submarine (1,549 tons) - $1,785 per ton
$100 million for a Iowa battleship (44,500 tons) - $2,247 per ton
$60 million for a Carolina class BB (37,000 ton ) - $1,622 per ton
average: ca. 1,900 dollars per ton

Multiplying all the table values for these values we have:

--------------- Germany ----------- US
Ammunition - 4.05 billion ------- 3.11 billion
Tanks -------- 0.87 billion ------- 0.88 billion
Aircraft ------ 2.82 billion ------- 8.65 billion
Navy ---------- 0.53 billion ------ 1.99 billion
total ---------- 8.27 billion ------ 14.63 billion

German munitions would be 57% of US production in 1944. Considering the size of the labor forces it appears that productivity was higher in Germany. Though, these figures are highly incomplete and don't include the massive quantities of non-combat related US production. For instance, US ship production was equal to aircraft production in value, including all types of ships (such as the 50 million tons of merchant ships produced during the war).

Notice that using US prices it appears that ammunition was more important than combat aicraft for Germany, however, I am not including spare parts and non-combat aicraft, both which would greatly increase the value of the aircraft. Also, I am using US prices, perhaps German ammunition prices in relation to aircraft prices were lower.

Combat munitions output in 1944, Germany and the United States:

Total employment in industry for the armed forces

------------------------------------------------- Germany ------------ USA
-------------------------------------------------- ca. 6 million -------- ca. 12.5 million

Army

Ground artillery ammunition
--- projectile weight metric tons ----------- 1,657,592 ----------- 1,312,545
heavy (over 118 mm), thousand rounds ----- 12,350 ------------- 9,668
------ projectile weight metric tons ---------- 560,601 ----------- 460,480
medium (20 mm > x > 118 mm), t. rounds -- 121,238 ----------- 85,639
------ projectile weight metric tons ---------- 1,096,991 --------- 852,065

small arms (>= 20 mm), m, rounds ------------ 5,370 ------------- 6,578
------ projectile weight metric tons ---------- 64,400 ------------- 65,780

About 75% of army related combat munitions value was ammunition. It was around 6 times more important than tanks for the German war effort. About 60-70% of all WW2 casualties were caused by artillery. In the German war effort, from 1940 to 1944, expenditures on tanks totaled 6 billion RM, on ammunition, about 30 billion RM, on weapons, about 7 billion RM.

I have used the following ammunition numbers and weights: 42,421 t. rounds of 105 mm (14.8 kg), t. 15,357 rounds of 88 mm (9.4 kg) and 37,872 t. rounds of 75 mm (7.2 kg). German figures of weight are probably incomplete. In terms of proportion to US output, for which I have precise figures, it suggests a total German ammo weight of 1,794,479 tons (108.26% of figure I have calculated manually). The difference can be explained by the fact that I computed the 75 mm as a residual from the figures of larger calibers and from the fact that Germany produced 108 million rounds of ammo equal or over 75 mm, so I computed the weight of each type of ammo over 75 mm that I found and it left 38 million rounds, which I assumed to be 75 mm.

In 1944, German ammunition production was 3,350,000 metric tons, including the projectiles and the complete cartridges, which is about twice of the 1.7 million tons of projectiles of ammo over 20 mm. The weight of projectile ammo equal and under 20 mm was very small relative to heavy ammo, the standard German rifle bullet weighted 12 grams per bullet, or ca. 64,000 tons for Germany, and the standard American bullet weighted ca. 10 grams which implies in ca. 65,000 tons of infantry ammo for the US. Total ammunition production in 1944 in terms of metric tons of projectile weight was probably around these figures:

------------------------------------- Germany ------------ USA
projectile weight metric tons --- 1,800,000 ----------- 1,380,000

Air force

Fighters -------------------------- 28,926 --------------- 38,873
------ single-engine ------------- 25,580 --------------- 34,140
------ twin-engine --------------- 3,066 ------------------ 4,733
Bombers ------------------------- 6,468 ----------------- 35,003
------ tactical -------------------- 5,950 ----------------- 18,958
------ strategic ------------------- 518 ------------------- 16,045

Germany produced comparable numbers of fighters, a reaction to the air attacks of the United States. In the absence of Allied intervention, in 1945 Germany was planning to produce a total of 70,000 fighters. Note the massive difference in terms of bombers produced, a result of the fact that the United States focused on strategic bombing while Germany focused on the airforce as a tactical support of the ground forces. Note also that the low level of tactical bomber production relative to fighter production was also a consequence of the bombing of Germany, which redirected resources from bombers to fighters in response.

Navy

--------------------------------- Germany ------- USA
Naval vessels ----------------- 234 ------------- 379
------ displacement ---------- 280,500 -------- 1,047,000

Note: I only included major naval vessels. I.e. submarines, destroyers, carriers, battleships, cruisers, etc. Much of US ship production consisted of merchant ships. In fact, most of American ship production, in terms of value, consisted of merchant ships to replace the losses to the U-boats.

Sources:

US, http://books.google.com.br/books?id=72j ... &q&f=false

Germany,
ammunition: http://www.sturmvogel.orbat.com/GermWeapProd.html, and http://www.wwiiarchives.net/servlet/act ... /149/295/0
other: USSBS, Report on the European War

[paspartoo]

Let's see looking at the wiki pages:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Amer ... 51_Mustang
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Messerschmitt_Bf_109
P-51D empty weight 7,635 lbs and 1,720hp
bF-109G empty weight 5,893 lbs and 1,455 hp
So it looks like I got confused by the flip floping of units and you are correct the P-51 only weights ~1.5 times what the Me-109 does. However the engine is clearly not weaker indeed on Kurfurst site it mentions that they were not suppose to run it at that power rating.

For wwii aircraft when you state engine power you need to include the power setting. Those numbers are for emergency power (which it is true the Bf109G was not cleared until late 1943).
For combat power my numbers are closer to: Bf109G - ~1.300 , P-51- ~1.490
Also the weight for the Bf is wrong. G6 should be 2250-2300kg (empty).

[LWD]

Using the US prices we can get an idea of the relative values of these munitions, in 1944 dollars.

Prices (for 1944 when I have the source):

Ammunition
105 mm shell - 32 dollars (http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 9#p1303259), usually a 105 mm shell had 14.2 kg, implying in a price of 2.25 dollars per kg of projectile produced.

Aircraft:

Single engine fighters:
P-40: 44,892
P-47: 85,578
P-51: 51,572
average: 60,681

Twin engine fighters:
P-38: 97,147

Tactical bombers:
A-20: 100,800
B-25: 142,194
B-26: 192,427
average: 145,140

Strategic bombers:
B-17: 204,370
B-24: 215,516
average: 209,943

from: http://www.usaaf.net/digest/t82.htm

Navy:
$2,765,000 for a Gato class submarine (1,549 tons) - $1,785 per ton
$100 million for a Iowa battleship (44,500 tons) - $2,247 per ton
$60 million for a Carolina class BB (37,000 ton ) - $1,622 per ton
average: ca. 1,900 dollars per ton

Multiplying all the table values for these values we have:

--------------- Germany ----------- US
Ammunition - 4.05 billion ------- 3.11 billion
Aircraft ------ 2.82 billion ------- 8.65 billion
Navy ---------- 0.53 billion ----- 1.99 billion
total ---------- 7.40 billion ------ 13.75 billion

What are you multiplying the prices by?
I note that you have left out a lot of US single engine fighters (P-40, P-39, F4F, F4U, F6F, etc)
Not sure how you can get a navy cost per ton by using battleships costs either.

[Guaporense]

Your numbers seem a bit off. For instance you state:

...
Air force

Fighters -------------------------- 28,926 --------------- 38,873

On the other hand http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Sta ... rld_War_II lists the US producing a total of over 99,000 fighters over 47,000 of which went to the USAAF.

Those are 1944 numbers, ONLY. Please, read my posts more carefully.

...
Bombers ------------------------- 6,468 ----------------- 35,003

Similarly the wiki page mentions over 96,000 bombers for the US and the airforce statistical document lists over 98,000.

Again, 1944 numbers only.

Navy

--------------------------------- Germany ------- USA
Naval vessels ----------------- 234 ------------- 379
------ displacement ---------- 280,500 -------- 1,047,000

Note: I only included major naval vessels. I.e. submarines, destroyers, carriers, battleships, cruisers, etc. Much of US ship production consisted of merchant ships. In fact, most of American ship production, in terms of value, consisted of merchant ships to replace the losses to the U-boats.
...

http://www.combinedfleet.com/economic.htm
lists the US as having produced 1249 or not counting escorts 751

Again, 1944 numbers only. Germany produced 1,150 submarines during the war, 234 in 1944. You wanna compare numbers for the whole war? In terms of ammunition the difference between US and Germany was greater in earlier years.

[Guaporense]

...
Let's compare productivity in the munitions industries:

For instance, productivity in munitions was not that lower than in the US. If fact, it may have been higher, at least in some sectors. Germany produced U-Boats with a greater worker productivity than the US produced submarines.

Did they? How did you determine this? I.e. sources please.

From the respective costs of German and American submarines. A German type VII U-Boat cost in 1943, when production reached 25 submarines per month, 2 million RM. That's 2,500 RM per ton. An American submarine cost 3 million dollars, of 2,000 dollars per ton. Considering that the RM was certainly worth less than 0.8 cents of dollar (it was 50 cents of a dollar if it is indexed by inflation to pre-war exchange rates). And much lower production costs usually imply in higher levels of labor productivity.

Where did you get your costs? What's included in them?

It's the final cost of both items. American submarine from http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 1#p1303531 and German submarine from http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 77#p628277.

For instance if you talk about tanks there are quite a few different "costs" associate with say a M4 in 1943. There's the cost to produce, the cost the government paid for it, and the costs they charged to external customers. If you are comparing between countries there's the amount of governement furnished equipment included or not included in those costs (GFE often includes armament and radios for instance and may include engines). Furthermore there was a surcharge applied to many US tanks, planes, and I suspect ships that covered the cost of buidling and/or expanding the facility where they were built. Then there are questions about whether spares are included and if so how many and the impact of the design and materials on the costs. For instance US warships (not sure about subs) used armor quality steel througout the vessels for internal bulkheads and decks.

True, a more careful comparison would have to be made. However, it clearly appears that Germany produced some munitions at a lower cost than the United States.

Also, the same estimates that German productivity was lower than American also state that British productivity was much lower:
(from: http://books.google.com.br/books?id=72j ... navlinks_s)

Munitions productivity
USA ------- 100
Germany -- 48
UK --------- 41
Japan ----- 16

But the fact is that either German or British levels of productivity do not appear to so low relative to the US. Japanese levels appear to be quite right, though.

I don't have labor hours for British outputs, but a Lancaster heavy bomber of 16,571 kg cost 42,000 Pounds in 1943. That's 215,000 dollars at pre-war exchange rates. The B-24 of 16,590 kg was $215,516 in 1944. It appears that British levels of manufacturing productivity were much greater than only 41% of American levels.

I'd like to see a source for that as well.

I have posted the sources:

German medium bomber, hours and cost: http://www.econ.yale.edu/growth_pdf/cdp905.pdf
Me-109: Wages of Destruction, page 583
American aircraft: http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/VI/AAF-VI-10.html

For instance I strongly suspect that a B-29 was not at all "easier to build in terms of labor hours per ton". Looking a fighters I'm almost certain that the P-38 was more difficult to build in such terms than any of the single engine fighters.[/quote]

I am talking about the B-17 bomber. Anyway, I have compared all the data that I have here:

Additional data on productivity:

Hours worked per plane, for the airframe and assembly:

Plane Company ----------------------- Jan. 1943 --------Jan. 1944 -- empty weight -- hours per ton in 1944
B-17 Boeing at Seattle ---------------- 35,400 ------------ 18,600 ---- 16,210 kg ---- 1,147
B-24 Consolidated at San Diego ----- 24,800 ------------ 14,500 ----- 16,590 kg ---- 874
B-25 North American at Inglewood -- 14,800 ------------ 10,700 ----- 8,855 kg ------ 1,208
C-46 Curtiss at Buffalo ---------------- 113,000 ---------- 49,500 ----- 14,700 kg ---- 3,367
C-54 Douglas at Santa Monica -------- 142,100 ---------- 62,600 ----- 16,660 kg ----- 3,758
P-38 Lockheed-"B" at Burbank -------- 14,800 ------------ 9,600 ----- 5,800 kg ------- 1,655
P-47 Republic at Farmingdale --------- 22,200 ------------ 9,100 ----- 4,540 kg -------- 2,004

From: http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/VI/AAF-VI-10.html

Compare now with the two main German planes in the war:

Plane Company -------------------------------------------- Jan 1943 -- Jan 1944 -- empty weight -- hours per ton (last date)
Ju-88 Junkers Flugzeugund Motorenwerke, Dessau ---- 7,000 ------ NA -------- 9,860 kg -------- 710
Me-109 Messerschmitt-Regensburg , -------------------- 3,600 ------ 2,000 ---- 2,250 kg --------- 889 *

See? Junker's output of Ju-88 in 1943 beats all the sample of US aircraft plants in 1944 in terms of labor productivity. The Mythos of unsurpassable American productivity is definitely taken down.

I think it is safe to say that the German aircraft industry had greater levels of productivity than the US aircraft industry, at least in terms of medium bombers and single engine fighters. In 1943-1944, German levels of productivity for medium bombers were 170% of American levels (Ju-88 to B-25) and 225% if we compare Me-109 with P-47.

* Wages of Destruction, page 583

So, German productivity in making bombers was in fact much higher than in the US during the war.

You have yet to substanitate this.

What do you want?

Perhaps an apples to apples comparison?

I am doing an apples to apples comparison:

Hours to make a Medium Bomber (airframe and assembly) in 1943:

Germany: 7,000 hours
USA: 14,800 hours

Again what's included. The P-51 cost mentioned above is almost sure to include a prorated value for buidling the plant and equiping it with tools. It may also include some spares.

Spares? No. Plant? Of course.

"Average cost per airplane is the weighted average on all programs approved during a designated fiscal year and represents the estimated cost of a complete airplane ready for flyaway, including factory installed ordnance and radio equipment. Costs exclude equipment installed at modification centers and airplane spare parts."

One simply cannot say that 3 P-51 = 1 Me-109, unless this one is a retard.

Indeed. The P-51's role was that of a long range escort where the Me-109 was essentially useless. So 1 P-51 was worth an infinte numer of Me-109's if you need a long range escort.

The P-51 was modified to be a long range escort. In the same way the Me-109 could be modified. Anyway, this discussion is ludicrous.

If you want harder data, how about these:

Cost

Ju-88 A4 Medium bomber (9,860 kg)

1941 - 367,108 RM
1942 - 307,677 RM
1943 - 254,496 RM

B-25 Medium bomber (8,855 kg)

1941 - $180,031
1942 - $153,396
1943 - $151,894
1944 - $142,194

Hours worked

Ju-88 A-4
1941 - 15,317
1943 - 7,000

B-25
1943 - 14,800
1944 - 10,700

Exchange rate:

1939 - 2.50 RM per $
indexed to relative inflation* becomes:
1941 - 2.39
1942 - 2.13
1943 - 1.92

* using Klein (1959) and Friedman (1963) deflators for Germany and the US, respectively.

So Ju-88 costs adjusted to exchange rates and inflation are:

1941 - $153,602 (85.3% of B-25 costs)
1942 - $144,450 (94.2% of B-25 costs)
1943 - $132,550 (87.3% of B-25 costs)

So, hours worked and costs were systematically lower for the Ju-88 compared to the B-25. Hence, it appears that German medium bombers were manufactured in a more efficient basis.

[Guaporense]

Combat munitions output in 1944, Germany and the United States:

Total employment in industry for the armed forces

------------------------------------------------- Germany ------------ USA
-------------------------------------------------- ca. 6 million -------- ca. 12.5 million

Army

Ground artillery ammunition
--- projectile weight metric tons ----------- 1,657,592 ----------- 1,312,545
heavy (over 118 mm), thousand rounds ----- 12,350 ------------- 9,668
------ projectile weight metric tons ---------- 560,601 ----------- 460,480
medium (20 mm > x > 118 mm), t. rounds -- 121,238 ----------- 85,639
------ projectile weight metric tons ---------- 1,096,991 --------- 852,065

small arms (>= 20 mm), m, rounds ------------ 5,370 ------------- 6,578
------ projectile weight metric tons ---------- 64,400 ------------- 65,780

A further comparison of ammunition production, in 1944 Germany produced 3,350,000 tons of ammunition counting the full weight of the shells. Projectiles appear to have been ca. 52% of the total ammunition weight produced. So we would have these figures:

Ammunition production, metric tons of projectiles, including small arms ammo:

--------- Germany --------- USA
1940 -- 449,800 ----------- negligible
1941 -- 280,800 ----------- 63,900
1942 -- 660,400 ----------- 713,130
1943 -- 1,331,000 -------- 923,450
1944 -- 1,740,300 -------- 1,378,300
total -- 4,182,000 -------- 3,078,700

Ammunition production, thousands of rounds (all ammo over 20 mm):

--------- Germany --------- USA ----------- UK
1940 --- 27,000 ---------- negligible ----- 10,000
1941 --- 35,000 ----------- 3,038 --------- 23,000
1942 -- 99,000 ----------- 77,090 -------- 50,000
1943 -- 108,000 ---------- 91,562 -------- 37,000
1944 -- 134,000 ---------- 95,307 -------- 22,000
total -- 403,000 ---------- 266,997 ------- 142,000

Note that I am probably underestimating German ammunition production in terms of tons. The tonnage adjusted by
number of rounds would be 4.65 million instead of 4.18 million. Though the US produced more small arms ammunition, which represented 12% of total US projectile weight and only 4.5% total German projectile weight. Anyway, Germany fired at the USSR ca. 5.3 million tons of ammo from June 1941 to November 1944, that's 2.8 million tons of projectiles and about equal to total US production over the same period.

UK ammunition production is also over represented by number of rounds because most of it consisted of rounds of less than 75 mm.

See also: http://www.wwiiarchives.net/servlet/act ... /149/196/0

[LWD]

...Where did you get your costs? What's included in them?

It's the final cost of both items. American submarine from http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 1#p1303531 and German submarine from http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 77#p628277.

I don't see any words to that effect there. There's also the matter of material costs, profit margins, and plant offsets that need to be addressed before you can really use these as a measure of comparative productivity.

True, a more careful comparison would have to be made. However, it clearly appears that Germany produced some munitions at a lower cost than the United States.

Not really. Indeed it's quite clear that the US produced more munitions than Germany. The cost of US munitions also included plants that were converted to civilian produciton post war while the same can hardly be said for Germany.

I'd like to see a source for that as well.

I have posted the sources:

Where does it state that:

since heavy bombers are larger they tend to be easier to build in terms of labor hours per ton

Additional data on productivity:

Hours worked per plane, for the airframe and assembly:

Plane Company ----------------------- Jan. 1943 --------Jan. 1944 -- empty weight -- hours per ton in 1944
B-17 Boeing at Seattle ---------------- 35,400 ------------ 18,600 ---- 16,210 kg ---- 1,147
B-24 Consolidated at San Diego ----- 24,800 ------------ 14,500 ----- 16,590 kg ---- 874
B-25 North American at Inglewood -- 14,800 ------------ 10,700 ----- 8,855 kg ------ 1,208
C-46 Curtiss at Buffalo ---------------- 113,000 ---------- 49,500 ----- 14,700 kg ---- 3,367
C-54 Douglas at Santa Monica -------- 142,100 ---------- 62,600 ----- 16,660 kg ----- 3,758
P-38 Lockheed-"B" at Burbank -------- 14,800 ------------ 9,600 ----- 5,800 kg ------- 1,655
P-47 Republic at Farmingdale --------- 22,200 ------------ 9,100 ----- 4,540 kg -------- 2,004

From: http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/VI/AAF-VI-10.html

Compare now with the two main German planes in the war:

Plane Company -------------------------------------------- Jan 1943 -- Jan 1944 -- empty weight -- hours per ton (last date)
Ju-88 Junkers Flugzeugund Motorenwerke, Dessau ---- 7,000 ------ NA -------- 9,860 kg -------- 710
Me-109 Messerschmitt-Regensburg , -------------------- 3,600 ------ 2,000 ---- 2,250 kg --------- 889 *

See? Junker's output of Ju-88 in 1943 beats all the sample of US aircraft plants in 1944 in terms of labor productivity. The Mythos of unsurpassable American productivity is definitely taken down.

What I see is that plane design has a huge impact. For instance if you compare the B-17 (which was in production first) to the B-24 there is a huge disparity even though the weight is about the same. The other values tend to point out that your MOE for producitvity is rather flawed.

I am doing an apples to apples comparison:

Not really.

Hours to make a Medium Bomber (airframe and assembly) in 1943:

For that to be an apples to apples you would have to demonstrate an equivalancy between the planes. You haven't.

Again what's included. The P-51 cost mentioned above is almost sure to include a prorated value for buidling the plant and equiping it with tools. It may also include some spares.

Spares? No. Plant? Of course.

And the German planes don't include the plant cost. Some of the latter US might not as well as these tended to "go away" after the plant was paid for. Then there's profit margins. Another impact would be that the German manufacturers recieved an allocation of alluminium for each plane that was in excess of what was required for that plane (at least according to a thread somewhere on this forum I believe). It's not clear if they paid for this or not but in any case since they couldn't get the aluminium without the allocation it allowed them to use it for other purposes so even if they took a paper "loss" on the plane they might well recover it.

One simply cannot say that 3 P-51 = 1 Me-109, unless this one is a retard.

Indeed. The P-51's role was that of a long range escort where the Me-109 was essentially useless. So 1 P-51 was worth an infinte numer of Me-109's if you need a long range escort.

The P-51 was modified to be a long range escort. In the same way the Me-109 could be modified.

It was? How? and how do you propose modifying an Me-109 to meet the same range criteria.

Anyway, this discussion is ludicrous.

You are finally seeing the light.

... So, hours worked and costs were systematically lower for the Ju-88 compared to the B-25. Hence, it appears that German medium bombers were manufactured in a more efficient basis.

Let's see comparing their loaded weights vs the empty weights the Ju-88 can carry about 4,000kg of fuel, amunition, and crew where the B-25 can carry over 7,000kg. I think I'd go with the B-25.

[LWD]

Again I"m wondering where you got your data. For instance

... Army

Ground artillery ammunition
--- projectile weight metric tons ----------- 1,657,592 ----------- 1,312,545
heavy (over 118 mm), thousand rounds ----- 12,350 ------------- 9,668
------ projectile weight metric tons ---------- 560,601 ----------- 460,480
medium (20 mm > x > 118 mm), t. rounds -- 121,238 ----------- 85,639
------ projectile weight metric tons ---------- 1,096,991 --------- 852,065

small arms (>= 20 mm), m, rounds ------------ 5,370 ------------- 6,578
------ projectile weight metric tons ---------- 64,400 ------------- 65,780

A further comparison of ammunition production, in 1944 Germany produced 3,350,000 tons of ammunition counting the full weight of the shells. Projectiles appear to have been ca. 52% of the total ammunition weight produced. So we would have these figures:

Ammunition production, metric tons of projectiles, including small arms ammo:

--------- Germany --------- USA
1940 -- 449,800 ----------- negligible
1941 -- 280,800 ----------- 63,900
1942 -- 660,400 ----------- 713,130
1943 -- 1,331,000 -------- 923,450
1944 -- 1,740,300 -------- 1,378,300
total -- 4,182,000 -------- 3,078,700
...

But http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/ATO/Adm ... ex.html#ii states that in 1944 the US produced 1,416,774 short tons or 1,285,276 metric tons of ground artillery. That means less than 100,000 tons of small arms, naval artillery, and bombs. Indeed if we look at http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/StatReview-ASF.pdf
Appendix 8 we see the dollar amounts spent on ammo are as follows
Small arms ~$473M
Bombs, mines, grenades, and pyrotechnics - ~$976
Heavy field artillery ~$385
Other Ammo ~$1,953

http://www.lewrockwell.com/higgs/higgs62.html also seems to disagree with your small arms ammo numbers statting that:

In World War II, U.S. factories cranked out, along with mountains of other munitions, about 41.4 billion rounds of small-arms ammunition

This site http://history.stackexchange.com/questi ... sed-in-ww2 states:

Lt. Gen. Levin H. Campbell, Jr., Chief of Ordnance from 1942 to 1946, proudly had this to say:

From Pearl Harbor to V-J Day the Industry-Ordnance team furnished to the Army and 43 foreign nations 47 billion rounds of small arms ammunition, approximately 11 million tons of artillery ammunition,

[Guaporense]

In 1943 this was the distribution of American military expenditures, in billions of current dollars:

Total -------------------------------------------- 79.7
--- Munitions ----------------------------------- 54.4
------ Combat related ------------------------- 38.0
-------- Aircraft -------------------------------- 13.0
-------- Ammunition & bombs ----------------- 5.8
-------- Tanks & trucks ------------------------- 6.3
-------- Weapons -------------------------------- 3.2
------ Non-combat related --------------------- 16.4
--- Personnel ------------------------------------ 25.3

In percentages:

Total --------------------------------------------100.0
--- Munitions ----------------------------------- 68.3
------ Combat related ------------------------- 46.7
-------- Aircraft -------------------------------- 16.3
------ Non-combat related -------------------- 21.6
--- Personnel ----------------------------------- 31.7

Now, compare to the distribution of German military expenditures, in 1943, in billions of Reichmarks:

Total --------------------------------------------- 112
--- Munitions ----------------------------------- 53.1
----- Combat related -------------------------- 25.8
-------- Aircraft -------------------------------- 10.6
-------- Ammunition & bombs ----------------- 7.6
-------- Tanks & trucks ------------------------- 3.1
-------- Weapons -------------------------------- 2.0
------ Non-combat related --------------------- 27.3
--- Personnel ------------------------------------ 58.9

In percentages:

Total --------------------------------------------- 100
--- Munitions ----------------------------------- 47.4
----- Combat related --------------------------- 23.0
-------- Aircraft ---------------------------------- 9.5
------ Non-combat related --------------------- 24.4
--- Personnel ------------------------------------ 52.6

In dollars (1 dollar = 1.92 RM):

Total -------------------------------------------- 58.3
--- Munitions ----------------------------------- 27.7
----- Combat related -------------------------- 13.5
-------- Aircraft --------------------------------- 5.5
-------- Ammunition & bombs ----------------- 4.0
-------- Tanks & trucks ------------------------- 1.6
-------- Weapons -------------------------------- 1.0
------ Non-combat related --------------------- 14.2
--- Personnel ------------------------------------ 30.7

In proportion to US expenditures:

Total -------------------------------------------- 73.1%
--- Munitions ----------------------------------- 50.9%
----- Combat related -------------------------- 35.5%
-------- Ammunition & bombs ---------------- 69.0%
-------- Tanks & trucks ------------------------ 25.4%
------ Non-combat related --------------------- 86.6%
--- Personnel ------------------------------------ 121.3%

Apparently, Germany spent much more on personnel and on non-combat related munitions (those are army supplies in general, such as uniforms, boots, paper and things such as buildings and fortifications, such as the Atlantic Wall) relative to American expenditures. It really appears that in 1943 the German expenditures on combat related munitions was as estimated by Goldsmith in 1946, ca. 13.5 billion dollars, much smaller than American expenditures.

German expenditures on ammunition were smaller than American expenditures. But that's because the US produced much more bombs. In 1943 these were the respective outputs of ammunition (including canisters) and bombs, in metric tons:

1943 outputs ----------- Germany --------------- USA
Ammunition ----------- 2,558,000 ------------- 1,776,000
Bombs -------------------- 273,000 ------------- 1,404,000
total -------------------- 2,831,000 ------------- 3,180,000

Still, German ammunition prices were probably lower than in the US.

In terms of tanks and trucks, the US produced 640,000 trucks and half tracks and 36,000 tanks, Germany produced 125,000 trucks and half tracks and 13,000 tanks. It really represented around 1/4 of American output, as the expenditures indicate.

Also, notice how the distribution of employment fits the distribution of expenditures:

Manpower mobilized for the war

Germany - may 1943

Total manpower mobilized for the war -- 17,800,000
-------- Munitions --------------------------- 6,600,000
----------- Aircraft ----------------------------- 740,000
------------- Air frames ------------------------ 373,000
------------- Aero engines --------------------- 240,000
----------- Shipbuilding ------------------------ 143,000
----------- Motor vehicles --------------------- 394,000
------- Armed forces ----------------------- 11,230,000
----------- Active ----------------------------- 9,550,000
--------------- Field army -------------------- 4,540,000
----------- Losses ----------------------------- 1,680,000

US - mid 1943

Total manpower mobilized for the war --- 21,400,000
------- Munitions ----------------------------- 12,300,000
--------- Aircraft ------------------------------ 2,100,000
------------ Air frames ------------------------ 1,084,000
------------ Aero engines ----------------------- 700,000 (?)
------- Armed forces ------------------------- 9,130,000
----------- Active ----------------------------- 9,030,000
--------------- Field Army -------------------- 2,160,000
----------- Losses ------------------------------- 100,000 (less than)

Aircraft production, for instance, involved 9.9% of American employment for the war and 16.3% of the military expenditures. In Germany, in the same year, the aircraft industry involved 4.6% of German manpower employed for the war (excluding the dead ones) and 9.5% of the military expenditures. Overall, combat munitions represented twice the proportion of total military expenditures of the US compared to Germany.

[Guaporense]

I have made a very detailed analysis of German ammunition production, here are the results, compared to American ammunition:

[LWD]

...Those are 1944 numbers, ONLY. Please, read my posts more carefully. ...

OK but then what sense does it make to talk about buidling battleships which take multiple years to build?

[LWD]

... Apparently, Germany spent much more on personnel and on non-combat related munitions (those are army supplies in general, such as uniforms, boots, paper and things such as buildings and fortifications, such as the Atlantic Wall) relative to American expenditures. It really appears that in 1943 the German expenditures on combat related munitions was as estimated by Goldsmith in 1946, ca. 13.5 billion dollars, much smaller than American expenditures.

Hardly a surprise though is it? Especially when you consider that the American military was still expanding signifcantly and that the US was building munitions for most of the allies as well.

German expenditures on ammunition were smaller than American expenditures. But that's because the US produced much more bombs. In 1943 these were the respective outputs of ammunition (including canisters) and bombs, in metric tons:

1943 outputs ----------- Germany --------------- USA
Ammunition ----------- 2,558,000 ------------- 1,776,000
Bombs -------------------- 273,000 ------------- 1,404,000
total -------------------- 2,831,000 ------------- 3,180,000

And what significance do you attach to this? Consider that the US was producing bombs to attack the axis homelands and the Germans were producing a fair few AA rounds to try and protect said homeland. It's unclear just what economic lessons you are drawing from this.

Still, German ammunition prices were probably lower than in the US.

Possibly but again there's the problem of actually making apple to apple comparisons. Slave labor was being used to a considerable extent in German ammo production and for instance a proximaty fused AA round would cost considerably more than one that wasn't but was much more effective.

In terms of tanks and trucks, the US produced 640,000 trucks and half tracks and 36,000 tanks, Germany produced 125,000 trucks and half tracks and 13,000 tanks. It really represented around 1/4 of American output, as the expenditures indicate.

Again what's being compared? What was the average cargo capacity of the trucks in question for instance? How many had all wheel drive?

Also, notice how the distribution of employment fits the distribution of expenditures:
...
Aircraft production, for instance, involved 9.9% of American employment for the war and 16.3% of the military expenditures. In Germany, in the same year, the aircraft industry involved 4.6% of German manpower employed for the war (excluding the dead ones) and 9.5% of the military expenditures. Overall, combat munitions represented twice the proportion of total military expenditures of the US compared to Germany.

However Germany was facing severe manpower limitations the US was not facing problems anywhere near as significant in that regard. In particular German faced some signficant problems due to drafting workers whose loss cut the production in key industries. The US on the otherhand allevieated part of this problem by encouraging females to take such jobs and since it didn't have as severe of a problem by granting exemptions in some cases.