Was the USSR economically stronger than Germany?

[ljadw]

[Split from "At what point did Germany lose WW2?"]

[...] the Ostheer an improvised gathering of mostly divisions that were not ready for a big war .

The Ostheer wasn't ready for a major war? How so? And, more importantly, compared to who?

Germany was the underdog to the economic power of the SU [...]

Germany's economy was far stronger than that of the USSR. Where did you get this idea that Germany was behind industrially?

[...] and to the economic power of Britain and the Commonwealth .

Germany alone, sure. Germany + occupied Europe, I'm not so sure.

Regards,

KDF

1) It is obvious that the SU was economically stronger than Germany : it produced more tanks,artillery,aircraft,oil,etc

2) The Ostheer (again) :from Germany and WWII Tome V PP 986/987

Classification of the German Army in june 1941 (208 divisions)

1) 20 Pz and 1 Light

2)10 Mot,4 WSS and 1 Mountain

3)1 Cavalry and 3 Mountain

4)26 ID (1st Wave)

5)16 ID (2nd W) and 14 ID (4th W)

6)14 ID (7th W) and 10 ID (8th W)

Now are starting the big problems:

7)10 ID (11 W) and 10 ID (12W): comment of Germany and WWII: little training and no battle experience

8)5 ID (5W) and the SS Police division : these were even worse than those of number 7

9)15 ID (3W) and 4 ID (6 W)

10)9 ID (13 W) and 8 ID (14 W) : occupation troops ,useless for active service

11)15 ID (15 W) and 9 security divisions : useless .

[KDF33]

1) It is obvious that the SU was economically stronger than Germany : it produced more tanks,artillery,aircraft,oil,etc

On the contrary, every piece of evidence indicates that Germany was ahead of the USSR economically and industrially. The basic inputs of the industrial economy, coal and steel, were overwhelmingly in Germany's favor:

1942:

Germany: 268,595,000 tons of coal and 28,744,000 tons of steel
USSR: 75,536,000 tons of coal and 8,069,600 tons of steel

1943:

Germany: 273,895,000 tons of coal and 30,603,000 tons of steel
USSR: 93,141,000 tons of coal and 8,474,800 tons of steel

1944:

Germany: 250,837,000 tons of coal and 25,853,000 tons of steel
USSR: 121,470,000 tons of coal and 10,886,700 tons of steel

This data obviously begs the question "Why then was the USSR overwhelmingly ahead of Germany in military output?", which was your reply to my initial assertion that Germany was ahead industrially. The short answer is that the USSR never outproduced Germany in military equipment, and that the usual yardsticks (i.e. tanks, guns, etc.) on which such an assertion is based are fundamentally flawed.

To compare Germany's military output to that of the USSR, we must first clarify what, exactly, is "military output". For the Germans, "military output" amounted to the following categories of equipment:

Ammunition, common equipment, tanks and half-tracks, railway cars and locomotives, automobiles, aircraft (and Luftwaffe-related various outputs), artillery and small arms, ships, electrical equipment, sea mines and torpedoes, explosives and, finally, precise mechanics and optics.

In 1942, Germany's military production consumed 45.7% of the steel supply (14,043,000 tons), in 1943 52.7% (16,368,000 tons) and in 1944, 53.7% (15,378,000 tons). Note that Germany's steel supply was slightly larger than it's steel output, since it imported finished steel from occupied nations, mostly France and Belgium.

This page gives a detailed breakdown of Germany's military steel consumption in 1943. As you can see, "big-ticket items" like tanks, artillery and small arms constituted a relatively small part of it, respectively 12.1% (tanks and half-tracks) and 7.4% (artillery and small arms). It also helps to understand the comparatively larger Soviet output in some limited categories, the most obvious of which is tanks.

It is well-known that the USSR outproduced Germany in AFVs during the war. Here's a quick comparison of AFV output from 1942 to 1944, data being Germany / USSR:

1942: 6,180 / 24,640
1943: 12,063 / 24,092
1944: 19,002 / 28,983

At first sight it looks like the USSR's industry is dwarfing that of Germany, especially in 1942. But what is a tank, if not another ground vehicle? This qualification is especially appropriate given that associated heavy industries like the automobile industry or the rolling stock industry can quickly be converted for AFV production, as demonstrated by the Soviets between mid-1941 and early 1942. As shown here, the Gorky Automobile Factory, for instance, converted a large part of it's floor space for the production of light AFVs like the T-60, T-70 and SU-76, of which it produced a total of 13,791 between 1942 and 1944 (63% of the Soviet total). No. 112 Factory, which mainly produced locomotives before the war, turned out 9,188 T-34s over the same period (21%). And Uralvagonzavod, which produced railway cars, was merged with KhPZ to form No. 183 Factory, which turned out 21,571 T-34s between 1942 and 1944, amounting to 50% of the total.

Thus, if one wants to compare German and Soviet output, one has to compare whole categories together, and not just a limited cross-section. Thus, "ground vehicle production" actually looks like this, data again being Germany / USSR:

1942:

Tanks and SP guns: 6,180 / 24,640
Armored cars: 982 / 2,623
Half-tracks: 10,152 / 0
Trucks: 81,276 / 30,947
Cars: 27,895 / 2,567
Locomotives: 2,637 / 9
Train cars: 60,892 / 147

1943:

Tanks and SP guns: 12,063 / 24,092
Armored cars: 806 / 1,820
Half-tracks: 16,964 / 0
Trucks: 109,483 / 45,545
Cars: 34,478 / 2,546
Locomotives: 5,243 / 43
Train cars: 66,263 / 108

1944:

Tanks and SP guns: 19,002 / 28,983
Armored cars: 485 / 3,000
Half-tracks: 17,143 / 0
Trucks: 89,069 / 53,467
Cars: 21,656 / 5,382
Locomotives: 3,495 / 32
Train cars: 45,189 / 13

"Ground vehicles" consumed 18.5% of Germany's total steel supply in 1943, and 34.4% of the military's share. The second largest steel user was ammunition, which consumed 11.6% of the total supply and 21.6% of the military's. In ammunition, as in ground vehicles, Germany was substantially outproducing the USSR, even in 1942.

So there you have it: Germany was outproducing the USSR at every point during the war, which makes sense given the large disparity in industrial inputs between the two countries. Only by looking at a limited cross-section of military outputs, and thus misleading data points, can one reach the conclusion that the USSR was economically / industrially ahead of Germany.

Regards,

KDF

[ljadw]

1) It is obvious that the SU was economically stronger than Germany : it produced more tanks,artillery,aircraft,oil,etc

On the contrary, every piece of evidence indicates that Germany was ahead of the USSR economically and industrially. The basic inputs of the industrial economy, coal and steel, were overwhelmingly in Germany's favor:

1942:

Germany: 268,595,000 tons of coal and 28,744,000 tons of steel
USSR: 75,536,000 tons of coal and 8,069,600 tons of steel

1943:

Germany: 273,895,000 tons of coal and 30,603,000 tons of steel
USSR: 93,141,000 tons of coal and 8,474,800 tons of steel

1944:

Germany: 250,837,000 tons of coal and 25,853,000 tons of steel
USSR: 121,470,000 tons of coal and 10,886,700 tons of steel

This data obviously begs the question "Why then was the USSR overwhelmingly ahead of Germany in military output?", which was your reply to my initial assertion that Germany was ahead industrially. The short answer is that the USSR never outproduced Germany in military equipment, and that the usual yardsticks (i.e. tanks, guns, etc.) on which such an assertion is based are fundamentally flawed.

To compare Germany's military output to that of the USSR, we must first clarify what, exactly, is "military output". For the Germans, "military output" amounted to the following categories of equipment:

Ammunition, common equipment, tanks and half-tracks, railway cars and locomotives, automobiles, aircraft (and Luftwaffe-related various outputs), artillery and small arms, ships, electrical equipment, sea mines and torpedoes, explosives and, finally, precise mechanics and optics.

In 1942, Germany's military production consumed 45.7% of the steel supply (14,043,000 tons), in 1943 52.7% (16,368,000 tons) and in 1944, 53.7% (15,378,000 tons). Note that Germany's steel supply was slightly larger than it's steel output, since it imported finished steel from occupied nations, mostly France and Belgium.

This page gives a detailed breakdown of Germany's military steel consumption in 1943. As you can see, "big-ticket items" like tanks, artillery and small arms constituted a relatively small part of it, respectively 12.1% (tanks and half-tracks) and 7.4% (artillery and small arms). It also helps to understand the comparatively larger Soviet output in some limited categories, the most obvious of which is tanks.

It is well-known that the USSR outproduced Germany in AFVs during the war. Here's a quick comparison of AFV output from 1942 to 1944, data being Germany / USSR:

1942: 6,180 / 24,640
1943: 12,063 / 24,092
1944: 19,002 / 28,983

At first sight it looks like the USSR's industry is dwarfing that of Germany, especially in 1942. But what is a tank, if not another ground vehicle? This qualification is especially appropriate given that associated heavy industries like the automobile industry or the rolling stock industry can quickly be converted for AFV production, as demonstrated by the Soviets between mid-1941 and early 1942. As shown here, the Gorky Automobile Factory, for instance, converted a large part of it's floor space for the production of light AFVs like the T-60, T-70 and SU-76, of which it produced a total of 13,791 between 1942 and 1944 (63% of the Soviet total). No. 112 Factory, which mainly produced locomotives before the war, turned out 9,188 T-34s over the same period (21%). And Uralvagonzavod, which produced railway cars, was merged with KhPZ to form No. 183 Factory, which turned out 21,571 T-34s between 1942 and 1944, amounting to 50% of the total.

Thus, if one wants to compare German and Soviet output, one has to compare whole categories together, and not just a limited cross-section. Thus, "ground vehicle production" actually looks like this, data again being Germany / USSR:

1942:

Tanks and SP guns: 6,180 / 24,640
Armored cars: 982 / 2,623
Half-tracks: 10,152 / 0
Trucks: 81,276 / 30,947
Cars: 27,895 / 2,567
Locomotives: 2,637 / 9
Train cars: 60,892 / 147

1943:

Tanks and SP guns: 12,063 / 24,092
Armored cars: 806 / 1,820
Half-tracks: 16,964 / 0
Trucks: 109,483 / 45,545
Cars: 34,478 / 2,546
Locomotives: 5,243 / 43
Train cars: 66,263 / 108

1944:

Tanks and SP guns: 19,002 / 28,983
Armored cars: 485 / 3,000
Half-tracks: 17,143 / 0
Trucks: 89,069 / 53,467
Cars: 21,656 / 5,382
Locomotives: 3,495 / 32
Train cars: 45,189 / 13

"Ground vehicles" consumed 18.5% of Germany's total steel supply in 1943, and 34.4% of the military's share. The second largest steel user was ammunition, which consumed 11.6% of the total supply and 21.6% of the military's. In ammunition, as in ground vehicles, Germany was substantially outproducing the USSR, even in 1942.

So there you have it: Germany was outproducing the USSR at every point during the war, which makes sense given the large disparity in industrial inputs between the two countries. Only by looking at a limited cross-section of military outputs, and thus misleading data points, can one reach the conclusion that the USSR was economically / industrially ahead of Germany.

Regards,

KDF

These are milk-maid calculations : steel and coal are not military equipment .

Military equipment is :


tanks + SP guns : production : SU :95000, Germany : 53800

artillery :188000 / 102000

aircraft : 108000/79000

mortars :348000/ 68000

And,ammunition,supplies,

In all these things,Germany was outproduced by the SU .

The Germans planned a short campaign,because they knew that in a long war,they would be outproduced by the SU. The short campaign failed,and the result was a long war,where they were outproduced by the SU .

During 1941,the SU was able to supply a front army of 8.8 million men,Germany : 4 million

In 1942,the SU was able to supply a front army of 13.6 million men ,Germany 4.5 million, in 1943 also some 13.6 million, Germany some 4. 5 million, in 1944 some 14.8 million.

After 1941,the SU was able to supply 3 men for 1 German .

[KDF33]

These are milk-maid calculations : steel and coal are not military equipment .

Military equipment is :


tanks + SP guns : production : SU :95000, Germany : 53800

artillery :188000 / 102000

aircraft : 108000/79000

mortars :348000/ 68000

And,ammunition,supplies,

As I stated previously, the Germans included the following under "military production":

Ammunition, common equipment, tanks and half-tracks, railway cars and locomotives, automobiles, aircraft (and Luftwaffe-related various outputs), artillery and small arms, ships, electrical equipment, sea mines and torpedoes, explosives and, finally, precise mechanics and optics.

In all these things,Germany was outproduced by the SU .

That's patently false. Germany outproduced the USSR in ammunition, ground vehicles and ships for every year of the war. Again, you keep focusing on a few "big-ticket" items while completely missing others, and ignoring each item's relative weight in overall military production. You compare AFV output while completely ignoring half-track, automobile and rolling stock output, which constituted a far greater share of Germany's ground vehicle production compared to the Soviets, who gutted these sectors to make room for more AFV production, something which has nothing whatsoever to do with total economic / industrial capacity, but rather with production decisions.

As for artillery / mortars / small arms, the gap is truly significant in 1942, and still somewhat significant in 1943, but you fail to account for the fact that artillery and small arms held an absolutely insignificant share of total military output, which was dominated by ammunition, aircraft and ground vehicles. Thus in 1943 artillery and small arms consumed just 4% of Germany's total steel supply, i.e. 7.4% of the military's share, against 18.5% / 34.4% for ground vehicles and 11.6% / 21.6% for ammunition. As for the Soviets, the Commissariat for Armament consumed just 10.3% of the rolled steel supply in 1942, 9.5% in 1943 and 7.9% in 1944. So the greater Soviet output in artillery and small arms pales in comparison to the large German edge in the ammunition and vehicle industries.

The Germans planned a short campaign,because they knew that in a long war,they would be outproduced by the SU. The short campaign failed,and the result was a long war,where they were outproduced by the SU .

That's hardly my understanding of it. The Germans wanted a short campaign because they were already at war with Britain and because American involvement loomed on the horizon. It had nothing to do with German expectations of overwhelmingly superior Soviet production. Or do you have any quote to back up your assertion?

During 1941,the SU was able to supply a front army of 8.8 million men,Germany : 4 million

In 1942,the SU was able to supply a front army of 13.6 million men ,Germany 4.5 million, in 1943 also some 13.6 million, Germany some 4. 5 million, in 1944 some 14.8 million.

After 1941,the SU was able to supply 3 men for 1 German .

This makes no sense. At it's peak, the Soviet Union supplied field forces (including air and navy) of somewhat over 6.5 million men. The Germans fielded on average roughly half that on the Eastern Front. By mid-1943, the other fronts were already tying down about 1.5 million ground troops, plus hundreds of thousands of Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine active personnel. The Germans were fighting a multi-front, multi-dimensional war, whereas the Soviets were fighting a land war against a single enemy. This, and not a mythical "Soviet economic / industrial edge", is why the Soviets could achieve superiority at the front.

Regards,

KDF

[ljadw]

A lot of irrelevant points .

After the war,the German generals said in Germany : we lost because of Hitler,to the Americans,they said :we lost to the Soviets because of the US intervention and LL (the usual flattery),in the gulag,they said : we lost to the Americans,because the heroic fight of the Red Army (the usual flattery).


THE FACTS:

1)you can't dissociate theeastern front from the other fronts and blame the defeat in the east on the existence of the other fronts :without a war with the west,there would be no war in the east;

2) you can't say that without a war in the east,Germany would be stronger in the west,or that without a war in the west,Germany would be stronger in the east: 300 U Boats less does not mean 600 tanks more .

"This makes no sense" : it's making a lot of sense,unless you are unable to read what I did write :I was not writing how much men the SU could supply at its peak (which,BTW,is irrelevant),but:how much men the SU could supply DURING 1941,1942,1943,1944.
In june 1941,the Soviet operational forces were some 3.3 million men,in december 1941 4.6 million , an increase of 1.3 million.

Meanwhile,the Red Army had lost some 4.1 million combat losses (probably more) ;4.6 million + 4.1 million = 8.7 million.
During the same period,Germany committed some 4 million men on the eastern front.

It is obvious that the country that could commit and supply more than the double of men was economically stronger ,unless... you can prove that,if during this period,the war with the west had stopped,Germany would be able to commit/supply 8 million men .
QED.

[KDF33]

THE FACTS:

1)you can't dissociate theeastern front from the other fronts and blame the defeat in the east on the existence of the other fronts :without a war with the west,there would be no war in the east;

That wasn't the argument of the previous post. This is about military production, not about why the Germans lost the war in the East.

2) you can't say that without a war in the east,Germany would be stronger in the west,or that without a war in the west,Germany would be stronger in the east: 300 U Boats less does not mean 600 tanks more .

300 U-boats doesn't mean 600 more tanks, but to assume that the impact of the war in the East had no impact on overall production priorities, and vice versa, is naive. Besides, you still missed the very simple point of my previous post: the Germans outproduced the Soviets in military equipment during the war years.

"This makes no sense" : it's making a lot of sense,unless you are unable to read what I did write[...]

It is obvious that the country that could commit and supply more than the double of men was economically stronger ,unless... you can prove that,if during this period,the war with the west had stopped,Germany would be able to commit/supply 8 million men .
QED.

Here you're making an unproven assumption: that the ability to field manpower in the field corresponds to economic / industrial capacity, and that necessarily, man for man, the Soviet was comparably equipped to the German. This was not the case. In artillery ammunition, for instance, the Germans had a much larger supply than the Soviets, despite the latter's largest stock of guns. Or take the motorized vehicle park: the German Army held 425,174 trucks and 290,174 cars on 1.1.43, to the Soviet Armed Forces total of 362,000 trucks and 29,100 cars. If you include the trucks and cars held by the Luftwaffe (a significant number) and by the Kriegsmarine (a much lower number), and if you take into account that the RKKA was larger than the Wehrmacht by a few million men at the time, you see that the Wehrmacht was both absolutely and proportionately much more motorized than the RKKA. Indeed, it would take until late 1944 and the arrival of a substantial number of LL vehicles for the RKKA motor pool to outgrow that of the Wehrmacht, and still not in proportional terms.

In any event, your objections are little more than peripheral matters, and you still haven't addressed the core points of my argument: namely that I've provided a detailed breakdown of ground vehicle production that shows that the Germans outproduced the Soviets. I've asserted that the Germans also outproduced the Soviets in ammunition, and although I haven't provided a comparable breakdown, I could if you put my word in doubt. I've also shown that artillery and smalls arms production was relatively minor in overall terms.

Therefore I wonder: how can you still claim that the USSR outproduced Germany?

Regards,

KDF

[KDF33]

Here, heavy ground artillery ammunition production, Germany / USSR:

1942: 37,750,000 / 33,806,400
1943: 74,000,000 / 35,940,000
1944: 87,000,000 / 42,454,000

The Soviets produced much more mortar rounds than the Germans, and this somewhat reduces the above gap, but it's still pretty clear that the Germans held a very large advantage in shell supply.

Mortar round production, Germany / USSR:

1942: 9,672,000 / 53,571,000
1943: 30,011,000 / 75,704,000
1944: 39,495,000 / 78,630,000

And I haven't even included AA artillery shells, the production of which was massive in Germany and comparatively meager in the USSR. As an aside, this is a good example of an area where events in one theater constrained overall production priorities, and therefore affected another.

Regards,

KDF

Sources:

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 4&start=15
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 0&start=15
http://www.soldat.ru/doc/mobilization/mob/

[KDF33]

The German park of motor vehicles was made up of domestic trucks, both impounded or newly-built, and of foreign vehicles, much like the Soviet park was. Need I remind you that this specific argument - the number of trucks fielded by Germany and the USSR - was made in response to your claim that the Soviets' ability to commit and supply more men was somehow tied to gross productive capacity. It was simply meant to dispel the misheld belief that, man for man, the Soviet was as well supplied as the German.

Besides, you still haven't addressed any of the data points on military production that I provided. Neither those relative to ground vehicle production, nor those addressing shell production. Thus, I restate my question: How can you claim that "It is obvious that the SU was economically stronger than Germany" when the data contradicts your claim?

Regards,

KDF

[KDF33]

Here, to compare production. I added indirect fire shell production (without naval), in metric tons. Data is Germany / USSR:

1942:

Tanks and SP guns: 6,180 / 24,640
Armored cars: 982 / 2,623
Half-tracks: 10,152 / 0
Trucks: 81,276 / 30,947
Cars: 27,895 / 2,567
Locomotives: 2,637 / 9
Train cars: 60,892 / 147

Artillery and mortar shells: 825,000 metric tons / 635,000 metric tons

1943:

Tanks and SP guns: 12,063 / 24,092
Armored cars: 806 / 1,820
Half-tracks: 16,964 / 0
Trucks: 109,483 / 45,545
Cars: 34,478 / 2,546
Locomotives: 5,243 / 43
Train cars: 66,263 / 108

Artillery and mortar shells: 1,410,000 / 850,000

1944:

Tanks and SP guns: 19,002 / 28,983
Armored cars: 485 / 3,000
Half-tracks: 17,143 / 0
Trucks: 89,069 / 53,467
Cars: 21,656 / 5,382
Locomotives: 3,495 / 32
Train cars: 45,189 / 13

Artillery and mortar shells: 1,735,000 / 1,100,000

[ljadw]

The German park of motor vehicles was made up of domestic trucks, both impounded or newly-built, and of foreign vehicles, much like the Soviet park was. Need I remind you that this specific argument - the number of trucks fielded by Germany and the USSR - was made in response to your claim that the Soviets' ability to commit and supply more men was somehow tied to gross productive capacity. It was simply meant to dispel the misheld belief that, man for man, the Soviet was as well supplied as the German

Regards,

KDF

1) MUCH LIKE THE SOVIET PARK ?? Well,I am waiting for the numbers of Soviet LL trucks on 1 january 1943

2) As usual glibberish : first talking about the number of trucks in the WM,and then talking about the German park of motor vehicles,which is not the same : there is a difference between motor vehicles and trucks,and there is a difference between trucks in the WM and the park of trucks.

3) Of course,you were not thinking about points as ;number of German trucks on 1 september 1939
/Soviet trucks on 22 june 1941,about losses of trucks and cars,.....

4) Unless you have proofs,your statement that the Soviet soldier was not as well supplied as the German one,is only hot air (btw : proofs is not :Enemy at the gate)

[ljadw]

[quote="KDF33"]Here, to compare production. I added indirect fire shell production (without naval), in metric tons. Data is Germany / USSR:

1) Why are you adding indirect fire shell production? Why not direct fire shell production ?

2)Why are you using metric tons? Why not the number of shells ,

3) Why are you not mentioning 1941 ?

4)Why are you not mentioning 1945? Maybe,because it would give a more realistic picture ?

[KDF33]

1) Why are you adding indirect fire shell production? Why not direct fire shell production ?

You can add it if you want, it's not gonna favor the Soviets either.

2)Why are you using metric tons? Why not the number of shells ,

I also supplied data on the number of shells in a previous post. In any event, weight is generally a better metric than the number of shells, considering that shells vary in caliber / explosive filling weight.

3) Why are you not mentioning 1941 ?

Why would I? The Soviet economy was suffering massive dislocation in 1941.

4)Why are you not mentioning 1945? Maybe,because it would give a more realistic picture ?

For the same reason I didn't bother with 1941: because the German economy was collapsing in 1945.

Again, I return to my question which you obstinately refuse to answer, let alone acknowledge:

How can you claim that "It is obvious that the SU was economically stronger than Germany" when the data contradicts your claim?

Regards,

KDF

[ljadw]

1) The Soviet economy was not collapsing in 1941,as was doing the German economy in 1945

2) The data are not contradicting my claim : the SU committed much more men than Germany,and,these were as well supplied as the Germans,unless you can prove the opposite .

[ljadw]

Your figures for the Soviet car production are also very questionable :5113 for 1942 +1943,while the Soviet wartime domestic truck production thread (on this forum) is giving 110.244 for 1941/1942/1943.

[KDF33]

4) Unless you have proofs,your statement that the Soviet soldier was not as well supplied as the German one,is only hot air (btw : proofs is not :Enemy at the gate)

Let's see, the Heer, a force smaller than the RKKA, fielded more:

-Trucks;
-Cars;
-Motorcycles;
-Half-tracks.

And was thus considerably more motorized.

Although it fielded less artillery guns than it's Soviet counterpart, it boasted a much larger supply of artillery shells.

Although the USSR outproduced Germany in cartridges and mortar shells, the Heer started the war in the East with considerably larger stocks, and was thus generally better supplied, until at least 1944 when those had been significantly depleted and the army was suffering the effects of a major two-front ground war.

Leaving aside the army for a moment, in the air the Soviets fielded more planes, but made much less sorties per plane, due to their severe fuel constraints. The Germans outproduced the Soviets in avgas by a significant margin until the oil campaign began in May 1944. On the ground, they had access to more vehicle gasoline and diesel fuel.

The only area where the Soviets had a durable, clear-cut advantage was in AFVs and submachine guns.

Regards,

KDF