Details on the German investment drive

[KDF33]

A common misconception about WWII is the claim that Germany was substantially under-mobilised during the early war years. As Adam Tooze makes clear in his book, "The Wages of Destruction", this was never the case. In particular, the year 1941, which saw armament production stagnate in comparison to 1940, saw a large reallocation of steel away from direct armaments production toward military-related industrial expansion. In effect, the Germans gambled on a quick victory over the USSR with their current production level to gear up for what they saw as an inevitable showdown with the United States.


Tooze provides steel allocation data to illustrate his point. I reproduce it here, on a half-year basis (except for the last data point):

1940/1: 5,412 thousand tons for armaments-related production (including industrial expansion), of which 2,361 thousand tons for direct army armaments production (44%)

1940/2: 5,751 thousand tons, of which 1,965 thousand tons (34%)
1941/1: 6,120 thousand tons, of which 1,680 thousand tons (27%)
1941/2: 6,456 thousand tons, of which 1,221 thousand tons (19%)
1942/1: 6,678 thousand tons, of which 2,097 thousand tons (31%)

1942, 3rd quarter: 2,982 thousand tons, of which 1,200 thousand tons (40%)


Unfortunately, Tooze never provides any breakdown of the large-scale German expansion investments*. Thus my post and this question: does anybody have information on what, exactly, the Germans invested in during the early war years, and what was the payoff in terms of increased production during the late-war period?


*A significant expansion of the synthetic oil industry certainly accounts for a part of the investment drive, however.