mescal wrote:Guaporense wrote:
According to production plans, production of all military munitions was planned to increase in Germany in 1945, aircraft was supposed to increase to 80,000 units. Your little theory that Speer was reorienting everything to present day output needs to be supported and is contradicted into the actual plans for munitions production.
Well, dreaming is free of cost ...
You can dream to produce 80k planes in 1945.
But you can't "plan" for such figures for 1945 in late 1944. Speer sold it to Hitler as a "plan", but it was a pipe dream.
The survey people used the discrepancy between the numbers in those plans and actual output as proof that strategic bombing worked as the output from July to March 1945 feel short of planned numbers by 18,000 units.
And with regard to the cuts in investments : I do not have overall figures, but some indicators are useful.
Notably and on different levels :
* factory floor surface shrank in 1944,
* the Bf-109 was still one of the most produced fighter though it was outdated
* working slave labor to death may temporarily increase production, but it cannot be seen as a durable and reliable policy.
*The Bf-109 wasn't outdated in 1944, it suffered continuous updates and was still relevant as experienced pilots could still shoot down allied aircraft with it.
*Factory floor surface in which industry? I agree they stopped investing in 1944, machine tool production feel to 110,000 units in 1944 compared to over 200,000 units 3 years before.
Anyway, it didn't make sense to invest since nearly all industries were working on a single shift.
Guaporense wrote:Steel: in 1937, the territories Germany controlled in June 1940 produced 38 million tons of steel,
And guess what ? ... it wasn't the case anymore after Germany invaded.
You've been told previously and more than once that projecting pre-war data to the wartime years is unsound, because the war and occupation had very significant effects. Not the least the fact that the Germans themselves plundered said occupied countries, and that occupation de facto put those countries under British blockade.
The most significant effect of war on those territories would be to increase steel production. As war uses relatively more steel than peacetime economic activities so increased demand increases output. For example, in the US steel production increased in response to war. UK didn't increase because they could import from the US and the USSR's output increased if you only look at Siberia. The main raw materials for steel production could be easily produced in Europe, coal, obviously, and iron ore was also produced in significant quantities.
Guaporense wrote:
Understanding of many of my arguments requires some experience with economics.
I have some and a bit more, thank you.
Prove it, because you don't appear to understand the how prices work in allocating resources.
But you would understand and clarify your own arguments better if you had some experience in statistical methodology.
I didn't need to actually use any fancy statistical methodology in my previous arguments. It's just descriptive statistics.
RichTO90 wrote:Nor do I have any problem with "different opinions" except for those that verge on the glorification of fascist regimes.
What is worse : glorification of fascist regimes grounded on wrong data or on correct data ?
Tough question ....

Showing and understanding the puzzle posed by these two facts:
1. Germany had access to vast economic resources,
2. German armed forces had great difficulty with supply of equipment and ammo, which feel short in proportion to those resources.
Explaining it as caused by the inneficiency of Nazi economic policies is a glorification of facist regimes? Quite to the contrary, arguments such as Tooze's story that Nazi policies made fully efficient utilization of existing resources and that they failed despite being fully efficient, that's the true glorification of facist regimes.
The observation that the facists controlled the bulk of Europe, an area with about 1/3 of the world's economic activity during the 1930's and despite that, they failed to produce adequate supplies for their armed forces, is indeed a powerful historical criticism of the general inefficiency of those regimes.
"In tactics, as in strategy, superiority in numbers is the most common element of victory." - Carl von Clausewitz